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INTRODUCTION 
Legal uncertainty arises regarding which State may hear a dispute and whether the judgement 
of the court will be upheld in other countries.1 This risk can be reduced through a specific tool 
– choice-of-court agreements, which enable the parties to plan the venue for the dispute. 
However, the efficacy of this tool to provide legal certainty is dependent on the legal 
framework created by the States through which the parties may realize their rights and 
interests and on the functional system of the recognition of the judgments rendered by the 
designated courts.  
A survey prepared for the Hague Conference on Private International Law noticed that 
business choice-of-court agreements are common in certain types of business-to-business 
(B2B) contracts.2 The rule on choice-of-court agreements in civil and commercial matters was 
introduced in 1968 in the Brussels Convention3 and later on, in the Brussels I Regulation.4 
However, the operators faced some difficulties in practice caused by the lacunas in the 
applying the rule on prorogation of jurisdiction under the Brussels regime and by the related 
interpretation provided by the Court of Justice of the European Union (“ECJ”). These 
difficulties lead to unfair commercial practices and sparked the call for reforming the Brussels 
Regulation’s rules. The Proposal for a Recast of the Brussels I Regulation5 aimed at amending 
or introducing the rules: (i) which would create uniform solutions among the Member States 
of the European Union (“Member States”) concerning the rule on substantive validity; and (ii) 
which would not encourage abusive litigation tactics. Although the Brussels Regime 
determines the rule on choice-of-court agreements in the EU, it must be borne in mind that the 
recognition of choice-of-court agreements is also relevant beyond the EU. Growing 
                                                          
1 Study to Inform an Impact Assessment on the Ratification of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements by the European Community, Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and Security, Final Report 
submitted by GHK, 7 December 2007, p. 15. 
2 Commission Staff Working paper. Impact Assessment. Accompanying document to the Proposal for 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters (Recast), SEC(2010) 1547 final, 14 December 2010, p. 29. 
3 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 
OJ L 299, 31 December 1972. For consolidated text see 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (consolidated version), OJ C 27, 26 January 1998, 
(“Brussels Convention”). 
4 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 12, 16 January 2001, (“Brussels I Regulation”). 
5 Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, COM/2010/0748 final, 14 December 2010 
(“Proposal for a Recast of the Brussels I Regulation”). 
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international trade and parallel proceedings in the Third States resulting in irreconcilable 
judgments necessitate solving this problem. Indeed, the Brussels Ibis Regulation6 established 
new rules dealing with parallel proceedings in Third States. Moreover, the Hague Convention 
on Choice of Court Agreements,7 which almost 10 years after its adoption entered into force 
on 1 October 2015, is currently applicable in in 32 Contracting States, including the EU. The 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements is expected to promote international trade 
and investment through enhanced judicial co-operation by introducing uniform rules on 
jurisdiction agreements and recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil or 
commercial matters.8  
Jurisdiction agreements are recognized as a planning tool mainly in the private international 
law of contracts. The prevalence of mandatory rules in family law (predominantly concerning 
the status of the persons), where States do not mostly permit derogation from their content, 
has slowed down the progress of party autonomy in the field of family procedural 
international law. The increasing migration not only within the EU leads to a growing number 
of international couples and calls for greater legal certainty. Thus, the trend of recognizing 
choice-of-court agreements has gradually spread into all areas of international family law. It 
must be highlighted that choice-of-court agreements pursue another significant function of the 
EU family law: they enable the concentration of the jurisdiction in a single court of a Member 
State. This function may prevent the fragmentation of jurisdiction in different Member States 
which is caused by the multiplicity of the EU Regulations providing for different 
jurisdictional grounds.  
This PhD project aims at verifying whether the current rules on choice-of-court agreements in 
the above-mentioned legal instruments provide for a clear and predictable legal framework in 
civil, family, and succession matters which contributes to desirable legal certainty within the 
EU. In particular, this PhD project aims at:  
i) Analysing the legal framework of choice-of-court agreements and lis pendens among 
both Member States courts and Third States courts in the presence of choice-of-court 
                                                          
6 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 351, 20 
December 2012 (“Brussels Ibis Regulation). 
7 Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements (“Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreement”). 
8 Preamble of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. 
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agreements in the EU in civil, family, and succession matters under the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation, the Brussels I Regulation, the 2007 Lugano Convention,9 the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, the Brussels IIa Regulation,10 the 
Maintenance Regulation,11 Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation,12 Regulation on the 
Property Consequences of Registered Partnerships,13 and the Succession Regulation;14 
ii) Determining the interactions between these legal instruments and where possible, 
examining their interplay through their simultaneous application; 
iii) Identifying the barriers, weaknesses, and gaps of the rules on choice-of-court agreements, 
lis pendens, and parallel proceedings and proposing solutions de lege ferenda.  
Thus, the research will develop the effort to find answers on the following questions: Do the 
current rules on choice-of-court agreements in the all analysed legal instruments function in 
the correct manner? Can the effectiveness of the rules on choice-of-court agreements be 
further enhanced and strengthened? Are there any problems, loopholes, gaps, or weak points 
in the wording of the text of the rules on choice-of-court agreements or in the case law of the 
ECJ? What (if any) solutions should be adopted for the identified problems, loopholes, gaps, 
or weak points? What is the best approach for testing the current rules and their interplay? 
Can the approach ascertained in one subject matter be transferred to other one? Can be any 
common conclusions be assumed transversely through all subject matters?  
The research will be conducted mainly on the basis of the qualitative method, where the 
author analyses: (i) the wording of the text of the target rules laid down in different legal 
                                                          
9 Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 
OJ L 339, 21 December 2007 (“2007 Lugano Convention”). 
10 Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation 
(EC) No 1347/2000, OJ L 338, 23 December 2003 (“Brussels IIa Regulation”). 
11 Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and 
enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, OJ L 7, 10 January 
2009 (“Maintenance Regulation”). 
12 Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1103 of 24 June 2016 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of 
jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property 
regimes, OJ L 183, 8 July 2016 (“Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation”). 
13 Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1104 of 24 June 2016 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of 
jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of the property 
consequences of registered partnerships, OJ L 183., 8 July 2016 (“Regulation on the Property Consequences of 
Registered Partnerships”). 
14 Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, 
applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic 
instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession, OJ L 201, 27 
July 2012 (“Succession Regulation”). 
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instruments, and take into consideration the ratio of the rules, historical backgrounds, 
legislative procedure, the amendments, and recasts; (ii) the interpretation provided by the ECJ 
and its impact on the case law of the Member States, which covers the acceptance of such 
interpretation by the Member States, the deviation from it with the further justifications, the 
adding of their own criteria, or tracking down the loopholes; (iii) the presentation of the 
doctrinal discussions, which present different approaches, assist in searching for answers, 
draw attention to the possible problems (or sometimes they even contradict themselves), and 
may be to the detriment of legal certainty; and (iv) the creation of examples; considerations 
and analysis of the examples; evaluation, verification, and presentation of their outcomes.  
Although the topic may be seen as not very “new”, the purport of this PhD thesis offers new 
aspects, views, considerations, and conclusions and may benefit the current studies and 
publications due to the several reasons. First, this PhD thesis provides for an integrated 
analysis of choice-of-court agreements covering commercial, family, and succession matters 
in a single document. Although the subject matters are dealt with in separate chapters due to 
their specific characteristics, the PhD thesis examines their mutual interpenetration, influence, 
and the possibility of extending the approaches from one subject matter to another one. The 
current publications examining choice-of-court agreements focus mainly on one or two of the 
analysed legal instruments. However, no publication (at least which are known to the author) 
considers the commercial, family, and succession matters jointly. Second, it examines the 
interplay of the various legal instruments in practical examples. Moreover, the presentation, 
description, and examination of the problem may be sometimes difficult to follow due to its 
complexity. For this reason, the examples assist in imagining the outcomes arising out from 
the presented problems. Although most of the scientific, legal publications do not use 
practical examples, according to the author, it represents an efficient tool for revealing 
different legal problems and gaps following their (combined) application. Third, this topic is 
also a new one because it provides for a complete insight to the “whole package” of the rules 
on choice-of-court agreements concerning various aspects of the private life, which are laid 
down in different legal instruments dealing with family and succession matters. It is worth 
mentioning that a large part of the studies analyzes choice-of-court agreements in civil and 
commercial matters, but there is a minor number of the publications which pay particular 
attention to choice-of-court agreements in family matters. Furthermore, there is still no a 
cumulative assessment of choice-of-court agreements under different legal instruments in 
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family matters. Lastly, the PhD thesis analyses the new rules on choice-of-court agreements, 
lis pendens, and parallel proceedings under the Brussels Ibis Regulation under the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, which are applicable only from 2015. The 
analysis covers also a Proposal for a Recast for Brussels IIa Regulation15 and Regulations of 
the Property Regimes in the context of choice-of-court agreements, which are applicable as 
from January 2019, and at the time of the choice of this topic, were not published. 
Accordingly, this thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter introduces party 
autonomy on a general level, which significantly contributes to the correct comprehension of 
the statutory recognition of choice-of-court agreements in the next chapters. This includes the 
outline of different categorizations of party autonomy, their cross-over into the topic of 
choice-of-court agreements, and a brief historical development of the choice-of-court 
agreements. The nature and effect of the choice-of-court agreement are described in the 
subsequent subchapter, demonstrating the different approaches influencing the legislative or 
case law choices as to the law applicable to the choice-of-court agreements. This analysis 
becomes a building block in the subsequent chapters dealing with substantive validity. 
Furthermore, it introduces the importance of the rules on choice-of-court agreements, their 
functions, and practical use, as well as divergent limitations with respect to choice-of-court 
agreements. The analysis of limitations demonstrates currently unclear issues, such as the 
impact of overriding mandatory rules on choice-of-court agreements.  
The second chapter represents a core of the PhD thesis tackling the civil and commercial 
matters. This chapter is divided into three subchapters: (i) choice-of-court agreements and 
issues related to it under the Brussels and Lugano Regimes; (ii) choice-of-court agreements 
and issues related to it under the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreement; and (iii) 
examination of the interplay between the Brussels and Lugano Regimes, between the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreement and the Brussels Ibis Regulation, and between the 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreement and the 2007 Lugano Convention. The first 
two subchapters focus on the analysis of the rules on choice-of-court agreements, such as their 
scope, conditions for applications, formal and substantive validity, exclusivity, severability, 
rules on lis pendens or on parallel proceedings, and other related issues. The specificity of 
                                                          
15 Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial 
matters and the matters of parental responsibility, and on international child abduction (recast), COM/2016/0411 
final, 30 June 2016 (“Proposal for a Recast of the Brussels IIa Regulation”). 
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each legal instrument is considered (for example, the specific rules on choice-of-court 
agreements concluded with weaker parties in accordance with Articles 15, 19, and 23 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation). This analysis identifies problematic points and searches for 
reasonable solutions. The last subchapter shows the differences between the legal instruments 
and tests their interplay in the practical examples. 
The third and last part is a core of the PhD thesis dealing with family and succession matters 
and is divided into two subchapters: choice-of-court agreements concerning family matters 
and choice-of-court agreements concerning succession matters. Moreover, family matters are 
further broken down by the single EU Regulations. In particular, the Regulations are: the 
Brussels IIa Regulation, which determines the rule on prorogation of jurisdiction in parental 
responsibility matters in Article 12 of the Brussels IIa Regulation, and where the rule on 
choice-of-court in divorce is lacking; the Maintenance Regulation, which determines the rule 
on choice-of-court agreements in Article 4; and the Regulation on Matrimonial Property 
Regimes and the Regulation on Property Consequences of Registered Partnerships, which 
determine the rules on choice-of-court agreements in Articles 5 and 7. The scope, conditions 
for applications, formal and substantive validity, exclusivity, and severability of the rules on 
choice-of-court agreements is examined in all sections. Also considered are the problem of 
jurisdiction clauses in favour of Third States and the rules on lis alibi pendens. The last 
subchapter describes the “mechanisms” contained in Articles 5, 6, 7, and 9 of the Succession 
Regulation allowing party autonomy to a limited extent, as well as the problem of jurisdiction 
clauses in favour of Third States and the lis alibi pendens rule.  
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CHAPTER ONE. CHOICE-OF-COURT AGREEMENT AS AN EXPRESSION OF THE PARTY 
AUTONOMY AND ITS LIMITATIONS 
I. Party Autonomy: The Path to the Recognition of the Choice-of-Court Agreements 
The origin of the term “autonomy” comes from the Greek word “nomos” which may be 
translated as “law” or “rule”, and word “auto” which may be translated as “self”.16 Autonomy 
is often used in broad terms, as an equivalent to liberty, self-rule or self-sovereignty, and 
sometimes as freedom of a will.17 According to Kant, people are subordinated to the laws 
which they lay down for themselves.18 The autonomy of the will is correlated mainly with the 
private law – Kant’s views to all private law categories reflect a strictly relational character 
between two individuals.19  
Nowadays, autonomy is perceived as “self-arrangement of legal relations by individuals 
according to their respective will”.20 However, should the parties be permitted to design their 
own private rights and duties? And what is the relationship between the public power, i.e., the 
power of the State to enact legal rules, and party autonomy, i.e., the power of the individuals 
to make their arrangements? The concept of the sovereign State, which enacts a positive law, 
is superior to the individual.21 Then, party autonomy derives from the authorisation or from 
the legal rule enacted in the legal system with the aim to be consequently recognised and it is 
bounded by the limitations.22 It means that the legal instruments regulate what the act of party 
autonomy is, how it is constituted in the legal terms, and what limitations are imposed by 
                                                          
16 G. DWORKIN, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 11. 
17 G. DWORKIN, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, op. cit., p. 3. 
18 E. KANT, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, translated by H. J. PORTON, Harper Torchbooks, 1964, p. 
98-99: «The will is therefore not merely subject to the law but is so subject that it must be considered as also 
making the law for itself and precisely on this account as the first subject to the law.». 
19 E. KANT, The Metaphysics of Morals (1797), translated by M. GREGOR, Cambridge University Press, 1996, 
par. 6:2330.  
20 Study to Inform an Impact Assessment on the Ratification of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements by the European Community, Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and Security, Final Report 
submitted by GHK, 7 December 2007 (“Impact Assessment on the Ratification of the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements”), p. 6. 
21 J. CARRUTHERS, Party Autonomy in the Legal Regulation of Adult Relationships: What Place for Party Choice 
in Private International Law, International & Comparative Law Quarterly 61:4 (2012), p. 884. 
22 A. M. BENEDETTI, Autonomia privata procedimentale, La formazione del contratto fra legge e volontà delle 
parti, Giappichell, 2002, p. 2. On the tension between public order and party autonomy in choice of law, see H. 
E. YNTEMA, “Autonomy” in Choice of Law, The American Journal of Comparative Law (1952), p. 342-343, 
which makes reference to F. LAURENT, Le Droit Civil International, vol. 2, 1881, p. 378; id.; Ibidem, vol. 7, p. 
512: «....while the general laws established for the public welfare derive from the volonté generale, the parties 
are at liberty by their agreements to prescribe for themselves ‘private laws’ regulating the infinite variety of 
individual interests within the sphere of free enterprise.». 
  
17 
 
law.23 This applies in the area of substantive law, as well as in the area of procedural law. The 
States impose the external limitations, which are represented by: the mandatory rules or 
principles of public order in the context of substantive law;24 other limitations aiming at the 
protection of the specific subjects (i.e., weaker parties);25 whereby the internal limitations 
must be found in the specific provisions of the national legal orders.26  
The autonomy of the parties is traditionally connected with the notion of freedom or liberty of 
contract, which must be distinguished from the party autonomy in international procedural 
law, which is subject of the analysis of this thesis.27 Wachter and Savigny presumed that, 
except for the public ordering, contract law rests upon the autonomy of the parties.28 This 
contractual autonomy also known as freedom or liberty of contract,29 is defined as “the rights 
to enter into binding private agreements with others” and as “a judicial concept that contracts 
are based on mutual agreement and free choice that should not be hampered by the undue 
external control such as governmental interference”.30  
                                                          
23 Emphasis added. A. M. BENEDETTI, Autonomia privata procedimentale, La formazione del contratto fra legge 
e volontà delle parti, op. cit., p. 3, 
24 G. MORELLI, Studi Di Diritto Processuale Civile di diritto processuale civile internazionale, Giuffrè, 1961, p. 
12.12, according to the author, the public order cannot operate as the limit of procedural provisions. 
25 On this type of limitation see infra Chapter One, Subchapter III, Section 2.3. 
26 On the differences between international overriding mandatory rules and simple internal mandatory rules see 
infra Chapter One, Subchapter III, Section 2.1. 
27 On the differences between party autonomy and freedom of contract: Z. MENG, Party Autonomy, Private 
Autonomy, and Freedom of Contract, Canadian Social Science 10: 6 (2014), p. 212 et seq.  
28 E. YNTEMA, “Autonomy” in Choice of Law, op. cit., p. 342. 
29 See for example, B. A. GARNER (ed), Black’s Law Dictionary, Thomson West, 2009, 9.ed., which does not 
provide for the definition of “autonomy of parties”, but directly refers to the notion of “freedom of the contract”.  
30 Impact Assessment on the Ratification of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, p. 6. The 
meaning of contractual party autonomy may be characterised by more freedoms (jus dispositivum): the freedom 
to conclude a contract (the parties have a right to conclude a contract, which is contrary to the obligation of the 
party to conclude a contract, such as in the case of a preliminary contract, duty to conclude a contract in case of 
non-fulfilment, etc.); the freedom to determine the contents of the contract (the contracts can adopt the exact 
wording of the provision laid down by the national law, or, may deviate from the dispositive provisions); or the 
freedom to choose a contractor (the obligation to select a contractor is sometimes predefined by law, mainly by 
the family law). On this division see R. SCHULZE, Common European Sales Law (CESL), Beck, Hart, 2012, p. 
85. According to some authors, the freedom to conclude an innominate contract, the freedom to determine the 
form of the contract, or the freedom to make amendments to the contract form part of the contractual party 
autonomy. For example, in Poland, see M. LUBELSKA-SAZANOW, The “Principle of No Freedom of Contract”: 
A Post Modern Version of the Freedom of Contract Principle, in M. E. DE MAESTRI, S. DOMINELLI (eds), Party 
Autonomy in European Private (and) International Law, Aracne, 2015, p. 17-18. See also the judgment of 
Ústavní soud České Republiky, 7 December 2004, I. ÚS 670/02, which decided that another two factors of 
contractual freedom must be added: the freedom to agree on the modifications of the contract and the freedom to 
decide on the termination of the contract. 
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However, it must be pointed out that one party can also express its autonomy by making an 
unilateral legal act, such as a testament.31 All these freedoms stand behind the restrictions 
(negative aspect): duty to respect mandatory provisions (jus cogens); duty not to disrupt 
public order; and duty not to contravene to bono mores, which are laid down by national rules 
aiming at counterbalancing positive rights of the parties.32 The restrictions on freedoms play 
an important role, mainly in family law which require the higher level of mandatory 
regulations, and mostly the derogation from their content is not permitted.33 In the succession 
law, the national law regulates the specific legal acts of party autonomy of the de cuis, as 
testaments, joint and mutual wills, or testamentary contracts.34 Testamentary freedom also has 
significant limitations laid down by the national law, which protect the testator’s closest 
relatives. For example, one limitation is the compulsory portion of the testator’s inheritance, 
which must be passed on the most intimate relatives.35 
                                                          
31 G. A. BERMANN, Party Autonomy: Constitutional and International Law Limits in Comparative Perspective, 
Juris, 2005. p. 1, according to the author freedom of private parties applies in case of unilateral legal acts, such as 
gifts and testaments. The question is if the unilateral act is an expression of party autonomy or individual 
autonomy. See in this respect X. KRAMER, E. THEMELI, The Party Autonomy Paradigm: European and Global 
Developments on Choice of Forum, in S. STUIJ, V. LAZIĆ (eds), Brussels Ibis Regulation: Changes and 
Challenges of the Renewed Procedural Scheme, Springer, 2017, p. 30, which make a difference between party 
autonomy and individual autonomy. 
32 E.g., in Italy see Article 1343 of the Italian Codice civile (approvato con Regio Decreto del 16 marzo 1942, n. 
262, e come modificato dalla Decreto 7 dicembre 2016, n. 291): «La causa è illecita quando è contraria a norme 
imperative, all’ordine pubblico o al buon costume.», or Article 588 of Czech Civil Code (Nový občanský 
zákoník č. 89/2012 Sb.), official translation available at: obcanskyzakonik.justice.cz/images/pdf/Civil-Code.pdf: 
«A court shall, even of its own motion, take into account the invalidity of a juridical act which is manifestly 
against good morals or which is contrary to a statute and manifestly disrupting public order.». 
33 In the Czech Republic, the rules on family matters are predominantly ius cogens, but the family law 
distinguishes personal rights and rules regulating property rights, when mandatory provisions are characterised 
only in respect of status rights. The national law usually expressly prescribes the possibility to conclude the 
certain legal acts (e.g. to enter into the marriage, conclude agreements on property regime and prenuptial 
agreements, a conclusion of agreements dealing with specific rights are excluded, innominate legal acts in family 
matters are not usually permitted), and their requirements, conditions and their form which must be fulfilled. 
Moreover, the recipients of the contract are usually already “chosen” by the circumstances, e.g. the future 
spouse, the father of the child, etc. See K. ELIÁŠ, M. ZUKLÍNOVÁ, Principy a východiska nového kodexu 
soukromého práva. Linde Praha, 2001, p. 134; Z. KRÁLÍČOVÁ, Autonomie vůle v rodinném právu v česko-
italském porovnání, Masarykova univerzita, 2003, p. 38-39. On the comparison between legal systems 
concerning specific questions of family law, see: J. M. SCHERPE, Marital Agreements and Private Autonomy in 
Comparative Perspective, Hart Publishing, 2012. 
34 In Italy, France, and Germany, the arrangements as to succession, the joint wills are not permitted. See A. 
FUSARO, Testamentary freedom in Italy, in B. HEIDERHOFF, I. QUEIROLO (eds), Party Autonomy in European 
Private (and) International Law, Aracne, 2015, p. 211. For the comparative perspective, see M. ANDERSON, E. 
ARROYO I AMAYUELAS, The Law of Succession: Testamentary Freedom: European Perspectives, Europa Law 
Publishing, 2011. 
35 See A. FUSARO, Testamentary freedom in Italy, op. cit., p. 212.  
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The recognition of the principle of freedom of contract may be attributed to the liberal 
conceptions of Smith, Rousseau, and Kant and was also extended into the area of conflicts-of-
laws.36 The disciplines of the freedom of contract and the choice-of-law were firstly 
assimilated when the reference to the foreign law was seen as the instrument to determine the 
contents of the contract; consequently the distinction between these two disciplines was 
drawn.37 The principle of party autonomy in respect to the choice-of-law was, according to 
Giuliano and Lagarde Report, “embodied in the private international law of all the Member 
States of the Community and most other countries”.38 This principle is recognised in most 
conflict-of-law codifications of the Twentieth Century in civil and commercial matters,39 
including: the EU Regulations;40 international conventions;41 conventions adopted by Hague 
Conference on Private International Law;42 non-State law, such as lex mercatoria;43 or 
                                                          
36 E. YNTEMA, “Autonomy” in Choice of Law, op. cit., p. 342. 
37 I. VIARENGO, Autonomia della volontà e rapporti patrimoniali tra coniugi nel diritto internazionale privato, 
CEDAM, 1996, p. 112, 113; E. YNTEMA, “Autonomy” in Choice of Law, p. 342. 
38 see Report on the Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations by Mario Giuliano, Professor, 
University of Milan, and Paul Lagarde, Professor, University of Paris I, 31 October 1980, OJ C 282 (“Giuliano 
and Lagarde Report”). ”), where Giuliano and Lagarde Report expressly refer to the legislation and case-law of 
France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, UK, and Denmark. 
39 S. SYMEONIDES, Codifying Choice of Law around the World: An International Comparative Analysis, Oxford 
University Press, 2014, p. 114. 
40 See for example, Article 3 par. 1 of the Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), OJ L 177, 4 July 2008, 
(“Rome I Regulation”). 
41 See for example, Article 7 para 1 of Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International 
Contracts adopted in 1994 in Mexico.  
42 See for example Article, Article 2 par. 1 and 2 of the Convention of 15 June 1955 on the law applicable to 
international sales of goods. The Hague Conference also drafted the Principles on Choice of Law in International 
Commercial Contracts, which seeks to harmonise approaches to international choice-of-law contracts by 
providing a universal model and best practice of recognition. The Hague Principles on Choice of Law in 
International Commercial Contracts were approved on 19 March 2015, and has been already implemented into 
Paraguayan Law 5393 of 2015 Regarding the Applicable Law to International Contracts, available at: 
https://www.hcch.net/en/publications-and-studies/details4/?pid=6300&dtid=41. On the Hague Principles on 
Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts, see among other M. PERTEGÁS, B. A. MARSHAL, Party 
Autonomy and its Limits: Convergence through the New Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International 
Commercial Contracts, Brooklyn Journal of International Law 39:3 (2014), pp. 975-1003; L. G. RADICATI DI 
BROZOLO, Non-national rules and conflicts of laws: Reflections in light of the UNIDROIT and Hague Principles, 
Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale 4 (2012), pp. 841–864; S. SYMEONIDES, The Hague 
Principles on Choice of Law for International Contracts: Some Preliminary Comments, American Journal of 
Comparative Law 61 (2013), pp. 873–899; J. BASEDOW, The Hague Principles on Choice of Law: Their 
Addressees and Impact, Uniform Law Review, 22 (2017), pp. 304-315; K. BOELE-WOELKI, Party Autonomy in 
Litigation and Arbitration in View of the Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial 
Contracts, Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, The Hague Academy of International 
Law 379 (2015), p. 51, 53. 
43 Parties entering into the contracts sometimes prefer that lex mercatoria governs the contract by exclusion of 
the national law and its limits. If the parties, choose to apply lex mercatoria and subject matter faills into the 
scope application of Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations opened for signature in 
Rome on 19 June 1980, OJ L 266, 9 October 1980 (“Rome Convention”) or Rome I Regulation the question 
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UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts.44 The parties are allowed, 
within specific parameters and limitations, to agree in advance on which State’s law will 
govern the contract or legal relationship45 “…and this choice includes in principle the 
mandatory law of the chosen legal system and excludes that of the ‘deselected’ legal 
system.”46 According to Savigny, family and succession law are anomalous laws, which are 
immune from choice-of-law theory and are always governed by the lex fori.47 Actually, there 
are significant current efforts to establish choice-of-law frameworks for family and succession 
matters,48 but such efforts are determined in a limited manner.49  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
arises whether lex mercatoria as a non-state law can be chosen by the parties independently on the national law. 
See J. BASEDOW, The Law of Open Societies: Private Ordering and Public Regulation of International 
Relations:, Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, The Hague Academy of International 
Law 360 (2013), p. 171: «In the legislative proceedings leading to the adoption of the Rome I Regulation, the 
European Commission had in fact suggested to admit the parties’ agreement on “the principles and the rules of 
the substantive law of contract recognised internationally or in the Community” as an agreement on the 
applicable law. The proposal met with strong opposition in the European Council and was finally deleted; 
recital 13 of the definitive Regulation now only refers to the possible incorporation of a non-State body of law 
into the contract within the framework of the applicable law, i.e. not at the level of private international law. Put 
in other words, the parties are confined to the selection of one of the 200 or 250 State contract laws that exist in 
the jurisdictions of the world.». For this reason, the lex mercatoria may be perceived as a limitation on the power 
to choose the applicable law. 
44 The situation with UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts is very similar as in case of 
lex mercatoria and «will bind the parties only to the extent that they do not affect the rules of the applicable law 
from which the parties may not derogate.». See Preamble, Comment to Article 4 lett. a) of UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts 19941994 
45 S. SYMEONIDES, Codifying Choice of Law around the World: An International Comparative Analysis, op. cit, 
p.110.  
46 A. FLESSNER, Interessenjurisprudenz im internationalen Privatrecht, J.C.B. Mohr, 1990, p. 97, where English 
translation in text provided by J. BASEDOW, The Law of Open Societies: Private Ordering and Public Regulation 
of International Relations: General Course on Private International Law, op. cit., p. 165. On the lex limitatis see 
S. SYMEONIDES, Party Autonomy in International Contracts and the Multiple Ways of Slicing the Apple, 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law 39 (2014), p. 1123 et seq.; S. SYMEONIDES, Codifying Choice of Law 
around the World: An International Comparative Analysis, op. cit., p. 149. 
47 F.C. SAVIGNY, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws, and the Limits of their Their Operation in respect of Place 
and Time, translated by W. GUTHRIE, T & T Clark, 1880, p. 297. See also S. PEARI, Choice-of-Law in Family 
Law: Kant, Savigny and the Parties’ Autonomy Principle, Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht (2012), p. 597. 
See also J. CARRUTHERS, Party Autonomy in the Legal Regulation of Adult Relationships: What Place for Party 
Choice in Private International Law, op. cit., p. 883: «…family law is concerned with matters of capacity, and it 
has not traditionally been deemed appropriate that parties, by their own agreement as to governing law, should 
be able to clothe themselves with, or deny themselves, capacity. Though it may be accepted that the parties to a 
transaction should enjoy the power to choose the law to govern that transaction, the position regarding capacity 
seemingly is different…marriage is to be regarded as more of a status than a contract, with the corollary that, its 
incidents are determined not by the will of the parties but by the prescriptions of the law». For example, the UK 
law applies lex fori in family cases. 
48 The enhanced cooperation in the area of applicable law in matrimonial matters among the specific 
participating Member States has been established in Council Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010 of 20 December 
2010 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation, OJ L 
343;, 29 December 2010 (“Rome III Regulation”).. 
49 See for example Article, Article 5 of the Rome III Regulation. 
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Already in the 19th Century, the German doctrine made a distinction between substantive, 
dispositive principle (“Dispositions Maxime”) and procedural, dispositive principle (c.d. 
“Verhandlungsmaxime”).50 Since the disposal of the substantive rights is left to the free will 
of private individuals, the decision whether to quarrel, and on what basis, must be left to the 
intention of the parties as well.51 In other words, the parties may decide which issues they 
wish to bring to court, when, and where they wish to litigate.52 The principle of party 
autonomy in civil procedure law is known as the dispositive principle, which guarantees that a 
process is fully compliant with the contradictory principle, with the right of defence, and fully 
respecting the freedom of the parties.53 This must be distinguished from the burdens 
constituting the negative side of the rights: the burdens represent the activities which are 
revealed by the parties in order to obtain a favourable result.54 The dispositive principle does 
not mean only that the parties themselves determine the subject matter of proceedings,55 but it 
also covers the right to dispose of the proceedings,56 the rights given to the parties within the 
course of the proceedings,57 or rights during the fact-finding phase.58 In many legal systems, 
                                                          
50 G. MONTELONE, Manuale di diritto processuale civile. Disposizioni generali. I processi di cognizione di primo 
grado. Le impugnazioni, Vol. I, CEDAM, 2012, p. 275; T. CARNACINI, Tutela giurisdizionale e tecnica del 
processo vol., Vol. 2, Giuffrè, 1966, p. 724 et seq. 
51 A. CARRATA, Il principio della non contestazione nel processo civile, GiuffreGiuffrè, 1995, p. 118; J. MACUR, 
Občanské právo procesní v systému práva, Universita J. E. Purkyně v Brně – právnická fakulta, 1975, p. 255.  
52 Impact Assessment on the Ratification of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, p. 6.  
53 On the dispositive principle, see among others: E. MERLIN, Elementi di diritto processuale civile, Parte 
generale, Pacini Editore, 2017, p. 25 ss.; C. MANDRIOLI, A. CARRATTA, Diritto procesuale civile, Nozioni 
introduttive e disposizioni generali, Giappichelli, 2017, 26eds., p. 112 et seq.; A. P. PISANI, Lezioni di diritto 
processuale civile, Jovene, 2014, p. 412 et seq.; E. T. LIEBMAN, Manuale di diritto processuale civile, Giuffrè, 
1955, p. 138. There are different views to the dispositive principle, sometimes it is considered as: (i) an absolute 
right belonging to the parties which cannot be restricted by the legal rules (the power to initiate the proceedings, 
to decide on the relevant facts for the proceedings are reserved only to the parties, and thus the judicial 
intervention on the determination of the material and probative facts is excluded); or (ii) the right of the parties to 
dispose with the substantive law which is reflected into the procedural law; or (iii) the direction of the legislator 
based on the opportunity principle represented by the guarantees of the State given to the individuals in order to 
defend their right and to recognize their interests. In this regard see G. CHIOVENDA, Principii di diritto 
processuale civile: le azioni, il processo di cognizione, Jovene, 1923, p. 728. 
54 E. T. LIEBMAN, Manuale di diritto processuale civile, p. 106. 
55 Case C-32/12, Soledad Duarte Hueros v Autociba SA and Automóviles Citroën España SA., point 9. Opinion 
of Advocate General Kokott delivered on 28 February 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:128, par. 9.  
56 The initiative of the process represents the freedom of the party to provoke the exercise of jurisdiction with 
regards to a legal claim in which it is interested in order to obtain the protection of its interest, since the court 
does not have a duty either discretionarily to decide over the claim without a lodged application.  
57 For example, a withdrawal of a legal action, a default of appearance, a modification of the suit filed, an 
acknowledgement of the claim, etc. The party autonomy and the disposition principle are recognised even after 
the decision is delivered when the parties can appeal against the final judgments. 
58 The court has duty of the court to decide according to Iuxta alligata et probate. However, the modern legal 
systems modified the absolute dispositive principle into the “mitigated dispositive system” where some elements 
of inquisitor system are inserted. 
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the dispositive principle is limited, or sometimes even excluded, in matters concerning family 
and succession law; in these legal orders, the inquisitorial principle prevails. 59 
It is evident that the party autonomy in the substantive law, procedural law and conflict-of-
laws was widely recognized, at least in civil and commercial matters. However, in the case of 
the choice of jurisdiction in the presence of the international elements, the situation was even 
more complicated. The way to the adoption and enactment of the express rule on party 
autonomy was much longer since the choice-of-court agreements may be seen as the 
privatization of a matter of procedure.60 In the international procedural law, there is a plurality 
of the legal orders, which must co-exist together, and it creates a problem of interrelations of 
the jurisdiction of the States on the normative level.61 The adjudicatory power depends on a 
number of factors, mainly on the sovereignty of the States.62 The States have created the rules 
for the delimitation of their jurisdiction, prevalently based on the territorial factor.63 Choice-
                                                          
59 For example, in the Czech Republic, the inquisitorial principle prevails concerning status rights and rights 
concerning parental responsibility. See Act No., see Zákon č. 292/2013 Sb., o zvláštních řízeních soudních. The 
court in such proceedings may ascertain the evidence, may initiate proceedings ex officio etc.  
60 M.E. SOLIMINE, Forum-Selection Clauses and the Privatization of Procedure, Cornell International Law 
Journal, 25 (1992), p. 97. 
61 On the interaction between public and private law in respect of the choice-of-court agreements, see A. BRIGGS, 
Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, Oxford University Press, 2008, par. 1.17«... whether a court has 
jurisdiction is always - ultimately - a matter of public law which lies beyond the direct control or autonomy of 
the parties.... where legislators have established jurisdictional rules for a court, it is not for the parties as 
individuals to make private agreements which assert priority over that public law». See also I. QUEIROLO, 
Evolutionary Trends in Choice-of-court Agreements: from the Lotus Case to the Brussels I-bis Regulation, in B. 
HEIDERHOFF, I. QUEIROLO (eds), Party Autonomy in European Private (and) International Law, Aracne, 2015, p. 
82 et seq.; I. QUEIROLO, Gli accordi sulla competenza giurisdizionale: tra diritto comunitario e diritto interno, 
CEDAM, 2000, p. 7 et seq. 
62 On the sovereignty of the States and exercise of its jurisdiction see case S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 
Permanent Court of International Justice, Judgment No. 9, 7 September 1927: «International law governs 
relations between independent States. The rules of law binding upon States therefor emanate from their own free 
will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established 
in order to regulate the relations between these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the 
achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed». 
63 Case S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), Permanent Court of International Justice, Judgment No. 9, 7 September 
1927: «It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a State from exercising jurisdiction in its 
own territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken place abroad, and in which it cannot 
rely on some permissive rule of international law…. Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect 
that States may not extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property 
and acts outside their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion, which is only limited 
in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the principles 
which it regards as best and most suitable.». On the jurisdiction in comparative law and private international law 
see, e.g. H. SMIT, Proceedings of the 1961 Annual Meeting of the American Foreign Law Association, American 
Journal of Comparative Law, 10:3 (1961), p. 164 et seq., M. PRYLES, The Basis of Adjudicatory Competence in 
Private International Law, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 21:1 (1972), pp. 61-80. The notion 
“jurisdiction” and “international competence” must be distinguished from “internal competence” which 
distributes the adjudicatory power to the courts of the specific State on the basis of the subject matter, territory, 
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of-court agreements were understood as the extension of the adjudicatory power, but the 
recognition of the instances where the national courts were limited in their adjudicative power 
was not always upheld.64 The rise of international conventions aimed at preventing the 
positive and negative conflicts of jurisdiction and contrasting judgments and finally, party 
autonomy as a connecting factor was acknowledged on the international level. The Hague 
Convention of 15 April 1958 on the jurisdiction of the selected forum in the case of 
international sale of goods65 and the Hague Convention of 25 November 1965 on the Choice 
of Court66 were the first two essential efforts of the Hague Conference of Private International 
Law to regulate the choice-of-court agreements on an international level. The first one 
covered both jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement regarding the choice-of-court 
agreements; the latter one included only the rules of jurisdiction. Although both conventions 
have not ever entered into force, they served as the basis for the wording of Article 17 of the 
Brussels Convention.67 However, there were still discussions whether the parties may exclude 
the jurisdiction of the courts of other States which would have otherwise jurisdiction since  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
and value, see G. MORELLI, Studi di diritto processuale civile internazionale, p. 89. M. GIULIANO, La 
giurisdizione civile italiana e lo straniero, 1970, Giuffrè, 2ed., p. 1 et seq. 
64 Until the beginning of the Twentieth Century, it was disputed that parties should have right to “withdraw” 
from the jurisdiction of the States since jurisdiction was a matter of sovereignty of that State see E. BARTIN, 
Etudes sur les effets internationaux des jugements, LGDJ, 1907, p. 57-61. See also I. QUEIROLO, Evolutionary 
Trends in Choice-of-court Agreements: from the Lotus Case to the Brussels I-bis Regulation, op. cit., p. 89. I. 
QUEIROLO, Prorogation of Jurisdiction in the Proposal for a Recast of the Brussels I Regulation, in F. POCAR, I. 
VIARENGO, F.C. VILLATA (eds), Recasting Brussels I: Proceedings of the Conference Held at the University of 
Milan on 25-26 November 2011, CEDAM, 2012, p. 183: «In the past, the jurisdictional, connecting factors laid 
down by the State could generally not be derogated by the will of the parties because they are considered as a 
direct expression of the State’s sovereignty. Now, the jurisdictional function is, mainly, considered as a way 
through which individuals’ rights and interests can be realized and not principally as the realization of the State 
legal order». See also, for example, the Lord Chief Justice in Gienar v. Meyer [1796] 2 H. BI. 603: «..no persons 
in this country can by agreement between themselves exclude themselves from the jurisdiction of the King's 
Courts.». 
65 Convention of 15 April 1958 on the jurisdiction of the selected forum in the case of international sales of 
goods was signed by Austria, Belgium, Germany, and France, but it has not entered into force, on the status table 
see: https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=34.  
66 Convention of 25 November 1965 on the Choice of Court was signed by Israel, but it has not entered into 
force, on the status table see: https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=77. 
67 Report by Mr P. Jenard on the Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ C 59, 5 March 1979, p. 37, (“Jenard Report”). According to the 
Jenard Report, the wording determining formal requirements of rule on prorogation of jurisdiction was similar to 
the Convention between Germany and Belgium, which was based on the rules of the Hague Convention of 15 
April 1958 on the jurisdiction of the selected forum in the case of international sale of goods, and the Hague 
Convention of 25 November 1965 on the choice-of-court. 
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…some legal systems seem to consider such provision beyond the power of private 
parties, or they impose a test of reasonableness; others exclude this kind of agreement 
from specified areas of the law.68  
For example, the prorogation or derogation of jurisdiction based on the choice-of-court 
agreement, were not known to all national legal systems of six founding countries of 
European Community. In the Netherlands, the prorogation of jurisdiction was not introduced 
into the Dutch civil procedure, and until 1985 was not recognized. The parties could designate 
the Dutch court indirectly through the defendant’s election of domicile.69 However, the first 
judgment can be traced back to 1955 when the Dutch court refused jurisdiction in the 
presence of a choice of foreign court because of sanctity of the contract.70 In Belgium, 
although there was no statutory provision defining the jurisdiction clause, the parties could 
elect the jurisdiction of a Belgian court or derogate from it.71 In France, as well as in 
Luxembourg, the freedom of parties concerning the choice of court was upheld as one of the 
fundamental principles when the Napoleonic Code was promulgated in 1807.72 The express 
                                                          
68 K. H. NADELMANN, The Hague Conference on Private International Law and the Validity of Forum Selecting 
Clauses, American Journal of Comparative Law, 13 (1964), p. 158. 
69 A. LENHOFF, The Parties’ Choice of a Forum: “Prorogation Agreements”, Rutgers Law Review 15 (1961), p. 
426, footnote no. 58.  
70 A. LENHOFF, The Parties’ Choice of a Forum: “Prorogation Agreements”, op. cit., p. 426. In 1985 Hoge Raad, 
Piscator, 1 February 1985, NJ 698 JCS, held that the parties are free to confer jurisdiction on a Dutch court. The 
derogation of the Dutch court in favour of other court was confirmed by the Hoge Raad, Harvest Trader, 28 
October 1988, NJ 765, in 1988 referring to Article 17 of the Brussels Convention. 
71 M. FALLON, Belgium, in J. J. FAWCETT (ed), Declining Jurisdiction in Private International Law: Reports to the 
XIVth Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 110-111. 
72 P. FRANCESCAKIS, Compétence étrangère et jugement étranger, Revue critique de droit international privé 42 
(1953), p. 30: «The idea of a jurisdiction (in the international sense) that is not subject to the will of the parties, 
is alien to the constant course taken by French courts.». Article 1134 of the French Code Civil, 21 March 1804 
provided: «Agreements legally formed have the force of law over those who are the makers of them.». See also 
the French case law cited in A. LENHOFF, The Parties’ Choice of a Forum: “Prorogation Agreements”, op. cit., 
p. 440, footnote 176. When the parties were foreigners in spite of their domicile or residence in France and 
selected French court, they did not have the right to bring an action before a French court. When one of the 
parties was a French citizen, ArticlesArticles 14 and 15 of French Civil Code applied. If the plaintiff was a 
French citizen regardless of the domicile or residence he could sue a foreigner before the French courts, Article 
15 has granted privilege of French jurisdiction to French citizen in the position of a defendant by a foreigner 
counterparty. See Article 14 and 15 of French Civil Code: «A foreigner, although not resident in France, may be 
cited before the French courts, to enforce the execution of engagements contracted by him in France with a 
Frenchman; he may be summoned before the tribunals of France, on account of engagements entered into by 
him with Frenchmen in a foreign country. A Frenchman may be summoned before a French court, for 
engagements contracted by him in a foreign country, though with a foreigner.». The opinion caused such 
exclusion of foreigners from the French jurisdiction that administration of jurisdiction is offered by the State and 
in case of two foreigners, there is no interest therein. However, the non-resident foreigners could be sued in front 
of French court by submission despite any other factor connecting the dispute with the French court. 
Subsequently, the prevailing case law disregarded the doctrine that French nationality is a requirement for the 
institution of proceedings in front of the French court. The provision did not prescribe the form of the forum 
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provision on territorial competence was amended by Decree on 5 December 1975,73 which in 
1986 was extended into the international order by Cour de Cassation in Cie de Signaux et 
d’Enterprises Electriques v. Soc. Sorelec.74 In Germany, the jurisdiction of German courts 
was based on the provisions of Zivilprozessordnung on territorial competence; there was no 
special rule concerning disputes with an international element.75 Already in 1877 Article 38 of 
Zivilprozessordnung expressly allowed the rule on the choice-of-court agreements on 
territorial competence.76 In Italy, in contrast with France or Germany, international 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
selection agreement, but, the oral evidence was excluded in the certain cases, see Article 7 of Code of Civil 
Procedure requiring signature (and as a consequence the written form): «Thus, the judge will proceed although 
he is not the natural judge of the parties; for neither the defendant’s domicile nor the situs of the object of the 
litigation is within his district. The parties’ declaration demanding judgment must be signed by them, or, if they 
are unable to sign, this must be noted.» and Article 1341 of the Civil Code: «An act must be made before 
notaries or under private signature, respecting all things exceeding the sum or value of one hundred and fifty 
francs, even in the case of voluntary deposits; and no proof can be received by witnesses against or beyond what 
is contained in such acts, nor touching what shall be alleged to have been said before, at the time of or 
subsequently to such acts, although there may be question of a sum or value less than 150 francs; The whole 
without prejudice to what is prescribed in the laws relative to commerce.». The case law of the French court was 
very progressive – the prorogation stipulations could form part of the bylaws of stock companies and general 
terms and conditions, the explicit acceptance was often required, but no waiver of French jurisdiction was 
permitted in case of immovable property situated in France, rectification of national Registers of Civil Status, or 
letters of patent or trademarks issued or registered by domestic authorities, see (also translation) A. LENHOFF, 
The Parties’ Choice of a Forum: “Prorogation Agreements”, op. cit., p. 421, 441, 443, 444, 445, 448, 477, 479; 
J. M. PERILLO, Selected Forum Agreements in Western Europe, The American Journal of Comparative Law, 13/1 
(1964), p. 162-163; M. PRYLES, Comparative Aspects of Prorogation and Arbitration Agreements, International 
& Comparative Law Quarterly, 25:3 (1976), p. 550. 
73 «Any clause that departs, directly or indirectly, from the rules of territorial jurisdiction will be deemed non-
existent unless it has been agreed between parties to a contract entered into as merchants and the same has been 
provided for in an explicit manner in the undertakings of the party against whom it will be enforced.», on the 
English translation see https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/content/download/1962/13735/version/3/.../Code_39.pdf. 
74 Cour de Cassation Chambre Civile 1, Cie de Signaux et d’Enterprises Electriques v. Soc. Sorelec, 17 
December 1985, N° de pourvoi: 84-16338, stating that: «Clauses which extend the scope of international 
jurisdiction are legal when dealing with an international dispute, and when the clause does not deny application 
of the mandatory territorial competence of a French court». See also H. GAUDEMET-TALLON, France, in J. J.J. 
FAWCETT (ed), Declining Jurisdiction in Private International Law: Reports to the XIVth Congress of the 
International Academy of Comparative Law, Oxford University Press, 1995, p.183. 
75 See A. ABT, M. MOLITORIS, Comparative Study of “Residual Jurisdiction” in Civil and Commercial Disputes 
in the EU, National Report for Germany, p. 2.available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_resid_jurisd_germany_en.pdf, p. 2. 
76 Code of Civil Procedure dated 30 January 1877, promulgated in Reichsgesetzblatt, RGBl, Law Gazette of the 
Reich, Article 38 provided «Ein an dich unzuständiges gericht des ersten Rechtzuges wird durch ausdruckliche 
odelr Stillschweigende Vereinbarung der parteien zustandig.». In 1974, the provisions in Germany were 
modified, see Bundesgesetzblatt Teil No 28 ausgedeben zu Bonn in 23 Mach 1974 and motivation for the reform 
in Gesetzentwurf des Bundesrates Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Änderung der Zivilprozeßordnung, Drucksache 7/ 
268 from 27 February 1973. Article 38 par. 1 clarified that the parties which are subject to that provision must be 
merchants, legal persons under public law, or special assets under public law (Sondervermögen). Moreover, the 
provision in its paragraph 2 newly stated that the German court may be competent also if one of the parties does 
not have a general forum in Germany and in the case that one of the parties has a general forum in Germany and 
the German court was selected by the parties. In in such a case, the territorial competence is not possible to select 
- only the court of general venue is competent over the dispute. Article 40 of Zivilprozessordnung then regulated 
admissibility of choice-of-court agreements and provided that: (i) it must refer to the determinate legal dispute, 
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jurisdiction was explicitly distinguished from the territorial competence, and the rules on 
jurisdiction were directly determined by the Italian Code of Civil Procedure applicable from 
21 April 1942.77 The rule on prorogation of jurisdiction was embodied into Article 4 of the 
Italian Code of Civil Procedure from 1942,78 whereby Article 2 of the Italian Code of Civil 
Procedure provided the conditions for derogation from Italian jurisdiction.79 The choice-of-
court agreements were at that time recognized also in other States. For example, in 1950 the 
Czech Republic (formal Czechoslovak Republic) adopted the new Act on Civil Procedure, 
where Article 623 determined both prorogation and derogation agreement with the 
international element.80 After the new so-called “socialistic” Constitution was adopted in 
1960, extensive codification works begun.81 It may be surprising that despite a State 
reorganization and nationalization of the property, Czech Act on Private and Procedural 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
thus it was not admissible if it covered all legal disputes which might arise in the future; and (ii) no contractual 
agreement on jurisdiction was permitted as to non-pecuniary claims and claims concerning exclusive 
competence. The written form was not required by Zivilprozessordnung, but some authors assumed that 
international choice-of-court agreement had to be written by the analogy to arbitration agreements when the 
prorogation was agreed as an exclusive. The derogation from German jurisdiction was denied, as in France, in 
cases of immovable property situated in Germany, or letters of patent or trademarks issued or registered by 
domestic authorities. See F. LENT, Diritto processuale civile tedesco: parte prima: il procedimento di 
cognizione, Morano, 1962, p. 50; A. LENHOFF, The Parties’ Choice of a Forum: “Prorogation Agreements”, op. 
cit., p. 421. 458. 
77 Codice di Procedura Civile, Royal Decree from 28 October 1940, No. 1443, Official gazette n. 253 from 28 
October 1940. 
78 This rule provided that the foreigner can be sued in front of the Italian court if he is there resident or domiciled 
(also if he elected domicile) or the representative is authorized to be cited in legal proceeding ex Article 77 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure, or if he accepted Italian jurisdiction unless the application is related to real estate 
located abroad. Article 37 of Italian Code of Civil Procedure determined the obligation for Italian court to detect 
the defect of Italian jurisdiction ex officio in cases of immovables. Otherwise, if the defendant was sued in front 
of an Italian court in contradiction of derogation agreement and he submitted by appearance to the Italian court 
without pleading the lack of jurisdiction in time, jurisdiction could lie in the Italian court. See G. MORELLI, 
Diritto processuale civile internazionale, op. cit., p. 186. 
79 Article 2 of Codice di Procedura Civile from 1942 reads: «Italian jurisdiction cannot be derogated by contract 
in favor of a foreign jurisdiction or of arbitrators who render their decision abroad, except in cases relating to 
obligations between aliens or between an alien and a citizen who neither resides in nor is domiciled in the State 
[Italy] and where the derogation results from a written act.», in other words the derogation was not permitted by 
contract except for cases concerning obligations between foreigners or between a foreigner and a citizen who 
was neither a resident nor a domiciliary in Italy and derogation resulted from a written act. On the translation see 
J. M. PERILLO, Selected Forum Agreements in Western Europe, op. cit, p. 165. The validity of the derogation 
from Italian jurisdiction was subject to specific conditions – the object of the dispute had obligatory nature, the 
jurisdictional ground represented the character of internationality (parties), and the written form of agreement 
was required. G. MORELLI, Diritto processuale civile internazionale, op. cit., p. 183 and 184. Articles 2 and 4 of 
Italian Code of Civil Procedure were replaced by Article 4 of the Legge 31 maggio 1995, n. 218  
Riforma del sistema italiano di diritto internazionale privato (“Italian Act on Private International Law”)1995. 
80 Zákon č. 142/1950 Sb. o konaní v občianskych právnych veciach (občiansky súdny poriadok), where Article 
623 permitted to agree on a jurisdiction of a Czech court in the civil matters. However, derogation agreement 
could conclude only the (also private) legal entities. The jurisdiction agreement had to be concluded in written 
form. 
81 M. PAUKNEROVÁ, Private International Law in the Czech Republic, Kluwer Law International, 2011, p. 14-15. 
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International Law (which was in practice legally binding until 2012 with specific 
amendments) entered into force in 1964 and it was permitted to agree on jurisdiction of Czech 
court in property matters.82  
Party autonomy in respect of a choice-of-court was recognised in the Brussels Convention and 
represented the first step to spread party autonomy at the European level.83 The rule on the 
choice-of-court agreement was inspired by the two already mentioned Hague Conventions, as 
well as by the bilateral and multilateral conventions between the establishing States of the 
European Community before 1968.84  
                                                          
82 Zákon č. 97/1963 Sb. o mezinárodním právu soukromém a procesním, where Article 37 determined that the 
parties may agree on a jurisdiction of a Czech court. However, the derogation agreement could conclude only the 
Czechoslovak organizations. 
83 G. RÜHL, Choice of Law and Choice of Forum in the European Union. Recent Developments, in C. HODGES, 
S. VOGENAUER (eds), Civil Justice Systems in Europe. Implications for Choice of Forum and Choice of Contract 
Law, Hart Publishing, 2010, p. 8 available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1604615 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1604615. 
84 In particular, in the following three conventions, the possibility to choose the jurisdiction was enabled only 
through the election of domicile: Convention concluded between France and Belgium on jurisdiction and the 
validity and enforcement of judgments, arbitration awards and authentic instruments, signed at Paris on 8 July 
1899, where Article 3 provides: «Lorsqu’un domicile attributif de juridiction a été élu dans l’un des pays pour 
l’exécutions d’un acte, les juges du lieu du domicile élu sont seuls compétentes pour connaître des contestations 
relatives a cet ate. Si cependant le domicile n’a été élu qu’en faveur de lìune des parties contracteantes celle-ci 
conserve le droit de satir tout autre juge compétent.» ; between Belgium and the Netherlands jurisdiction, 
bankruptcy, and the validity and enforcement of judgments, arbitration awards and authentic instruments, signed 
at Brussels on 28 March 1925, where Article 5 provides: «Lorsqu’un domicile attributif de juridiction a été élu 
dans l’un des pays pour l’exécutions d’un acte, les juges du lieu du domicile élu sont seuls compétentes pour 
connaître des contestations relatives a cet ate, sauf les exceptions at modifications établies ou à établir par l’une 
des deus législations nationales ainsi quo par les conventions internationales. Si le domicile n’a été élu qu’en 
faveur de l’une des parties contractactanes, celle-ci conserve le droit de satir tout autre juge compétent.»; and 
between Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg on jurisdiction, bankruptcy, and the validity and 
enforcement of judgments, arbitration awards and authentic instruments, signed at Brussels on 24 November 
1961. Other conventions concerned the recognition and enforcement of judgments. The “single” conventions did 
not determine the jurisdiction of the courts, but they were applied only for recognition and enforcement issued in 
another Convention State – the domestic legal orders regulated the jurisdictional grounds. The following single 
conventionsconvention were concluded before 1968 between founding States: Convention between France and 
Italy on the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, signed at Rome on 3 June 1930, where 
Article 12 provides: «Dans les contestations entre français et italiens, lorsqu’un domicile attributif de juridiction 
a été élu dans celui des deux pays où un contrat a été conclu ou doit recevoir son exécutions, les juridictions du 
pays du domicile élu sont compétentes pour connaître des contestations relatives au contrat. L’élection de 
domicile doit avoir été acceptée expressément par les parties et spécialement pour chaque contrat. Si le domicile 
n’a été élu qu’en faveur d’une des parties, celle-ci conserve le droit de saisir tout juge compétent.»..», on the 
interpretation of this provision see: Corte di Cassazione, S.U., n. 2520, 10 July 1934, in Rivista di diritto 
internazionale (1934), p. 234; Cour d’Appel de Colmar, 26 February 1957, in Revue critique de droit 
internatonal privé, (1957), p. 302 ; between Germany and Italy on the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters, signed at Rome on 9 March 1936, where Article 2 par. 2 provides: «Quando si 
tratta di contestazioni patrimoniali, le Autorità giudiziarie dello Stato in cui la decisione è stata pronunziata 
sono competenti ai sensi dell’art. 1, nelle ipotesi previste da convenzioni internazionali, quando, mediante una 
convenzione espressa in vista di contestazioni derivanti da rapporti giuridici determinati, il convenuto si era 
sottoposto alla competenza dell’Autorità giudiziaria che si è pronunciata, ovvero quando il convenuto senza 
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Although the prominence on jurisdiction agreements was always attributed to the civil and 
commercial private international law, where Professor Briggs speaks of the 
“contractualisation” of private international law,85 the general recognition of choice-of-court 
agreements is not so obvious in all areas of the family law. As stated, substantive family law, 
in particular, status law, is characterized by prevalence of the mandatory rules, unlike 
commercial relations where the dispositive rules prevail. Indeed, through the selection of the 
competent court (in the States where the conflict-of-laws rules are not harmonized or unified), 
the parties may derogate from the mandatory rules of the family law. At least, party autonomy 
in international family law was for the first time recognized in an international convention in 
1978 and concerned the property law of the spouses, where the use of ius cogens is limited 
(Article 3 of the 1978 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Matrimonial Property 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
opporre alcuna riserva si è difeso nel merito della controversia salvo che le parti avessero la cittadinanza dello 
Stato richiesto e fossero domiciliate sul suo territorio.», on the interpretation of this Article see Corte di Appello 
Milano, 3 May 1940 in Rivista di diritto internazionale (1943), p. 118; Corte di Cassazione, S.U., n. 2528, 18 
August 1941 in Rivista di diritto internazionale (1960), p. 538; Corte di Cassazione, n. 1061, 26 May 1965, in 
Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (1965), p. 711; between Italy and the Netherlands on the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, signed at Rome on 17 April 1959, 
where Articlerticle 2 par. 2 provides: «La compétence des jurisdictions de l’Etat où la décision a été rendue est 
fondée au sens de l’Article premier, n.1 si elle est prévue par une autre Convention entre les Hautes Parties 
Contractantes, ou dans les cas mentionnés ci-aprés: lorsque, par une convention écrite en vue de contestations 
déterminées, le défendeur s’était soumis à la compétence du tribunal qui a rendu la décision, sauf si toutes les 
parties avaient leur domicile dans l’Etat où la décision est invoquée ou s’il s’agit de contestations concernant la 
possession ou la propriéte d’un immeuble dans un Etat autre que celui où la decision a été rendue, ou bien 
concernant les droits réel sur un tel immeuble.».», on the interpretation of this Article see: Corte di Appello di 
Genova, 10 May 1972 in Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (1972), p. 596; 
Arrondissementsrechtbank Leeuwarden, 11 January 1968, in F. POCAR, Codice delle convenzioni sulla 
giurisdizione e l’esecuzione delle sentenze straniere nella C.E.E.: con la giurisprudenza sulla Convenzione di 
Bruxelles del 1968 e sulle convenzioni bilaterali concluse dall’Italia, Giuffrè, 1980, p. 660; between Belgium 
and Italy on the recognition and enforcement of judgments and other enforceable instruments in civil and 
commercial matters, signed at Rome on 6 April 1962, where Article 2 paras. 1, 2 provide: «La compétence de 
l’autorité judiciare de l’Etat dans lequel la décision décision a été rendue est fondée au sens de l’Article 
précédent si, au moment de l’introduction de la domande, l’une des conditions suivantes est réalisée lorsque, par 
une convention écrite en vue d’une contestation relative à un contrat déterminé, le défendeur s’est soumis à la 
juridiction de l’Etat dans lequel la décision a été rendue, sauf si les parties à ladite convention ont la nationalité 
de l’Etat dans lequel la décision est invoquée et y ont leur domicile ou leur residence.»; between Germany and 
the Netherlands on the mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments and other enforceable instruments in 
civil and commercial matters, signed at The Hague on 30 August 1962, where Article 4 par. 1 lett. b) provides : 
«Die Zuständigkeit der Gerichte des Staates, in dem die Entscheidung ergangen ist, wird im Sinne dieses 
Vertrages anerkannt wenn der Beklagte sich durch eine Vereinbarung der Zuständigkeit der Gerichte des 
Staates, in dem die Entscheidung ergangen ist, unterworfen hat, es sei denn, daß eine solche Vereinbarung nach 
dem Recht des Staates, in dem die Entscheidung geltend gemacht wird, unzulässig ist; eine Vereinbarung im 
Sinne dieser Vorschrift liegt nur vor, wenn eine Partei ihre Erklärung schriftlich abgegeben und die Gegenpartei 
sie ange- nommen hat oder wenn eine mündlich getroffene Vereinbarung von einer Partei schriftlich bestätigt 
worden ist, ohne daß die Gegenpartei der Bestätigung widersprochen hat.»; and between Germany and Belgium 
on the mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments, arbitration awards and authentic instruments in civil 
and commercial matters, signed at Bonn on 30 June 1958. 
85 A. BRIGGS, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, op. cit., par. 1.05. 
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Regimes).86 Almost 30 years after the adoption of the Brussels Convention, the 1996 Hague 
Convention on Parental Responsibility on Parental Responsibility87 and the Brussels II 
Convention88 established the new rule of prorogation of jurisdiction of the divorce court to the 
court with jurisdiction over parental responsibility. However, full party autonomy to choose a 
competent court was permitted already in 1965 for the maintenance matters in a surprisingly 
generous manner under the Brussels Convention.89 In consequence, the exercise of indirect 
choice or direct choice through presumed intention is significant mainly in the area of family 
law, where the choice-of-court is not permitted, or is permitted in a very limited manner.90 
Article 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation, is an example and contains seven alternative 
jurisdictional grounds for divorce, legal separation, and marriage annulment. First, forum 
shopping, gives a direct choice to the applicant to seize one of the forums offered in Article 3 
of the Brussels IIa Regulation.91 Second, parties can indirectly choose any of the Member 
                                                          
86 Convention of 14 March 1978 on the Law Applicable to Matrimonial Property Regimes, only France, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands are Contracting States to this Convention., on the status table see: 
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=87.  
87 Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation 
in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children (“1996 Hague Convention on 
Parental Responsibility”), on the status table see https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-
table/?cid=70.  
88 Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters - Declaration, annexed to the minutes of the 
Council, adopted during the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 28 and 29 May 1998 when drawing up the 
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters, OJ C 
221, 16 July 1998, (“Brussels II Convention”). 
89 See Article 5 par. 2 of the Brussels Convention. 
90 Emphasis added. The direct choice of jurisdiction may be exercised in three different ways: through the 
express intention; through the intention inferred from the circumstances of the case (tacit intention); or through 
the presumed intention (choice is imputed from the circumstances). P. E. NYGH, Autonomy in International 
Contracts, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 4-5; E. YNTEMA, “Autonomy” in Choice of Law, op. cit., p. 342; J. 
CARRUTHERS, Party Autonomy in the Legal Regulation of Adult Relationships: What Place for Party Choice in 
Private International Law, op. cit., p. 882. 
91 Emphasis added. Forum shopping is not only problem in the family cross-border matters, but it occurs also in 
the civil and commercial matters. See A. BELL, Forum Shopping and Venue in Transnational Litigation, Oxford 
University Press, 2003; F. FERRARI, Forum Shopping: A Plea for a Broad and Value-Neutral Definition, NYU 
Lectures on Transnational Litigation, Arbitration and Commercial Law, 2013. Forum shopping may occur also 
in the context of Article 7 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation which regulates “special jurisdiction”, conferring 
decisive power also to other courts other than to the courts of defendant’s domicile. Article 7 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation does not have to result in forum shopping but can be even perceived as “jurisdiction agreement sui 
generis”. The ECJ, the Case 56/79, Siegfried Zelger v Sebastiano Salinitri, 17 January 1980, 
ECLI:EU:C:1980:15, ruled that if the parties are permitted to specify the place of performance of an obligation 
without satisfying any special condition of form by the law of such agreement on the place of performance 
according to the law applicable to the contract, the agreement on the place of performance of the obligation is 
sufficient to found jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 5 par. 1 of the Brussels Convention. However, in 
case the agreed place does not represent a real place of performance aiming only at the establishing jurisdiction, 
such an agreement of the place of performance would circumvent of the functioning of Article 25 of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation and therefore, it requires the form required by this provision, in this regard see ECJ, Case C-
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States by the change of their residence.92 However, a drawback may outweigh the advantage. 
Article 3 uses the “first seized” lis pendens rule, which opens the door to the phenomena of a 
“rush to court” and may be easily abused by the strategic move of habitual residence to other 
Member State in order to secure the most advantageous result of the dispute.93 Another 
similar rule can be found in Article 15 of the Brussels IIa Regulation allowing a transfer of 
the case from a Member State court to a better placed Member State court on the request of 
one or both the parties. 94 
 
II.    Effects and Nature of the Choice-of-Court Agreements 
The nature of the choice-of-court agreements and the relationship between the substantive law 
on one side and procedural law on the other side has not been clarified due to its “hybrid 
nature”.95 The impossibility of drawing the distinction between procedural and substantive 
law is caused by the fact that it is a private contract and simultaneously falls under the law of 
procedure. The nature of the jurisdiction agreement represents a key for comprehension of 
consideration of its legal binding determination on the national, EU and international level.  
There are several doctrinal discussions regarding the nature of the choice-of-court agreements 
and regarding the effects produced in respect to jurisdiction of the courts and in respect to the 
parties. In this Subchapter, the effect and nature are analysed on the general level. The 
considerations concerning the effects and the nature of jurisdiction clauses, which are 
subordinated to the national regime, come into play on the residual basis or when the EU 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
106/95, Mainschiffahrts-Genossenschaft eG (MSG) v Les Gravières Rhénanes SARL, 20 February 1997, 
ECLI:EU:C:1997:70, par. 31-35 
92 Emphasis added. The reason is that six out of seven jurisdictional grounds are based on habitual residence. 
93 On the problem of “rush to court” see infra Chapter Three, Subchapter I, Section 2.6.  
94 Any agreement between the parties will be “in the shadow of the law”: E. M. MAGRONE, La disciplina del 
diritto di visita nel regolamento(CE) n. 2201/2003, Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (2005,), 
p. 339 at 360. On Article 15 see E. PATAUT, E. GALLANT, Article 15, in U. MAGNUS, P. MANKOWSKI (eds), 
Brussels IIbis Regulation: 2017, European Commentaries on Private International Law, Otto Schmidt, Sellier 
European Law Publishers, 2017, p. 173. It is uncommon to use the forum non conveniens within the Brussels 
system in the virtue of ECJ, Case C-281/02, Andrew Owusu v N. B. Jackson, trading as “Villa Holidays Bal-Inn 
Villas” and Others, 1 March 2005, ECLI:EU:C:2005:120, which represents a risk for the principle of legal 
certainty. 
95 T. HARTLEY, Choice-of-Court Agreements under the European and International Instruments: The Revised 
Brussels I Regulation, the Lugano Convention, and the Hague Convention, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 
129, M. AHMED, The Nature and Enforcement of Choice of Court Agreements: A Comparative Study. Studies in 
Private International Law, Hart Publishing, 2017, p. 7. 
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regulations and the international conventions do not apply. The characterisation of choice-of-
court agreements is then decisive mainly for determination of the law applicable to the 
jurisdiction clauses. 
 
1. Positive and Negative Effects in respect to the State’s Court Jurisdiction  
The choice-of-court clauses have impact on the jurisdiction of more one or more states – in 
case of exclusive jurisdiction agreements, they interfere with the jurisdiction of a State whose 
court is designated by the parties and with the jurisdiction of a State whose court should have 
jurisdiction in the absence of such jurisdiction agreement by virtue of the national law. In 
other words, the exclusive choice-of-court agreements have two effects: a prorogation effect 
which confers the jurisdiction to the designated court (positive effect) and derogation effect 
which excludes the jurisdiction of the court which would have otherwise jurisdiction 
(negative effect).96 The prorogation effect does not directly interfere with the exercise of State 
authority - the State control is not affected. However, the derogation effect causes interference 
in the exercise of State authority.97 The national legislators attribute to conduct and consent of 
the parties the existence or non-existence of the decisive power of the seized court. The 
obligation of the prorogued court to decide the case is constituted and vice versa the derogated 
court is refrained in exercising jurisdiction on the basis of the jurisdiction agreement. On the 
other hand, non-exclusive choice-of-court agreements have the same positive effect, but they 
do not impose on the parties to seize a designated court.98 Sometimes, it is not possible to fit 
all jurisdiction agreements into the categories of exclusive and non-exclusive.99 
 
                                                          
96 M. KEYES, B. A. MARSHALL, Jurisdiction agreements: exclusive, optional and asymmetrical, Journal of 
Private International Law, 11.3 (2015), p. 349; J. J. FAWCETT, Non-Exclusive Jurisdiction Clauses in Private 
International Law, Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly, 28 (2001), p. 240. 
97 As stated in Chapter One, Subcahpter I supra, until the beginning of the Twentieth Century, it was disputed 
that parties should have right to “withdraw” from the jurisdiction of the States since jurisdiction was a matter of 
sovereignty of that State. However, now are perceived as a mean for realization of individuals’ rights and 
interests can be realized. See I. QUEIROLO, Prorogation of Jurisdiction in the Proposal for a Recast of the 
Brussels I Regulation, op. cit., p. 183. 
98 M. KEYES, B. A. MARSHALL, Jurisdiction agreements: exclusive, optional and asymmetrical, op. cit., p. 349 
99 A. BRIGGS, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, op. cit., par. 4.24–4.25, 5.20. 
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2. Nature of the Choice-of-court Agreements  
Choice-of-court agreements are a frequent subject of the doctrinal discussion regarding their 
nature. These discussions question if they are substantive agreements, procedural agreements, 
or substantive agreements with the procedural effects.  
Choice-of-court agreements affect the position of the parties and the doctrinal approaches in 
this respect are divided mainly into two significant approaches. The first approach perceives 
jurisdiction agreements as substantive agreements, which is based on the right and duties of 
the parties. The second approach assigns to jurisdictional agreements only a procedural 
nature. The divergences are significant mainly in the common law and civil law countries and 
are decisive for determining the applicable law and the obligation of the parties concerning 
the damages for the breach of the choice-of-court agreement. 
 
2.1.  Substantive Nature 
Choice-of-court agreements may be regarded as contractual terms, which are part of the 
contract.100 According to the common law perspective, a substantive nature is attributed to the 
choice-of-court agreements because they are analogous with the contract by which the parties 
are bound.101 This theory considers the choice-of-court agreements as substantive agreements 
constituting rights and obligations for the parties. The conception of substantive effects of the 
choice-of-court agreements falls back to the Eighteen Century and has been gradually 
developed in the UK.102 The common law system observes the jurisdictional rules in terms of 
                                                          
100 A. BRIGGS, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, op. cit., par. 3.09, D. JOSEPH, Jurisdiction and 
Arbitration Agreements and Their Enforcement, Sweet & Maxwell, 2014, 3ed., par. 4.02, 4.07; A. BRIGGS, P. 
REES, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgements, Norton Rose, 2009, par. 2.113. This qualification can be also found in 
civil law countries. 
101 See M. AHMED, The Nature and Enforcement of Choice-of-court Agreements: A Comparative Study, op. cit., 
p. 79. 
102 The first theory was developed in the context of the arbitration, the jurisdiction agreements were submitted 
within the meaning of the Common Law procedure Act 1854 and Arbitration Act 1889. L. GRAUPNER, 
Contractual Stipulations Conferring Exclusive Jurisdiction upon Foreign Courts in the Law of England and 
Scotland, Law Quarterly Review, 59 (1943), p. 238: «Reviewing the English decisions we see that they started 
from the point that reference to a foreign Court came within the meaning of the C. L. P. Act of 1854 and now of 
section 4 of the Arbitration Act of 1889. And though the correctness of this starting point might be doubted, it 
turned out to be of great practical value, enabling the Courts by not having their jurisdiction ousted to exercise 
their discretion to stay proceedings or to refuse such a stay and if necessary to give relief and to dispose of any 
specific case according to its merits.». See also Law v. Garret [1878] L. R. 8 Ch. D. 26; Austrian Lloyd 
Steamship Company v Gresham Life Assurance Society Limited [1903] 1 KB 249; Racecourse Betting Control 
Board v Secretary for Air [1943] Ch. 114 
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rights and duties of the parties.103 According to this perception, the jurisdiction agreement 
grants a right to the plaintiff, who is entitled to decide whether to exercise his right to sue a 
defendant in front of a designated forum; the defendant then must assume the obligation 
resulting from the plaintiff’s right to act according to the agreement.104 The reasoning of the 
common law theory, which considers the choice-of-court agreements as substantive 
agreements composed by the rights and obligations of the parties, is based on two facts. First, 
the jurisdiction of a court in a common law system is based on the principle of territorial 
dominion and is established where the person is present within the territory of that State, at 
the time when the document instituting the proceedings is lodged with the court.105 If the 
defendant cannot be served within the jurisdiction and does not enter into appearance, the 
claimant needs the permission of the court to serve outside its jurisdiction.106 Thus, this 
territorial dominion gives rise to the effects of the jurisdiction agreements in another way than 
in the civil law countries. The second justification for the common law conception of the 
substantive rights and obligations focuses on the role of the choice-of-court agreements in 
international commercial trade; this conception was significant mainly in the USA.107 
Although the theory of substantive nature is the most significant in the common law 
countries, the conception of the substantive nature of the jurisdiction agreements can also be 
found in the certain civil law countries. In Spain, Tribunal Supremo upheld that choice-of-
forum clauses are of a contractual nature. Failure to comply with it implies that party may be 
sued for compensation for the legal costs in case of breach of the choice-of-court clause. The 
Tribunal Supremo also stated that the choice-of-court agreement is incorporated into the 
                                                          
103 A. BRIGGS, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, op. cit., p. 57. 
104 A. BRIGGS, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, op. cit., p. 57, L. PENASA, Gli accordi sulla 
giurisdizione tra parti e terzi, Vol. 1, CEDAM, 2012, p. 50; A. BRIGGS, The Impact of Recent Judgments of the 
European Court on English Procedural Law and Practice, Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 11/2006, 
available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=899689, p. 10; D. JOSEPH, Jurisdiction and Arbitration Agreements 
and Their Enforcement, op. cit., p. 102. 
105 A. BRIGGS, P. REES, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgements, op. cit., p. 408; A. BRIGGS, The Impact of Recent 
Judgments of the European Court on English Procedural Law and Practice, op. cit., p. 137; T. HARTLEY, The 
Modern Approach to Private International Law: International Litigation and Transactions from a Common-Law 
Perspective in Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, The Hague Academy of 
International Law, 319 (2006), p.166. 
106 J. HILL, A. CHONG, International Commercial Disputes: Commercial Conflict of Laws in English Courts, Hart 
Publishing, 2010, 4eds, p. 216-217 
107 In UK, such a doctrine was connected with the importance of the negotiations of the jurisdiction clause with 
the main contract L. COLLINS, Forum selection and an Anglo-American Conflict - The Sad Case of The 
Chaparral, International & Comparative Law Quarterly 20:3 (1971), p. 557. See also US Supreme Court, The 
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). 
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contractual relationship as one of the rules of conduct to be observed by the parties and it 
creates a duty.108 
 
2.2.  Procedural Nature and Substantive Nature with Procedural Effects 
In some States of the civil law and according to the Brussels regime, the jurisdiction clauses 
are perceived as a direction for the State to consider its jurisdiction. It can be assumed that the 
national, European, and international rules expressly recognize the admissibility of the choice-
of-court agreements, and directly impact the State’s jurisdiction.109  
Choice-of-court agreements, as procedural acts, are inserted into the proceedings (even if they 
are accomplished outside of the proceedings) and produce direct and immediate procedural 
effects in respect to the rights of the parties to bring a legal action. The relationship between 
the parties and the court is created in the moment of the conclusion of the choice-of-court 
agreement.110  
This conception denies any substantive effects which would produce obligations and rights of 
the parties. Thus, the compensation of damages, which is based on the breach of contractual 
obligations, should not be allowed. However, certain authors recognizing the procedural 
effects of the jurisdiction clauses do not deny the right to the compensation of the damages for 
breach of the jurisdiction clause in the specific circumstances: the parties’ agreement may be 
interpreted (on the basis of applicable law) as a simultaneous obligation to seize a specific 
court, which also covers the compensation of damages.111 Thus, the jurisdiction agreement 
may be understood as two unilateral contracts, each with its own criteria of the validity where 
each party is bound by the restriction of jurisdiction they formally accepted, and no contract is 
                                                          
108 Tribunal Supremo, 12 January2009, which confirmed judgment of Tribunal Supremo, 23 February 2007. See 
translation and the further comments M. REQUEJO, On the Value of Choice of Forum and Choice of Law Clauses 
in Spain (2009), available at http://conflictoflaws.net/2009/on-the-value-of-choice-of-forum-and-choice-of-law-
clauses-in-spain/; P. BŘÍZA, Volba práva a volba soudu v mezinárodním obchodě, Beck, 2012, p. 169. 
109 L. PENASA, Gli accordi sulla giurisdizione tra parti e terzi, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 90. 
110 Ibidem, p. 90. 
111 This concurrent agreement on the duties and rights of the parties to seize only prorogued court must be 
considered according to the national law. The applicable law cannot be determined according to the Rome 
Convention and Rome I Regulation, since the choice-of-court agreements (which may produce the substantive 
effects) are excluded from the scope of application (Article 1 par. 2 lett. c) of Rome Convention and Article 1 
par. 2 lett. s) of the Rome I Regulation). See L. PENASA, Gli accordi sulla giurisdizione tra parti e terzi, op. cit., 
Vol. 1, p. 61. 
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needed.112 However, the parties may simultaneously conclude a mutual “promise” of the 
parties not to bring or to bring the legal proceedings in the designated court or State which 
must be interpreted by virtue of the applicable law which governs the contract. 113 Such a 
promise may be called, for our purpose, “separate agreements on rights and obligations”. In 
other words, according to this theory, the parties entering into the choice-of-court agreement 
may conclude two agreements, the first one has only procedural effects and directly affects 
the jurisdiction of the courts (i.e., the “true” choice-of-court agreements); the second one (“a 
separate agreement on rights and obligations”) may produce the substantive effect of the 
jurisdiction clauses, which gives rise to the rights and duties to the parties. The admissibility 
of “separate agreement on rights and obligations” according to the lex contractus would allow 
the right for compensation of damage caused by the breach of the choice-of-court agreements. 
In the case that the “true” choice-of-court agreement is not accompanied by another 
autonomous agreement which creates substantive effects, it can be concluded that such an 
agreement has only a procedural character.114 These “true” choice-of-court agreements do not 
constitute obligations for the parties to compensate for damages if there is a breach of a 
jurisdiction clause.115 However, according to other authors, the procedural nature of the 
jurisdiction clauses does not preclude the mandatory effects of the agreement between the 
parties, when a party has right to sue another party for a breach of jurisdiction agreements.116 
In some other civil law countries, there is no uniform approach as to the nature of the 
jurisdictional agreements. However, the choice-of-court agreements are sometimes qualified 
as procedural 117 or substantive with procedural effects.118 
                                                          
112 A. BRIGGS, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, op. cit., p. 258, 259. See opposite approach, 
where a choice-of-court agreement is perceived as bilateral (“negozi processuali bilaterali”): L. PENASA, Gli 
accordi sulla giurisdizione tra parti e terzi, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 92. 
113 A. BRIGGS, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, op. cit., p. 278, L. PENASA, Gli accordi sulla 
giurisdizione tra parti e terzi, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 65. 
114 L. PENASA, Gli accordi sulla giurisdizione tra parti e terzi, op. cit, Vol. 1, p. 75 et seq. 
115 J. STEINLE, E. VASILIADES, The Enforcement of Jurisdiction Agreements under the Brussels I Regulation: 
Reconsidering the Principle of Party Autonomy, Journal of Private International Law, 6:3 (2015), p. 576. 
116 For example, mainly in Germany, the jurisdiction clauses are effective only when it may be assumed that the 
jurisdiction clauses have mandatory effects and provide for the sanctions when one of the parties seises the 
derogated court. See L. PENASA, Gli accordi sulla giurisdizione tra parti e terzi, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 59, footnote 
No 113, where the author makes reference to P. SCHLOSSER, Materiell-rechtliche Wirkungen von (nationalen 
und internationalen) Gerichtsstandsvereinbarungen, in W. HAU, H. SCHMIDT (eds), Liber Amicorum Walter F. 
Lindacher zum 70. Geburtstag am 20. Februar 2007, Heymann, 2007, p. 111; B. HESS, Europäisches 
Zivilprozessrecht, Müller, 2010, p. 318. 
117 For example, Italy is considered as “negozio giuridico processuale”, among the authors affirming the 
procedural nature of the jurisdictional clauses see L. PENASA, Gli accordi sulla giurisdizione tra parti e terzi, op. 
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The procedural character of the choice-of-court clauses is given credence mainly due to the 
fact that the Rome Convention (and the Rome I Regulation) excludes choice-of-court 
agreements from the scope of its application.119 The Economic and Social Committee has 
been consulted during the negotiations of the Rome Convention and excluded jurisdiction 
agreements since “these matters are covered by international civil procedural law, as they 
can be better dealt with in this context”.120 According to the Giuliano and Lagarde Report 
“the matter lies within the sphere of procedure and forms part of the administration of justice 
(exercise of State authority)”.121  
This opinion can be supported by qualifying choice-of-court agreements as procedural 
agreements with procedural effects since it is difficult to imagine that the effect of the act, 
which is inserted into the proceedings, is autonomous and represents only the transition from 
another act with its own legal consequences.122 In other words, the nature of the choice-of-
court agreements is dependent on its effects.123 The adverse characterisation of choice-of-
court agreement as substantive would lead to the application of the substantive rules without 
the possibility to consider the specific, procedural legal act and such would not produce direct 
and immediate effects on procedural situations.124  
On the contrary, according to another theory, which perceives the choice-of-court agreements 
as substantive agreements with the procedural effects, the qualification of the choice-of-court 
agreements as procedural acts would lead to the conclusion that they may produce legal 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
cit, Vol. 1, p. 86; E. RIGHETTI, La Deroga Alla deroga alla giurisdizione, Giuffrè, 2002, p. 213 e 376; G. GAJA, 
La deroga alla giurisdizione italiana, Giuffrè, 1971, p. 256; M. GIULIANO, La giurisdizione civile italiana e lo 
straniero, op. cit., p. 185. In the context of the Brussels regime, see ECJ, Case C-269/95, Francesco Benincasa v 
Dentalkit Srl., 3 July 1997, ECLI:EU:C:1997:337, par. 25: «…jurisdiction clause, which serves a procedural 
purpose, is governed by the provisions of the Convention, whose aim is to establish uniform rules of 
international jurisdiction.». 
118 Mainly in Germany so-called “materiell-rechtliche verträge über prozessuale beziehungen”, see BGH NJW 
1968, 1233; BGH NJW, 1972, 1622; BGH NJW1989,1431; BGH NJW 1997, 2885. See also F. SPARKA, 
Jurisdiction and Arbitration Clauses in Maritime Transport Documents: A Comparative Analysis. Hamburg 
Studies on Maritime Affairs, Springer Science & Business Media, 2010, p. 30, 87.  
119 See Article 1 par. 2 lett. d) of the Rome Convention and Article 1 par. 2 lett. e) of the Rome I Regulation. 
120 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), CESE/2006/1153, 13 
September 2006, point 3.1.4. 
121 Article 1 par. 5 of Giuliano and Lagarde Report. 
122 L. PENASA, Gli accordi sulla giurisdizione tra parti e terzi, op. cit, Vol. 1, p. 88. 
123 Ibidem, p. 114. 
124 Ibidem, p. 89, 90. 
  
37 
 
effects only once they are plead in the proceedings.125 This substantive nature must also be 
deduced a priori due to the fact that jurisdiction agreements are bilateral, as in case of 
contracts.126  
 
3. Law Applicable to the Choice-of-Court Agreements 
It can be summarised that the qualification of the nature and effects of the choice-of-court 
agreements has a significant impact on the legislative choices concerning the law applicable 
to the choice-of-court agreements. Thus, the following division should result: 
- when choice-of-court agreements are qualified as substantive agreements, the law applicable 
to the choice-of-court agreements should be identified using provisions of private 
international law;127 
- when choice-of-court agreements are qualified as procedural legal acts with procedural 
effects, the law applicable to the choice-of-court agreements should be governed by the 
procedural provisions of lex fori;128  
- when choice-of-court agreements are qualified as substantive agreements with procedural 
effects, then admissibility and the efficacy should be governed by lex fori, but the 
substantive nature should permit the application of lex causae according to the provisions of 
private international law regarding substantive validity.129 
However, the doctrine, the legislation, and the national case-law do not connect necessarily 
the nature and the effects of the choice-of-court agreements with the choices concerning 
                                                          
125 Ibidem, p. 84. 
126 On the critique see L. PENASA, Gli accordi sulla giurisdizione tra parti e terzi, op. cit, Vol. 1, p. 85. 
127 See A. BRIGGS, P. REES, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgements, op. cit, p. 172, 465, 474, the English law 
considers the validity and the scope as a contractual matter governed by the law of the contract in which it is 
contained. Therefore, the law governing the jurisdiction agreement will usually be specified by the Rome 
Convention. The parties may also provide for a separate law to govern the jurisdiction agreement and may make 
such an agreement distinct from a substantive contract. The principle of severability resolved the problem of the 
alleged invalidity of the main contract. 
128 Study JLS/C4/2005/03, Report on the Application of Regulation Brussels I in the Member States, presented 
by B. HESS, T. PFEIFFER, P. SCHLOSSER, (“Heidelberg Report”), par. 377; I. QUEIROLO, Gli accordi sulla 
competenza giurisdizionale: tra diritto comunitario e diritto interno, op. cit, p. 203, L. Penasa, Gli accordi sulla 
giurisdizione tra parti e terzi, op. cit, Vol. 1, p. 141. 
129 P. E. NYGH, Autonomy in International Contracts, op. cit, p. 38, where the author divides the law governing 
the validity (and possibly the existence) of the choice of jurisdiction, and the question of whether the prorogued 
forum will accept the jurisdiction and whether the derogated forum will accept its exclusion (the permissibility of 
prorogation and derogation). 
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applicable law. For example, according to the German doctrine, although the procedural 
nature of the choice-of-court agreements has been upheld, it does not mean that lex fori is 
automatically applied to all situations.130 Moreover, some of the doctrines consider 
jurisdiction agreements as a matter of procedural law and apply lex causae instead of lex 
fori.131 This approach concerns the choice-of-court agreements as the legal acts accomplished 
outside the proceedings, which should be governed by conflict-of-law rules instead of lex fori, 
which concerns only legal acts performed within the proceedings.132 This divergence 
demonstrates that the nature of choice-of-court agreements does not have necessarily a direct 
impact on the applicable law, but the nature of the choice-of-court agreements influences the 
legislation choices in respect of the applicable law. In particular, classification of the choice-
of-court agreements may play a significant factor in respect of the determination of law 
applicable to the substantive validity to the choice-of-court agreements since the 
admissibility, and the formal validity is usually governed by lex fori.133 Substantive validity 
covers the question whether the jurisdiction agreement was procured by misrepresentation, 
mistake, frustration, duress, etc. Although the Brussels Ibis Regulation134 and the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreement135 provides for express answers regarding the 
                                                          
130 When the prorogued court should apply lex fori, but derogated court would apply lex causae see L. PENASA, 
Gli accordi sulla giurisdizione tra parti e terzi, op. cit, Vol. 1, p. 118, 126, which makes reference to G. 
WAGNER, Prozeßverträge, Mohr Siebeck, 1998, p. 353. 
131 F. SPARKA, Jurisdiction and Arbitration Clauses in Maritime Transport Documents: A Comparative Analysis. 
Hamburg Studies on Maritime Affairs, op. cit, p. 87. 
132 This theory is rejected by L. PENASA, Gli accordi sulla giurisdizione tra parti e terzi, op. cit, Vol. 1, p. 117 
133 See also L. PENASA, Gli accordi sulla giurisdizione tra parti e terzi, op. cit, Vol. 1, p. 120, where the author 
refers to the theory of G. WAGNER, Prozeßverträge, Mohr Siebeck, 1998, p.358. According to this theory, the lex 
fori must be applied in respect of admissibility and effects. For example, in Italy, in case of prorogation and 
derogation, the jurisdiction agreement is admissible when the non-derogated (exclusive) jurisdiction is respected 
and when the agreement is written. Moreover, in case of derogation, other conditions are established: the claim 
concerns available rights (“diritti diponibili”); the designated courts do not decline jurisdiction, see in this 
respect F. C. VILLATA, Sulla legge applicabile alla validità sostanziale degli accordi di scelta del foro: appunti 
per una revisione dell’art. 4 della legge n. 218/1995, Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale, 
(2015), p. 978. Article 4 of law 218/1995 takes into consideration the only admissibility of the derogation of the 
Italian court and not of other derogated courts through renvoi – see L. PENASA, Gli accordi sulla giurisdizione 
tra parti e terzi, op. cit, Vol. 1, p. 127. 
134 See Recital no 20 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation: «Where a question arises as to whether a choice-of-court 
agreement in favour of a court or the courts of a Member State is null and void as to its substantive validity, that 
question should be decided in accordance with the law of the Member State of the court or courts designated in 
the agreement, including the conflict-of-laws rules of that Member State». On the substantive validity under the 
Brussels Regime see infra Chapter Two, Subchapter I, Section 8. 
135 See Article 5 par. 1 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreement in case of the jurisdiction of the 
chosen court and Article 6 lett. a) and lett. b) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements in case of 
the jurisdiction of a court not nonchosen. Whether the agreement is null and void will be determined according 
to the law of the chosen court, but an a unchosen court may consider the capacity of the parties according to its 
lex fori. 
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substantive validity of the jurisdiction agreements, the national rules on choice-of-court may 
come into play on several occasions. In practice, national rules governing substantive validity 
of the jurisdiction agreements apply: (i) when jurisdiction is conferred to Third State courts 
that are not party to the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreement and Lugano 
Conventions (“Third States”) on the basis of the jurisdiction agreement and the claim 
concerns civil and commercial matters;136 (ii) when jurisdiction is conferred to Member States 
or to Third States on the basis of the jurisdiction agreement concerning family or succession 
matters, and such a jurisdiction agreement does not contravene to the EU law,137 or a to the 
national law; or (iii) in respect of ongoing proceedings instituted before 10 January 2015, 
when jurisdiction was conferred to the Member State courts on the basis of the jurisdiction 
agreement, and the claim falls under the scope of application of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation.138  
In all these cases where the national rules on choice-of-court applies and there is a “gap” 
concerning the law applicable to the substantive validity, the options for the national courts 
are following: (i) to apply own lex fori by the seized, prorogued and derogated forum; (ii) to 
apply the national law of the designated court by both seized, prorogued and derogated forum; 
(iii) to apply own national conflict-of-laws rules by the seized, prorogued and derogated 
forum, such as lex causae; or (iv) to apply national conflict-of-laws rules of the designated 
court by both the seized, prorogued and derogated forum, such as lex causae. 
All scenarios offer advantages and disadvantages at the same time. The need for simplicity 
and predictability, without any complications, is guaranteed by the application of lex fori 
excluding its conflict-of-laws rules. On the opposite side stands the application of conflict-of-
laws rules, which may lead to unpredictable results ex ante. The application of lex fori mirrors 
                                                          
136 If we presume that there is no potential clash with ECJ, Case C-281/02, Owusu. 
137 The jurisdiction agreements are permitted in maintenance matters, see Article 4 of the Maintenance 
Regulation, in succession matters according to Article 5 of the Succession Regulation; according to Article 5 and 
7 of the Regulations on the Property Regime; the jurisdiction agreements sui generis in parental responsibility 
matters according to Article 12 of the Brussels IIa Regulation. The question of substantive validity is not 
regulated in these EU regulations. On the substantive validity under the Maintenance Regulation see infra 
Chapter Three, Subchapter I, Section 3.5.; on the substantive validity under the Regulations on the Property 
Regime see infra Chapter Three, Subchapter I, Section 4.4.; on the substantive validity under the Brussels IIa 
Regulation see infra Chapter Three, Subchapter I, Section 2.5.; on the substantive validity under the Succession 
Regulation see infra Chapter Three, Subchapter II, Section 2.2.3. 
138 See Article 66 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation: «…this Regulation shall apply only to legal proceedings 
instituted, to authentic instruments formally drawn up or registered and to court settlements approved or 
concluded on or after 10 January 2015.». 
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the perception of choice-of-court agreements as procedural agreements since they do not 
interfere with the substantive law, and thus renvoi to the foreign law is excluded.139 Therefore, 
if we admit that jurisdiction agreements, which are considered to be procedural legal acts, 
should be governed by the national rules without referring to the conflict-of-laws rules, 
another question arises: whether the seized court should apply its own lex fori or the national 
rules of the prorogued court. The application of own lex fori by both, derogated and 
prorogued court, also offers to the seized derogated courts a clear and practical solution 
without the need to ascertain the foreign law of the prorogued forum. Moreover, both courts 
can very simply give effect to their own overriding mandatory rules which could not be 
otherwise applied, and which may prohibit the derogation from the domestic jurisdiction. 
However, the application of lex fori in two different States (i.e., by the derogated and 
prorogued court) could lead to positive or negative conflicts of jurisdictions.140 Moreover, 
applying lex fori may lead to abusive, legal tactics in order to escape from the effects of the 
jurisdiction agreement, as such for example due to the mentioned overriding mandatory rules 
of the seized derogated forum. The application of the lex fori excluding conflict-of-laws rules 
only of the designated court by the seized court, which can be the prorogued court, as well as 
the derogated court, seems to be much more coherent in respect of the view of non-
contrasting jurisdictions and unified solutions, when both courts evaluate the substantive 
validity according to a single law. 141 The possibility of applying the same law should be 
considered from another point of view - the designation of specific national courts reflects the 
will of the parties also in regard to the law applicable to the substantive validity of the choice-
of-court agreement, although such an intention is not expressed.142 The effect of the 
                                                          
139 L. PENASA, Gli accordi sulla giurisdizione tra parti e terzi, op. cit, Vol. 1, p. 125. 
140 F. C. VILLATA, Sulla legge applicabile alla validità sostanziale degli accordi di scelta del foro: appunti per 
una revisione dell’art. 4 della legge n. 218/1995, op. cit., p. 981; L. Penasa, Gli accordi sulla giurisdizione tra 
parti e terzi, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 130. 
141 On this solution under the Brussels Ibis Regulation, see infra Chapter Two, Subchapter I, Section 8.2. See 
also ECJ, Case C-150/80, Elefanten Schuh GmbH v Jacqmain, The Opinion of Advocate General Sir Gordon 
Slynn, 20 May 1981, ECLI:EU:C:1981:112, p. 1699, the Advocat General stated: «A further question arises as 
to which court decides the validity of the agreement under the national law of the named forum. One possibility 
is that the court in which the question is raised should immediately refer the matter to the named forum for 
decision under its own national law. There are advantages in this but I do not consider that it is right. It seems to 
me that the court seised of the challenge of jurisdiction must itself decide the validity of the agreement (other 
than in relation to the provisions as to form specified in Article 17 itself) under the national law of the named 
forum.». See also authors in note 36, 37 and 28 quoted by L. PENASA, Gli accordi sulla giurisdizione tra parti e 
terzi, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 130. 
142 L. PENASA, Gli accordi sulla giurisdizione tra parti e terzi, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 130, note 38, according to the 
author sucha conclusion is a legally unacceptable presumption. 
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overriding mandatory rules of the derogated court could come into play only in the case when 
they, by virtue of the national law, would fall into the category of “admissibility” which is 
governed by the lex fori of the seized, derogated court, but the substantive validity is 
determined according to lex fori of the designated court.143 
However, it seems that both options concerning the application of the lex fori, and excluding 
the conflict-of-laws rules, would not allow optio legis, i.e., the parties’ independent choice of 
the law applicable to the choice-of-court agreements.144 The parties’ choice could be gained 
by the operation of the conflict-of-laws rules.145 The conflict-of-law rules solution reflects the 
perception of the choice-of-court agreement as a substantive matter. Also, in this case, the 
question arises whether the seized, derogated court should apply its own conflict-of-law rules 
or the conflict-of-law rules only of the designated court.146 The application of its own conflict-
of-law rules by the seized, derogated court opens the door to the straightforward application 
of its own overriding mandatory rules. However, the second scenario, when the seized, 
derogated court should apply the conflict-of-law rules of the designated court, would 
practically exclude the application of its own overriding mandatory rules, apart from the 
situation when renvoi refers back to the law of the derogated court.147 Such a conclusion is 
strengthened when a State classifies the overriding mandatory rules as a matter of substantive 
validity instead of admissibility, which could allow the application of overriding mandatory 
rules of the seized, derogated court. 148  
                                                          
143 See infra note148. 
144 See L. PENASA, Gli accordi sulla giurisdizione tra parti e terzi, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 147; F. C. Villata, Sulla 
legge applicabile alla validità sostanziale degli accordi di scelta del foro: appunti per una revisione dell’art. 4 
della legge n. 218/1995, op. cit., p. 981; since they must be determined in virtue of procedural provisions see I. 
QUEIROLO, Gli accordi sulla competenza giurisdizionale: tra diritto comunitario e diritto interno, op. cit., p. 
203. 
145 See I. QUEIROLO, Gli accordi sulla competenza giurisdizionale: tra diritto comunitario e diritto interno, op. 
cit., p. 204. 
146 The latter solution corresponds to the rule laid down in the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
147 See this conclusion in respect of the Brussels Ibis Regulation in J. BASEDOW, Exclusive choice-of-court 
agreements as a derogation from imperative norms, in Essays in Honour of Michael Bogdan, Juristförlaget, 
2013, p. 19. 
148 There are discussions in respect of the Brussels Ibis Regulation whether the overriding mandatory rules or 
public order can be classified as issues regarding admissibility which can be assigned to the national law or to 
substantive validity. See J. BASEDOW, Exclusive Choice-of-court Court Agreements as a Derogation from 
Imperative Norms, op. cit., p. 20, which is oriented towards the substantive validity and see U. MAGNUS, Article 
23, in U. MAGNUS, P. MANKOWSKI (eds), Brussels I Regulation, 2eds, Sellier European Law Publishers, 2012, 
par. 65 et seq., 75 et seq., which suggests to include the compatibility of the choice-of-court clause with public 
policy in “admissibility”. See also L. PENASA, Gli accordi sulla giurisdizione tra parti e terzi, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 
121 which refers to the authors in footnote No 20, which affirm that the law chosen by the parties, or the lex 
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In conclusion, it can be stated that the identification of the law applicable to the jurisdiction 
agreements is subject to the legislative decisions in the specific States, i.e., whether the States 
apply lex fori prorogati by prorogued and derogated courts, or lex fori of respective courts, or 
lex causae. The non-unified approaches flowing up from the choices of the national 
legislators result in different outcomes. Even more, unpredictable consequences derive from 
the “silence” of national acts in this respect.149 The impossibility to predict the outcome as to 
the law applicable to the choice-of-court agreements may discourage the parties from entering 
into the choice-of-court agreements. At least, the gap may be refilled by the constant national 
case law. Another acceptable solution might be closer to loopholes in the rule on substantive 
validity considering the Brussels Ibis Regulation or the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreement. 
 
III. Choice-of-Court Agreements in the International Disputes and its Limitations 
1. Functions of the Choice-of-Court Agreements 
The parties express their autonomy by designating a competent court. Parties are free to agree 
which court shall have jurisdiction over the dispute, which arises or may arise, between the 
parties and their freedom is counterbalanced by imposing reasonable limits. “Jurisdiction 
clauses”, or “forum selection clauses” or “choice-of-court clauses” are synonyms for the 
parties’ agreement on the forum. Due to the different characteristics which can be attributed to 
the choice-of-court agreements, a single definition is hard to provide. There are several types 
of jurisdiction clauses. Jurisdiction clauses may form part of the main contract, or may be 
drafted on the separate document, may be exclusive or non-exclusive, may designate specific 
court or courts of specific states, may be symmetric, asymmetric, alternative etc. Thus, the 
definition, the admissibility, the effects and the conditions must be found in the applicable 
legal instrument, either national or international. The Impact Assessment on the Ratification 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
contractus should regulate the admissibility, but the certain limits (such as protection of the weaker parties) of 
lex fori can operate in case of the imperative norms or in case of positive public order. F. C. VILLATA, Sulla 
legge applicabile alla validità sostanziale degli accordi di scelta del foro: appunti per una revisione dell’art. 4 
della legge n. 218/1995, op. cit., p. 985, affirms that the derogated court could verify the conditions of 
admissibility of the Italian jurisdiction in order to protect interests of the legal order. 
149 For example, in Italy where Article 4 of 218/1995 do not provide for any expressed rule on the applicable 
law, see F. C. VILLATA, Sulla legge applicabile alla validità sostanziale degli accordi di scelta del foro: appunti 
per una revisione dell’art. 4 della legge n. 218/1995, op. cit., p. 973-986. 
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of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements defines the choice-of-court 
agreement as  
…an agreement through which parties to a contract agree that any future conflict arising 
out of that contract should be resolved by a court.150 
Choice-of-court agreements provide for greater certainty and predictability for parties by 
enabling them to litigate in front of a designated court. In the international context, courts can 
recognise a judgment issued by the selected court in another state. They also allow the parties 
(with same bargaining powers) to select the venue of their shared interest, or at least avoid 
trying the case in an undesirable forum by designating a neutral one. The exclusive 
jurisdiction agreements may anticipate and minimalize clashes over the venue, and thus they 
prevent self-interested jurisdictional battles caused by the forum shopping.151 In this manner, 
the neutral forum guarantees the parties will have the same position in civil proceedings and 
the parties do not face risk of being sued in front of the other party’s home court, or in front of 
the most advantage one.152 Several factors should be taken into consideration by the parties 
entering into a forum-selection clause. 
By designating a specific court, the parties can assess their rights and obligations according to 
the procedural rules of the chosen forum. The attractiveness of the forum is also represented 
by the procedural rules the lex fori.153 The importance of procedural rules cannot be 
downgraded: the procedural rules determine the conduct of the hearing, the time limits, the 
requirements of written filings, the legal remedies, the legal costs and the cost recovery, the 
mode and the speed of litigation, and the quality and the ability of the courts. Last but not 
least, the lex fori also governs the mentioned dispositive principle and operation of party 
autonomy during the proceedings. In any case, good knowledge of procedural rules 
contributes to the successful result of the dispute. A specific experience or expertise, the 
                                                          
150 Impact Assessment on the Ratification of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, p. 6. 
151 A. BELL, Forum Shopping and Venue in Transnational Litigation, op. cit., p. 275. 
152 G. BORN, International Arbitration and Forum Selection Agreements: Drafting and Enforcing, Kluwer Law 
International, 2016, 4eds., p. 3. 
153 K. KERAMEUS, Procedural harmonization in Europe, The American Journal of Comparative law, 43:3 
(1995), p. 404; M. A. LUPOI, Conflitti transnazionali di giurisdizione, Giuffrè, 2002, 2eds, p. 26. The 
proceedings are regulated by lex fori, with certain exceptions. Sometimes the procedural rules follow lex causae 
or lex diligentiae, see: J. DOLINGER, C. TIBURCIO, The Forum Law Rule in International Litigation–Which 
Procedural Law Governs Proceedings to Be Performed in Foreign Jurisdictions: Lex fori or Lex Diligentiae. 
Texas International Law Journal, 33 (1998), p. 425; A. SURANA, International Civil Procedure and Principle 
of’Lex fori’, 2006, available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=915923. 
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specific language skills, the distance of the parties in respect of the selected forum, or a good 
reputation of the courts help the parties to decide on the designation of such a court. The 
designation of the domestic court or a court which may favour only one of the parties may 
play an essential role during the negotiation of the contract and may be decisive for the result 
of the potential dispute.  
In the absence of a choice-of-law agreement, the choice of a court has a significant impact on 
the law which is applied to the dispute. If the international or EU legal instruments do not 
unify or harmonize the applicable law, the designated court determines the applicable law 
according to its own national law. Although the importance of the selection of the competent 
court as to the impact to the applicable law is “weakened” when the choice-of-court 
agreement is coupled by a choice-of-law agreement, on the contrary, predictability and 
certainty of the parties are escalated.  
The most important advantage is that parallel proceedings regarding the same dispute between 
the same parties may be avoided by exclusive choice-of-court agreements. When an exclusive 
forum-selection agreement lacks, the jurisdictions of courts in different states may overlap 
and may result in inconsistent judgments.154 Moreover, as already stated, the forum-selection 
agreements may be perceived as an instrument for anticipating forum shopping since the 
parties have the freedom to minimise any potential clashes by the agreement.155 The choice-
of-forum clauses also assist in predicting whether the judgment will be recognized and 
enforced in the requested state. The conventions on judicial cooperation between the chosen 
and required court increase the possibility of successful recognition or enforcement of the 
judgment in the requested state. Therefore, the tendency of concluding international 
conventions in the field of jurisdiction (covering the lis alibi pendens rule and the rule on 
prevention of parallel proceedings) and recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment 
concerning the choice-of-court agreements is growing, and the efficiency of the rules on 
choice-of-court agreements is maximised. 
 
                                                          
154 C. MACLACHLAN, Lis pendens in International Litigation, in Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of 
International Law, The Hague Academy of International Law, 336 (2008), p. 199, 231.  
155 A. BELL, Forum Shopping and Venue in Transnational Litigation, op. cit., p. 276. 
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1.1.  Practical Use of Choice-of-Court Agreements 
Several studies concerning the practical use of the choice-of-court agreements were 
published. The Oxford University paid attention to the choice-of-forum clauses in civil and 
commercial matters and revealed several interesting facts – England, Italy, Germany, and 
Switzerland were preferable choices as home bias.156 However, when the party, which opted 
for home bias, should choose other forum, States like Switzerland, England, France, or 
Germany were among the top choices. Countries like Poland or Spain were not preferred by 
hometown parties, or by parties coming from other states. Thus, what are the factors which 
are reflected in the parties’ choice? The parties in the business sector consider mainly the 
quality of judges and court (4,39%), the fairness of the outcome and corruption (4,38%), the 
predictability of outcomes (4,32%), or the speed of dispute resolution (4,15%). All these 
answers lead to the conclusion that business parties assume that the quality of judges is higher 
for example in Switzerland than in Poland, that the corruption is lower in England than in 
Spain, etc. However, according to professor Vogenaurer, the parties, are influenced mainly by 
familiarity or image of the forum, and thus, the legal factors do not dominate a party’s 
choice.157 However, the crucial factors for selection of the specific courts represent 
undoubtedly the experience and the expertise of the courts and single judges. In Switzerland, 
England, France, or Germany specialised commercial courts were established.158 Moreover, 
all preferred states are bound by the Brussels Ibis Regulation159 and/or the 2007 Lugano 
Convention, which guarantee the successful recognition and enforcement of the judgment in 
other Member or Contracting States. Nowadays, other States try to attract parties and offer 
them higher standards, better procedures with more experiences, and proceedings in another 
language.160 For example, a special state court in the Netherlands (Netherlands Commercial 
                                                          
156 See question n. 30 of final results of the study Civil Justice Systems in Europe: Implications for Choice of 
Forum and Choice of Contract Law, available at: http://www.fondation-droitcontinental.org/fr/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/oxford_civil_justice_survey_-_summary_of_results_final.pdf. 
157 S. VOGENAUER, Regulatory Competition through the Choice of Contract Law and Choice of Forum in 
Europe: Theory and Evidence, in H. EIDENMÜLLER (ed), Regulatory Competition in Contract Law and Dispute 
Resolution, C.H. Beck and Hart Publishing, 2013, p. 256-263. 
158 M. ZIMMER, Overview of Specialized Courts, International Journal for Court Administration, 2:1 (2009), 
available at: http://ijca.ubiquitypress.com/Articles/10.18352/ijca.111/galley/92/download/;  
159 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 351, 20 
December 2012, (“Brussels Ibis Regulation”). 
160 On competition between the national systems see: A. OGUS, Competition between National Legal Systems: A 
Contribution of Economic Analysis to Comparative Law, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 48:2 
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Court) for large national and international commercial disputes should open their doors during 
the course of 2018 and should offer to the party’s specialized judges, English or Dutch 
language proceedings, shorter proceedings, paperless litigation, recovery options, and no risk 
of high adversary party costs or awards if claims are dismissed, etc.161 
Civil litigation gains popularity and can compete with arbitration proceedings in the civil and 
commercial matters. Two surveys analyzed the popularity and the use of arbitration and civil 
litigation in practice. The first questionnaire on international arbitration spread out among 101 
corporate counsels by the Queen Mary University, and PWC in London in 2013 found out 
that most of the financial services sector organisations prefer litigation over arbitration;162 
when it is not possible to settle amicably, the same percentage of persons opted in for 
arbitration and litigation.163 A more recent survey from 2015 conducted by White and Case 
and Queen Mary University on arbitration revealed a stronger preference for arbitration over 
civil litigation.164 However, the survey conducted by PWC in 2005 in Germany shows the 
opposite tendency – the most of the companies primarily prefer to use negotiation and 
litigation for national and international disputes.165Also, the improvement of the national 
procedural law, competition among national legal systems, the creation of specialised courts, 
and the existence of useful international legal instruments on jurisdiction and recognition and 
enforcement of judgments should offer same advantages as arbitration proceedings.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(1999), p. 405–418; G. WAGNER, The Dispute Resolution Market, Buffalo Law Review, 62 (2014), p. 1085 et 
seq. On the advantageous and disadvantageous of the specialised courts see R. C. DREYFUSS, Forums of the 
Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in Resolving Business Disputes’, Brooklyn Law Review, 61 (1995), p. 1 
et seq.; R. C. DREYFUSS, Specialized Adjudication, Brigham Young University Law Review, 1 (1990), p. 377-
441; M. J. KROEZE, The Dutch Companies and Business Court as a Specialized Court, Ondernemingsrecht 29 
(2007), pp. 86-91. 
161 On the information see https://netherlands-commercial-court.com/. On 11 December 2018 the Dutch Senate 
voted to create the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC District Court and NCC Court of Appeal) as part of the 
Amsterdam courts. The Minister of Justice and Security should now issue a decree for the NCC legislation to 
enter into force. In this regard see https://www.rechtspraak.nl/English/NCC. 
162 See Corporate Choices in International Arbitration, 2013 International Arbitration Survey, available at: 
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=2ahUKEwilqf3YopzdAhVwha
YKHYoYBq4QFjAAegQIABAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.pwc.com%2Fgx%2Fen%2Farbitration-dispute-
resolution%2Fassets%2Fpwc-international-arbitration-
study.pdf&usg=AOvVaw1_vHC8B91K8Wkw45j86wBM, p. 7. 
163 47 %, see 2013 International Arbitration Survey, p. 7. 
164 90 % of respondents answered that over the past five years they used international arbitration for cross-border 
disputes and 43 % cross-border litigation. 763 respondents completed an online questionnaire. See 2015 
International Arbitration, Survey Improvements and Innovations in International Arbitration, available at: 
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/2015-international-arbitration-survey-improvements-and-
innovations, p.53.  
165 See summary: https://www.ikm.europa-uni.de/de/publikationen/IKM_PwC_Commercial-Dispute-
Resolution_english-summary_2005.pdf  
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2. Limitation to Party Autonomy in respect of Choice-of-Court Agreements 
The core of party autonomy is an idea that parties have the liberty to use their independence 
within the boundaries.166 However, as we could see supra in a Subchapter II, the situation 
with respect to the choice-of-court agreements is not so simple due to their hybrid nature. But 
in any case, the limits are necessary aspects in order to construct barriers for the freedom of 
the parties which should counterbalance their rights to protect their specific interests.  
The purpose of this subchapter is not to describe limits to party autonomy on general level, 
but it restricts the analysis to choice-of-court agreements.167 The limitations of party 
autonomy in respect of choice-of-court agreements with the cross-border element may be 
divided into two categories: (i) overriding mandatory rules and public policy control; and (ii) 
protection of the weaker parties. As we will see, the overriding mandatory rules and the 
protection of the weaker parties often overlap and are complementary to each other: 
overriding mandatory rules represent the interest of the State which also includes the 
protection of the weaker parties. Sometimes it is not possible to set boundaries between these 
two categories. Moreover, it is questionable whether the doctrine of forum non conveniens 
could be categorized as a third type of limitation to party autonomy. However, due to the 
discretionary power of the court often resulting in the dismissal of the valid choice-of-court 
agreement, the forum non conveniens will be considered as another type of limitation to the 
party autonomy. This may be supported by the fact that the overriding mandatory rules and 
public policy exception are factors when deciding whether the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens is upheld for the specific dispute. 
 
                                                          
166 L. ERVO, Nordic Court Culture in Progress: Historical and Futuristic Perspectives, in L. ERVO, A. NYLUND 
(eds), The Future of Civil Litigation: Access to Courts and Court-Annexed Mediation in the Nordic Countries, 
Springer, 2014, p. 389-396. 
167 On the restrictions regarding the choice of law, see: P. E. NYGH, Autonomy in International Contracts, op., 
cit., p. 15. According to the author, the contract should have an international character; the chosen law should 
have connection with the transaction or parties; the chosen law should be of a contemporary municipal system; 
the choice should be bona fide and legal and not contrary to public policy and the choice should be made freely 
and voluntary. 
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2.1.  Public Policy and Overriding Mandatory Rules 
Major part of civil law countries does not usually apply the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens.168 In order to counterbalance unlimited party autonomy, specific “emergency 
breaks” has been introduced. Although certainty and predictability represent important values, 
the substantive law which protects the strong State policies and precludes abuse of unlimited 
party autonomy is primary. Party autonomy is not usually respected when it contravenes the 
overriding mandatory rules of the forum (positive effect) or when the restrictions are 
necessary for securing the public interest and the fundamental principles of the State (negative 
effect).169 The international, overriding mandatory rules and the substantive public-policy 
exception have a common scope: they safeguard the public interests of the forum. However, 
each of these requires separate attention.170 The overriding mandatory rules and rules on 
public policy are applied irrespectively of the law otherwise applicable to the dispute.171 Such 
rules are usually regulated in the national, EU and international law.172 A definition of the 
                                                          
168 However, for example in Sweden, the courts have a certain margin of appreciation which may be perceived as 
forum non conveniens, see M. BOGDAN, Sweden, in J. J. FAWCETT (ed), Declining Jurisdiction in Private 
International Law: Reports to the XIVth Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law, Oxford 
University Press, 1995, p. 373-374. 
169 A. BĚLOHLÁVEK, Public Policy and Public Interest in International Law and EU Law, in A. BĚLOHLÁVEK, N. 
ROZEHNALOVÁ, Czech Yearbook of International Law: Public Policy and Ordre Public, p. 139. 
170 On the differences between public policy and overriding mandatory rules, see F. FERRARI, S. LEIBLE, Rome I 
Regulation: The Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations in Europe, Sellier. European Law Pub, 2009, p. 
297; R. FENTIMAN, International Commercial Litigation, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 114-151. However, 
see for example that The Hague Principles address public policy and overriding mandatory provisions in a single 
Article, which differs from the Hague Conference’s traditional approach separating these two concepts. 
171 See A. BONOMI, Le norme imperative nel diritto internazionale privato: considerazioni sulla Convenzione 
europea sulla legge applicabile alle obbligazioni contrattuali del 19 giugno 1980 nonché sulle leggi italiana e 
svizzera di diritto internazionale privato, Schulthess, 1998.  
172 On the public policy in EU law see L. FUMAGALLI, L’ordine pubblico nel sistema del diritto internazionale 
privato comunitario, Diritto del Commercio Internazionale 3 (2004), pp. 635-652; L. FUMAGALLI, EC Private 
International Law and the Public Policy Exception. Modern Features of a Traditional Concept, Yearbook of 
Private International Law (2004), pp. 171-183. On the national rules, see for example, in Italy Article16 of the 
Italian Act on Private International Law (rule on public policy): «No foreign law shall be applied whose effects 
are incompatible with public policy (ordre public). In that case, the applicable law shall be determined on the 
basis of other connecting factors possibly provided for with respect to the same matter. In the absence of other 
connecting factors, Italian law applies.»; and Article 17 (rule on overriding mandatory rules): «The following 
dispositions do not prejudice those provisions of Italian law which, because of their object and purpose, are 
applicable irrespective of the reference made to the foreign law.», the non-official translation is available at: 
http://www.unife.it/giurisprudenza/giurisprudenza/studiare/private-international-law/materiale-
didattico/archivio/italian-statute-on-private-international-law-of-31-may-1995-no-218-as-originally-adopted-
unofficial-english-translation/view. In the Czech Republic, see Article 3 of Zákon č. 91/2012 Sb. o 
mezinárodním právu soukromém (“Czech Act on Private International Law”) governing overriding mandatory 
rules: «The provisions of this Act do not prevent the use of those provisions of Czech law which must always be 
used within the bounds of the regulation of their given subject areas regardless of which body of laws the legal 
relations, in which the effects of the use of any such provisions are manifest, are subject to.»; and Article 4 (rule 
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international overriding mandatory rules may also be found in the EU regulations, for 
example in Article 9 para 1 of the Rome I Regulation:  
Overriding mandatory provisions are provisions the respect for which is regarded as 
crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or 
economic organisation, to such an extent that they are applicable to any situation falling 
within their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract under this 
Regulation.173  
The overriding mandatory rules are positive norms aiming at enforcing the public interest and 
protect the political, social, or economic order. They are applied irrespective of the chosen or 
otherwise applicable law. Thus, they are enforced irrespective of the law determined by the 
conflict-of-laws rules, and they even precede the application of the conflict-of-laws rules. The 
question arises what kind of the interests are triggers since the definition does not include an 
exhaustive list of such interests due to the phrase “such as”. The overriding mandatory 
provisions are internationally binding and must be distinguished from the “ordinary” or the 
“simple” mandatory provisions that might be avoided by the choice of law.174 The notion of 
public policy includes a general category of values which cover the concepts of morality and 
justice that are subject to the protection of the overriding mandatory rules. However, the term 
public policy is a narrower term than then overriding mandatory rules when its function is to 
prevent the application of foreign rules which can seriously violate the system’s fundamental 
principles.175 The exception of public policy then represents a negative law, it applies after the 
governing law has been determined through the conflict-of-laws rule and allows a final check 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
on public policy): «The provisions of any foreign body of laws which are supposed to be used in accordance 
with the provisions of this Act cannot be applied, if the effects of any such application would clearly contravene 
public order.», the official translation is available at: http://obcanskyzakonik.justice.cz/index.php/home/zakony-
a-stanoviska/preklady/english.  
173 See also Article 7 of the Rome Convention: «When applying under this Convention the law of a country, 
effect may be given to the mandatory rules of the law of another country with which the situation has a close 
connection, if and in so far as, under the law of the latter country, those rules must be applied whatever the law 
applicable to the contract. In considering whether to give effect to these mandatory rules, regard shall be had to 
their nature and purpose and to the consequences of their application or non-application. 2. Nothing in this 
Convention shall restrict the application of the rules of the law of the forum in a situation where they are 
mandatory irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract». 
174 On the difference between internal mandatory rules and overriding mandatory rules see M. PAUKNEROVÁ, 
Mandatory Rules and Public Policy in International Contract Law, ERA Forum, Springer-Verlag, 11:1 (2010), 
p. 30. 
175 A. CHONG, The public policy and mandatory rules of third countries in international contracts, Journal of 
Private International Law, 2:1 (2006), p. 325 
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on the contents.176 The application of a law determined through the conflict-of-laws rules can 
be refused by the court if the application is manifestly incompatible with the public policy of 
the forum. The chosen law is only replaced to the extent of the incompatibility with the 
fundamental principles of the forum.177 The substantive exception of public policy is defined 
in Article 21 of the Rome I Regulation:  
The application of a provision of the law of any country specified by this Regulation may 
be refused only if such application is manifestly incompatible with the public policy 
(order public) of the forum.178  
Although classic examples can be found in family and succession law,179 the Rome III 
Regulation regulates only the rule on public policy control but does not make any statement 
concerning overriding mandatory rules.180 In succession matters, Article 30 of the Succession 
Regulation has introduced special substantive rules imposing restrictions on economic, 
family, and social considerations and Article 35 contains the rule on public policy.  
A question arises whether the overriding mandatory rules or the exception of public policy 
can be considered to be limits on party autonomy in the context of jurisdiction, and 
specifically in choice-of-court agreements. In other words, should a non-chosen court 
disregard the jurisdiction agreement on the grounds of violation of the public policy or the 
overriding mandatory rules of the forum? The invalidation of choice-of-court agreements 
based on the overriding mandatory rules and public policy is a more complicated problem and 
in the literature is sometimes criticised,181 or on the contrary, is deemed to be an inevitable 
feature.182 In this context it must be remembered that derogation from jurisdiction gives the 
                                                          
176 T. M. DE BOER, Unwelcome Foreign Law: Public Policy and Other Means to Protect the Fundamental Values 
and Public Interests of the European Community, in A. MALATESTA, S. BARIATTI, F. POCAR, (eds), The External 
Dimension of EC Private International Law in Family and Succession Matters, CEDAM, 2008, p. 296. 
177 M. PERTEGÁS, B. A. MARSHALL, Harmonization Through the Draft Hague Principles on Choice of Law in 
International Contracts, Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 39:3 (2014), p. 999. 
178 See also Article 16 of the Rome Convention: «The application of a rule of the law of any country specified by 
this Convention may be refused only if such application is manifestly incompatible with the public policy (‘ordre 
public’) of the forum.». 
179 See M. PAUKNEROVÁ, Mandatory Rules and Public Policy in International Contract Law, op. cit, p. 31. 
180 On the potential problems regarding the lack of rules concerning overriding mandatory rules see S. MARINAI, 
Matrimonial Matters and the Harmonization of Conflict of Laws: A Way to Reduce the Role of Public Policy as 
a Ground for Non-Recognition of Judgments, in Yearbook of Private International Law, 13 (2012), p. 264, 265. 
181 H. SCHACK, Internationales Zivilverfahrensrecht, C.H. Beck, 2014, 6ed, par. 516. 
182 M. WELLER, Choice of Forum Agreements Under the Brussels I Recast and Under the Hague Convention: 
Coherences and Clashes, Journal of Private International Law, available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2827711, p. 12. 
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parties the possibility to escape from the overriding mandatory provisions and from the public 
policy control of the otherwise seized forum in the absence of choice-of-court agreements.  
The answers are left to the national courts, whenever the EU regulations and international 
conventions are not applicable. In the EU, none of the regulations governing the jurisdiction 
contain any rule like Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation regarding the overriding mandatory 
rule or Article 21 concerning public policy exceptions in respect of choice-of-court 
agreements. However, Article 6 lett c) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreement introduced the “escape clause”. This clause provides for the possibility of the 
national court not to suspend or dismiss proceedings when the agreement “…would lead to a 
manifest injustice or would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the state of the court 
seized.”. Such a public policy exception may be found in the Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreement – a non-designated court is permitted to disregard a valid jurisdiction 
agreement and to proceed with the case if it finds that a jurisdiction agreement is contrary to 
the public policy of the lex fori. Hartley and Dogauchi explain this rule as “situations where 
the chosen court would not apply some rule or principle that was regarded in the State of the 
court seized as being manifestly part of its fundamental public policy.”183  
 
2.1.1. Case law concerning the Interference of the Overriding Mandatory Rules with 
the Choice-of-Court Agreements 
In this chapter, the subsequent case-law demonstrates how the overriding mandatory rules or 
public policy exception intervene in party autonomy regarding the choice of jurisdiction. In 
order to step forward with the considerations regarding the overriding mandatory rules and 
public policy in the context of choice-of-court agreements, the cases Trasporti Castelletti,184 
CDC,185 Unamar,186 and Ingmar187 rendered by the ECJ must be firstly mentioned (although 
the latter one concerns only choice-of-law clauses). 
                                                          
183 Prel. Doc. No 25 of March 2004 - Explanatory Report on the Preliminary Draft Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements, drawn up by Trevor C. Hartley and Masato Dogauchi, par. 97. 
184 ECJ, Case C-159/97, Trasporti Castelletti Spedizioni Internazionali SpA v Hugo Trumpy SpA, 16 March 
1999, ECLI:EU:C:1999:142. 
185 ECJ, Case C-352/13, Cartel Damage Claims (CDC) Hydrogen Peroxide SA v Evonik Degussa GmbH and 
Others, 21 May 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:335 and Case C-352/13, Cartel Damage Claims (CDC) Hydrogen 
Peroxide SA v Evonik Degussa GmbH and Others, Opinion of Advocat General, 11 December 2014, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2443. 
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i) Trasporti Castelletti  
Corte Suprema di Cassazione referred to the ECJ a preliminary ruling in a dispute, between 
Trasporti Castelletti Spedizioni Internazionali (customer) and Hugo Trumpy (agent for the 
vessel) with their registered offices in Italy and Lauritzen Reefers with registered office in 
Copenhagen (carrier), concerning the compensation for damage caused during the unloading 
of goods carried under the bills of lading from Argentina to Italy. Hugo Trumpy contested 
international jurisdiction due to the jurisdictional clause contained in the bills of lading 
conferring jurisdiction on the High Court of Justice in London. Corte Suprema di Cassazione 
raised fourteen questions as to the consent, form, and validity of the jurisdiction clause 
according to Article 17 of the Brussels Convention. For the current considerations, it is 
decisive only for the question whether the substantive provisions applicable to the chosen 
court and reducing party’s liability may affect the validity of the jurisdiction clause. 
According to the ECJ, in keeping with the spirit of certainty of the Brussels Convention, the 
court should decide on jurisdiction only based on the rules of the Brussels Convention without 
having to consider the substance of the case, in this specific case the substantive rules related 
to the liability of a carrier under a bill of lading. The ECJ justified its reasoning on legal 
certainty in order to foresee which court will have jurisdiction by virtue of Article 17 of the 
Brussels Convention as already interpreted in Benincasa.188 From the decision it follows that 
only formal requirements specifically set out in Article 17 of the Brussels Convention must be 
assessed. Thus, any objective connection between the relationship in dispute and the 
designated court are excluded. In other words, the substantive rules applicable to the chosen 
court must not affect the validity of the jurisdiction clause.  
ii) Cartel Damage Claims (CDC) 
The transnational disputes for damages against international cartels are frequently decided by 
the national courts and answer questions on applicable law and jurisdiction.189 Landgericht 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
186 ECJ, C-184/12, United Antwerp Maritime Agencies (Unamar) NV v Navigation Maritime Bulgare, 17 
October 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:663. 
187 ECJ, Case C-381/98, Ingmar GB Ltd v Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc., 9 November 2000, 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:605, par. 20. 
188 ECJ, Case, C-269/95, Benincasa, par. 28 and 29. 
189 On Article 23 in antitrust litigation see: M. WILDESPRIN, Jurisdiction Issues: Brussels I Regulation Articles 
6(1), 23, 27 and 28 in Antitrust Litigation, in J. BASEDOW, S. FRANCQ, L. IDOT, (eds) International Antitrust 
Litigation: Conflict of Laws and Coordination. Studies in Private International Law, Hart Publishing, 2012, p. 
41-61. 
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Dortmund referred the CDC case to the ECJ. Before judicial proceedings in 2006, the 
European Commission fined the defendants for undertakings for a single and continuous 
infringement of Article 101 TFEU (Article 81 EC) and Article 53 EEA on the prohibition of 
cartel agreements regarding the chemicals hydrogen peroxide and sodium perborate which 
lasted several years.190 Subsequently, in 2009, the Cartel Damages Claim group (CDC), a 
special enforcement entity, concluded agreements on the transfer of damage claims with 
companies in different Member States affected by a cartel and filed an action against six 
chemical undertakings addressed in the Commission’s infringement decision of 2006. Only 
Evonik Degussa GmbH had its seat in Germany; the other five defendants were domiciled in 
different Member States. CDC withdrew the action regarding Evonik Degussa due to an out-
of-court settlement. The defendants contested the court’s jurisdiction. The dispute revolved 
around three issues on the court’s jurisdiction. In the context of choice-of-court agreement, 
only the last question of Landgericht Dortmund is relevant. In particular, whether in actions 
for damages for infringement of the prohibition of agreements, jurisdiction agreements in 
favour of a court other than the Landgericht Dortmund contained in the purchase agreements 
concluded with the customers were valid and were in line with the principle of effective 
enforcement of the European competition rules and of Article 101 TFEU. 
Advocate General Jääskinen proposed two views on the jurisdiction agreements. First, the 
forum selection agreements covered by Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation may not be 
frustrated by recourse to the principle of the full effectiveness of the prohibition of 
agreements, decisions, and concerted practices laid down in Article 101 TFEU.191 By contrast, 
according to the Advocate General, the agreements not covered by Article 23 of the Brussels I 
Regulation, may not be applied in cases where the implementation of such clause would 
hamper the effectiveness of Article 101 TFEU which “may be regarded as a matter of public 
policy”.192 However, with regard to both types of clauses, the Advocate General doubted if 
forum selection agreements relating to disputes arising out of a concrete contractual 
                                                          
190 Commission Decision of 3 May 2006 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement against Akzo Nobel NV, Akzo Nobel Chemicals 
Holding AB, EKA Chemicals AB, Degussa AG, Edison SpA, FMC Corporation, FMC Foret S.A., Kemira OYJ, 
L’Air Liquide SA, Chemoxal SA, Snia SpA, Caffaro Srl, Solvay SA/NV, Solvay Solexis SpA, Total SA, Elf 
Aquitaine SA and Arkema SA. (Case COMP/F/C.38.620 — Hydrogen Peroxide and perborate), 2006/903/EC, 
OJ L 353, 13 December 2006. 
191 ECJ, Case C-352/13, Cartel Damage Claims (CDC), par. 114 and 116. 
192 ECJ, Case C-352/13, Cartel Damage Claims (CDC), par. 123 and 124. 
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relationship can be interpreted as covering claims for damages brought against cartel 
members.193 The ECJ did not provide any interpretation as to the derogation agreements not 
covered by Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation due to insufficient information at its 
disposal in order to provide a useful answer to the referring court.194  
In case of prorogation agreements according to Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation, the 
ECJ stated that the principle of effective enforcement of the prohibition of cartel agreements 
could not restrict the possibility to be bound by a jurisdiction clause derogating from the 
jurisdiction of Member State courts according to Article 2, Article 5 par. 3 and 6 par. 1 of the 
Brussels I Regulation.195 Moreover, according to the ECJ, the rules applicable to the 
substance of a case cannot affect the validity of a jurisdiction clause agreed to under Article 
23 of the Brussels I Regulation - this judgment seems to follow the ECJ’s interpretation given 
in Trasporti Castelletti.196 The opposite approach would undermine the objective of 
jurisdiction agreements to provide legal certainty and predictability. The ECJ opted for mutual 
trust and predictability rather than for a break from the substantive law of the derogated lex 
fori. However, the ECJ concluded that those jurisdiction clauses which abstractly refer to 
disputes arising from the contractual relationship do not automatically extend the application 
of Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation to disputes concerning liability incurred because of 
an infringement of competition law.  
iii) Unamar 
The Unamar case concerned only choice-of-law agreements and did not tackle the question of 
jurisdiction. However, it is interesting to mention this judgment in the context of previous 
interpretation of the ECJ in Trasporti Castelletti and CDC on mutual trust. Unamar, a 
company incorporated in Belgium (as an agent) and Navigation Maritime Bulgare (“NMB”), 
a company incorporated in Bulgaria, concluded a commercial agency agreement. The 
agreement contained an arbitration clause in favour of the Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry in Sofia and a clause on the choice of Bulgarian law. Unamar brought proceedings in 
front of the Antwerp Commercial court, and NMB contested the international jurisdiction of 
the seized court. Hof van Cassatie requested an answer from ECJ on whether special 
                                                          
193 ECJ, Case C-352/13, Cartel Damage Claims (CDC), par. 129 and 130. 
194 ECJ, Case C-352/13, Cartel Damage Claims (CDC), par. 58. 
195 ECJ, Case C-352/13, Cartel Damage Claims (CDC), par. 59. 
196 ECJ, Case C-352/13, Cartel Damage Claims (CDC), par. 60. 
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mandatory rules of law of the forum exceeding the scope and the level of protection offered 
by Agency Directive 86/653 may be applied to the contract, even if the law applicable to the 
contract is the law of another Member State. The ECJ restricted the effect of overriding 
mandatory rules but also admitted that the Member States have the discretion to designate a 
mandatory rule as overriding if that rule is based on the directive and exceeds the minimum 
protection in it.197 Therefore, the ECJ took the opposite approach as in the Trasporti 
Castelletti and CDC cases and went even further. Party autonomy concerning the choice of 
law can be restricted based on overriding mandatory rules also between the Member States 
which implemented the directive, although the mutual trust between the Member States 
should be guaranteed. 
iv) Ingmar and National Case Law based on Ingmar 
Ingmar, a company, established in the United Kingdom, entered into an agency contract with 
Eaton, company established in California. The contract was governed by the law of the State 
of California. Ingmar seized the High Court of Justice of England and Wales for post-
contractual compensation for damages. California law did not regulate the post-contractual 
compensation. The ECJ held that the chosen law did not ensure the adequate protection for 
the commercial agents. Articles 17 and 18 of Council Directive 86/653/EEC of 18 December 
1986 on the coordination of the laws of the Member States relating to self-employed 
commercial agents guarantees certain rights to commercial agents after termination of agency 
contracts. As a consequence, parties cannot deviate from such non-derogable EU rules by 
opting for a choice-of-law clause.  
Although the interpretation given in the Ingmar case regards the choice-of-law clause, the 
approach of Ingmar was extended by German courts also into choice-of-court clauses. The 
German courts, unlike common law courts, do not have any discretion to accept jurisdiction in 
the presence of a valid choice-of-court agreement specifying a foreign forum based on forum 
non conveniens. On the contrary, according to the German scholar’s doctrine forum non 
conveniens, also called “appreciation of uncertainty” undermines predictable jurisdiction and 
                                                          
197 For more details, see L. M. VON BOCHOVE, Overriding mandatory rules as a vehicle for weaker party 
protection in European private international law, Erasmus Law Review, 7 (2014), p. 149. 
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might be manipulated.198 Thus, the German courts’ dismissal of the claim is inadmissible if 
the parties reached a valid agreement of exclusive competence. The mandatory derogation of 
the German courts is ex officio. Nonetheless, the subsequent judgments demonstrate the 
German courts continued German proceedings despite the valid jurisdiction clause. The 
national overriding mandatory rules caused the dismissal of valid jurisdiction clauses in 
favour of courts outside the EU by the German courts due to the choice of a forum with a 
choice-of-law clause in favour of a Third State whose national law did not provide the same 
level protection as German law.  
The first judgment of OLG München on 17 May 2006199 concerned a self-employed 
commercial agent who was residing and performing an activity in Germany. The contract was 
governed by California law and contained an exclusive choice-of-court clause in favour of 
Santa Clara courts.200 The German protection of commercial agents and, the post-contractual 
compensation was unknown to the California law. According to the German court, Article 
89b of German Commercial Code implementing Article 17 of Directive 86/653/EEC had a 
mandatory character. Coupling the choice-of-law with choice-of-court clause resulted in 
dismissal of the choice of law, as well as the forum-selection clause.201 The OLG München 
recalled earlier judgments of German courts, involving jurisdiction agreements designating a 
foreign court in the area of carriage of goods by sea,202 financial services,203 and others, when 
the courts dismissed a forum-selection clause when the application of German law could not 
be otherwise upheld.  
The more recent decision of the German Federal Court (BGH) also tackled the protection of 
commercial agents.204 In November 2005, a US company headquartered in Virginia entered 
into an agency agreement with a German agent. The contract contained a choice-of-law clause 
                                                          
198 H. SCHACK, Germany, in J. J. FAWCETT (ed), Declining Jurisdiction in Private International Law: Reports to 
the XIVth Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 194. 
199 OLG München, 17 May 2006, in: IPRax 2007, 322 = IHR 2006. 
200 The contract also included an arbitration clause the validity of forum-selection clause standing next to the 
arbitration clause will not be further analysed; on this type of optional clauses see D. DRAGUIEV, Unilateral 
Jurisdiction Clauses: The Case for Invalidity, Severability or Enforceability, Journal of International Arbitration 
31:1 (2014), pp. 19–46. 
201On the analysis of the judgment, see P. MANKOWSKI, Commercial Agents under European Jurisdiction Rules. 
The Brussels I Regulation plus the Procedural Consequences of Ingmar, Yearbook of Private International Law, 
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202 BGH, NJW 1961, 1061, 1062.  
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designating Virginia law as applicable law and a choice-of-court provision providing for 
exclusive jurisdiction in favour of the courts in Virginia. The German court was seized in 
order to decide on post-termination indemnity of the commercial agent (the contract expressly 
excluded the agent's German-law right to a post-termination, and according to the German 
law such an exclusion is not valid). According to the Court of Appeals of Stuttgart, such a 
case should be examined from the Ingmar perspective, and German provisions on the 
protection of commercial agents guaranteeing the right to post-termination indemnity and 
implementing Directive 86/653/EEC should be classified as an overriding mandatory rule. 
Hence, the overriding mandatory provision invalidated the choice-of-law clause, as well as 
the choice-of-court clause. The Court of Appeals of Stuttgart did not permit further appeal and 
BGH denied the complaint against this decision. The BGH stated that in light of Ingmar, 
Articles 17 and 18 contained in Directive 86/653/EEC are mandatory and parties cannot avoid 
its application through the choice of law of the non-EU state. Therefore, national substantive 
overriding mandatory rules implementing Directive 86/653/EEC invalidate the choice of law 
of the country that does not provide for post-contractual indemnity. Thus, there are no doubts 
that such and invalidation must be extended to the choice of forum. However, the German 
decision must be criticised mainly because the case was not referred to the ECJ and even in 
supra mentioned latter decision was assessed by BGH as acte clair.205  
v) Océano Grupo Editorial SA 
Although the ECJ judgment in joined cases C-240/98 to C-244/98,206 concerned only the 
domestic choice-of-court agreement, it is worth mentioning also because of international 
jurisdiction agreements. Defendants (not domiciled in Barcelona) entered into a contract for 
the purchase by instalments of an encyclopedia for personal use, which contained a 
jurisdiction clause in favour of the courts in Barcelona, in which the plaintiffs had their 
principal place of business. The sellers brought actions involving due sums in front of the 
                                                          
205 On the obligation to bring the matter before the ECJ, see Case 283/81, Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo 
SpA v Ministry of Health, 6 October 1982, ECLI:EU:C:1982:335. The theory of acte claire was a subject of a 
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considerations in this regard see E. D’ALESSANDRO, Il procedimento pregiudiziale interpretativo dinanzi alla 
Corte di Giustizia, Oggetto ed efficacia della pronuncia, Giappichelli, 2012, p. 279-285. On the acte clair see E. 
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206 ECJ, Joined cases C-240/98 to C-244/98, Océano Grupo Editorial SA v Roció Murciano Quintero and Salvat 
Editores SA v José M. Sánchez Alcón Prades (C-241/98), José Luis Copano Badillo, Mohammed Berroane, and 
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court in Barcelona. According to the ECJ, the jurisdiction clause, was not individually 
negotiated and included in a contract between a seller or supplier and a consumer within the 
meaning of the Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer 
contracts.207 Thus, conferring exclusive jurisdiction on a Member State court where the seller 
or supplier has their principal place of business, was unfair due to a significant imbalance in 
the parties’ rights and obligations. Therefore, the jurisdiction agreement violating the Council 
Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, may be 
considered as invalid.208 
 
2.1.2. What Solution for Overriding Mandatory Rules and Public Policy in the context 
of the Jurisdiction Agreements? 
As demonstrated, the ECJ did not provide for the unique interpretation that applied the 
overriding mandatory rules and the public-policy exception of the seized derogated court in 
the presence of choice-of-court agreement in favour of another court. From the previous 
judgments, different approaches to the invalidation of choice-of-court agreement (i) in favour 
of a court other than a court of a Member State, and (ii) in favour of a court of Member State, 
may result. 
a) Choice-of-Court Agreement according to the EU Regulations 
Before the ECJ in 1999 provided the Trasporti Castelletti interpretation, in 1984 the German 
court in a dispute relative to the protection of German investors (“Rechtsumschwung”) 
invalidated jurisdiction agreements designating courts in London for the violation of the 
public policy.209 However, nowadays such decisions of a German court would be 
questionable. The ECJ tends to ensure party autonomy and excludes any effect of a loss of 
juridical advantage in substantive law on an otherwise valid jurisdiction agreement. The ECJ 
expressly stated in Trasporti Castelletti, which dealt with jurisdiction clause in favour of 
another Member State court, that:  
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Considerations about the links between the court designated and the relationship at issue, 
about the validity of the clause, or about the substantive rules of liability applicable 
before the chosen court are unconnected with those requirements.210  
This conclusion was then confirmed by the ECJ in CDC when the ECJ upheld party 
autonomy to designate another Member State court, even if such designation amounts to a 
public policy violation of the derogated Member State. In fact, the ECJ affirmed the 
separability of a choice-of-court clause from the substantive law, which might result in a 
violation of public policy of the derogated forum. Thus, it practically did not leave any space 
for other interpretations. The conclusion of the ECJ was built on the conviction that the legal 
certainty laid down in the Brussels Regime prevails over securing the public policy of the 
derogated forum. The mutual trust practically excludes the application of the overriding 
mandatory rules and public policy by which the derogation of the jurisdiction of a Member 
State court by a jurisdiction agreement would be invalidated.211 Such a conclusion was 
reached in 2007 also by the Sezione Unite of Italian Corte Suprema di Cassazione stating that 
the court’s jurisdiction prevails over the application of norme di applicazione necessaria since 
in the current case, the prorogued court was situated in another Member State.212 On the other 
hand, it is interesting to observe a different conclusion in the purely domestic case (Océano 
Grupo Editorial SA), when the ECJ indirectly admitted the possibility of invalidation of a 
domestic jurisdiction clause when it contravenes the protection of the consumer, as a weaker 
party, provided by the EU directive.  
The two ECJ interpretations regarding the application of overriding mandatory rules were 
provided in regard to Article 17 of the Brussels Convention (Trasporti Castelletti) and Article 
23 of the Brussels I Regulation (CDC). But neither Article 17 of the Brussels Convention nor 
Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation contained rules on the substantive validity of forum-
selection agreements. According to Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, a deselected 
Member State court should apply its national rules including conflict-of-laws norms for the 
substantive validity of the prorogued court, by both the prorogued and derogated court. 
According to Professor Basedow, the enforcement of overriding mandatory provisions or 
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international public policy of the non-selected forum under the Brussels regime should be 
classified as relating to the substantive validity of choice-of-court agreements. The rationae is 
that creation of the third category of “admissibility”, which is not covered by Article 25 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation and which should be left to the national law, is not convincing.213 As 
a consequence of introducing new conflict-of-law rule on substantive validity of jurisdiction 
agreement to Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, which refers to the conflict-of-laws 
rules of a chosen Member State, a seized derogated Member State court then must apply 
foreign law to the substantive validity of the prorogation clause, covering overriding 
mandatory rules of the selected forum. It practically means completely excluding the 
application of overriding mandatory rules of the lex fori of the derogated Member State, 
unless the conflict-of-laws rule refers back to the derogated forum.214 It is also questionable 
whether the substantive validity really concerns the question of the overriding mandatory 
rules. Professor Magnus, in contrast with Professor Basedow, admits the possibility of the 
third category of “admissibility” concerning the public order question separated from the 
substantive validity, which would allow application of national rules of seized, non-
designated court.215 However, doctrinal consensus does not exist. The dispute is whether 
further control of Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is permissible or whether this 
provision does not allow denial of the validity of choice-of-court agreement, even if such an 
approach constitutes misuse of the freedom granted in Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation. All questions about invalidating choice-of-court clauses to avoid giving effects to 
the overriding mandatory rules of the seized derogated Member State court may become even 
more significant in future. For example, directives protecting specific interests, either in 
context of protection of weaker parties (as consumer protection under Directive 
2011/83/EU,216 consumer credit protection under Directive 2008/48/EC217 etc.), or in context 
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Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council Text with EEA relevance, OJ L 304, 22 November 2011.  
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of other public interest regarding antitrust, or the environment, will be considered as 
mandatory and overriding. The more overriding mandatory rules that exist within the EU law, 
the more tensions will be created when limiting the effect of the choice-of-forum agreements. 
Moreover, it must be mentioned, that Article 9 para 3 of the Rome I Regulation does not 
provide for a rule protecting overriding mandatory rules of any other Third State with which 
the situation has a close connection, as the Rome Convention did.218 As a consequence, there 
is much more probability that the overriding mandatory rules of the seized, derogated forum 
would not be applicable in the selected forum.  
In this context, other aspects should be taken into consideration – i.e., the ratio concerning 
invalidation of the choice-of-court agreements. The invalidation of the choice-of-court 
agreements represents a tool for the protection of the overriding mandatory rules or public 
policy of the seized Member State court. If we admit that invalidation of the choice-of-court 
agreement is not permitted, such a conclusion will lead to a paradox. In Unamar, although the 
ECJ did not explicitly invalidate the choice-of-law agreement, it decided that the law of a 
Member State of the European Union, which has been chosen by the parties, may be rejected 
by the court of another Member State (before which the case has been brought) in favour of 
the law of the forum. From this ECJ judgment follows a clear intention to protect the 
mandatory nature of the norms of lex fori. Although the ECJ admitted the possibility of 
knocking out the law of a Member State in favour of lex fori in the presence of choice-of-law 
agreement, this conclusion may bear a significant relevance also in respect of the rules on 
jurisdiction. The opposite approach would lead to the conclusion that the principle of mutual 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
217 Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements 
for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC, OJ L 133, 22 May 2008. 
218 See Article 9 par. 3 of the Rome I Regulation which provides: «Effect may be given to the overriding 
mandatory provisions of the law of the country where the obligations arising out of the contract have to be or 
have been performed, in so far as those overriding mandatory provisions render the performance of the contract 
unlawful. In considering whether to give effect to those provisions, regard shall be had to their nature and 
purpose and to the consequences of their application or non-application.», see also Article 7 par. 1 of the Rome 
Convention: «When applying under this Convention the law of a country, effect may be given to the mandatory 
rules of the law of another country with which the situation has a close connection, if and in so far as, under the 
law of the latter country, those rules must be applied whatever the law applicable to the contract. In considering 
whether to give effect to these mandatory rules, regard shall be had to their nature and purpose and to the 
consequences of their application or non-application.». 
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trust based on the substantive laws of the states using the same connecting factors,219 is not 
treated equally when it comes to a choice-of-law agreement and choice-of-court agreement. 
We can imagine a situation concerning the question of overriding mandatory rules in respect 
of a choice-of-law agreement: 
The defendant (agent) was domiciled in the Member State A, the claimant (agency) in the Member 
State B, and the law of Member State B was designated as the governing law. The action on liability 
for breach of contract was filed. Although Member State B implemented the directive, the Member 
State A offers wider protection. Member State A was seized. 
The seized Member State court A established its jurisdiction according to Article 4 of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation. Then the Member State court A determined the law of Member State B was 
applicable. However, the application of the law of Member State B would result in a violation of 
overriding mandatory provisions of the lex fori. In this case, the Member State court A may reject 
the law of the Member State B (following the Unamar case). 
 
  
However, we can imagine a different situation when the choice-of-law is coupled with a 
choice-of-court agreement. 
The defendant (agent) was domiciled in the Member State A, the claimant (agency) in the Member 
State B, and an exclusive choice-of-court agreement and a choice-of-law agreement was granted in 
favour of the Member State B. The action on liability for breach of contract was filed. Although the 
Member State B implemented the directive, the Member State A offers wider protection. The 
Member State A was seized.  
The seized Member State court A examines its jurisdiction and finds out that the prorogation 
agreement is valid. However, the court of a Member State A makes the following consideration. If 
the court of Member State B were seized, it would apply only its own overriding mandatory 
provisions in accordance with Articles 4 and 7 of the Rome I Regulation. Thus, the overriding 
mandatory rules of the Member State A would be disregarded. According to the ECJ case law and 
                                                          
219 M. WELLER, Mutual trust: in search of the future of European Union private international law, Journal of 
Private International Law, 11:1 (2015), p. 72. 
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the doctrinal theory mentioned above, Member State A must decline its jurisdiction, although the 
non-invalidation of the choice-of-court agreement would lead to the application of the law of the 
Member State B with its overriding mandatory rules. However, if the Member State court A would 
be entitled to invalidate the choice-of-court agreement, it could apply the law of the Member State 
B in accordance with Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation, but also its own overriding mandatory 
rules according to Article 7 para 2 of the Rome I Regulation, or could directly reject the law of the 
Member State B as in Unamar case. 
 
These are two similar cases, with two different results. In the examples mentioned above, 
different approaches to the choice-of-court and choice of law were demonstrated. However, is 
it necessary to accept the unique approach in the coupled choice-of-law and choice-of-court 
agreement? The principle of party autonomy in private and procedural international law is 
often discussed in the context of choice-of-law and choice-of-forum together. Choice-of-law 
and choice-of-forum are connected legal concepts and their aim is the same - to provide 
certainty and predictability.220 “Choice-of-forum is as much an expression of party autonomy 
as a choice-of-law clause, and equally specific”221 and even in many cases determines 
whether a choice-of-law clause will be respected and enforced. However, there is one 
significant difference - the choice-of-forum is considered as a matter lying “within the sphere 
of procedure and forms part of the administration of justice”222 and is formalised as an 
exception to the general jurisdiction rule.223 On the other hand, choice-of-law creates the 
cornerstone of the system of conflict-of-law rules224 and only if parties fail to choose the 
applicable law, the applicable law will be determined on the basis of connecting factors.225 
Different handling of choice-of-law and choice-of-court agreements is also evident due to 
their different nature and effects. It must be borne in mind that choice-of-law clauses and 
forum-selection clauses are not synonymous and that a choice-of-law clause does not 
necessarily determine the outcome of a jurisdiction motion. Although stated in other 
                                                          
220 P. E. NYGH, Autonomy in International Contracts, op. cit., p. 2. 
221 S. SYMEONIDES, The Hague Principles on Choice of Law for International Contracts: Some Preliminary 
Comments, op. cit., p. 898. 
222 Article 1 par. 5 of Giuliano and Lagarde Report. 
223 ECJ, Case 266/85 Hassan Shenavai v Klaus Kreischer, 15 January 1987 ECLI:EU:C:1987:11, par. 17; 
224 See Recital No 11 to the Rome I Regulation 
225 J. KUIPERS, Party Autonomy in the Brussels I Regulation and Rome I Regulation and the European Court of 
Justice, German Law Journal, 10 (2009), p. 1505. 
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circumstances, this decision was upheld in the recent judgment, We Serve Health Care LP v. 
Onasanya.226 However, does it mean that substantive law cannot be backed by the procedural 
rules by extending the protective regime also into the area of jurisdiction?227 What solutions 
can be proposed? 
Since the jurisdiction clauses permit to “escape” from the application of overriding mandatory 
rules of the derogated court, it would be reasonable to offer a solution of application 
overriding mandatory rules already at the stage of jurisdiction and to allow to the Member 
State court to examine the potential result of the dispute in the presence of the choice-of-court 
clause. Such an examination should not only cover the situation when the choice-of-law is 
coupled with the choice-of-forum. This examination should also cover examination of 
applicable law determined according to the national or EU law of the deselected forum and 
the potentiality of exclusion of overriding mandatory rules of seized, non-designated Member 
State. However, this proposed solution concerning verification at the stage of jurisdiction does 
not seem to be acceptable by virtue of the interpretation provided by the ECJ, which is even 
more strengthened by the new conflict-of-laws rule of substantive validity in Article 25 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
The other solution might be to shift the public policy control into the stage of recognition. The 
examination of choice-of-court agreement would be provided ex post. This approach is in 
contrast with the previous scenario when the effect of choice-of-court agreement could be ex 
ante examined, i.e., at the stage of jurisdiction, and might result in invalidation of choice-of-
court agreement. However, it must be borne in mind that only public policy control plays a 
role at the stage of recognition and enforcement of the foreign judgment. In particular, a 
judgment shall not be recognised if such recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy in 
the Member State in which recognition is sought.228 The public policy control protects only 
fundamental principles of the legal order and cannot cover every issue which is evaluated as 
                                                          
226 Ontario Court, We Serve Health Care LP v. Onasanya, 2018 ONSC 1758. See also The Importance of Forum 
Selection Clauses in Contracts: A Comment on We Serve Health Care LP v. Onasanya, available at: 
https://www.dentons.com/en/insights/Articles/2018/april/3/the-importance-of-forum-selection-clauses-in-
contracts.  
227 P. MANKOWSKI, Commercial Agents under European Jurisdiction Rules. The Brussels I Regulation plus the 
Procedural Consequences of Ingmar, op. cit., p. 25. 
228 Article 45 par. 1 lett. a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation; Article 22 lett. a) and 23 lett. a) of the Brussels IIa 
Regulation; Article 40 lett. a) of the Succession Regulation. 
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an overriding mandatory rule.229 The review of the application as to the substance, including 
the overriding mandatory rules in the judgment, is prohibited.230 The principle of pact sunt 
servanda is not to be deprived. However, forcing parties to litigate in the designated state, 
even if the judgment will not be enforceable in the requested Member State due to public 
policy, may be a violation of the right of access to justice. Moreover, such a solution might be 
unsatisfactory since the judgment issued by the designated court would be enforced only in 
the territory of the designated state or even in a Third State. Thus, the overriding mandatory 
rules of the previously seized, non-designated state will remain unaffected.  
The last solution might be a future proposal for an EU regulation and might combine the first 
and the second solution above, whereby inspiration may be found in Article 33 and 34 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation. The seized, non-designated court would forecast the possible 
recognition of the judgment issued by the chosen Member State court, which covers public 
policy control representing one of the grounds for non-recognition of the judgment. If the 
prognosis were positive, the court would stay proceedings in favour of the chosen court until 
the judgment of the chosen court is recognised. In case of an adverse prognosis, the court 
would be entitled to continue in proceedings. However, also this solution would open the door 
to public policy control, but the overriding mandatory rules of lex fori would not operate as 
well. 
However, in my opinion, the mutual trust between the Member States as to the jurisdiction 
and predictability of the jurisdiction should prevail over the protection of specific State 
interests which may be classified as mandatory and overriding. It is true that overriding 
mandatory rules of the forum “escape” from the effects whenever derogated Member State 
court does not exercise its jurisdiction due to the jurisdiction agreement in favour of other 
Member State court and their mandatory, overriding character is then lost.231 On the other 
hand, it is almost impossible to outline the borders of the overriding mandatory rules of 
specific Member State, and they have become more international and less bound to the 
                                                          
229 L. RADICATI DI BROZOLO, Deroga alla giurisdizione e deroga alle norme imperative. Un conflitto fra conflitti 
di oleggi e conflitti di giurisdizione?, Il diritto processuale civile nell’avvicinamento giuridico internazionale, 
Part 1, CLEUP, 2009, p. 290. 
230 Article 52 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, Article 26 of the Brussels IIa Regulation, Article 41 of the 
Succession Regulation. 
231 L. RADICATI DI BROZOLO, Deroga alla giurisdizione e deroga alle norme imperative. Un conflitto fra conflitti 
di oleggi e conflitti di giurisdizione?, op.cit., p. 301, the author calls such rules “semi-mandatory” or “almost 
mandatory.”  
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particular Member State.232 And thus, the invalidation of the choice-of-court agreement every 
time that the derogated Member State deems that its overriding mandatory rules come into 
play would hamper the smooth functioning of European system on jurisdiction. In 
consequence, the opposite approach might be admitted – the overriding mandatory rules of 
the derogated court could be taken into consideration by the selected court by virtue of the 
regulations governing applicable law. For example, a new rule could be created for 
application of the overriding mandatory rules of the derogated court whenever there is a 
situation with a close connection between the dispute and derogated court. 
b) Choice-of-Court Agreement in favour of a Third State’s Court 
The ECJ has not entirely clarified the relationship between the EU rules and jurisdiction 
agreements designating the court outside the EU. However, the considerations on possible 
mandatory application of Article 4 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation in virtue of Owusu case and 
on the potential application of Articles 33 and 34 concerning lis pendens between Member 
State and Third State will be left aside for a while. 
The problematic issue arises in the situation when the choice-of-court in favour of a Third 
State would result in the application of the law of a Third State and which might circumvent 
the overriding mandatory rules either of the national law or the EU law. The possibility of 
invalidation of the abusive choice-of-court agreements depends on the national law when the 
jurisdiction is conferred to Third State courts that are not a party to the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreement based on the jurisdiction agreement.  
In some civil law countries, which do not attribute directionality power to the courts, 
constitutional breaks have been introduced into the national legal orders which impose on the 
courts a requirement to verify their jurisdiction before hearing the case. This requirement 
prevents abusive choice-of-court agreements and enables the operation of overriding 
mandatory rules and public policy of the forum. For example, in Switzerland, choice-of-court 
agreements are not effective, if one of the parties is abusively deprived of the forum regulated 
by Swiss law.233 In the Czech Republic, the possibility to hear the case in the presence of 
                                                          
232 L. RADICATI DI BROZOLO, Deroga alla giurisdizione e deroga alle norme imperative. Un conflitto fra conflitti 
di oleggi e conflitti di giurisdizione?, op.cit., p. 300. 
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derogation agreement from Czech court is expressly regulated by the Czech Act on Private 
International Law in case that choice-of-court agreement contravenes to the public order. 
Article 86 par. 2 lett. d) provides:  
If the jurisdiction of a foreign court has been agreed in accordance with subsection 1, 
this rule oust the jurisdiction of the Czech courts. A Czech court may, however, hear the 
matter, if the agreement on the jurisdiction of the foreign court is at odds with public 
order.234  
Although the wording of this Article indicates a discretional power of the court, some authors 
deduce the courts’ duty to hear the case.235 This rule should be possible to invoke only in very 
exceptional cases where the negotiation of the jurisdiction agreement circumvents overriding 
mandatory rules and other provisions protecting the values of the public order of the Czech 
Republic, i.e., provisions which the Czech court must apply regardless of the choice -of-
law.236 However, the Czech court must be sure that the foreign court would not provide the 
same protection of the values constituting the Czech public order. Additionally, only the 
strong connection between the case and the Czech Republic can justify the use of this 
extraordinary means of protection. The Czech rule thus moved the protection of public policy 
ex post during the recognition and enforcement into the phase of the determination of 
jurisdiction by rejecting derogatory effects of jurisdiction of the Czech courts.237  
A different situation is when the national law does not expressly provide for invalidating the 
derogation from the State’s jurisdiction when attributing the effect to the choice-of-court 
agreement would mean circumvention of the overriding mandatory rules of the seized 
(derogated) court. In these circumstances, the question of the nature and effects of the choice-
of-court agreement may play a significant factor. If the national law categorises the overriding 
mandatory rules as a matter of admissibility (which is usually governed by lex fori), the 
national court could simply give effect to its own overriding mandatory rules of the forum in 
                                                          
234 The official translation of Czech Act on Private International Law is available at: 
http://obcanskyzakonik.justice.cz/index.php/home/zakony-a-stanoviska/preklady/english.  
235 P. BŘÍZA, § 86 Sjednání příslušnosti zahraničního soudu, in Zákon o mezinárodním právu soukromém: 
komentář, C.H. Beck, 2014, p. 519. 
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order to invalidate the choice-of-court agreement.238 However, when the overriding 
mandatory rules are part of substantive validity by virtue of the national law,239 it depends on 
the law applicable to substantive validity, which as we could see, is usually legally affected by 
the classification of choice-of-court agreement’s nature and effects.240  
Sometimes this gap is refilled by continuous national case law. For examples, the French 
Cour de Cassation, which upheld a forum-selection agreement in favour of the court of 
California, even if French loi de police came into play. The French court affirmed that public 
policy control should be considered during the recognition and enforcement in France.241 The 
national courts could also follow an interpretation provided by the ECJ in similar cases. Thus, 
we may assume two scenarios of possible decisions from the derogated Member States, when 
they refill the gap by the interpretation provided by the ECJ in case Ingmar and CDC or when 
they apply Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation in relation with the Third State courts by 
effet réflexe principle. In the first scenario, the national court’s decision of a derogated 
Member State court may simply follow the Ingmar case extending the application of 
overriding mandatory rules of the derogated lex fori to the area of the validity of jurisdictional 
clauses (as is the case of German courts). Moreover, as already stated, according to the 
Advocate General in case CDC, the agreements not covered by Article 23 of the Brussels I 
Regulation (which may be qualified as jurisdiction agreements in favour of Third State 
courts), should be invalidated in cases where the implementation of such a clause would 
hamper the effectiveness of Article 101 TFEU.242 From this opinion, it is not clear whether 
the invalidation of a jurisdiction clause in favour of Third State court should be automatic 
without forecasting the law applicable to the dispute in front of a court in a Third State. Or 
vice versa, should a derogated Member State court predict if the law that would be applicable 
by the designated Third State court might hamper the overriding mandatory rules of EU law. 
Unfortunately, the ECJ did not provide any interpretation in this context and the questions 
concerning the invalidation of choice-of-court agreements “not covered by Article 25 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation” in the presence of a violation of overriding mandatory rules or 
public policy of the EU remain unanswered. In the second scenario, when a Member State 
                                                          
238 See supra note 148. 
239 See J. BASEDOW, Exclusive choice-of-court agreements as a derogation from imperative norms, p. 19. 
240 See supra Chapter I, Subchapter II, Section 3. 
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court applies Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation regarding jurisdiction clauses in 
favour of Third State courts, for example, based on effet réflexe, the result might be same as in 
case of a choice-of-court agreement in favour of a Member State court. The derogated 
Member State court may follow Trasporti Castelletti. However, as already stated, the 
reasoning of the ECJ was based on considerations of predictability and certainty of the 
Brussels Regime and mutual trust among Member State, which does not apply to does not 
apply to Third States. Also, the theories mentioned above of Professor Basedow or opposite 
approach of other German scholars can be taken to the consideration when deciding on the 
validity of a choice-of-court agreement which violates overriding mandatory rules of the non-
designated, seized court. 
 
2.2. Forum Non Conveniens 
The forum non conveniens is defined as a discretionary power of a court to decline 
jurisdiction on the basis that another court is more appropriate because the interest of justice is 
better secured if the trial takes place there.243 In the civil-law countries, there is usually no 
discretionary power to continue in proceedings in the presence of a foreign choice-of-court 
agreement.244 Civil-law states prefer certainty and predictability rather than flexibility, which 
the doctrine of forum non conveniens offers. It must be stressed that such flexibility is more 
time consuming and might require more expenses. Moreover, forum non conveniens may give 
rise to fears of an adverse conflict of jurisdiction or parallel litigation. Civil-law states tend to 
prefer a lis alibi pendens rule. Different positions on the doctrine of forum non conveniens 
may be found in Britain (and other states influenced by British law and the Spiliada case),245 
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Press, 2007. 
244 In German law, ex officio dismissal of the local proceedings is inadmissible, similarly according to Swiss, 
Dutch, Greek, Finnish, and Japanese law. The French and Argentinian courts must dismiss the claim upon 
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USA,246 Quebec,247 Japan,248 and also even in Sweden.249 However, not all states where forum 
non conveniens forms part of the procedural system, is the doctrine applicable to choice-of-
court agreements. For example, in Japan, although explicit provisions on the choice of the 
foreign forum are lacking, the subject is governed by a judgment from 28 November 1975, 
which stated that the exclusive international jurisdiction agreement in favour of a foreign 
court should be valid in principle, unless it would lead to unacceptable results violating public 
policy.250  
On the contrary, in some common law countries, the courts have discretionary power to 
continue in the proceedings despite valid choice-of-court agreements designating a foreign 
court. For example, in England, in the Eleftheria case, the court held that it has the discretion 
to stay the English proceedings for a breach of a forum-selection clause.251 The principles 
assumed in the Eleftheria were developed in the context of previous judgments and were 
confirmed by House of Lords.252 The fundamental principle of the case is the adoption of 
                                                          
246 In the USA the doctrine of forum non conveniens was developed mainly through three decisions of Supreme 
Court: Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); Koster 
v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947). According to the US doctrine of forum non 
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flexible consideration of the US court as well as the considerations of public interests. On other differences see J. 
J. FAWCETT, General Report, op. cit., p. 14-16. 
247 Article 3135 of the Civil Code of Quebec provides for the provision of forum non conveniens. The previous 
case law of court in Quebec suggested consideration which must be taken into account: the domicile or the 
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Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 146. 
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FAWCETT (ed), Declining Jurisdiction in Private International Law: Reports to the XIVth Congress of the 
International Academy of Comparative Law, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 309. 
249 It is uncertain whether Swedish law recognises the doctrine of forum non conveniens since the courts have a 
substantive margin of appreciation which can be used for the same aim as forum non conveniens. Among 
exceptions allowing continuation in proceedings are: exclusive competence of Swedish court (e.g. concerning 
right of property), weak-party relationship. See M. BOGDAN, Sweden, in Declining Jurisdiction in Private 
International Law, op. cit., p. 373-374. 
250 Koniglike Java China Paletvaat lijnen BV Amsterdam (Royal Interocean lines) v. Tokyo Marine and Fire 
Insurance Co [1976]. See also M. DOGAUCHI, Japan, in Declining Jurisdiction in Private International Law, op. 
cit., p. 305. 
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Blyth (Angola) Ltd [1979] 3 All ER 280; The “Panseptos” [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 139; The “Indian Fortune” 
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freedom, with the exception that English courts might stay the proceedings only in an 
“exceptional case” and in the presence of an exclusive jurisdiction clause. The supra 
mentioned principle was subsequently followed in New Zealand, Canada, and Israeli.253  
The US Supreme Court in its decision Bremen v. Zapata from 1972 upheld the binding effect 
of forum-selection clauses. The court stated that a forum-selection clause is “prima facie valid 
and should be enforced” unless the party makes a “strong showing that it should be set 
aside”. However, the respect of party autonomy in freely negotiated private commercial 
contracts is subject of certain exceptions if enforcement would cause inconvenience, denial of 
an effective remedy, a violation of public policy, if the transaction is unfair, unjust or 
unreasonable, or in case of “fraud, overreaching or unconscionable conduct relations”.254 It is 
interesting to highlight the question of public policy in this judgment. The court provided that:  
A contractual choice-of-forum clause should be held unenforceable if enforcement would 
contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is brought, whether declared 
by statute or by judicial decision.  
The court did not invalidate the jurisdiction agreement but provided a reasonableness test to 
be conducted which includes a public policy control. In 1991, the US court went much further 
in Carnival Cruise Lines Inc. v.Shuteby upholding an exclusive forum-selection clause in 
favour of a court in Florida in small print on the back of a cruise passenger ticket for 
voyage.255 Thus, the court did not provide a limitation on the enforcement of choice-of-court 
clauses for consumer contracts since the cruise had a legitimate interest in concentrating all 
litigation in Florida. However, nowadays forum-selection agreements are subject to public 
policy control and sometimes are invalidated, e.g. in the case of consumer rights in class 
action relief.256  
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In Australia, other cases in invalidating jurisdiction clauses due to public policy are more 
much restrictive. In the case of Akai, the court decided that a jurisdiction agreement 
designating an English court could be enforced since the insured would suffer a loss of 
Australian statutory rights due to non-application of the Australian Insurance Contracts Act 
1984.257 It may be assumed that invalidating the choice-of-court agreement was presumed 
from domestic mandatory rules, not on the internationally overriding mandatory rules.258 It is 
questionable whether such a far-reaching interpretation might undermine the effectiveness of 
choice-of-court agreements and circumvent exercises of party autonomy. 
 
2.3. Protection of the Weaker Parties 
It is still doubtful in the context of Ingmar case whether the overriding mandatory rules, 
defined as crucial provisions for safeguarding public interest, may preserve “individual 
interest” and protect weaker parties.259 In some States, the overriding mandatory rules are 
considered as vehicles for the protection of weaker parties.260 However, it was necessary to 
introduce the explicit rules on the protection of weaker parties and define groups of 
individuals which require special treatment. The rules on protection of weaker parties were 
entered into national, international, and EU instruments. Such rules are related to conflict-of-
laws as well as to the international procedural rules. As already stated hereof, the choice-of-
court agreement enables the parties to choose a neutral forum or that one they consider the 
most appropriate. The ideal situation is the case of perfect distribution of the powers, but in 
many cases, only one of the parties has more bargaining power. Because of non-balanced 
powers, the autonomy of the weaker party is limited during negotiation with the stronger 
party and during the process. Thus, the stronger party has more possibilities to reach a 
successful outcome. States should balance the power of stronger parties, and State’s civil 
                                                          
257 Akai Pty Ltd v People’s Insurance Co Ltd [1996] 188 CLR 418; see also Commonwealth Bank of Australia v. 
White [1999] 2 VR 681. 
258 M. WELLER, Choice of Forum Agreements Under the Brussels I Recast and Under the Hague Convention: 
Coherences and Clashes, op. cit., p.15.  
259 See L. M. VON BOCHOVE, Overriding mandatory rules as a vehicle for weaker party protection in European 
private international law, op. cit., p. 149; J. KUIPERS, EU Law and Private International Law: The 
Interrelationship in Contractual Obligations, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011, p. 145. 
260 For example, in the Netherlands, see J. KUIPERS, EU Law and Private International Law: The 
Interrelationship in Contractual Obligations, op. cit., p. 154. 
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procedure should take in consideration position of the weaker parties and evaluate the 
consequences of court’s decisions.261 
The problem may arise mainly with determination and categorisation of a weaker party. It is 
undisputed that the consumers, employees, and insurance policy-holders require special 
protection.262 The national law might protect other groups of individuals to guarantee them a 
better position. Therefore, the category of the person identified by the national law as weaker 
parties may vary from country to the country. In EU regulations, the situation is different - the 
EU regulations unify the protection of vulnerable parties in all Member States. The question 
arises whether certain parties in family or succession matters may be considered as weaker 
parties.263 Also, the position of other “weaker” parties, as in the previously mentioned case of 
commercial agents, remains unclear.264  
 
2.3.1.  Source of Vulnerability 
In the first place, it is necessary to investigate the source of the vulnerability of specific 
groups of individuals.265 
The information asymmetries prevail mainly in contract law. The protections rules presume 
that the specific individuals obtain partial or even no information. Such parties might be 
typical consumers who suffer information disadvantage while concluding the contract. On the 
opposite side stands the stronger party (in this case the strength represents only “informational 
strength”) that conclude the contracts daily, such as insurers, etc., that utilize financial 
resources in order to be informed of legal consequences of applying a specific law or using 
specific court and might misuse these information for their benefit. 
The economic or social reliance may be identified as the second reason for the vulnerability of 
weaker parties. This group may include employees or maintenance creditors. The dependence 
                                                          
261 L. ERVO, Nordic Court Culture in Progress: Historical and Futuristic Perspectives, op. cit., p. 396-399. 
262 G. RÜHL, The Protection of Weaker Parties in the Private International Law of the European Union: A 
Portrait of Inconsistency and Conceptual Truancy, Journal of Private International Law 10: 3 (2014), p. 342. 
263 On the imbalances of the powers in family and succession matters: G. RÜHL, The Protection of Weaker 
Parties in the Private International Law of the European Union: A Portrait of Inconsistency and Conceptual 
Truancy, op. cit. p. 335–58; J. CARRUTHERS, Party autonomy in the legal regulation of adult relationships: what 
place for party choice in Private International Law?, op. cit., pp. 881-913. 
264 See supra Chapter One, Subchapter III, Section 2.1.1. 
265 See division in G. RÜHL, The Protection of Weaker Parties in the Private International Law of the European 
Union: A Portrait of Inconsistency and Conceptual Truancy, op. cit., p. 342-346. 
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of the employee on the income from the employers is evident.266 The employer pays a salary 
to the employees and the employees benefit the business of employer by the performance of 
their duties according to the employment agreement. The maintenance creditors are dependent 
on the income from the maintenance debtor, but compared with the position of employees, the 
maintenance creditor does not provide for any performance for the maintenance debtor in 
order to benefit him. Therefore, the maintenance creditor must often rely on the voluntary 
fulfilment of the maintenance debtor. 
In the last group may be recalled intellectual disadvantage. The legislators presume that 
certain individuals did not reach the sufficient mental ability to consider the legal 
consequences of their conducts. The typical examples of such groups are individuals that may 
suffer intellectual disadvantage as if they are less than 18 years of age. On the EU level, such 
protection might be found in Maintenance Regulation, the choice-of-court agreement is not 
allowed to conclude with underage maintenance creditors.267 
 
2.3.2. Form of the Limitations concerning the Protection of the Weaker Parties 
The protection of the weaker parties is typically provided by introducing a general rule 
favouring the weaker party or by limiting or even excluding party autonomy. The different 
legislative techniques on the protection of weaker parties will be discussed.268 
i) Exclusion of Party Autonomy 
Party autonomy for specific groups is completely lacking. Such complete prohibition is 
justified by the vulnerability of the individuals which do not reach sufficient mental or 
intellectual maturity. For example, the possibility to agree on the choice-of-court agreement 
with a maintenance creditor less than 18-year-old is excluded in the Maintenance Regulation. 
This exclusion of party autonomy serves as an excellent example of a first technique which 
EU legislators opted to protect intellectually vulnerable individuals with regard to jurisdiction 
                                                          
266 Article 6 par. 1 of Giuliano and Lagarde Report. 
267 On the exclusion of party autonomy under the Maintenance Regulation see infra Chapter Three, Subchapter I, 
Section 3.3. 
268 On the division of form of limitation see F. MAULTZSCH, Party Autonomy in European Private International 
Law: Uniform Principle or Context-Dependent Instrument?, Journal of Private International Law 12: 3 (2016), p. 
484-487; G. RÜHL, The Protection of Weaker Parties in the Private International Law of the European Union: A 
Portrait of Inconsistency and Conceptual Truancy, op. cit., p. 346-356: 
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clauses. In other matters, that are considered as highly sensitive for the States (mainly family 
matters), the rule on the choice-of-court agreement is not even regulated and the relevant legal 
instruments remain silent. Such an approach is evident not only on the EU level,269 but as well 
as in national legal systems.270  
ii) Partial Limitation of Party Autonomy 
The second legislative technique for protection of weaker parties provides for the more 
flexible instrument. Party autonomy is not excluded, but instead gives parties option to 
express their mutual will by imposing the forums which may be designated. Three possible 
sub-approaches are outlined below. 
The first sub-approach pays attention to the free choice which is limited by a separate 
application of the additional protective norms.271 The protection is provided by a general rule 
and simultaneously by introducing a new rule favouring the weaker party. As regards to the 
choice of forum, such an approach may be found in the Brussels Ibis Regulation in respect of 
consumer contracts, employment contracts, or insurance contracts. The Brussels Ibis 
Regulation allows for the parties to bring the proceedings to other Member State courts in the 
general provisions.272  
The second sub-approach of primary limitation of party autonomy operates by substantive 
limiting the scope of the eligible forum.273 The aim is the protection of certain individuals 
against the obtrusion of the alternative forum - the parties may designate courts provided by 
the legal instruments. Such a technique finds application mainly in family and succession law. 
For example, in maintenance matters, party autonomy in respect to a jurisdiction agreement is 
allowed only when the agreement contains a choice of forum in favour of Member State 
                                                          
269 On the lack of the rule on the choice-of-court agreement in respect of divorce in the Brussels IIa Regulation 
see infra Chapter Three, Subchapter I, Section 2.6.  
270 The choice-of-court agreements are usually permitted only for the property rights. See for example, article 85 
of the Czech Act on Private International Law, which provides: «The jurisdiction of a foreign court may be 
agreed by the parties in writing with regard to matters of the law of obligations and other property rights.». On 
the official translation see: http://obcanskyzakonik.justice.cz/index.php/home/zakony-a-
stanoviska/preklady/english. 
271 Emphasis added. F. MAULTZSCH, Party Autonomy in European Private International Law: Uniform Principle 
or Context-Dependent Instrument?, op. cit., p. 484, the author indicates examples on the basis of Article 6 para 
2, Article 8 para 1, and Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation only in respect to conflict-of-laws rules. 
272 For examples Article 15, 19 or 23 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
273 Emphasis added. F. MAULTZSCh, Party Autonomy in European Private International Law: Uniform Principle 
or Context-Dependent Instrument?, op. cit., p. 485-486, where the author analyses this approach only in respect 
of conflict-of-laws, but not in respect of choice-of-court agreements. 
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courts prescribed in article 4 of the Maintenance Regulation. The limited choice of party 
autonomy is because the maintenance creditor would be otherwise entitled to sue a 
maintenance debtor in front of a vast range of other competent Member State courts that could 
favour the creditor’s position in civil proceedings. Moreover, such limitation should enforce 
public and sovereign interests.  
Lastly, the time factor limits the freedom of the parties.274 The parties are allowed to agree on 
the choice-of-court agreement only in a specific moment. The Brussels Ibis Regulation 
contains such limitations in consumers, insurance, and employment disputes. 
  
                                                          
274 Emphasis added. 
  
77 
 
CHAPTER TWO. LEGAL INSTRUMENTS GOVERNING THE CHOICE-OF-COURT 
AGREEMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS IN THE EU 
The rules on choice-of-court agreements in the civil and commercial matters in the EU are 
regulated by three significant legal instruments: by the Brussels I(-bis) Regulation, (2007) 
Lugano Convention and by the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. This 
chapter analyses all three legal instruments as to the rule on choice-of-court agreements, on 
the lis pendens rule in favour of the Member State courts and on the rule on parallel 
proceedings and the Third State courts in presence of the jurisdiction agreement. Lastly, the 
interrelationship between all three legal instruments is examined. 
  
I. The Brussels Regime and Lugano Regime 
1.  Historical Background 
The rules on jurisdiction (including the rule on the prorogation of jurisdiction) and the rules 
on recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters were codified 
in 1968 in the Brussels Convention and were applied initially in six Contracting States as 
from 1 February 1973. According to the Jenard Report, there was general consent to introduce 
the rule on the prorogation of jurisdiction into the Brussels Convention. The original version 
of the first paragraph of Article 17 provided: 
If the Parties, one or more of whom is domiciled in a Contracting State, have, by 
agreement in writing or by an oral agreement evidenced in writing, agreed that a court 
or the courts of a Contracting State are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which 
have arisen or which may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, that 
court or those courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction. 
The Brussels Convention was several times modified by conventions on the accession to that 
Convention of new Member States.275 As to the jurisdiction clauses, the reference to 
                                                          
275 Convention of Accession of 9 October 1978 of the Kingdom of Denmark, of Ireland and of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgements 
in civil and commercial matters and to the Protocol on its interpretation by the Court of Justice, (78/884/EEC), 
OJ L 304, 30 October 1978; Convention on the accession of the Hellenic Republic to the Convention on 
jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters and to the Protocol on its 
interpretation by the Court of Justice with the adjustments made to them by the Convention on the accession of 
the Kingdom of Denmark, of Ireland and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
(82/972/EEC), OJ L 388, 31 December 1982; Convention on the accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the 
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international trade usages was added by the 1978 Accession Convention276 and the reference 
to practices between the parties was incorporated by the 1989 Accession Convention, which 
followed the wording of the 1988 Lugano Convention.277  
In 2000, after the Amsterdam Treaty entered into force, 278 the Brussels Convention has been 
replaced by a community act - the Brussels I Regulation. The Brussels I Regulation was 
adopted on 22 December 2000, and came into force on 1 March 2002. As to the rule on 
prorogation of jurisdiction, some amendments were adopted, for example the reference to 
clauses for the benefit of only one of the parties was deleted,279 it was expressly provided that 
the Brussels I Regulation covers non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements,280 and the definition 
of a writing, which includes electronic communications, based on Article 6 par. 1 of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce 1996,281 was included into the text.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Portuguese Republic to the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters and to the Protocol on its interpretation by the Court of Justice with the adjustments made to 
them by the Convention on the accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, of Ireland and of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the adjustments made to them by the Convention on the accession of the 
Hellenic Republic, (89/535/EEC), OJ L 285, 3 October 1989; Convention on the accession of the Republic of 
Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden to the Convention on jurisdiction and the 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters and to the Protocol on its interpretation by the Court 
of Justice, with the adjustments made to them by the Convention on the accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, 
of Ireland and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, by the Convention on the accession 
of the Hellenic Republic and by the Convention on the accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese 
Republic, OJ C 15, 15 January 1997. 
276 Report by Professor Dr Peter Schlosser on the Convention of 9 October 1978 on the Association of the 
Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention 
on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters and to the Protocol on its 
interpretation by the Court of Justice, OJ C 59, 5 March 1979, par. 179, (“Schlosser Report”). 
277 Report by Mr de Almeida Cruz, Mr Desantes Real, and Mr Jenard on the Convention on the accession of the 
Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic to the 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ C 189, 28 July 1990 (“Almeida Cruz-Desantes 
Real-Jenard Report”), par. 26; Report by Mr P. Jenard and Mr G. Möller on the Convention on jurisdiction and 
the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters done at Lugano on 16 September 1988, OJ C 189, 
28 July 1990, paras. 57-58, (“Jenard-Möller Report”) 
278 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and certain related acts, OJ C 340, 10 November 1997, (“Treaty of Amsterdam”). 
279 This provision had legal basis in Conventions between France and Belgium, France and Italy, Belgium and 
Netherlands, and in the Benelux Treaty. It was not incorporated into the Brussels I Regulation due to uncertainty 
if the choice-of-court agreement was concluded for the benefit of one of the parties. See H. GAUDAMET-TALLON, 
Compétence et exécution des jugements en Europe, Règlement no 44/2001, Conventions de Bruxelles et de 
Lugano, 2002, 2ed., LGDJ, par. 157.  
280 Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation provides that jurisdiction shall be exclusive «unless the parties have 
agreed otherwise».  
281 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce (1996), adopted on 12 June 1996. 
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The Brussels I Regulation was repealed by the Brussels Ibis Regulation as from 12 December 
2012, and came into effect on 10 January 2015.282 The revised text has introduced three 
significant modifications as to the prorogation of jurisdiction, which is dealt in the details in 
Sections 4 and 8 of this Subchapter. The first modification has extended its scope of 
application to cases where none of the parties to the choice-of-court agreement is domiciled in 
a Member State.The second modification has added a new rule on the law applicable to the 
substantive validity. And the last modification has affirmed the severability of choice-of-court 
agreements from the main contract. Moreover, new Article 31 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation has set out an exception to the “first seized lis pendens” rule aiming at 
strengthening the effectiveness of choice-of-court agreements, which is dealt separately in 
Section 14 of this Subchapter.  
According to the Protocol on the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the Convention of 
27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters,283 the ECJ had jurisdiction to rule on the interpretation of the Brussels Convention. A 
separate protocol granting the ECJ the jurisdiction to interpret is no longer necessary with 
regard to the regulations. The ECJ has jurisdiction to interpret the Union Treaties and the acts 
of the institutions by virtue of Article 267 TFEU284 (ex Article 234 of EC Treaty285), which 
covers the Brussels Regulation and the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
It must be borne in mind that the continuity of the law between the Brussels Convention, the 
Brussels Regulation, and the Brussels Ibis Regulation has been ensured.286 This continuity 
also covers interpretation provided by the ECJ in context of the Brussels Convention and the 
Brussels I Regulation, and in relation to the Brussels Ibis Regulation287 Thus, even the 
                                                          
282 Subject to two exceptions of Articles 75 and 76, which are applied from 10 January 2014. 
283 Protocol concerning the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the convention of 27 September 1968 on 
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters - signed in Luxembourg on 3 June 
1971, OJ L 204, 2 August 1975. 
284 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 202, 7 June 2016, 
(“TFEU”). 
285 Treaty establishing the European Community (consolidated version 2006), OJ C 321E, 29 December 2006 
(“EC Treaty”). 
286 See Recital No 19 of the Brussels I Regulation and Recital No 34 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
287 ECJ, Case C-533/08, TNT Express Nederland BV v AXA Versicherung AG, 4 May 2010, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:243, par. 36; Case C-180/06, Renate Ilsinger v Martin Dreschers, 14 May 2009, 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:303, par. 41; Case C-189/08, Zuid-Chemie BV v Philippo's Mineralenfabriek NV/SA, 16 July 
2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:475, par. 18; Case C-292/08, German Graphics Graphische Maschinen GmbH v Alice 
van der Schee, 10 September 2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:544, par. 27; Case C-406/09, Realchemie Nederland BV v 
Bayer CropScience AG, 8 October 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:668, par. 38. 
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explanatory reports to the Brussels Convention or the Brussels Ibis Regulation, such as the 
Jenard Report, Schlosser Report, Evrigenis-Kerameus Report,288 or Almeida Cruz-Desantes 
Real-Jenard Report represent valuable tools to interpret the current Brussels Ibis Regulation, 
unless there is a change in the wording of the text.289 Moreover, due to the similar or even 
same wording of the Brussels Convention with the 1988 Lugano Convention,290 and of the 
Brussels I Regulation with the 2007 Lugano Convention, the Jenard-Möller Report and Pocar 
Report291 may be perceived as another essential source for the Brussels Ibis Regulation. In any 
case, although the reports represent a valuable tool for interpretation, they are not binding on 
the courts.292 
The 1988 Lugano Convention from 16 September 1987 applied in twelve Members of the 
European Union (European Communities)293 and six members of the European Free Trade 
Association (“EFTA”)294 as from 1 January 1992. Three of the Members of the European Free 
Trade Association (Austria, Finland, and Sweden) ceased to be Members when they joined 
the European Union. On 1 February 2000, the 1988 Lugano Convention became applicable in 
Poland. The EFTA countries were interested in the drafting of a parallel Convention to the 
Brussels Convention and in the creation of the contractual links between the Community 
Member States and the EFTA States with a view to facilitating the recognition and 
                                                          
288 Report on the accession of the Hellenic Republic to the Community Convention on jurisdiction and the 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ C 298, 24 November 1986 (“Evrigenis-Kerameus 
Report”), 
289 A. BRIGGS, P. REES, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgements, Norton Rose, 2015, p. 11. 
290 Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters - Done at 
Lugano on 16 September 1988, (88/592/EEC), OJ L 319, 25 November 1988 (“1988 Lugano Convention”). 
291 Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters, signed in Lugano on 30 October 2007 - Explanatory report by Professor Fausto Pocar (Holder of the 
Chair of International Law at the University of Milan), OJ C 319, 23 December 2009 (“Pocar Report”). 
However, point 11 stated: «…but it should be borne in mind that the report is concerned only with the Lugano 
Convention, and does not in any way reflect the position of the States or of the Community with regard to the 
Brussels I Regulation. The absence of an explanatory report on the Brussels I Regulation does not mean that this 
report is intended to fill the supposed gap. In other words, the present report is not intended to offer clarification 
of the Regulation, or to give indications as to its interpretation or the application of the rules it lays down: its 
sole purpose is to explain the rules of the Lugano Convention as they stand after revision.». 
292 J. HILL, A. CHONG, International Commercial Disputes: Commercial Conflict of Laws in English Courts, 
Bloomsbury Publishing, 2010, op. cit., p. 60, according to the authors, the importance of the reports must not be 
overstated. However, see Article 3 par. 3 of the English Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, which gives 
to the Jenard Report, Schlosser Report, Evrigenis-Kerameus Report or Almeida Cruz-Desantes Real-Jenard 
Report special status in relation to interpretation of the Brussels Convention, by providing that: «may be 
considered in ascertaining the meaning or effect of any provision of the Conventions and shall be given such 
weight as is appropriate in the circumstances.». 
293 Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom, 
Greece, Spain, and Portugal. 
294 Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Austria, Finland, and Sweden 
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enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.295 The 1988 Lugano Convention 
followed the Brussels Convention closely, and where rules were identical, the reader could 
refer to the explanatory reports to the Brussels Convention.296 Since many rules of the 1988 
Lugano Convention mirrored the text of the Brussels Convention, it was recognized that 
interpreting the 1988 Lugano Convention in the same way as the Brussels Convention would 
be desirable. Protocol 2 on the uniform interpretation of the Convention is an integral part of 
the 1988 Lugano Convention by virtue of Article 65. Article 1 of the Protocol 2 provides for 
the homogenous interpretations of both conventions297 The courts of each Contracting State 
shall, when applying and interpreting the Convention “pay due account to the principles laid 
down by any relevant decision delivered by courts of the other Contracting States concerning 
provisions of this Convention.”.298 According to the Recital to the Protocol 2, the Contracting 
States are desire  
…to prevent, in full deference to the independence of the courts, divergent interpretations 
and to arrive at an interpretation as uniform as possible of the provisions of this 
Convention and of those of the Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 which are substantially 
reproduced in this Convention and of other instruments referred to in Article 64(1) of this 
Convention. 
The 2007 Lugano Convention replaced the 1988 Lugano Convention. The 2007 Lugano 
Convention was signed in Lugano on 30 October 2007, and is applied between the EU, 
(including Denmark), and the EFTA States - Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland.299 The EU 
Member States are not parties to the 2007 Lugano Convention due to the ECJ interpretation 
                                                          
295 Jenard-Möller Report, p. 8. 
296 Jenard-Möller Report, p. 5, expressly refers to Jenard Report, Schlosser Report and Evrigenis-Kerameus 
Report. 
297 On the homogeneity, see C. KOHLER, Homogeneity or Renationalisation in the European Judicial Area? 
Comments on a Recent Judgment of the Norwegian Supreme Court, in C. BAUDENBACHER, P. SPEITLER, B. 
PÁLMARSDÓTTIR (eds), EEA and the EFTA Court: Decentred Integration, Hart Publishing, 2014, p. 239. 
298 On the Protocol 2, see the Pocar Report. The non-Member States, especially Switzerland, were unwilling to 
follow the interpretation of the Lugano Convention provided by the ECJ with regard to their courts, in 
consequence, Protocol No 2 represents a compromise. See B. HESS, The Unsuitability of the Lugano Convention 
(2007) to Serve as a Bridge between the UK and the EU after Brexit, MPILux Research Paper Series 2 (2018), 
available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3118360 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3118360, p. 5. 
299 The 2007 Lugano Convention entered into force for the EU, Denmark and Norway on 1 January 2010, for 
Switzerland on 1 January 2011 and for Iceland on 1 May 2011. 
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provided in Lugano opinion 1/03.300 In 2006, the ECJ was consulted by the Council in relation 
to the conclusion of the new Lugano Convention 2007. The ECJ was requested to take a 
position regarding exclusive or shared powers between the Community and the Member 
States. The ECJ verified its ability to affect Community rules on jurisdiction (i.e., the Brussels 
I Regulation) by international agreements (i.e., the 2007 Lugano Convention) and concluded 
that the new Lugano Convention falls within the Community’s exclusive competence. In 
other words, the Member States cannot become the Contracting States of the 2007 Lugano 
Convention individually, but it must be concluded by EC (EU). Thus, the 2007 Lugano 
Convention constitutes EU law, and the ECJ has jurisdiction to interpret it “as regards the 
application by the courts of the EU Member States” as provided in Article 1 of Protocol 2 to 
the 2007 Lugano Convention. 
Article 17 of the Brussels Convention on the prorogation of jurisdiction was a model for the 
same rule on the prorogation of jurisdiction according to Article 17 of the 1988 Lugano 
Convention. Moreover, Article 23 of the 2007 Lugano Convention contains a rule on the 
prorogation of jurisdiction in the same wording as Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation. 
Since Article 17 of the 1988 Lugano Convention and Article 23 of the 2007 Lugano 
Convention adopted the same wording as the Brussels Convention and the Brussels I 
Regulation, the analysis of these Articles is not provided in the separate chapters. Where the 
following text makes reference to Article 17 of the Brussels Convention, it covers the 
considerations on Article 17 of the 1988 Lugano Convention. Where the following text makes 
reference to Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation, it covers the considerations on Article 23 
of the 2007 Lugano Convention. And where the following text makes reference to Article 25 
of the Brussels Ibis Regulation without making a difference concerning Article 23 of the 
Brussels I Regulation, it also covers the considerations on Article 23 of the 2007 Lugano 
Convention. Finally, the interplay between the Brussels Ibis Regulation and the 2007 Lugano 
Convention is then analysed in Subchapter III, Section 3. 
 
                                                          
300 ECJ, Opinion of the Court (Full Court) of 7 February 2006, Competence of the Community to conclude the 
new Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters, Opinion 1/03, ECLI:EU:C:2006:81. (“Lugano Opinion 1/03”). 
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2.  Structure and Requirements for the Application of Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation 
Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is divided into five paragraphs. Paragraph 1 defines 
the scope of application of this rule, lays down the additional conditions, establishes the rule 
on substantive validity, prescribes formal requirements, and affirms the exclusivity of choice-
of-court agreements (unless agreed otherwise). Paragraph 2 defines the additional definition 
of the form in “writing”. Paragraph 3 extends the application of this rule also to the trusts. 
Paragraph 4 rejects the legal force to the agreements if they are contrary to Articles 15, 19, or 
23 (provisions giving the special protection to the weaker parties) or to Article 24 (exclusive 
jurisdiction). The last paragraph establishes the severability of the choice-of-court agreement 
from the main contract. 
The choice-of-court agreements must satisfy certain conditions in order to give them effect 
under the Brussels Ibis Regulation. If the conditions are not met, the seized Member State 
court may nonetheless have jurisdiction according to other provisions of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulations. The conditions are the following: (i) the transaction must fall within the scope of 
application of the Brussels Ibis Regulation; (ii) the chosen court must be a court of a Member 
State, (iii) the choice-of-court agreement must be agreed upon in a form prescribed by this 
rule; (iv) the choice-of-court agreement must be connected with “a particular legal 
relationship”; (v) the choice-of-court agreement must be validly concluded (“substantive 
validity”); and (vii) the jurisdiction agreement cannot contradict Article 15, 19, 23, or 24 of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation. All these conditions will be further analyzed. 
 
3. Scope of Application  
On the first place, it is necessary to verify whether the legal relationship falls under the scope 
of application of the Brussels regime, i.e., whether the prorogation agreement is regulated by 
the Brussels I(bis) Regulations. In consequence, attention must be paid to the territorial, 
material, temporal and personal scope of application of the Brussels Ibis Regulation in the 
context of Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
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3.1.  Territorial and Personal Scope of Application 
The Brussels Ibis Regulation, as well as the Brussels I Regulation, is applicable in the 
territory of all 28 Member States.301 Special status must be given to Ireland, the United 
Kingdom, and Denmark. 
The United Kingdom and Ireland reserved their rights not to participate in the adoption of 
measures under Title V of Part III of the TFEU (ex Title IV of Part III of the EC Treaty) in 
accordance with Protocol No 21 (ex Protocol No 4) on the Position of the United Kingdom 
and Ireland.302 In accordance with Article 3 of the Protocols above, the United Kingdom and 
Ireland notified their intention that they wished to accept that measure (i.e., the Brussels I 
Regulation, as well as the Brussels Ibis Regulation).303 
Denmark is in a different position than the United Kingdom and Ireland. In accordance with 
the Protocol No 22 on the Position of Denmark (ex Protocol No 5), the measures adopted 
under Title V of Part III of the TFEU (ex Title IV of Part III of the EC Treaty) would not 
apply to Denmark.304 However, in 2005, after the Brussels I Regulation was adopted, 
Denmark concluded with the EU (Community) a separate Agreement on the application of the 
provisions of the Brussels I Regulation,305 which entered into force on 1 July 2007. In 
accordance with Article 3 par. 2 of the Agreement, Denmark has, by letter dated 20 December 
2012, notified the Commission of its decision to implement the contents of the amendments to 
the Brussels I Regulation. Danish Law No 518 of 28 May 2013, came into force on 1 June 
2013, and implemented the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
                                                          
301 See Article 355 TFEU (ex 299 EC Treaty) 
302 Treaty establishing the European Community (consolidated version), Protocols annexed to the Treaty on 
European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community Protocol (No 4) on the position of the 
United Kingdom and Ireland (1997), OJ C 321E, 29 December 2006; Consolidated version of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, Protocol (No 21) on the Position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in 
Respect of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, OJ C 326, 26 October 2012. 
303 See Recital No 40 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
304 See Article 2 of the protocols: Treaty establishing the European Community (consolidated version), Protocols 
annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community Protocol (No 5) 
on the position of Denmark (1997), OJ C 321E, 29 December 2006; Consolidated version of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, Protocol (No 22) on the position of Denmark, OJ C 326, 26 October 2012. 
305 Council Decision of 20 September 2005 on the signing, on behalf of the Community, of the Agreement 
between the European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, (2005/790/EC), OJ L 299, 16 November 2005; 
Council Decision of 27 April 2006 concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between the European 
Community and the Kingdom of Denmark on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters, (2006/325/EC), OJ L 120, 5 May 2006. 
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The general rule requires the presence of the territorial element connecting the dispute with 
the forum (regularly the defendant’s domicile). As it will be examined further, this is not the 
case of the rule regulating the jurisdiction agreement under Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation. 
Although the Brussels Regime requires defendant to be domiciled within the territory of a 
Member State,306 Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation does not limit the scope of its 
application in this respect. Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant has to be domiciled in the 
Member State. The condition for application of Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation 
regarding domicile of one of the parties in the territory of EU has been abolished. However, 
the chosen court must be a court of a Member State.307 This issue will be subject to the 
detailed analysis in the Section 4 of this Subchapter.  
 
3.2.  Temporal Scope of Application 
The Brussels Ibis Regulation is applied to legal proceedings instituted, with authentic 
instruments formally drawn up or registered, and to court settlements approved or concluded 
on or after 10 January 2015.308 The Brussels I Regulation is applied to legal proceedings 
instituted, with authentic instruments formally drawn up or registered and to court settlements 
approved or concluded on or after 1 March 2002 in fourteen Member States,309 on or after 1 
May 2004 in ten Member States,310 on or after 1 January 2007 in two Member States311, on or 
after 1 July 2007 in Denmark and on or after 1 July 2013 in Croatia. 
It is not required that the choice-of-court agreement was concluded on or after those dates. It 
is sufficient that the Member State court is seized with the dispute concerning Article 25 of 
                                                          
306 Article 4 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation and Article 2 of the Brussels I Regulation. 
307 On the situation when the parties choose a court outside the EU, see infra Chapter Two, Subchapter I, Section 
15.  
308 Article 66 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
309 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Ireland, United Kingdom, Greece, Portugal, 
Spain, Austria, Finland, and Sweden. 
310 Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
311 Bulgaria, and Romania. 
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the Brussels Ibis Regulation (Article 23 of the Brussels Regulation) at the time the Brussels 
I(-bis) Regulation became applicable at that Member State.312  
However, the ECJ in case 25/79, Sanicentral GmbH,313 in the context of the intertemporal 
question related to the application of the Brussels Convention, stated that Article 17 requires 
judicial proceedings instituted after the coming into force of the Brussels Convention and 
clauses conferring jurisdiction concluded prior to that date must be considered valid, even in 
cases in which they would have been regarded as void under the national law in force at the 
time when the contract was entered into.Thus, the effects of the jurisdiction clause are fixed to 
the time of commencement of proceedings. This interpretation must be stressed in the context 
of the choice-of-court agreements concluded according to the national rules (for example in 
case of Croatia, where the Brussels I Regulation is applicable as from 1 July 2013), which 
governs the choice-of-court agreements differently than the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
Moreover, such an interpretation can have a positive impact on the situation when the choice-
of-court agreement, concluded before 1 January 2015, was considered invalid according to 
Article 23 Brussels I Regulation. (For example, when the question on the substantive validity 
of the choice-of-court agreement was left to the national law.) However, it can be considered 
valid under Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, for example, in accordance with the 
new conflict-of-laws rules on the substantive validity. The opposite scenario is more 
problematic, where the previously valid choice-of-court agreement could become 
subsequently void according to the Brussels Ibis Regulation.314 The extension of this 
interpretation to another case would practically enable undesirable false retroactivity, i.e., the 
jurisdiction clause is concluded in virtue of the rules applicable at the time of its conclusion, 
but its validity is considered according to the future rules that at time of its conclusion did not 
even exist. Such interpretation would be in line neither with the comprehension of the choice-
of-court clauses classifying their nature as substantial, nor with the perception of choice-of-
                                                          
312 U. MAGNUS, Article 25, in U. MAGNUS, P. MANKOWSKI (eds), Brussels I Bis Regulation: Commentary. 
European Commentaries on Private International Law, volume I., Otto Schmidt, Sellier European Law 
Publishers, 2016, p. 601. 
313 ECJ, Case 25/79, Sanicentral GmbH v René Collin, 13 November 1979, ECLI:EU:C:1979:255. 
314 On the discussion regarding the parties’ faithfulness to the originally valid jurisdiction clause, see: U. 
MAGNUS, Article 25, in Brussels I Bis Regulation: Commentary, 2016, p. 601; P. BŘÍZA, Volba práva a volba 
soudu v mezinárodním obchodě, op. cit., p. 131. 
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court clauses classifying their nature as procedural due to the direct and immediate effects to 
the courts at the time of their conclusion.315 
 
3.2.1.  Relevant Point in Time for the Application of Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation 
The question also arises what point in time is decisive for the determination of 
application/non-application of Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (Article 23 of the 
Brussels Regulation), i.e., whether the decisive moment is the moment of the conclusion of 
the choice-of-court agreement or the moment when the Member State court is seized. This 
aspect seems to be more than significant when the circumstances relevant to the application of 
Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (Article 23 of the Brussels Regulation) are changed. 
This change can concern the international element, which might be missed, or can concern the 
change of the domicile of both parties outside the EU in the case of Article 23 of the Brussels 
Regulation. 
Due to the new rule on substantive validity introduced into Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation, the relevant point in time regarding substantive validity is determined in 
accordance with the national conflict-of-laws rules of the prorogued court.316 
As to the formal validity, the ECJ in the above-mentioned case 25/79, Sanicentral, fixed the 
circumstances to the time of the commencement of proceedings.317 For example, in the case 
where the parties’ choice-of-court agreement concluded “in a form which accords with 
practices which the parties have established between themselves”, such an interpretation 
would lead to the conclusion that the agreement may become invalid if the parties’ practices 
change before the commencement of the proceedings. In consequence, due to the possibility 
of the change of circumstances between the conclusion of the contract and the beginning of 
the legal proceedings, it is recommended that the choice-of-court agreement should satisfy the 
formal requirements prescribed in Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation at least at the 
                                                          
315 On the nature and effects, see supra Chapter One, Subchapter II. 
316 U. MAGNUS, Article 25, in Brussels I Bis Regulation: Commentary, 2016, op. cit., p. 601; P. BŘÍZA, Volba 
práva a volba soudu v mezinárodním obchodě, op. cit., p. 617. 
317 For a restrictive interpretation see H. GAUDAMET-TALLON, Compétence et exécution des jugements en 
Europe, Règlement no 44/2001, Conventions de Bruxelles et de Lugano, op. cit., par. 129.  
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time of the proceedings.318 Such a conclusion would guarantee the full recognition of the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda. 
As to the element of internationality, there is no consensus at what point in time the existence 
an international factor should be considered, whether at the time the agreement is concluded 
or at the time the Member State court is seized.319 However, the parties should rely on the fact 
that once the choice-of-court agreement has an international element, it should not be “lost” 
even although the dispute subsequently becomes purely internal.320  
A similar conclusion may be upheld in the context of the change of the domicile to a Third 
State in the proceedings commenced before 1 January 2015, i.e., when Article 23 of the 
Brussels I Regulation determines, as the condition for its application, the domicile of at least 
of one of the parties is in the Member State. Also, in this case, it can be argued that one of the 
parties must have domicile in the Member State at the time the Member State court is seised 
by virtue of ECJ’s interpretation in case 25/79, Sanicentral. However, according to some 
opinions, it suffices that one of the parties is domiciled in the Member State at the time of 
conclusion of the choice-of-court agreement - considering that certainty and predictability are 
essential.321 The support for the latter approach can be found in the context of the 2007 
Lugano Convention in the Pocar Report where professor Pocar stated that the relevant time 
had to be the time of conclusion of the contract.322 This conclusion may also be supported by 
the ECJ interpretation related to the assignment of the contract. The ECJ upheld that the 
                                                          
318 Emphasis added. See U. MAGNUS, Article 25, in Brussels I Bis Regulation: Commentary. European 
Commentaries on Private International Law, 2016, op. cit., p. 601; P. BŘÍZA, Volba práva a volba soudu v 
mezinárodním obchodě, op. cit., p. 619. 
319 U. MAGNUS, Article 25, in Brussels I Bis Regulation: Commentary, 2016, op. cit., p. 601; P. BŘÍZA, Volba 
práva a volba soudu v mezinárodním obchodě, op. cit., 619. 
320 U. MAGNUS, Article 25, in Brussels I Bis Regulation: Commentary, 2016, op. cit., p. 619. 
321 G. A. L. DROZ, Compétence judiciaire et effets des jugements dans le Marché commun, Daloz, 8 (1972), par. 
184; S. O’MALLEY, A. LAYTON, European Civil Practice, Sweet & Maxwell, 2004, p. 570. 
322 Pocar Report, par. 105: «The ad hoc working party examined the question of the date on which one of the 
parties must be domiciled in a State bound by the Convention in order for Article 23(1) to apply, in the light of 
Articles 13(3) and 17(3), which specify that in the cases they refer to the relevant domicile is the parties’ 
domicile at the time of conclusion of the contract. It was agreed that that was the decisive date for purposes of 
Article 23 too, but it was not deemed necessary to add an explanation to that effect in the text. This was because 
the relevant time had to be the time of conclusion of the contract, for the sake of legal certainty and the 
confidence of the parties who agreed the clause. If the date of reference were to be the date on which the 
proceedings were brought, one party would be able to transfer his own domicile to a State bound by the 
Convention after signing the contract and before bringing the proceedings, thereby rendering Article 23(1) 
applicable, and changing the context in which the court designated in the clause was to verify its own 
jurisdiction.». 
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validity of a jurisdiction clause must be assessed by reference to the relationship between the 
parties to the original contract.323 
 
3.3.  Material Scope 
The choice-of-court agreement concluded under Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
must fall into the material scope of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, which concerns civil and 
commercial matters as provided in Article 1 par. 1. It must be borne in mind that the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation does not define the concept of civil and commercial matters, but it is an 
autonomous concept, which has been interpreted by the ECJ several times.324 Article 1 par. 2 
then expressly excludes specific issues from the term of the “civil and commercial matters”, 
such as: the status or legal capacity of natural persons; rights in property arising out of a 
matrimonial relationship or out of a relationship deemed by the law applicable to such 
relationship to have comparable effects to marriage; bankruptcy; proceedings relating to the 
winding-up of insolvent companies or other legal persons; judicial arrangements, 
compositions and analogous proceedings; social security; arbitration; maintenance obligations 
arising from a family relationship, parentage, marriage, or affinity; and wills and succession, 
including maintenance obligations arising by reason of death. The Jenard report explains such 
exclusions by the divergences in the national and private international law.325 The other reason 
for the exclusion of the specific issues is that they are already subject to international 
                                                          
323 ECJ, Case C-71/83, Partenreederei ms. Tilly Russ and Ernest Russ v NV Haven- & Vervoerbedrijf Nova and 
NV Goeminne Hout, 19 June 1984, ECLI:EU:C:1984:217, par. 24; Case C-159/97, Trasporti Castelletti par. 41, 
42; Case C-387/98, Coreck Maritime GmbH v Handelsveem BV and Others, 9 November 2000, 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:606, par. 20. See also J. HILL, A. CHONG, International Commercial Disputes: Commercial 
Conflict of Laws in English Courts, op. cit., p. 112. 
324 See for example ECJ, Case C-29/76, LTU Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH & Co. KG v Eurocontrol, 14 
October 1976, ECLI:EU:C:1976:137; Case C-814/79, Netherlands State v Reinhold Rüffer, 16 December 1980, 
ECLI:EU:C:1980:291; Case C-266/01, Préservatrice foncière TIARD SA v Staat der Nederlanden, 15 May 2003, 
ECLI:EU:C:2003:282; Case C-292/05, Eirini Lechouritou and Others v Dimosio tis Omospondiakis Dimokratias 
tis Germanias, 15 February 2007, ECLI:EU:C:2007:102; Case C-645/11, Land Berlin v Ellen Mirjam Sapir and 
Others, 11 April 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:228. 
325 Jenard Report, p. 10. 
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conventions or EU regulations.326 The differences between the excluded issues listed in the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation and in the Brussels I Regulation are mostly technical.327 
 
3.4. Internationality 
From the ECJ case law, it is evident that the Brussels Ibis Regulation applies to international 
cases and a minimum degree of internationality is required.328 The international element may 
also refer to the Third State.329 No problem arises when the parties have a domicile in different 
States, and the agreement confers jurisdiction to the courts of a Member State.330 However, 
some questions related to the choice-of-court agreements remain open - in what case is the 
situation considered only “domestic” (and thus national rules will be applied) and in what 
case is the situation “sufficiently international”. 
What happens if the two parties domiciled in the same Member State confer jurisdiction by 
agreement to another Member State court?331 This situation should be considered as 
sufficiently international, when the case had links also to other States, for example when the 
subject matter has an international character (e.g., delivery).332 However, such an answer is 
not so unequivocal where an objective link between the legal relationship and the chosen 
                                                          
326 See for example Maintenance Regulation, Succession Regulation, Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings, OJ L 141, 5 June 2015 (“Insolvency 
Regulation”). 
327 It was specified that the term matrimonial relationship covers also “relationship deemed by the law applicable 
to such relationship to have comparable effects to marriage”; the words “including maintenance obligations 
arising by reason of death” were added. 
328 ECJ, Case C-327/10, Hypoteční banka a.s. proti Udo Mike Lindner, 17 November 2011, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:745; Case C-9/12, Corman-Collins SA v La Maison du Whisky SA, 19 December 2013, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:860.  
329 ECJ, Case C-281/02, Owusu, par. 26. 
330 Jenard Report, p. 38. 
331 This question was posed to the ECJ in Case C-136/16, Sociedade Metropolitana de Desenvolvimento SA v 
Banco Santander Totta SA, 10 March 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:237. Request for a preliminary ruling from the 
Supremo Tribunal de Justiça (Portugal) lodged on 7 March 2016 — Sociedade Metropolitana de 
Desenvolvimento SA v Banco Santander Totta SA, OJ C 165, 10 May 2016: «In a dispute between two national 
undertakings of a Member State concerning agreements, does the fact that such agreements contain clauses 
conferring jurisdiction to another Member State constitute a sufficient international element to give rise to the 
application of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 (1) and Regulation No 1215/2012 (2) to determine international 
jurisdiction, or must there be other international elements?». However, the Order of the President of the Second 
Chamber of the Court of 10 March 2017 has been removed. 
332 Jenard Report, p. 38; U. MAGNUS, Article 25, in Brussels I Bis Regulation: Commentary, 2016, op. cit., p. 
602; S. O’MALLEY, A. LAYTON, European Civil Practice, Sweet & Maxwell, 1989, p. 553; F. GARCIMARTIN, 
Chapter 9 - Article 25, in A. DICKINSON, A. JAMES, E. LEIN (eds), The Brussels I Regulation Recast, Oxford 
University Press, 2015, p. 285. 
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court is missing. Although genuine autonomy is sometimes considered as a situation when a 
chosen court accepts jurisdiction, when there is no connection to the forum,333 the opinions 
differ in the context of the Brussels Regime regarding the dispute deriving from a case where 
all relevant elements are located in one Member State, but only the choice-of-court agreement 
designates a court of other Member State.334 However, according to Professor Droz every 
agreement which designates a Member State court, but excludes another Member State court 
which would have otherwise jurisdiction according to the Brussels Convention, is to be 
considered as having an international element.335 Such an assumption cannot cover all the 
cases, for example when both parties are domiciled in Third States.336 In my opinion, with the 
rising importance of the specialised business courts, the parties domiciled in the same 
Member States will be even more motivated to confer jurisdiction in favour of such courts, 
with a view of automatic recognition of the judgment in the other Member States337 and the 
limitations might seem to be counterproductive for the international trade. Article 25 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation, which has repealed the requirement of the domicile of one of the 
parties in a Member State, supports this view.338 On the other hand, this view seems to be 
                                                          
333 Some legal systems require a connection with the territory of the State, other legal systems respect party 
autonomy as far as possible. For examples, in Germany no connection between the dispute and forum is 
necessary. In Switzerland, the court may decline jurisdiction if neither party has residence, domicile, or place of 
business in the canton of the designated court. The law of New York requires that an agreement giving rise to the 
litigation is governed by the New York law. See P. NYGH, Autonomy in International Contracts, op. cit., p. 15, 
16; A. BĚLOHLÁVEK, Rome Convention-Rome I Regulation: Commentary: New EU Conflict-of-Laws Rules for 
Contractual Obligations, Juris, 2010, p. 670. 
334 On the negative approach see Schlosser Report, par. 174; in context of the 2007 Lugano Convention see 
Pocar Report, par. 104; A. BRIGGS, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, op. cit., p. 245 and footnote 
No 25. 
335 G. A. L. DROZ, Compétence judiciaire et effets des jugements dans le Marché commun, op. cit., par. 191. On 
the assumption that no connection is required see also M. WELLER, Choice of Forum Agreements Under the 
Brussels I Recast and Under the Hague Convention: Coherences and Clashes, op. cit., p. 5. On the other hand, 
Article 3 par. 3 of the Rome I Regulation provides: «Where all other elements relevant to the situation at the 
time of the choice are located in a country other than the country whose law has been chosen, the choice of the 
parties shall not prejudice the application of provisions of the law of that other country which cannot be 
derogated from by agreement». In consequence, it may be argued that this provision limits of a choice-of-law 
clause stands in respect of internationality of the case, whereby the mere choice of law or a foreign court in 
otherwise entirely domestic cases cannot suffice. 
336 See opposite approach in U. MAGNUS, Article 25, in Brussels I Bis Regulation: Commentary, 2016, op. cit., p. 
604, where the author considers the potential future change of the domicile from the Third State into the Member 
State until the commencement of the proceedings as “potential derogation”. 
337 F. GARCIMARTIN, Chapter 9 - Article 25, in The Brussels I Regulation Recast, op. cit., p. 286, where the 
author provides: «given the possibility that a judgment from one Member State may ultimately be enforced in 
another, the objectives of the Recast Regulation, in promoting party autonomy and facilitating the cross-border 
recognition and enforcement of judgments, would be better served by the harmonious application of Art 25 in 
this case.». 
338 U. MAGNUS, Article 25, in Brussels I Bis Regulation: Commentary, 2016, op. cit., p. 603. 
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inconsistent with Article 1 par. 2 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, 
which expressly provides: “…a case is international unless the parties are resident in the 
same Contracting State and the relationship of the parties and all other elements relevant to 
the dispute, regardless of the location of the chosen court, are connected only with that 
State.”. 
At least, the opinions on the purely domestic situation do not differ. According to the Jenard 
Report, Article 17 of the Brussels Convention (Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) 
does not apply “…where two parties who are domiciled in the same Contracting State have 
agreed that a court that State shall have jurisdiction…”339 
 
4.  Domicile of the Parties 
Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation, like Article 17 of the Brussels Convention,340 applied 
only when at least one of the parties had a domicile in the Member States. The procedural rule 
of the parties was not relevant. This party domiciled in the Member State could be in the 
position of the plaintiff.341 Although the party possessed more domiciles according to Article 
63 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (Article 60 of the Brussels I Regulation), it was sufficient 
that one of the domiciles was situated in a Member State.342 Article 23 of the Brussels I 
Regulation was in generally inapplicable where both parties were domiciled in Third States. 
However, Article 23 par. 3 of the Brussels I Regulation gave priority to the Member State 
court designated by the parties domiciled outside the EU over the courts of other Member 
States - the derogated Member State court had to stay the proceedings and had to decline its 
jurisdiction if the chosen Member State court established its jurisdiction. Although this 
paragraph should have secured the dealings with the derogative effect of other Member States 
                                                          
339 Jenard Report, p. 38. 
340 Article 17 of the Brussels Convention in contrast with Article 1 of the 1958 Hague Convention and Article 2 
of the 1965 Hague Convention, where only forum located in a Contracting State represent a condition for the 
application, requires the domicile of one of the parties in the Contracting State. 
341 ECJ, Case C-412/98, Group Josi Reinsurance Company SA v Universal General Insurance Company 
(UGIC), 13 July 2000, ECLI:EU:C:2000:399. See also U. MAGNUS, Article 25, in Brussels I Bis Regulation: 
Commentary, 2016, op. cit., p. 614. 
342 U. MAGNUS, Article 23, in Brussels I Regulation, 2012, op. cit., p. 463. On the different interpretation of the 
“domicile” determined in different Member States according to their national law see Heidelberg Report, par. 
180-186. 
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in a uniform way within the EU,343 on the contrary, specific uncertainties arose. The wording 
of this paragraph (“such an agreement”) may have supported the view that the jurisdiction 
agreement had to be upheld only if the formal requirements laid down in paragraph 1 were 
met.344 However, only the national rules (including the conflict-of-laws rules) can regulate the 
substantive and the formal validity, since the Brussels I Regulation did not cover the choice-
of-court agreements “from outside”.345 
In the Green Paper was stressed that:  
…the good functioning of an internal market and the Community's commercial policy 
both on the internal and on the international level require that equal access to justice on 
the basis of clear and precise rules on international jurisdiction is ensured not only for 
defendants but also for claimants domiciled in the Community.346 
The original Proposal for a Recast of the Brussels I Regulation, which intended, in general, to 
extend the scope to the Third State’s defendant, was not adopted.347 According to the Impact 
Assessment, the negative economic impact on companies was “difficult to quantify” and  
…there is little quantitative evidence that the existing divergences between the national 
laws lead to distortions of competition and that the absence of access to EU courts entails 
significant losses for consumers and other weaker parties.348  
In consequence, the Draft Report on the Proposal for the Brussels Ibis Regulation took the 
view that the general extension of the scope to the Third State’s defendant did not improve the 
position of non-EU defendants.349  
                                                          
343 Schlosser Report, par. 177. 
344 Ibidem. 
345 U. MAGNUS, Article 23, in Brussels I Regulation, 2012, op. cit., p. 464. 
346 See answer to question 1 in the Green Paper on the review of Council Regulation (EC) no 44/2001 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, COM/2009/0175 
final, 21 April 2009. 
347 Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, COM/2010/0748 final, 14 December 2010 
(“Proposal for a Recast of the Brussels I Regulation”). The scope of the Third State’s defendant was adopted 
only in the context of consumers and employees, see Article 18 par. 1 and Article 21 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation. 
348 Commission staff working paper. Impact assessment. Accompanying document to the Proposal for 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters (Recast), SEC (2010) 1547 final, 14 December 2010, p. 25. 
349 Committee on Legal Affairs, Draft Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
(recast), PE467.046, 28 June 2011. 
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However, the Brussels Ibis Regulation has extended the scope to Third State defendants in 
relation to the choice-of-court agreement.350 Thus, Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
applies irrespective of the domicile of the parties. The subsequent change of the domicile of 
one of the parties of the Third States does not represent a problem anymore.351 
However, under the 2007 Lugano Convention, the domicile of one of the parties in the 
Member State is still decisive. In consequence, all considerations related to the application of 
Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation remain relevant for the 2007 Lugano Convention. 
 
5. Prorogation of the Court of a Member State 
Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation determines that a court or the courts of a Member 
State are to have jurisdiction. In practice, it means that the parties may designate a specific 
court (Tribunale di Milano) or a specific Member State (Italian courts). The designation of the 
court in a specific city meets the requirements of Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
Such a conclusion was confirmed by the ECJ judgment, case C222/15, Hőszig, 352 when the 
parties agreed that “the Paris Courts have exclusive and final jurisdiction to settle disputes 
which may arise between the parties”. The interesting thing about this judgment is that the 
ECJ has supported its conclusion on the basis that the parties simultaneously agreed that the 
law of the designated Member State court was applicable to the contact. According to the 
ECJ, for this reason, there was “no doubt that that clause seeks to confer exclusive 
jurisdiction on the courts belonging to the judicial system of that Member State.”353 
When the courts of the Member State are designated, the national law decides which local 
court has jurisdiction.354 The plaintiff must comply with the national rules on local jurisdiction 
                                                          
350 The Proposal for a Recast of the Brussels I Regulation did not explain such an extension, but it can be 
presumed that this proposal made a part of the general option of the extension of the scope of the Brussels I 
Regulation to the Third State’s defendant. This extension was already proposed in 2008 by European Group for 
Private International Law (“GEDIP.”). See Proposition de modification du chapitre II du règlement 44/2001 en 
vue de son application aux situations externes, Bergen 21 September 2008, available at : https://www.gedip-
egpil.eu/documents/gedip-documents-18pf.htm.  
351 On the relevant point of time in case of transfer of a domicile according to Article 23 of the Brussels I 
Regulation, see supra Section 3.2.1. of this Subchapter  
352 ECJ, Case C222/15, Hőszig Kft. V Alstom Power Thermal Services, 7 July 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:525. 
353 ECJ, Case C222/15, Hőszig, para 46. 
354 See Jenard Report, p. 37; Case 23/78, Nikolaus Meeth v Glacetal, Opinion of Advocate General Capotorti, 12 
October 1978, ECLI:EU:C:1978:183, par. 2; U. MAGNUS, Article 25, in Brussels I Bis Regulation, 2016, op. cit., 
p. 622. 
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and identify the competent national court.355 Certain problem may arise when such a rule is 
lacking in the designated Member State, for example when the parties designate a “neutral” 
Member State or where the facts of the case do not have any connection with the chosen 
Member State. Professor Jenard in the Jenard Report, referring to professor Batiffol’s 
statement, pointed out that the jurisdiction clause “may have no legal effect if, in the absence 
of any connecting factor between the contractual situation and the State whose courts have 
been agreed on as having jurisdiction, the law of that State provides no way of determining 
which court can or should be seized of the matter”.356 However, it has been suggested, that in 
such a case, the plaintiff may choose a specific court in that Member State; in the absence of a 
choice, the domicile one of the parties or the seat of government should be decisive.357 
The parties can also designate courts in more than one Member State. In particular, the ECJ in 
the case 23/78, Meeth, stated that the wording could not exclude the right of the parties to 
agree on two or more courts.358 The ECJ justified its interpretation on the fact that Article 17 
of the Brussels Convention (Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) is based on the 
independent will of the parties and on widespread business practice. 359 The principle of the 
independent will of the parties was subsequently confirmed in the judgment C-387/98, Coreck 
Maritime360 and in C222/15, Hőszig. 361 
The designated court does not have to be indicated in the choice-of-court agreement. It 
suffices that the objective criterion, according to which it is possible to identify the designated 
court, is established; these criteria may be established on the basis of the circumstances of a 
specific case.362 The most crucial aspect is that the designation is “sufficiently precise”. The 
ECJ suggested that such a designation is specific enough when the parties designate a 
Member State court situated in the domicile of the defendant or the claimant,363 or in the place 
of business.364  
                                                          
355 Jenard Report, p. 37. 
356 Jenard Report, p. 37. 
357 U. MAGNUS, Article 25, in Brussels I Bis Regulation, 2016, op. cit., p. 622. 
358 ECJ, Case 23/78, Nikolaus Meeth v Glacetal, 9 November 1978, ECLI:EU:C:1978:198, para 5. On the 
asymmetric clauses under the Brussels Regime, see infra Section 11.2. of this Subchapter. 
359 ECJ, Case 23/78, Meeth, par. 5. 
360 ECJ, Case C-387/98, Coreck, par. 14. 
361 ECJ, Case C222/15, Hőszig, par. 44. 
362 ECJ, Case C-387/98, Coreck, par. 15 
363 ECJ, Case 23/78, Meeth, par.6. 
364 ECJ, Case C-387/98, Coreck, par. 15. 
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6.  Disputes in connection with a Particular Legal Relationship 
Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation provides that the parties may agree on a court or the 
courts of a Member State to have jurisdiction “to settle any dispute any disputes which have 
arisen or which may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship”. The ECJ has 
interpreted this wording in judgment C-214/89, Powell Duffryn,365 concerning a jurisdiction 
clause inserted in the company statute. According to the ECJ, such wording limits the scope 
of a jurisdiction agreement solely to disputes which arise from the legal relationship in 
connection with which the jurisdiction agreement was concluded.366 It cannot be deduced that 
the jurisdiction clause covers all disputes which may arise out of parties’ legal relationship or 
relationship other than that in connection with which the jurisdiction clause was entered 
into.367 Unless agreed otherwise between the parties, the part of the claim also represents set-
off claims.368 
It depends on the formulation of the jurisdiction clause to which extent it applies. However, 
“catch-all-clauses” covering every present and future dispute between the parties cannot be 
admitted under the Brussels Ibis Regulation.369 
 
7.  Formal Validity 
According to the Brussels Convention, the prorogation agreement must be in “writing or by 
an oral agreement evidenced in writing”.370 The purpose of such wording of Article 17 on 
                                                          
365 ECJ, Case C-214/89, Powell Duffryn plc v Wolfgang Petereit, 10 March 1992, ECLI:EU:C:1992:115. 
366 ECJ, Case C-214/89, Powell Duffryn, par. 31. 
367 ECJ, Case C-214/89, Powell Duffryn, par. 31. 
368 ECJ, Case 23/78, Meeth, par. 8, 9. 
369 U. MAGNUS, Article 25, in Brussels I Bis Regulation, 2016, op. cit., p. 620. 
370 According to the Jenard Report, the wording determining formal requirements of rule on prorogation of 
jurisdiction was similar to the Convention between Germany and Belgium, which was based on the rules of the 
Hague Convention of 15 April 1958 on the jurisdiction of the selected forum in the case of international sale of 
goods, and the Hague Convention of 25 November 1965 on the choice-of-court. The German-Belgian 
Convention specifies that an agreement within the meaning of that Article 3 para 2 shall exist only if a party has 
made its declaration in writing and the opponent has accepted it or if the agreement has been confirmed in 
writing: «..eine Vereinbarung im Sinne dieser Vorschrift liegt nur vor, wenn eine Partei ihre Erklärung 
schriftlich abgegeben und die Gegenpartei sie angenommen hat oder wenn die Vereinbarung für den Fall, daß 
sie mündlich getroffen ist, von einer Partei schriftlich bestätigt worden ist, ohne daß die Gegenpartei der 
Bestätigung widersprochen hat.» .The Hague Convention of 15 April 1958 in Article 2 provides that when the 
parties designate the forum in oral form, such designation is valid only if it has been expressly confirmed by a 
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formal requirements was “not to impede commercial practice” and avoid “excessive 
formality” which is “incompatible with commercial practice”. At the same time, it should not 
recognize the effect of the agreements on jurisdiction, unless they were the subject of an 
agreement which implied the consent of all the parties.371 Indeed, the jurisdiction clauses in 
the printed forms for business correspondence or in the invoices do not have legal force if 
they are not agreed to by the party against whom they would operate.372 The valid consent of 
the parties must be granted. The weight given to the written document, which evidences a 
previous oral agreement, is assessed by the Member State court (i.e., whether a written 
document serves as evidence of the existence of the agreement).373 The reference to 
international trade usages was added by the 1978 Accession Convention374 and the reference 
to practices between the parties was incorporated by the 1989 Accession Convention, which 
followed the wording of the 1988 Lugano Convention.375 The definition of writing, which 
includes electronic communications, was included in Article 23 of the Brussels Regulation. 
Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation has not been amended as to the formal validity of 
choice-of-court agreements. Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation requires that the parties 
“agree” on the jurisdiction. According to the ECJ, the concept must be interpreted 
independently, and no reference to the national law is permitted.376 Article 25 of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation represents an exhaustive and a uniform regime and must be interpreted 
autonomously.377 No conditions on the form can be added or reduced by the national law.378 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
declaration one of the party without having been contested.: «Lorsque la vente, conclue oralement, comporte la 
désignation du for, cette désignation n'est valable que si elle a été exprimée ou confirmée par une déclaration 
écrite émanant de l'une des parties ou d'un courtier, sans avoir été contestée.». Article 4 of the Hague 
Convention of 25 November 1965 provides as well for the formal requirements of the choice-of-court agreement 
in order to be considered validly made – the forum-selection agreement must be a result of the acceptance by one 
party of a written proposal by the other party expressly designating the chosen court or courts. 
371 Jenard Report, p. 37. 
372 Jenard Report, p. 37. This conclusion corresponds to the case law determined between the founding Member 
States, e.g., on Article 12 of the bilateral convention between Italy and France see Corte di Appello di Firenze, 5 
May 1967, in Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale, (1968), p. 394. 
373 Jenard Report, p. 37. 
374 Schlosser Report, par. 179. It was a reaction to the ECJ, Case 25/76, Galeries Segoura SPRL v Société Rahim 
Bonakdarian, 14 December 1976, ECLI:EU:C:1976:178. 
375 Almeida Cruz-Desantes Real-Jenard Report, par. 26; Jenard-Möller Report, par. 57, 58. It was a reaction to 
the ECJ, Case 25/76, Galeries Segoura. 
376 ECJ, Case C-214/89, Powell Duffryn, par. 11. 
377 U. MAGNUS, Article 25, in Brussels I Bis Regulation, 2016, op. cit., p. 635; F. GARCIMARTIN, Chapter 9 - 
Article 25, in The Brussels I Regulation Recast, op. cit., p. 286. 
378 ECJ, Case C-150/80, Elefanten Schuh GmbH v Jacqmain, 24 June 1981, ECLI:EU:C:1981:148, par. 25; Case 
C-159/97, Trasporti Castelletti, par. 37. 
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The formal requirements guarantee to protect the parties by: (i) ensuring a real consent 
between them; and (ii) providing proof of such consent.379 Therefore, the formal requirements, 
which assure that there was actual consent on the part of the persons concerned, prevent the 
jurisdiction clause from being unnoticed.380 On the other hand, meeting the formal 
requirements offers proof of such consent – Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
constitutes a presumption or at least an indication of the consent.381 
It might be disputed whether the wording “agree” covers “agreement” of both parties. 
According to Professor Briggs, the plural form of “agree” was necessary to use since at the 
time of the conclusion of the choice-of-court clause, it is unknown who will be suing whom, 
and therefore, it does not mean that the agreement is bilateral in its nature.382 In consequence, 
unilateral acceptance by the party or both parties must be sufficiently demonstrated and 
formalised.383 This conclusion corresponds to the ECJ case Estasis Salotti, Case 24/76, where 
the ECJ stated that: “since no guarantee is thereby given that the other party has really 
consented to the clause waiving the normal rules of jurisdiction”. 384 It practically means that 
it suffices that the defendant has accepted the jurisdiction of otherwise competent court 
according to the Brussels Ibis Regulation.385 The acceptance of the plaintiff is evident when he 
files the legal action in front of the designated Member State court.386 The more complicated 
situation takes place when the plaintiff seizes a Member State court other than the designated 
one. In such a case, it must be demonstrated that the plaintiff agreed to the jurisdiction of the 
designated Member State court. Therefore, it is crucial to demonstrate the existence of the 
consent, which is based on the fulfilment of the requirements imposed by Article 25 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation. Diversely, in the same judgment, the ECJ stated that the purpose of 
the formal requirements is “to ensure that the consensus between the parties is in fact 
                                                          
379 ECJ, Case C-150/80, Elefanten Schuh, par. 26; Case C-159/97, Case C-159/97, Trasporti Castelletti, par. 34, 
48. 
380 ECJ, Case C-106/95, MSG v Les Gravières Rhénanes, par. 17; Case C-159/97, Trasporti Castelletti, par. 19; 
Case 71/83, Tilly Russ, par. 24. 
381 F. GARCIMARTIN, Chapter 9 - Article 25, in The Brussels I Regulation Recast, op. cit., p. 287. 
382 A. BRIGGS, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, op. cit., p. 259. 
383 Ibidem. 
384 ECJ, Case 24/76, Estasis Salotti di Colzani Aimo e Gianmario Colzani s.n.c. v Rüwa Polstereimaschinen 
GmbH, 14 December 1976, ECLI:EU:C:1976:177, par. 9. 
385 P. BŘÍZA, Volba práva a volba soudu v mezinárodním obchodě, op. cit., p. 139. 
386 P. BŘÍZA, Volba práva a volba soudu v mezinárodním obchodě, op. cit., p. 139. 
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established” and that “the consensus must be clearly and precisely demonstrated”.387 This 
conclusion favours more the interpretation of the concept of bilateral agreement. 
Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation allows four alternative forms of the jurisdiction 
agreement: (i) in writing; (ii) evidenced in writing; (iii) shown by practices among the parties; 
or (iv) shown by international trade or commerce. 
 
7.1. In Writing 
The real consent of the parties is the aim of this provision.388 There are no doubts that the 
written jurisdiction clause signed by both parties satisfies the formal requirements according 
to Article 25 par. 1 lett. a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.389  
The national case law assumed another criterion as to the signature. The clause may be 
inserted into the contract with another clause, or may be separately signed, or may be in 
various documents referring to the jurisdiction clause if every document is individually 
signed. In case that the kind of writing (telefax, telegram, etc.) does not allow a handwritten 
signature, then it suffices that the clause is identifiable. Also, the jurisdiction clause inserted 
in an unreasonable place (bottom part of the page) into the contract, the confirmation of the 
reception of the offer containing jurisdiction clause, or the reference to the jurisdiction clause 
inserted into the other contract between the same parties, is not enough for application of 
Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.390 On the other hand, the supply order, containing 
jurisdiction clause, which is accepted and signed by other party satisfies formal requirements 
within the meaning of Article 25 par. 1 lett. a) of the Brussels-bis Regulation.391 
                                                          
387 ECJ, Case 24-76, Estasis Salotti, par. 7.  
388 ECJ, Case C543/10, Refcomp SpA v Axa Corporate Solutions Assurance SA and Others, 7 February 2013, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:62, par. 28. 
389 F. GARCIMARTIN, Chapter 9 - Article 25, in The Brussels I Regulation Recast, op. cit., p. 288; U. MAGNUS, 
Article 25, in Brussels I Bis Regulation, 2016, op. cit., p. 636. 
390 See reference to the case-law cited in the footnotes by F. GARCIMARTIN, Chapter 9 - Article 25, in The 
Brussels I Regulation Recast, op. cit., p. 288; U. MAGNUS, Article 25, in Brussels I Bis Regulation, 2016, op. cit., 
p. 636. See also Corte di Cassazione, S.U., n. 3693, 9 March 2012, in Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e 
processuale (2013), p. 144. 
391 Corte di Cassazione, S.U., n. 19447, 10 September 2009, in Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e 
processulae, (2010), p. 147. 
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The most problematic issue concerns the validity of the jurisdiction clause incorporated into 
the standard contract terms which is part of the main contract. The ECJ has developed 
autonomous criteria for the interpretation of such jurisdiction clauses.  
In the judgment C222/15, Hőszig, the ECJ held that the jurisdiction clause is lawful where the 
text of the contract signed by both parties contains an express reference to the general 
conditions which contain a jurisdiction clause.392 
In the judgment, 24/76, Estasis Salotti, the ECJ stressed that in a situation where a jurisdiction 
clause is incorporated into the general terms on the back of a contract signed by both parties, 
an express reference to those general conditions must be included in the contract in order to 
meet the formal requirements prescribed in the Brussels Convention.393 It is not sufficient that 
a jurisdiction clause is printed among the general conditions of one of the parties on the 
reverse of a contract drawn up by that party. Moreover, in the same judgment, the ECJ 
addressed the situation when the parties referred in the contract to a prior written offer, which 
made a reference to general conditions (including a jurisdiction clause). Such a reference 
satisfies the formal requirements only if the reference is express and can be checked by a 
party exercising reasonable care. 
The ECJ in the most recent case C64/17, Saey Home & Garden,394 dealt with the jurisdiction 
agreement, which was concluded verbally, was not evidenced in writing, and the general 
terms (including the jurisdiction clause) were included only in the invoices. The ECJ held that 
a jurisdiction clause contained in the invoices does not satisfy the formal requirements. Such a 
conclusion is in line with the previous national case law.395 
The national case law also developed another criterion as to the general terms and conditions 
containing jurisdiction clauses. For example, the case when the contract did not make any 
express reference to the general terms (including the jurisdiction clause) was considered 
                                                          
392 ECJ, Case C222/15, Hőszig, par. 39. 
393 For the same conclusion regarding printing of a jurisdiction clause on the reverse of the bill of lading, see also 
ECJ, Case 71/83, Tilly Russ, par. 16. 
394 ECJ, Case C-64/17, Saey Home & Garden NV/SA v. Lusavouga-Máquinas e Acessórios Industriais SA, 8 
March 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:173. 
395 Corte di Cassazione, S.U., n. 20887, 27 Septermber 2006, Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e 
processuale, (2007), p. 759; Tribunale di Lecco, 15 April 2010, Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e 
procedssuale, 2012, p. 221. 
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insufficient by the German and Italian courts.396 On the contrary, the formal requirements 
within the meaning of Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulations are met where one of the 
parties signs the general terms and conditions separately and explicitly,397 or where an 
apparent reference to the general terms is mentioned in the contract, or in the front page below 
the signature,398 without the necessity to make an explicit reference to the jurisdiction 
clause.399 
 
7.2. Evidenced in Writing 
Although Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation does not permit the oral agreement for the 
valid conclusion of the jurisdiction clause, it allows a “half writing” method, which requires 
two elements – a verbal agreement and a subsequent written confirmation.400 
The ECJ dealt with the situation in two judgements when the oral agreement was confirmed 
in writing, and such written confirmation referred to general terms containing the jurisdiction 
clause. In the ECJ case 71/83, Tilly Russ, concerned a dispute where a jurisdiction clause 
appeared in the conditions printed on a bill of lading signed by the carrier, which was subject 
to a prior oral agreement on the jurisdiction clause. The ECJ held that the formal requirements 
of “evidenced in writing” were fulfiled, even if conditions printed on a bill of lading was not 
signed by the shipper and bore only the signature of the carrier. According to the ECJ, the 
function of this form is to ensure that the agreement of the parties is clearly established.  
In the case 25/76, Segoura, the parties concluded an oral contract, and a partial payment was 
provided. The vendor delivered to the purchaser a confirmation of the order and an invoice, 
which referred to the conditions on the reverse containing a jurisdiction clause. The purchaser 
did not confirm delivery. The ECJ stated that even if the purchaser agreed to abide by the 
general conditions, it could not be considered as acceptance of a jurisdiction clause which 
might appear in the general conditions unless the purchaser agrees to it in writing.401 Not 
raising any objections against a written confirmation does not constitute the acceptance of the 
                                                          
396 OLG Hamm, IPRspr 1977, 118; Corte di Cassazione, S.U., n. 13891, 14 june 2007, Rivista di diritto 
internazionale privato e processuale, (2008), p. 505. 
397 OLG München, RIW, 1989, 901. 
398 LG Hamburg, RIW, 1977, 424. 
399 OLG Düsseldorf, RIW, 2001, 63, 64. 
400 U. MAGNUS, Article 25, in Brussels I Bis Regulation, 2016, op. cit., p. 641. 
401 ECJ, Case 25/76, Galeries Segoura, par. 8. 
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jurisdiction clause.402 The situation would be different when an oral agreement, which forms 
part of a continuing trading relationship, is based on the general conditions containing a 
jurisdiction clause.403 
In other two judgments, the ECJ concerned the reverse situation - the oral modification of the 
already concluded written contract containing a jurisdiction clause. In the first case 221/84, 
Berghoefer,404 the ECJ has dealt with the validity of a jurisdiction clause initially agreed in 
writing and subsequently amended orally. The parties had agreed in the agency contract that 
the Tribunal de Commerce in Roanne (France) would have jurisdiction, but the plaintiff 
claimed that he had agreed orally with the defendant to modify the initial jurisdiction 
agreement and to confer jurisdiction on the German courts. The ECJ decided that the formal 
requirements are satisfied concerning the jurisdiction established by express oral agreement, if 
the written confirmation of that agreement by one of the parties was received by the other and 
that the latter raised no objection. According to the ECJ, it would be a breach of good faith to 
raise any objection if the subsequent oral agreement was not contested previously.405 Thus, it 
can be stated that this case covers only the specific case, i.e., an oral modification of the 
original jurisdiction agreement, which was subsequently confirmed in writing by one party 
without objecting it by another party. However, this interpretation cannot find an application 
for the mere oral modification of the jurisdiction clause.  
In the second judgment, Case 313/85, Iveco Fiat,406 the ECJ concerned a dispute, where the 
contract, containing a jurisdiction clause, continued to serve as the legal basis for the 
contractual relations between the parties after its expiry date, although the agreement could be 
renewed only in writing. The ECJ took two views on this issue: when the law applicable to 
the jurisdiction agreement allows the renewal of the original written agreement, all the terms 
of the agreement (including the jurisdiction clause) continue to be binding on the parties. 
                                                          
402 ECJ, Case 25/76, Galeries Segoura, par. 12.  
403 ECJ, Case 25/76, Galeries Segoura, par. 11. In this sense see Corte di Cassazione, S.U., n. 4634, 28 February 
2007, Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale, (2008), p. 168, where the court affirmed that Article 
17 of the Brussels Convention, as well as Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation do not require the written 
acceptance according to Article 1341 of the Italian Code on Civil Procedure. The form within the meaning of 
Article 23 par. 1 lett. a) is satisfied where the agreement is implied through execution of Article 1327 of the 
Italian Coded on Civil Procedure. 
404 ECJ, Case 221/84, F. Berghoefer GmbH & Co. KG v ASA SA, 11 July 1985, ECLI:EU:C:1985:337. 
405 ECJ, Case 221/84, F. Berghoefer, par. 15. 
406 ECJ, Case 313/85, SpA Iveco Fiat v Van Hool NV, 11 November 1986, ECLI:EU:C:1986:423. 
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However, when the law applicable to jurisdiction agreements does not allow such renewal, the 
court must analogically apply the interpretation provided in ECJ Case 221/84, Berghoefer. 
 
7.3. Practices between the Parties 
According to Article 25 par. 1 lett. b) of the Brussels Regulation, the agreement conferring 
jurisdiction shall be “in a form which accords with practices which the parties have 
established between themselves”. The rule on this form of the jurisdiction clause was inserted 
in the Brussels Convention in 1989 and was a reaction to the ECJ judgment Segoura. The 
wording was taken from the CISG. Continuing trading relationship between the parties, 
relying on the principle of good faith, justifies the formal validity of the jurisdiction clause. 
However, the practice between the parties must be established on a regular basis, and it must 
last a particular time and take place several times.407Apparently, from the previous business 
practice, it must be evident that the parties concluded the jurisdiction clause; it cannot be 
assumed from the repeated practice that the jurisdiction clause mirrors the common will of the 
parties.408  
 
7.4. International Trade Usage 
This form of the jurisdiction agreement made  
…in international trade or commerce, in a form which accords with a usage of which the 
parties are or ought to have been aware and which in such trade or commerce is widely 
known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the 
particular trade or commerce concerned…  
is admitted by Article 25 par. 1 lett. c) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. Also, the rule on this 
form was inserted in the Brussels Convention in 1989 as a reaction to the ECJ judgment 
Segoura. The wording of this provision was inspired by the model of Article 9 par. 2 of the 
CISG. This provision represents “the relaxation” of the requirements as to form laid down by 
Article 25 par. 1 lett. a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation by eliminating the need for a written 
                                                          
407 U. MAGNUS, Article 25, in Brussels I Bis Regulation, 2016, op. cit., p. 644. 
408 BGH, IHR 2004, 221, 222; U. MAGNUS, Article 25, in Brussels I Bis Regulation, 2016, op. cit., p. 644. 
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form of consent for the purpose of non-formalism, simplicity and speed in international 
trade.409 
According to the ECJ, the real consent of the parties must also be established with regard to 
lett. c) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation “since it is still one of the aims of that provision to 
ensure that there is real consent on the part of the persons concerned”.410 However, consent 
may be presumed when commercial usages in a specific branch of international trade or 
commerce exist.411 Consent is not identified in relation to commercial trade or commerce in 
general, but the relevant branch must be taken into consideration, in particular, when conduct 
is “generally and regularly” followed by operators in that specific branch.412 It means that such 
conduct becomes usage after a regular and a general time during which it was observed. The 
usage, in contrast with the practice between the parties (lett. b) of par. 1 of Article 25 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation), does not exist inter partes. Although the usage must be constituted 
worldwide, it does not have to be established in specific countries. However, the general and 
regular observation by operators in the states playing a prominent role in a given branch can 
help to prove the existence of such usage.413 
How can the national courts ascertain whether the parties were aware of this usage? 
According to the ECJ, such “awareness” is presumed when the parties established commercial 
or trade relations between themselves or between other parties operating in the sector, or such 
usage is sufficiently well known since it was followed on the general and regular basis.414 The 
publicity of the usage provided by the specific associations does not play any role, but can 
make it easier to prove awareness.415 
Therefore, the national courts must determine whether the contract is a part of international 
trade or commerce and, whether the usage operates in the relevant branch.416 There may be 
borderline cases when deciding whether the conduct is “general and regular” and may be 
subsumed under the term “international usage” since the term represents indefinite and vague 
term. In consequence, it might be recommended not to rely on this form and to opt for an 
                                                          
409 ECJ, Case C-106/95, MSG, par. 18. 
410 ECJ, Case C-106/95, MSG, par. 17. 
411 ECJ, Case C-106/95, MSG, paras. 19 and 20. 
412 ECJ, Case C-106/95, MSG, par. 23. 
413 ECJ, Case C-159/97, Trasporti Castelletti, par. 27. 
414 ECJ, Case C-159/97, Trasporti Castelletti, par. 43. 
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“easier” alternative – i.e., to conclude a written choice-of-court agreement. In any case, this 
provision may be helpful in case that the jurisdiction clause was not concluded and one of the 
parties makes an effort to reconstruct the jurisdiction agreement ex post. 
 
7.5. Communication by Electronic Means 
The second paragraph of Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation provides that:  
Any communication by electronic means which provides a durable record of the 
agreement shall be equivalent to ‘writing’.  
This provision aims at treating certain forms of electronic communications in the same way as 
written communications,417 since: “…the need for an agreement ‘in writing or evidenced in 
writing’ should not invalidate a choice-of-forum clause concluded in a form that is not written 
on paper but accessible on screen.”418 
The national case law has suggested assuming other criteria. For example, the durable record 
of electronic communication may be understood as printing, saving, a backup tape, disk, 
storing it in some other way, or a record which is accessible to be usable for subsequent 
reference.419 In other words, the formal requirements are satisfied if the electronic 
communication provides a durable record, although if such durable record has not been made. 
The durable record is necessary to provide only for the scope of evidence of the existence of 
such a clause.420  
Certain difficulties may arise in the context of the e-mail correspondence and the use of active 
websites. The ECJ in case C322/14, Jaouad El Majdoub ruled on “click-wrapping” which 
represents a method of accepting the general terms and conditions of a contract for sale 
(including jurisdiction agreement). 421 The ECJ stated that such acceptance constitutes a 
communication by electronic means, which provides a durable record of the agreement, 
“where that method makes it possible to print and save the text of those terms and conditions 
                                                          
417 ECJ, Case C322/14, Jaouad El Majdoub v CarsOnTheWeb.Deutschland GmbH, 21 May 2015, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:334, par. 36. 
418 Explanatory Memorandum on the Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, (COM(1999) 348 final, 14 July 1999. 
419 In context of the 2007 Lugano Convention, see Pocar Report, par. 109. 
420 In context of the 2007 Lugano Convention, see Pocar Report, par. 109. 
421 On the similar conclusion see High Court of Ireland, Ryanair Ltd v Billigfluege.De GmbH [2010] IEHC 47. 
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before the conclusion of the contract.”. Quite a different case was dealt with in the Italian 
court in 2013 when the sale contract referred to the general terms and conditions (including 
the jurisdiction clause), which were accessible on the website.422 The court decided that the 
formal requirements by virtue of Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation were met. 
It must be born in mind that e-mail messages are stored in the recipient's mailbox; they can be 
downloaded or printed. It is usual that the jurisdiction clause is incorporated into the general 
condition and sent by e-mail. In these circumstances, the interpretation in ECJ case 24/76, 
Estasis Salotti in connection with the ECJ case C322/14, Jaouad El Majdoub, might be used 
analogously for e-mail correspondence. In case that an e-mail contains an express reference to 
the general terms, and the general terms may be printed and saved, such a reference could 
satisfy the formal conditions of Article 25 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. A certified 
electronic signature is not required.423 
 
8. Substantive Validity 
Article 25 of the Brussel I Regulation has established a new rule on the substantive validity of 
the jurisdiction clause. First, the different theories on the substantive validity of the 
jurisdiction agreement under the Brussels Convention and the Brussels I Regulation are 
further introduced. Subsequently, the various proposals on this rule and the current rule on the 
substantive validity according to the Brussel I Regulation will be analysed.  
 
8.1. The “Gap” in the Brussels Convention and the Brussels I Regulation as to the 
Substantive Validity 
Substantive validity means the consensus of the parties which have agreed on jurisdiction.424 
However, the absence of an explicit rule on the substantive validity in the Brussels 
Convention and the Brussels Ibis Regulation and the silence of the ECJ as to fraud, mistake, 
or duress and other related questions, as well as the capacity of the parties, has left room for 
                                                          
422 Tribunale di Torino, 13 May 2013, Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale, (2015), p. 567. 
423 In contrast with, for example, Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 12 December 2006 creating a European order for payment procedure, OJ L 399, 30 December 2006, when 
Article 7 par. 6 refers to Article 2(2) of Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
13 December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures, OJ L 13, 19 January 2000. 
424 U. MAGNUS, Article 25, in Brussels I Bis Regulation, 2016, op. cit., p. 626. 
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different doctrines and discussions. There are two central doctrinal theses concerning the 
substantive validity of the jurisdiction clauses in the light of Article 17 of the Brussels 
Convention and Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation. 
The first doctrine is based on the interpretation of the ECJ regarding the formal validity of the 
jurisdiction clauses, which is extended into the questions on substantive validity. 425 The ECJ 
in took the view in several occasions that “the consensus must be clearly and precisely 
demonstrated”426, which is presumed when “the formal requirements of the agreements 
conferring jurisdiction are met” and no reference to the national law is permitted.427 The ECJ 
confirmed this conclusion in the case, C-159/97, Trasporti Castelletti, stating that  
…the choice-of-court in a jurisdiction clause may be assessed only in the light of 
considerations connected with the requirements laid down by Article 17.428  
In the case C-116/02, Gasser, the ECJ went even further when the ECJ stated that the 
jurisdiction clause is an independent concept to be appraised solely in relation to the 
requirements of Article 17 of the Brussels Convention.429 Advocate General Leger in Gasser 
was even more specific when he held that  
…the formal and substantive conditions governing validity to which agreements 
conferring jurisdiction are subject must be assessed in the light of the requirements of 
Article 17 alone.430  
In other words, these judgments may lead to the conclusion that Article 23 of the Brussels 
Regulation provides a self-sufficient test for the validity of the jurisdiction clauses. Moreover, 
according to some authors, consent had to be interpreted autonomously: the existence of 
consent requires an inquiry which involves only the application of the rule of formal 
                                                          
425 A. DICKINSON, The Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction 
and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast) ('Brussels I bis' 
Regulation), Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 11/58, available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1930712, p. 21. 
426 ECJ, Case 24-76, Estasis Salotti, par. 7. 
427 ECJ, Case C-150/80, Elefanten Schuh, par. 25. The concept of agreement conferring jurisdiction must be 
interpreted independently and no reference to the national law is allowed. 
428 ECJ, Case C-159/97, Trasporti Castelletti, par. 49. 
429 ECJ, Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl, 9 December 2003, ECLI:EU:C:2003:657, para 51 
430 ECJ, Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl, 9 December 2003, ECLI:EU:C:2003:657, Opinion of 
Advocate General Leger, 9 September 2003, ECLI:EU:C:2003:436, par. 78. 
  
108 
 
requirements.431 It means that there is little space left (if any) for the use of the national law. 
This begged the question: Does any other kind of consensus exist which could be assessed in 
addition to formal validity, according to Article 23 of the Brussel I Regulation? Is it possible 
to invalidate the formally valid jurisdiction agreement? Is there any space left for the 
invalidation due to fraud or duress?432 For example, according to Professor Briggs, preclusion 
of any reference to any other rule of law, when the written agreement was obtained by 
extreme duress of fraud, would be absurd.433 On the other hand, according to Professor 
Merett, questions of fraud, mistake, duress etc., may be subordinated to the concept of good 
faith.434 The ECJ has already recognised a concept of good faith concerning the jurisdiction 
clause in Case 221/84, Berghoefer, where ECJ stated that it would be a breach of good faith to 
raise any objection as to the validity of a jurisdiction clause initially agreed in writing and 
subsequently amended orally if the subsequent oral agreement was not contested 
previously.435 Such an interpretation may be extended to another area of contracts.436 Also, 
Professors Beaumont and McEleavy suggest that “Union law could, in theory, be a better 
solution to the question of validity than a reference to national law.”.437 
A different interpretation is also possible to develop in lights of the case law of ECJ, where 
the ECJ referred in a number of cases to the national law. In the case of C-214/89, Powell 
Duffryn, the ECJ stated that the concept of a jurisdiction agreement “should not be interpreted 
simply as referring to the national law of one or other of the States concerned”.438  
Although it may seem that the ECJ excluded the reference to the national law, the analysis of 
its wording does not lead to a clear result. On the contrary, such an interpretation may be 
understood to mean that the reference to the national law is possible in certain cases. 
                                                          
431 Heidelberg Report, par. 376; L. MERRETT, Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation: A Comprehensive Code for 
Jurisdiction Agreements?, International & Comparative Law Quarterly 58.3 (2009), p. 545-564. 
432 R. FENTIMAN, International Commercial Litigation, op. cit., par. 2.36. 
433 A. BRIGGS, P. REES, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgements, Norton Rose, 2005, par. 2.105; L. COLLINS, C. G. J. 
MORSE, D. MCCLEAN, A. BRIGGS, J. HARRIS, C. MCLACHLAN, J. HILL (eds), Dicey, Morris, and Collins on the 
Conflict of Laws, Sweet & Maxwell, 2006, 14ed. par. 12.108. 
434 L. MERRETT, Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation: A Comprehensive Code for Jurisdiction Agreements?, 
op. cit., p. 559. 
435 ECJ, Case 221/84, F. Berghoefer, par. 15. 
436 L. MERRETT, Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation: A Comprehensive Code for Jurisdiction Agreements?, 
op. cit., p. 560. 
437 A. E. ANTON, P. R. BEAUMONT, P. E. MCELEAVY, Private International Law, W. Green/Thomson Reuters, 
2011, 3ed., par. 8.108. On the same opinion see Z. TANG, The Interrelationship of European Jurisdiction and 
Choice of Law in Contract, Journal of Private International Law 4.:1 (2008), p. 46. 
438 ECJ, Case C-214/89, Powell Duffryn, par. 13. 
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Moreover, Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn in the case Elefanten Schuh stated that the 
court seized when challenging jurisdiction must itself decide the validity of the agreement 
(other than in relation to the provisions as to form specified in Article 17 of the Brussels 
Convention) under the national law of the designated forum.439 From this opinion, it is evident 
that Advocate General Slynn did not exclude the existence of a “different” validity. Also, in 
other judgements, the ECJ expressly referred to the national law, in particular in case of: the 
adoption of a choice-of-court clause in the statute of a company;440 the renewal of a 
jurisdiction clause;441 the interpretation of the choice-of-court agreement;442 and the succession 
of a third party to the jurisdiction clause.443 It means that if the ECJ judgments are analyzed as 
a whole “package”, it may be deduced that material rules for jurisdiction clauses exist.444 
Also, the doctrinal approaches concerning the necessity to give space to evaluate formally 
valid jurisdiction agreements obtained by extreme the fraud or duress suggested that the 
questions on substantive law are better left to the national law. 445 
The ambiguity based on the doctrinal discussions resulted from the different judgments of 
ECJ mentioned above. In consequence, it was not clear whether Article 23 of the Brussels I 
Regulation represented the independent regulation of the formation of the choice-of-court 
agreement, and thus the reference to the national law was excluded; or if the referral to the 
domestic was admitted, even more, if it was necessary.446 In case that the second approach 
                                                          
439 Case C-150/80, Elefanten Schuh, The Opinion of Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn, 20 May 1981, 
ECLI:EU:C:1981:112, p. 1699. 
440 ECJ, Case C-214/89, Powell Duffryn, par. 21. 
441 ECJ, Case 313/85, SpA Iveco Fiat, par. 7-8. 
442 ECJ, Case, C-269/95, Benincasa, par. 31. 
443 ECJ, C-387/98, Coreck Maritime, par. 24. 
444 U. MAGNUS, Choice-of-court Agreements in the Review Proposal for the Brussels I Regulation, in E. LEIN, 
(ed), The Brussels I Review Proposal Uncovered, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2012., 
p. 86; R. FENTIMAN, International Commercial Litigation, par. 2.32. 
445 U. MAGNUS, Choice-of-court Agreements in the Review Proposal for the Brussels I Regulation, op. cit., p. 86; 
S. O’MALLEY, A. LAYTON, European Civil Practice, 2004, op. cit., par. 20.029; U. MAGNUS, Article 23, Brussels 
I Regulation, 2012, op. cit., p. 475; I. QUEIROLO, Choice-of-court Agreements in the new Brussels I-bis 
Regulation: A critical Appraisal, in Yearbook of Private International Law, 15 (2013/2014), p. 118, 124; F. C. 
VILLATA, L’attuazione degli accordi di scelta del foro nel regolamento Bruxelles I, CEDAM, 2012, p. 94; I. 
QUEIROLO, Prorogation of Jurisdiction in the proposal for a Recast of the Brussels I Regulation, in Recasting 
Brussels I, op. cit., p. 183, 189; T. RATKOVIĆ, D. ZGRABLJIĆ ROTAR, Choice-of-court agreements under the 
Brussels I Regulation (Recast), Journal of Private International Law 9.2 (2013), p. 254-5. 
446 See A. MALATESTA, Gli accordi di scelta del foro, in A. MALATESTA (ed), La riforma del regolamento di 
Bruxelles I: il regolamento (UE) n. 1215/2012 sulla giurisdizione e l’efficacia delle decisioni in materia civile e 
commerciale, Giuffrè Editore, 2016., p. 69, where the author uses a word “necessity”. 
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prevails, what law should be applied to the jurisdiction agreements: the lex fori or the lex 
causae? 
In case of the absence of an uniform rule to the substantive validity to jurisdiction clause, the 
solutions in the Member States may differ on the basis of various hypotheses, such as their 
nature.447 The qualification of jurisdiction clauses as procedural in the specific Member States 
probably should lead to the application of lex fori.448 On the other hand, their classification as 
substantive or procedural with substantive effects should indicate the use of lex causae.449 As 
stressed in the Heidelberg Report, 450 the law of some Member States refers to the lex fori,451 
whereas others refer to the lex causae,452 and in some Member States there is no clear 
answer.453 It seems that a significant number of the Member States apply the conflict-of-laws 
rules of the seized Member State court.454 The divergences between the Member States might 
be held materially valid in one Member State and invalid in other Member State.455 
 
8.2. Substantive Validity according to Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation provides that the Member State court designated in 
the jurisdiction agreement shall have jurisdiction“…unless the agreement is null and void as 
to its substantive validity under the law of that Member State…”  
                                                          
447 A. MALATESTA, Gli accordi di scelta del foro, in La riforma del regolamento di Bruxelles I, op. cit., p. 69 
448 F. C. VILLATA, L’attuazione degli accordi di scelta del foro nel regolamento Bruxelles I, op. cit., p. 94. See 
also Heidelberg Report, par. 377. 
449 F. C. VILLATA, L’attuazione degli accordi di scelta del foro nel regolamento Bruxelles I, op. cit., p. 94. See 
also Heidelberg Report, par. 377. 
450 Heidelberg Report, par. 377 
451 Cyprus, Greece, and Ireland apply lex fori. See Study JLS/C4/2005/03 “Compilation of All National Reports, 
Questionnaire No 3: Legal Problem Analysis”, 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_bxl1_compilation_quest_3_en.pdf, pp. 388–95. 
452 Austria, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Luxemburg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, 
and Spain, see Study JLS/C4/2005/03 “Compilation of All National Reports, Questionnaire No 3: Legal Problem 
Analysis”, http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_bxl1_compilation_quest_3_en.pdf, pp. 388–95. 
453 Italy, Slovenia see Study JLS/C4/2005/03 “Compilation of All National Reports, Questionnaire No 3: Legal 
Problem Analysis”, http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_bxl1_compilation_quest_3_en.pdf, pp. 388–
95. 
454 U. MAGNUS, Choice-of-court Agreements in the Review Proposal for the Brussels I Regulation, in The 
Brussels I Review Proposal Uncovered, op. cit., p. 86. 
455 Heidelberg Report, par. 377. 
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The legal recognition of severability of the formal and substantive validity was welcomed by 
certain scholars,456 but the legal introduction of substantive validity to Article 25 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation was not the necessary solution, according to other scholars. For 
example, according to Professor Dickinson, the ECJ has reached a high level of legal certainty 
which assumes that only the requirements provided in Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation 
are decisive for establishing consent.457  
 The current wording of Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation corresponds to the wording 
of the first Commission Proposal with the one exception, providing that “..unless the 
agreement is null and void as to its substance”458 under the law of the designated Member 
State. The interesting point is the fact that the proposal did not consider the possibility of the 
application of the law of the seized (also non-designated) Member State, as it was applied 
prevalently in the Member States.459 Moreover, the possibility of the application of the 
conflict-of-laws rules was not addressed. A major portion of the scholars deemed this rule to 
refer to the substantive law of the designated Member State. 460 However, the explanatory 
memorandum to the Commission Proposal provided that this solution should reflect the 
solution adopted in the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements.461  
The application of the substantive law, with the exclusion of conflict-of-laws rules, has an 
advantage in its simplicity, but it does not represent the best solution in a certain situation. 
The simultaneous application of the conflict-of-laws rules to the main contract and the 
application of the substantive law excluding conflict-of-laws rules to substantive validity of 
choice-of-court agreements would practically lead to their complete division. This approach 
                                                          
456 U. MAGNUS, Choice-of-court Agreements in the Review Proposal for the Brussels I Regulation, in The 
Brussels I Review Proposal Uncovered, op. cit., p. 84; A. BRIGGS, The Brussels Ibis Regulation Appears on the 
Horizon, Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly, 2013, p. 161. 
457 A. DICKINSON, The Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction 
and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast), op. cit., p. 21. 
458 Proposal for a Recast of the Brussels I Regulation, p. 32. 
459 U. MAGNUS, Choice-of-court Agreements in the Review Proposal for the Brussels I Regulation, in The 
Brussels I Review Proposal Uncovered, op. cit., p. 86. 
460 The doctrine tended to interpret this wording as mere application of the substantive law, see B. HESS, The 
Proposed Recast of the Brussels I Regulation: Rules on Jurisdiction, in F. POCAR, I. VIARENGO, F. C. VILLATA 
(eds.),), Recasting Brussels I: Proceedings of the Conference Held at the University of Milan on 25-26 
November 2011, CEDAM, 2012, p. 105; I. QUEIROLO, Prorogation of Jurisdiction in the Proposal for a Recast 
of the Brussels I Regulation In Recasting Brussels I, in Recasting Brussels I, p. 190-191. On the opposite 
approach see C. HEINZE, Choice-of-court agreements, coordination of proceedings and provisional measures in 
the reform of the Brussels I regulation, Rabels Zeitschrift fuer auslaendisches und internationales Privatrecht, 
75.3 (2011), p. 585. 
461 Proposal for a Recast of the Brussels I Regulation, p. 9. 
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might result in the validity of the main contract and invalidity of the jurisdiction clause and 
vice versa. Although such result would not contradict the principle of severability laid down 
by the Brussels regime, problems of separation would be even more evident in more complex 
contracts, such as in the Articles of Association.462  
The opinion on the introduction of the explicit rule on substantive validity was also shared by 
the Committee for Legal Affairs of the European Parliament. However, the Committee for 
Legal Affairs of the European Parliament favoured the solution of favour validitatis in the 
proposal of 28 June 2011. 463 The proposed law to address substantive validity meant the rules 
of substantive law, with the exception of its rules of private international law. In particular, 
the law governing substantive validity was proposed as follows: (a) the law of the Member 
State of the court or courts designated by the agreement; (b) the law chosen by the parties to 
govern the agreement; (c) in the absence of such a choice, the law applicable to the contract of 
which the agreement forms a part; or (d) in all other cases, the law applicable to the particular 
legal relationship from which the dispute between the parties arose.464 It means that the 
                                                          
462 On the similar approach, see C. HEINZE, Choice-of-court agreements, coordination of proceedings and 
provisional measures in the reform of the Brussels I regulation, op. cit., p. 586. 
463 Committee on Legal Affairs, Draft Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
(recast), PE467.046, 28 June 2011. See proposed Article 23a: «1. An agreement conferring jurisdiction shall be 
valid as to its substance if it is regarded as being such by: (a) the law of the Member State of the court or courts 
designated by the agreement, or (b) the law chosen by the parties to govern the agreement, or (c) in the absence 
of such choice, the law applicable to the contract of which the agreement forms a part, or (d) in all other cases, 
the law applicable to the particular legal relationship from which the dispute between the parties arose. 2. The 
law designated by points (b) to (d) of paragraph 1 shall apply even if that law is not the law of a Member State. 
3. The law of any State designated by paragraph 1 means the rules of substantive law in force in that State with 
the exception of its rules of private international law. 4. The law designated by paragraph 1 shall not govern 
legal capacity. The reality of the consent of the parties to the agreement shall be governed by Article 23(1). 5. 
Where a State consists of several territorial units each with its own rules as to the substantive validity of 
agreements conferring jurisdiction, each territorial unit shall be regarded as a State for the purposes of this 
Article. 6. A Member State in which various territorial units have their own rules as to the substantive validity of 
agreements conferring jurisdiction shall not be bound to apply this Article to conflicts concerning solely the laws 
of those units.».». 
464 This wording partially coincides with the proposal of A. DICKINSON, The Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast), op. cit., p. 38: «Without prejudice to paragraph 1, an agreement 
conferring jurisdiction is materially valid if it is regarded as being such by either: (a) the law of any country in 
which any Member State court or courts designated by the agreement are located, or (b) the law chosen by the 
parties to govern the choice-of-court agreement or, in the absence of such choice, the law governing the contract 
or other relationship between the parties to which the choice-of-court agreement relates. The application of the 
law of any country designated by point (b) above means the rules of law in force in that State other than its rules 
of private international law, and that law shall apply even if it is not the law of a Member State. 1b. The law 
designated by paragraph 1 shall not govern questions of legal capacity.». This wording also partially coincides 
with the proposal of C. HEINZE, Choice-of-court agreements, coordination of proceedings and provisional 
measures in the reform of the Brussels I regulation, op. cit., p. 587, where he proposed: «1. If the parties have 
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jurisdiction clause would be valid if one of the listed laws would regard the jurisdiction clause 
valid. This solution would ensure that the jurisdiction clause in most cases would be valid 
rather than invalid. The exclusion of the conflict-of-laws rule assumes the same solution as 
the Rome I Regulation, where renvoi is excluded. Letter b) regulates the choice-of-law (as 
Article 3 of the Rome I Regulation). Furthermore, this solution would resolve the problem of 
the “gap” in several Member States concerning substantive validity of the jurisdiction clause, 
which does not guarantee the respect of choice of law in relation to the validity of the 
jurisdiction clause. Letter c) does not separate the jurisdiction clause from the main contract 
whereby the law applicable to substantive validity may also be the law applicable to the main 
contract (where the parties fail to choose the law to govern the jurisdiction agreement). This 
would mirror the solution adopted in Article 10 of the Rome I Regulation where the law 
governing the contract determines the existence and substantive validity of a contract. Letter 
d) then would resolve other problems, such as the jurisdiction clause inserted into the Articles 
of Association. Therefore, letter a) providing for lex fori of the designated Member State court 
would lead, in theory, to the same law as in sopra listed letter b) and c).465 This solution was 
not adopted.  
On 29 June 2011, the Working Party was invited to discuss whether the reference to the law 
of the Member State should be construed as including the rules of private international law 
and whether any clarification is needed in the text or a recital.466 On 24 February 2012, the 
Presidency of the Council of the European Union addressed the Working Party on Civil Law 
Matters proposal on substantive validity of the jurisdiction clause. It was directly specified in 
Article 23 that the law includes the conflict-of-law rules of the designated Member State.467 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
agreed that a court or the courts of a Member State are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have 
arisen or which may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, that court or those courts shall 
have jurisdiction, unless the agreement is null and void as to its substance under the law of that Member State 
under the law designated by paragraph 5. 5. Subject to the provisions of this Regulation, an agreement referred 
to in paragraph 1 shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties, in the absence of such choice by the same 
law which governs the issue in dispute in the main contract in which the agreement is incorporated, and in the 
absence of a main contract by the substantive law of the Member State whose court or courts have been chosen 
in the agreement.». 
465 U. MAGNUS, Article 25, in Brussels I Bis Regulation, 2016, op. cit., p. 629. 
466 The Presidency and the incoming Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 11867/11, 
2010/0383 (COD), 29 June 2011, p. 21. 
467 The Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 6795/12, 2010/0383 (COD), 24 February 2012, p. 19. 
The specification was in the brackets: «…unless the agreement is null and void as to its substantive 
validity under the law [designated by the conflict-of-law rules] of that Member State…». 
  
114 
 
Finally, on 1 June 2012, the Presidency of the Council of the European Union proposed to the 
Council to add a new text as to the new rule on substantive validity of jurisdiction clause:  
The question as to whether a choice-of-court agreement in favour of a court or the 
courts of a Member State is null and void as to its substantive validity should be 
decided in accordance with the law of that Member State. The reference to the law of 
the Member State of the chosen court should include the conflict of laws rules of that 
State.468  
However, this rule was inserted into the Recital and not into the text concerning the choice-of-
court agreement. The European Parliament kept the structure with regard to the clarification 
of the application of the conflict-of-laws rules in the Recital. 469 Such text was adopted by the 
European Parliament on 20 November 2012, and by the Council of the European Union on 6 
December 2012.470 
The current rule on substantive validity brings specific problems, such as the statutory weight 
of the Recital, law applicable to the non-exclusive clauses or exclusive clauses designating 
more Member State courts and the scope of substantive validity. These problems are 
individually dealt with in more details. 
Recital 20 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation was probably inspired by the Explanatory Report to 
the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements which also suggests application of 
conflict-of-laws rules of the forum prorogatum according to Article 5 par. 1 of the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements.471 Both of them do not have statutory weight, but 
they actively favour of inclusion of conflict-of-law rules.472 
The law of the chosen Member State, including its conflict-of-laws rules, should ensure that 
all courts would consider the substantive validity of a choice-of-court agreement under the 
                                                          
468 The Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 10609/12 ADD 1, 2010/0383 (COD), 1 June 2012, p. 
22. 
469 Committee on Legal Affairs, Amendments 121 Draft report - Jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast), PE496.504, 2010/0383 (COD), 25 
September 2012, p. 13. 
470 European Parliament legislative resolution of 20 November 2012 on the proposal for a regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters (recast), T7-0412/2012, 2010/0383 (COD). 
471 T. Hartley, M. Dogauchi, Explanatory Report on the 2005 Hague Choice-of-court Agreements Convention, 
HCCH Publications, 2013, par. 125 (“Hartley-Dogauchi Report”). Some doubts on the interpretation provided in 
the Hartley-Dogauchi Report, see F. POCAR, Brevi riflessioni in tema di revisione del regolamento Bruxelles I e 
clausole di scelta di foro, Diritto del Commercio Internazionale, (2) 2012, p. 332. 
472 U. MAGNUS, Article 25, in Brussels I Bis Regulation, 2016, op. cit., p. 629. 
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same substantive national law.473 Therefore, it offers uniform solutions - it avoids the non-
uniformity between the designated court and seized non-designated court474 and inconsistent 
judgments on the validity of the jurisdiction agreement.475 The potential problem may 
represent the ambiguous approaches concerning application of the Rome I Regulation. 
Although jurisdiction clauses were excluded from the Rome I Regulation (Article 1 par. 2 lett. 
e), as well as from the Rome Convention (Article 1 par. 2 lett. d). there is no uniformity 
between the Member States. Some Member States apply the national law, and some Member 
States abolished their conflict-of-laws rules due to the application of the Rome I Regulation, 
or they analogously apply the Rome I Regulation.476 There is also doctrinal support for the 
method that conflict-of-laws rules of the Rome I Regulation should be applied in all Member 
State courts.477 The application of the Rome I Regulation would ensure the possibility of 
application of the choice-of-law rule,478 whereby according to some of the national law of the 
Member States, the choice of law may be excluded.  
Also, the problem of renvoi to the law of the other States including its conflict-of-laws rules 
permitted by the domestic acts may complicate the testing of the substantive validity of the 
                                                          
473 A. SCHULZ, The Hague convention of 30 June 2005 on choice- of- court agreements, Journal of Private 
International Law 2:2 (2006), p. 253. 
474 On the context of the Hague Convention see R. A. BRAND, P. HERRUP, The 2005 Hague Convention on 
Choice- of-court Court Agreements: Commentary and Documents, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 90. 
475 On the context of the Hague Convention see Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 149. 
476 For example, in Germany, the conflict-of-laws rule was abolished when the Rome I Regulation became 
applicable. In Belgium, the scope of application of the Rome I Regulation is extended, see H. BOULARBAH, Le 
nouveau droit international privé belge, March Journal des Tribunaux, (2005), p. 190. In Italy, in the absence of 
the conflict-of-laws rules to the substantive validity of the jurisdiction clause in Italian legal order, probably the 
Rome Convention would find the application by its extension through Article 57 of the Italian Act on Private 
International Law. On this approach see S. CARBONE, Il Nuovo Spazio Giudiziario Europeo in Materia Civile E 
Commerciale: Il Regolamento UE N. 1215/2012, Giappichelli, 2016, p. 928. On the possibilities of the law 
applicable to the substantive validity in Italy see F. C. VILLATA, L’attuazione degli accordi di scelta del foro nel 
regolamento Bruxelles I, op. cit., p. 105-106; F. C. VILLATA, Sulla legge applicabile alla validità sostanziale 
degli accordi di scelta del foro: appunti per una revisione dell’art. 4 della legge n. 218/1995, pp. 973-986. In 
Spain, the Spanish court would probably apply Article 10 par. 5 of the Spanish Civil Code where the law of 
common nationality applies. see Article 10 par. 5 of the Spanish Civil Code, approved by Royal Decree of July 
24, 1889, (“Spanish Civil Code”) provides: «The law to which the parties have expressly submitted shall apply 
to contractual obligations, provided that it has some connection with the transaction in question; in the absence 
thereof, the law of the common nationality of the parties shall apply; and in the absence of such law, then that of 
their common habitual residence and, lastly, the law of the place where the contract has been entered into.». 
Article 12 par. 2 of the Civil Code (approved by Royal Decree of July 24, 1889) says: «Referral to foreign law 
shall be deemed made to its material law, without taking into account any renvoi made by its conflict of laws 
rules to another law other than Spanish law». On the possibility of the application of the Spanish Civil Code and 
on translation see M. HERRANZ BALLESTEROS, The Regime of Party Autonomy in the Brussels I Recast: the 
Solutions Adopted for Agreements on Jurisdiction, Journal of Private International Law, 10:2 (2014), p. 300. 
477 U. MAGNUS, Article 25, in Brussels I Bis Regulation, 2016, op. cit., p. 629. 
478 Article 3 of the Rome I Regulation, as well as Article 3 of the Rome Convention. 
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jurisdiction clause, contrary to the Rome I Regulation, where renvoi is excluded.479 The 
simplest solution would be not to apply renvoi, but the different Member States adopt 
different solutions to this problem.480 
Another problematic issue represents the situation when the parties select two or more 
Member State courts to decide their dispute, i.e., the problem of the non-unique exclusive or 
even non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses in the context of the substantive validity.481 Which law 
would govern the substantive validity of the jurisdiction clause as provided in the cases Meeth 
or even Rotschild? One of the options is testing the substantive validity under the law of all 
designated Member States. This solution is advocated by Professor Magnus when both courts 
would apply the provisions of the Rome I Regulation which would lead to the same 
substantive law.482 Another option is checking the substantive validity only under the law of 
the seized designated Member State. However, what will happen if the seized Member State 
court would not be one of the chosen Member State courts? In case the jurisdiction clause will 
be non-exclusive, the new lis pendens rule according to Article 31 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation is not applicable, and the seized non-designated Member State would be obliged 
to proceed according to the “first seized” lis pendens rule;thus, it would be obliged to test the 
substantive validity.483 Probably, in such a case, the seized non-designated Member State 
court should apply conflict-of-laws rules of all designated Member State courts, but it would 
be unreasonable if the seized non-designated Member State would “choose” randomly one of 
the conflict-of-laws rules of the designated Member States in order to test substantive validity. 
The other uncertainty as to the substantive validity of the jurisdiction clause concerns its 
scope. Some academics divide the validity of jurisdiction clause into three types: formal 
validity in its usual sense; validity as to prima facie consent; and substantive validity 
                                                          
479 Article 20 of the Rome I Regulation, as well as Article 15 of the Rome Convention. 
480 For example, in France there is “simple renvoi”, in England “double renvoi”. On the problem of the renvoi 
according to the Brussels I -bis Regulation see T. HARTLEY, Choice-of-Court Agreements under the European 
and International Instruments: The Revised Brussels I Regulation, the Lugano Convention, and the Hague 
Convention, op. cit., p. 166. 
481 Recital 20 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is drafted on the assumption that only one Member State court can 
be designated. 
482 U. MAGNUS, Article 25, in Brussels I Bis Regulation, 2016, op. cit., p. 631. 
483 See different opinion, M. HERRANZ BALLESTEROS, The Regime of Party Autonomy in the Brussels I Recast: 
the Solutions Adopted for Agreements on Jurisdiction, op. cit., p. 296. 
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excluding formal consent, but including, the creation of consent and capacity.484 Hence, which 
issues relate to substantive validity, according to Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation? 
In the first place, Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation uses the term “null and void as to 
its substantive validity”. According to Professor Magnus, validity covers all issues which may 
invalidate the formally valid jurisdiction clause, such as incapacity or violation of good 
morals.485 However, due to the silence of the EU legislator in respect to the capacity of the 
parties to enter into jurisdiction agreements, the opinion leaves certain doubts. Such a solution 
would be only partially supported by the alignment with the rules on the capacity contained in 
the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements.486 In consequence, it may be 
considered to apply conflict-of-laws rules of the seized Member State court.487 The question 
also arises whether the other circumstances which may render the jurisdiction clause 
“voidable” are included in the new rule on substantive validity. The voidable circumstances 
invalidate the jurisdiction clause only if the party invokes the invalidation and may cover 
error, mistake, fraud, duress, and threats.488 Such problems may be even more evident when 
an error, mistake, fraud, duress, or threats are considered to be voidable circumstances 
according to the certain national laws.489 During the approval process of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation, it was suggested by professor Magnus to make this rule clearer as it follows: “The 
substantive validity (concerning capacity, mistake, fraud, duress) of the choice-of-court 
agreement is governed by the law of the Member State where the chosen court or courts are 
                                                          
484 T. RATKOVIĆ, D. ZGRABLJIĆ ROTAR, Choice-of-court agreements under the Brussels I Regulation (Recast), 
op. cit., p. 12. 
485 U. MAGNUS, Choice-of-court Agreements in the Review Proposal for the Brussels I Regulation, in The 
Brussels I Review Proposal Uncovered, op. cit., p. 93. 
486 On the substantive validity under the of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements see infra 
Chaper Two, Subchapter II, Section 5. Tquestion of capacity of the parties is included in the question of “null 
and void” jurisdiction agreement in case that the designated court is seized according to Article 5 of the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. However, the question of capacity is separated by the phrase “null 
and void” whenever the non-designated court is seized and is governed by the lex fori including conflict-of-law 
rules according to Article 6 lett. b) and simultaneously by the law of the chosen court according to Article 6 lett. 
a) of the Hague Convention on Choice- of Court Agreements. 
487 See Article 1 par. 2 lett. a) of the Rome I Regulation where the question of capacity is excluded from the 
scope of its application. On the similar conclusion see F. C. VILLATA, L’attuazione degli accordi di scelta del 
foro nel regolamento Bruxelles I, op. cit., p. 109; M. WELLER, Choice of Forum Agreements Under the Brussels 
I Recast and Under the Hague Convention: Coherences and Clashes, op. cit., p. 10. 
488 U. MAGNUS, Choice-of-court Agreements in the Review Proposal for the Brussels I Regulation, in The 
Brussels I Review Proposal Uncovered, op. cit., p. 93. 
489 On similar considerations, see A. MALATESTA, Gli accordi di scelta del foro, in La riforma del regolamento 
di Bruxelles I: il regolamento (UE) n. 1215/2012 sulla giurisdizione e l’efficacia delle decisioni in materia civile 
e commerciale, op. cit., p. 71. 
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located”.490 Unfortunately, the wording of Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation did not 
clarify this issue. However, according to some scholars, voidable circumstances should be 
subsumed under Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.491 This opinion can be supported 
by the original intention of the Commission to harmonize the rule with the Hague Convention 
on Choice of Court Agreements which also use the term “null and void”, but the Explanatory 
Report recognised the grounds as fraud, mistake, misrepresentation, duress, and lack of 
capacity.492  
Moreover, it remains unclear whether Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation still contains 
the autonomous elements on the formation of the agreement not referring to the national 
law,493 or if the concept such as “considerations” is newly relevant in the context of the 
substantive validity.494 However, the word “unless” would indicate that the interpretation of 
the validity of a choice-of-court agreement is presumed by virtue of the current ECJ 
judgments on the formation of the consent; “null and void” points in the direction of 
restrictions on the grounds which might invalidate the jurisdiction clause.495 In consequence, it 
might be stated the internal considerations on the formation of the jurisdiction clause should 
not interfere with the formal validity according to Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation.496  
If we conclude that formal validity by virtue of Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation and 
as interpreted by the ECJ will be untouched by this new rule on substantive validity, and if the 
concept “null and void” refers only to the substantive grounds, the question arises whether 
specific matters such as agency, assignment, interpretation, subrogation, etc. are separate 
                                                          
490 U. MAGNUS, Choice-of-court Agreements in the Review Proposal for the Brussels I Regulation, in The 
Brussels I Review Proposal Uncovered, op. cit., p. 93. 
491 M. HERRANZ BALLESTEROS, The Regime of Party Autonomy in the Brussels I Recast: the Solutions Adopted 
for Agreements on Jurisdiction, op. cit., p. 296; C. HEINZE, Choice-of-court agreements, coordination of 
proceedings and provisional measures in the reform of the Brussels I regulation, op. cit., p. 585; U. MAGNUS, 
Article 25, in Brussels I Bis Regulation, 2016, op. cit., p. 630. 
492 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 126. 
493 ECJ, Case C-150/80, Elefanten Schuh, par. 25. 
494 U. MAGNUS, Choice-of-court Agreements in the Review Proposal for the Brussels I Regulation, in The 
Brussels I Review Proposal Uncovered, op. cit., p. 93. 
495 U. MAGNUS, Article 25, in Brussels I Bis Regulation, 2016, op. cit., p. 627. 
496 A. BRIGGS, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, op. cit., p. 138-143; M. HERRANZ BALLESTEROS, 
The Regime of Party Autonomy in the Brussels I Recast: the Solutions Adopted for Agreements on Jurisdiction, 
op. cit., p. 302. 
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aspects of substantive validity.497 The ECJ has already stated that specific matters are 
governed by national law, in particular when adopting a choice-of-court clause in the statute 
of a company,498 the renewal of a jurisdiction clause,499 the interpretation of the choice-of-
court agreement,500 and the succession of a third party to the jurisdiction clause.501 Is the new 
rule on substantive validity applied to these issues? One may suggest that due to the wording 
“as to the substantive validity” the meaning must be restricted and thus, the other grounds 
which could invalidate the jurisdiction clause must remain excluded from the application of 
the new rule on substantive validity.502 Professor Magnus admits the non-application of the 
new rule on substantive validity to these remaining issues, but he suggests application of the 
conflict-of-laws rules of the prorogued court in this regard.503 During the preparatory works, 
he proposed to cover other separate questions such as agency or assignment under this rule, 
by providing:  
The substantive validity (concerning capacity, mistake, fraud, duress) of the choice-of-
court agreement as well as matters such as agency and assignment connected with the 
formation of such agreement are governed by the law designated by the rules of private 
international law of the Member state where the chosen court or courts are located.504 
 
9. Effects of Choice-of-Court Agreements in respect of the Third Parties 
A jurisdiction agreement, usually included in the contracts, limits its effect only to the 
contractual parties ultra partes. The rights and duties incorporated in the contract may be 
                                                          
497 U. MAGNUS, Choice-of-court Agreements in the Review Proposal for the Brussels I Regulation, in The 
Brussels I Review Proposal Uncovered, op. cit., p. 93. 
498 ECJ, Case C-214/89, Powell Duffryn, par. 21. 
499 ECJ, Case 313/85, SpA Iveco Fiat, par. 7-8. 
500 ECJ, Case, C-269/95, Benincasa, par. 31. 
501 ECJ, C-387/98, Coreck Maritime, par. 24. 
502 F. C. VILLATA, L’attuazione degli accordi di scelta del foro nel regolamento Bruxelles I, op. cit., p. 103; T. 
Hartley, Choice-of-Court Agreements under the European and International Instruments: The Revised Brussels I 
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regolamento (UE) n. 1215/2012 sulla giurisdizione e l’efficacia delle decisioni in materia civile e commerciale, 
op. cit., p. 72. 
503 U. MAGNUS, Article 25, in Brussels I Bis Regulation, 2016, op. cit., p. 631. 
504 U. MAGNUS, Choice-of-court Agreements in the Review Proposal for the Brussels I Regulation, in The 
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transferred partially or as a whole to the third parties. Can the third parties be bound by the 
choice-of-court agreements when there is no consent?  
The Brussels Ibis Regulation does not directly regulate this issue, but two provisions of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation implicitly extend the effects of the jurisdiction agreements to the 
third parties: (i) to trustees and beneficiaries in the “unilateral”505 trust instruments according 
to Article 25 par. 3 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation; and (ii) to the insured and the 
beneficiaries in insurance contracts according to Article 15 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation. The ECJ has also admitted the extension of the effects to the third parties on 
several occasions – regarding company statues, bills of lading, and chain of contracts. 
 
9.1. Company Statutes 
As stated in Section 4 of this Subchapter, the ECJ in the judgment C-214/89, Powell Duffryn, 
considered the choice-of-court agreement incorporated into the statute of the company. The 
ECJ decided that such a clause constitutes an agreement conferring jurisdiction within the 
meaning of Article 17 of the Brussels Convention. 
According to the ECJ, the company’s statutes must be regarded as a contract covering 
relations between the shareholders respectively and between the shareholders and the 
company. The relationship between the shareholders is comparable to the relationship of the 
parties to a contract, whereby their rights and obligations are set out in the company’s 
statutes.506 This part of the interpretation seems to be in line with the principle of the effects of 
the clause inter partes since the shareholders constituting the company express their consent 
with the statute and the jurisdiction clause. Therefore, such clauses must be regarded as an 
agreement within the meaning of Article 17 of the Brussels Convention. However, the ECJ 
went even further. According to the ECJ, the adoption of the jurisdiction clause which was 
opposed by the shareholder is irrelevant and the statute binds the shareholder, even if he 
entered into the company after the clause was adopted507 since the shareholder:  
...agrees to be subject to all the provisions appearing in the statutes of the company and 
to the decisions adopted by the organs of the company, in accordance with the 
                                                          
505 Schlosser Report, p. 320; S. O’MALLEY, A. LAYTON, European Civil Practice, 1989, op. cit., p. 736. 
506 ECJ, Case C-214/89, Powell Duffryn, par. 16. 
507 ECJ, Case C-214/89, Powell Duffryn, par. 18. 
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provisions of the applicable national law and the statutes, even if he does not agree 
with some of those provisions or decisions.508  
In other words, the new shareholder of the company that accedes to the statute is bound by the 
jurisdiction clause without the necessity to give express consent. However, the national 
applicable law regulates the modality of the introduction of the jurisdiction clause into the 
statutes. The ECJ did not specify if a national law is the lex fori of the seized Member State 
court or lex fori prorogati. Because it is presumed this issue is not governed by the new rule 
on substantive validity according to Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation,509 it will 
depend on the seized Member State court what “applicable national law” will be applied. It 
might be suggested to apply the lex fori prorogati,510 but on the other hand, the ECJ in the 
judgment CDC (which is analysed further) by referring to the Coreck case explicitly specified 
that the application of the national law is the rules of private international law of the court 
seized. 511  
As to the formal requirements prescribed in the Brussels Ibis Regulation, according to the 
ECJ, they are deemed to be satisfied if the statutes are lodged in a place to which the 
shareholder may have access, such as the seat of the company, or are contained in a public 
register. 
 
9.2. Bills of Lading 
In three judgments, the ECJ addressed the opposability of the jurisdiction clause incorporated 
in a bill of lading between a carrier and a shipper in respect of a bearer. 
In the judgments 71/83, Tilly Russ and Trasporti Castelletti, the ECJ upheld that, a valid and 
formally consented to jurisdiction agreement incorporated in a bill of lading is binding for a 
third party, which has succeeded to the shipper’s rights and obligations by acquiring the bill 
of lading under the relevant national law. 512 The third party becomes subject to all the rights 
                                                          
508 ECJ, Case C-214/89, Powell Duffryn, par. 19. 
509 See supra Section 8.2. of this Subchapter. On the opposite approach see L. PENASA, Gli accordi sulla 
giurisdizione tra parti e terzi. Vol. 2: Profili soggettivi, CEDAM, 2017, p. 162. 
510 U. MAGNUS, Article 25, in Brussels I Bis Regulation, 2016, op. cit., p. 631. 
511 ECJ, Case C-352/13, CDC, par. 65. 
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and to all the obligations under the bill of lading.513 In other words, the question of the 
opposability against the third party is governed by the applicable national law (applying its 
conflict-of-laws rules). In Coreck case, the ECJ confirmed the interpretation provided in the 
71/83, Tilly Russ and Trasporti Castelletti case, and decided that in cases that the rights and 
obligations do not succeed to the third party under the applicable national law, the seized 
Member State court must ascertain, whether the third party actually accepted the jurisdiction 
clause by virtue of formal requirements laid down in Article 17 of the Brussels Convention. 
The question arises whether the law of the seized Member State court or the law of the chosen 
Member State court will govern this succession. It might be suggested to apply the lex fori 
prorogati,514 but it must also be remembered in this context that the ECJ in CDC, when it 
referred to the Coreck case, specified that the application of the national law is the rules of 
private international law of the court seized.515  
 
9.3. Agreements Affecting a Third Party’s Right 
The ECJ has addressed the question concerning the choice-of-court agreement included in a 
contract for the benefit of a third party. As stated above, one provision of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation contemplates the effects of the choice-of-court clause in favour of third parties: 
Article 15 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation permits the insured and the beneficiary of the 
insurance contract, concluded between the policyholder and the insurer, to bring proceedings 
in courts other than those indicated in the Section 3 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.  
The ECJ Gerling Konzern case,516 regarded a question if a person, in whose favour the 
contract of insurance was made and who was not a party to the contract between the insurer 
and the policyholder, was entitled to rely on a jurisdiction clause which he had not signed. 
The ECJ upheld that such a jurisdiction clause according to Article 17 of the Brussels 
Convention must be considered valid when Article 12 of the Brussels Convention (Article 15 
of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) provided for the possibility of stipulating the jurisdiction 
clauses in favour of the insured and the beneficiary, even though they were not parties to the 
                                                          
513 ECJ, Case 71/83, Tilly Russ, par. 25; Case C-159/97, Trasporti Castelletti, par. 41. 
514 U. MAGNUS, Article 25, in Brussels I Bis Regulation, 2016, op. cit., p. 631. 
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contract.517 Consequently, the ECJ relied on the principle of good faith: if Article 17 was to be 
regarded as requiring the insured or the beneficiary expressly to sign the jurisdiction clause, 
the effect of such an interpretation would result in:  
…a pointless restriction amounting even, it may be, to a formality with which it would be 
difficult to comply if, before any proceedings, the insured has not been informed by the 
policy-holder of the existence of a clause conferring jurisdiction which has been made for 
his benefit.518  
Due to the recognition of the insured or the beneficiary as weaker parties, which justifies the 
application of the jurisdiction clause, for their benefit in order to protect them against a 
predetermined non-negotiable contract,519 it seems that this interpretation can be extended 
with difficulty to the “different” third parties, which benefit from the jurisdiction clause.520 
The ECJ in the case Société financière et industrielle du Peloux 521 confirmed the protective 
approach when it stated that a jurisdiction clause according to Article 12 par. 3 of the Brussels 
Convention cannot be relied on against a beneficiary who has not expressly subscribed to the 
jurisdiction clause.522 
 
9.4. Chain of Contracts 
The Refcomp, C543/10 case concerned the question whether a jurisdiction clause, concluded 
between a manufacturer of goods and a buyer, is effective also against a sub-buyer. The 
claimant, the French insurance company, to which the rights of property were subrogated, 
sued the manufacturer, the fitter and the seller of goods before the French court seeking for 
the remedy of damage suffered. The manufacturer Refcomp challenged the jurisdiction of the 
French court relying on a jurisdiction clause in favour of the Italian courts included in the 
contract concluded between the fitter and itself, in order to escape French jurisdiction. The 
ECJ decided against the opposability of the jurisdiction clause against the sub-buyer “unless 
                                                          
517 ECJ, Case 201/82, Gerling Konzern, par. 18. 
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it is established that that third party has actually consented to that clause under the 
conditions laid down in that Article.”523  
The ECJ reasoning was based on the several arguments. First, the choice-of-court clause 
included in a contract may produce effects only in the relations between the parties who have 
given their consent.524 On the other hand, Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation does not 
indicate whether a jurisdiction clause may be transmitted to a third party.525 Second, the 
conditions and the forms of the consent to a jurisdiction clause may vary taking into 
consideration the nature of the initial contract.526 In particular, the chain of contracts cannot be 
assimilated to: 
(a) The statutes of a company (C-214/89, Powel Duffryn case) when in the context of an 
action for damages there is no contractual relationship between the sub-buyer and the 
manufacturer. Thus, due to the lack of a contractual link, the parties did not agree within 
the meaning of Article 23 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation;527 
(b) Bill of ladings (71/83, Tilly Russ and Coreck) due to its specific nature: it is an instrument 
of international commerce intended to govern a relationship involving at least three 
persons and in most legal systems it is a negotiable instrument which allows transferring 
the goods to a purchaser, who becomes as the bearer of the bill of lading;528 
(c) Transfer to of a single contract or the transfer of all the rights and obligations since in a 
chain of contracts “the contractual obligations of the parties may vary from contract to 
contract, so that the contractual rights which the sub-buyer can enforce against his 
immediate seller will not necessarily be the same as those which the manufacturer will 
have accepted in his relationship with the first buyer.”529 Moreover, the relationships 
between manufacturer and sub-buyer are perceived differently in the Member States, and 
there is no single approach to it.530 
Although the ECJ has admitted the application of the national law in several cases, it seems 
that the ECJ was, in this case, afraid of the different outcomes. The reference to the national 
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law would be according to the ECJ an “element of uncertainty incompatible with the concern 
to ensure the predictability of jurisdiction”.531 The interpretation of C543/10 in the Refcomp 
case has been already applied by the Member State courts, emphasising the role of an 
effective agreement.532 
 
9.5. Bond Prospectus 
In April 2014, the ECJ handed down the judgment C-366/13, Profit Investment,533concerning 
the question on the opposability of the jurisdiction clause against a third party who acquired 
the bonds from a financial intermediary. The referring national court asked the ECJ whether 
the choice-of-court clause inserted into a bond prospectus binds not only the original 
transactional parties, but also the buyers of the bonds on the secondary markets. The parties in 
the dispute were: Commerzbank, the bond issuer of a programme for the issue of bonds, 
whereby the general rules of the programme were set out in the issuing prospectus containing 
a jurisdiction clause in favour of the English courts and previously approved by the Irish 
Stock Exchange; Redi, financial intermediary, which subscribed to the bonds issued by 
Commerzbank on the ‘primary’ market; and Profit, an Italian company who bought part of the 
bonds of Redi on the secondary market. The credit event in relation to the bonds in question 
brought the compulsory liquidation of Profit, which brought an action before the Italian court, 
seeking a declaration of nullity of the purchase agreements of the bonds between itself and 
Redi and the restitution of the sum paid. The ECJ upheld that a jurisdiction agreement 
contained in a prospectus produced by the bond issuer concerning the issue of bonds may be 
relied on against a third party who acquired those bonds from a financial intermediary if it is 
established, and the referring party must verify, that:  
…(i) that clause is valid in the relationship between the issuer and the financial 
intermediary, (ii) the third party, by acquiring those bonds on the secondary market, 
succeeded to the financial intermediary’s rights and obligations attached to those bonds 
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under the applicable national law, and (iii) the third party had the opportunity to 
acquaint himself with the prospectus containing that clause.534  
The ECJ referred to Refcomp case, C‑543/10, and distinguished on one hand the chain of 
contracts where a contractual link was absent and which cannot be regarded as “agreed”, and 
on the other hand the bills of lading and company’s statutes, in which the ECJ had accepted 
transferability of choice-of-court clause to third parties.535 In view of the case law regarding 
Tilly Russ, 71/83; Trasporti Castelletti, C‑159/97; Coreck, C‑387/98 and Powell Duffryn, 
C‑214/89, the ECJ answered in an affirmative way. 
It might be surprising that after the Refcomp, C543/10, a case in which the ECJ refused the 
reference to the national law due to the uncertainty incompatible with the predictability of the 
jurisdictional rules laid down in the Brussels regime, the ECJ has turned back to the reference 
of the applicable national law to resolve the question of the succession of the financial 
intermediary’s rights and obligations attached to the bonds to the third party, which acquired 
the bonds on the secondary market. The ECJ judgment has been criticised due to the reference 
to the national law and for not providing the autonomous interpretation as in Refcomp case, 
C543/10, when there is a contractual relationship between the issuer and investor 
notwithstanding the number of intermediaries interposed between them.536 
 
9.6. Assignment of Claims for Damages for an Infringement of Competition Law 
The facts of the most recent case CDC, C-352/13, have already been analysed in Chapter I, 
Subchapter III, Section 2.1., regarding the application of the overriding mandatory rules. 
However, it must be mentioned that the ECJ inter alia stated that: 
…where a party not privy to the original contract had succeeded to an original 
contracting party’s rights and obligations in accordance with national substantive law as 
established by the application of the rules of private international law of the court seized 
                                                          
534 ECJ, Case C-366/13, Profit Investment, par. 37. 
535 ECJ, Case C-366/13, Profit Investment, par. 32 and 33. 
536 M. HAENTJENS, D. VERHEIJ, Finding Nemo: Locating Financial Losses after Kolassa/Barclays Bank and 
Profit, Leiden Law School Research Paper; Hazelhoff Research Paper Series No. 8. p. 346-358, available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2793727, p. 26, 27. 
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of the matter could that third party nevertheless be bound by a jurisdiction clause to 
which it had not agreed.537 
 The ECJ also, in this case, did not refuse to refer to the national law which could cause 
“uncertainty and non-predictability of the jurisdictional rules”, and did not provide the 
autonomous interpretation as in Refcomp case, C543/10. Moreover, as stated above, the ECJ 
made reference to the Coreck case. However, the ECJ affirmations seem to be new in two 
regards:  
(i) The “applicable national law” mentioned in the Coreck case must be newly 
comprehended as “the rules of private international law of the court seized”.538 Since the 
effects of the jurisdiction clause to the third parties are not governed by Article 25 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation, it was discussed whether the law of the chosen court or law of 
the seized Member State court should be applied. This ECJ judgment explicitly 
confirmed the approach of application lex fori proporgati;  
(ii) Where a successor acquired an original contracting party’s rights and obligations, such a 
successor is bound by a jurisdiction clause to which it had not agreed, also concerning the 
disputes as to the liability incurred as a result of an infringement of competition law. 
However, contrary to the Coreck case, the CDC entered into the agreement on the 
transfer of claims for damages with the different undertakings, some of which 
undertakings had previously concluded similar transfer agreements with other 
undertakings and the original contracts of sale concluded between the defendants and the 
undertakings contained agreements on jurisdiction. The application of the Coreck case 
regarded a bill of lading, which the ECJ classified as a special instrument of international 
commerce intended to govern a relationship involving at least three persons.  
 
9.7. What is necessity for a Rule on Opposability of the Choice-of-Court Agreements 
against Third Parties?  
Due to the ambiguity of the adopted solutions in different cases, the Committee on Legal 
Affairs considered in the course of preparatory works for the recast of the Brussels I 
                                                          
537 ECJ, Case C-352/13, CDC, par. 65. 
538 Emphasis added. 
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Regulation introducing a new provision dealing with the opposability of choice-of-court 
agreements against third parties. In particular it was proposed that:  
…a person who is not a party to the contract will be bound by an exclusive choice-of-
court agreement concluded in accordance with the Regulation only if: (a) that agreement 
is contained in a written document or electronic record; (b) that person is given timely 
and adequate notice of the court where the action is to be brought; (c) in contracts for 
carriage of goods, the chosen court is (i) the domicile of the carrier; (ii) the place of 
receipt agreed in the contract of carriage; (iii) the place of delivery agreed in the 
contract of carriage, or (iv) the port where the goods are initially loaded on a ship or the 
port where the goods are finally discharged from a ship; considers that it should further 
be provided that, in all other cases, the third party may bring an action before the court 
otherwise competent under the Regulation if it appears that holding that party to the 
chosen forum would be blatantly unfair.539 
This proposal aimed at ascertaining whether a third party has knowledge about the existence 
of the jurisdiction agreement and at giving a possibility to a third party to escape from the 
jurisdiction clause whenever the chosen forum would be blatantly unfair. However, the 
subsequent proposals were silent in this respect, and the rule has not been adopted. 
Consequently, the ECJ interpretation should give guideline and can be divided into three 
groups: 540 
1) Restrictive approach: a jurisdiction clause included in the contract cannot be relied on 
against a third party unless a third party has actually consented to that clause (Refcomp, 
C543/10); 
2) Substantive approach: a jurisdiction clause included in the contract for the benefit of a 
third party, is binding for such a third party even if he has not agreed (Gerling Konzern), 
but cannot be relied on against a beneficiary who has not expressly subscribed to the 
jurisdiction clause (Société financière et industrielle du Peloux); and 
3) Accessorial approach: a jurisdiction agreement incorporated in the original contract can 
be relied on against a third party, which has succeeded to the rights and obligations under 
                                                          
539 Committee on Legal Affairs, Report on the implementation and review of Council Regulation (EC) No 
44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, PE 
439.997v02-00997, A7-0219/2010, 29 June 2010, par. 13. 
540 On similar divisions, see B. MUSSEVA, Opposibility of Choice-of-Court Agreements against Third Parties 
under the Hague Choice-of-Court Convention and Brussels Ibis Regulation, Anali Pravnog Fakulteta 
Univerziteta u Zenici, 18 (2016), p. 86. 
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the applicable national law, even if he does not agree with a jurisdiction clause (C-
214/89, Powell Duffryn; 71/83, Tilly Russ, Trasporti Castelletti, Coreck, Profit 
Investment, CDC). 
Unfortunately, such different solutions offered by the ECJ, which depend on the specific 
dispute, may compromise the legal certainty and predictability in respect to the effects of the 
choice-of-court agreement on third parties and the national courts can interpret it in a different 
manner.541 
 
10. Severability of the Choice-of-Court Agreement 
Severability is a technique which protects the validity of the jurisdiction agreement from 
attacks of the invalidity of the contract to which it belongs.542 The new paragraph 5 of Article 
25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation expressly provides for the severability of the jurisdiction 
agreement from the contract or another instrument in which it was included. In other words, 
although the jurisdiction clause forms part of the main contract, the provision in the contract 
governing the jurisdiction clause must be treated as an independent agreement. The invalidity 
of the main contract does not cause invalidity of the jurisdiction clause. 
This new provision was not originally in the Commission Proposal,543 but the principle of the 
separability has already operated according to the Brussels Convention and the Brussels 
Regulation. Such a principle has been already recognized by the ECJ in the case Benincasa, 
C-269/95, stating a jurisdiction clause and the substantive provisions of the contract in which 
a jurisdiction clause is incorporated must be distinguished. The Brussels regime does not 
determine the substantial law, 544 but the provisions aim at establishing uniform rules of 
                                                          
541 See, for example, the UK developing case law on the circumstances in which an anti-suit injunction based on 
a contractual exclusive choice-of-court clause will be granted against a litigant that is not a party to the forum 
clause, in particular: The Yusuf Cepnioglu [2016] 1 Lloyd's Rep 641 (CA), [20]-[21], [35], [49]-[50], [55]-[56]; 
Dell v IB Maroc.com [2017] EWHC 2397 (Comm), [22]-[23], [27]-[28], [32]-[34]; The MD Gemini [2012] 2 
Lloyd's Rep 672, [15]; Fair Wind Navigation v ACE Seguradora [2017] EWHC 352 (Comm), [5]-[8]. In relation 
of the arbitration clause, see Qingdao Huiquan Shipping Company v Shanghai Dong He Xin Industry Group Co 
Ltd [2018] EWHC 3009 (Comm). 
542 A. BRIGGS, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, op. cit., par. 1.21. 
543 It has the origin in the Committee on Legal Affairs, Draft Report on the proposal for a regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters (recast), PE467.046, 28 June 2011, p. 19 with similar wording. 
544 ECJ, Case 25/79, Sanicentral, par. 5. 
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international jurisdiction.545 On the one hand, the jurisdictional clause serves a procedural 
purpose and is governed by Brussels Convention.546 On the other hand, the substantive 
provisions and validity of the main contract are governed by the lex causae determined by 
private international law rules. It means that these two distinct legal terms operate 
autonomously. The formal validity of the jurisdiction clause must be determined according to 
Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, and the formal validity of the main contract is 
governed by the law in accordance with Article 11 of the Rome I Regulation. The substantive 
validity of the jurisdiction clause is determined according to the conflict-of-laws rules of the 
designated Member State court, whereas the substantive validity of the main contract is 
governed by lex contractus according to Article 10 of the Rome I Regulation. Therefore, if the 
choice-of-court agreement is valid even when the main contract is invalid (e.g., the law 
applicable to the formal validity of the main contract requires additional formalities such as 
notarization), the designated Member State court will have jurisdiction to decide on the 
invalidity of the main contract and the consequences resulting from invalidity. 
 
11. Non-Exclusivity of the Choice-of-Court Agreement 
The characterisation of a choice-of-court agreement as exclusive or non-exclusive is crucial 
for the identification of the effects that they produce. Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation allows both exclusive and non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses compared to the 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, which applies only exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements.547 Thus, the accurate differentiation of jurisdiction clauses as exclusive and non-
exclusive is also essential for the determination of the regime applied.548 It must be borne in 
mind that categorization is a matter for national law.549 The character of the jurisdiction 
agreement might be perceived as a matter of interpretation,550 which is left to the national 
                                                          
545 ECJ, Case, C-269/95, Benincasa, par. 25. 
546 ECJ, Case, C-269/95, Benincasa, par. 25. 
547 See Article 1 and 3 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements.  
548 On the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements see infra Chapter Two, Subchapter II, Section 3. 
549 A. BRIGGS, P. REES, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgements, op. cit., 2009, par. 2.126. 
550 R. FENTIMAN, Article 31, in U. MAGNUS, P. MANKOWSKI (eds), Brussels I Bis Regulation: Commentary. 
European Commentaries on Private International Law, volume I., Otto Schmidt, Sellier European Law 
Publishers, 2016, p. 753. 
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law;551 or a matter of admissibility;552 or a matter of the substantive validity,553 which would be 
newly governed by the conflict-of-laws of the designated Member State court.  
Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, like Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation, 
provides for the exclusivity of the chosen court “unless agreed otherwise”. This rule was 
inserted into the Brussels I Regulation in 2001. Previously, Article 17 par. 1 of the Brussels 
Convention has provided for the exclusivity of choice-of-court agreements by stating that 
“that court or those courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction”.554 However, it was discussed 
whether the parties could agree otherwise.555 The only exception was the choice-of-court 
agreements for the benefit of one party, leaving non-exclusivity of the choice-of-court 
agreements.556 It is indisputable that the specific court or courts of a specific Member State 
shall have exclusive jurisdiction if the parties expressly provide so. Article 25 of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation can be interpreted that the provision raises a presumption that the parties 
intended to grant exclusive effect to their choice-of-court agreement; in case of doubts in the 
text of a jurisdiction clause, exclusive jurisdiction is presumed.557  
 
11.1. Exclusive and Non-Exclusive Choice-of-Court Agreement 
Exclusive jurisdiction agreements mean that the parties agree on the jurisdiction of specific 
courts and exclude the jurisdiction of other courts which would have jurisdiction.558 Exclusive 
choice-of-court agreements have both positive and negative effects. The positive effect 
                                                          
551 ECJ, Case C-214/89, Powell Duffryn, par. 33. 
552 Q. FORNER-DELAYGUA, Changes to jurisdiction based on exclusive jurisdiction agreements under the 
Brussels I Regulation Recast, Journal of Private International Law, 11:3 (2015), p. 396, according to the author’s 
opinion, the non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses are matter of admissibility in Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation. However, on the non-existence of third category “admissibility” according to the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation see J. BASEDOW, Exclusive choice-of-court agreements as a derogation from imperative norms, op. 
cit., p. 20. 
553 Q. FORNER-DELAYGUA, Changes to jurisdiction based on exclusive jurisdiction agreements under the 
Brussels I Regulation Recast, op. cit., p. 396, according to the author’s opinion, the asymmetric jurisdiction 
clauses are matter of substantive validity, but would be better placed under the admissibility. 
554 The rule providing for an exclusive nature of agreement could be found in Article 2 of the Hague Convention 
of 15 April 1958 or in bilateral conventions between France and the Netherlands, and between Belgium and 
France. The national legislations did not provide for an explicit rule on exclusive jurisdiction, the intention of the 
parties had to be ascertained by the court. See in this regard already cited judgments concerning national 
legislation, e.g. in France - Cour de Cassation Chambre Civile, Banque d’Italie v. Ferrand, 2 May 1928. 
555 U. MAGNUS, Article 23, in Brussels I Regulation, 2012, op. cit., p. 502. 
556 See Article 17 par. 5 of the Brussels Convention. 
557 S. O’MALLEY, A. LAYTON, European Civil Practice, 2004, op. cit., par. 20.060; U. MAGNUS, Article 23, in 
Brussels I Regulation, 2012, op. cit., p. 503. 
558 U. MAGNUS, Article 23, in Brussels I Regulation, 2012, op. cit., p. 503. 
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concerns the obligation of the designated court to accept jurisdiction. Under Article 25 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation, a designated Member State court does not have the discretion to 
decline jurisdiction based on the exclusive choice-of-court agreement.559 In addition to the 
positive effect of the exclusive prorogation, the exclusive choice-of-court agreement has a 
negative effect, which excludes all otherwise competent courts.  
It is generally accepted that exclusive jurisdiction agreements provide for unique (single) 
jurisdiction.560 Indeed, unique jurisdiction clauses create a high level of predictability and 
certainly about jurisdiction. However, does exclusive choice-of-court agreement mean really 
“unique”? 561 According to the ECJ, the parties may designate more than one exclusive 
jurisdiction. In case 23/78, Meeth v Glacetal, the parties concluded a contract containing the 
following jurisdiction clause: “If Meeth sues Glacetal the French courts alone shall have 
jurisdiction. If Glacetal sues Meeth the German courts alone shall have jurisdiction.” The 
ECJ, (in the context of application of Article 17 of the Brussels Convention), decided that:  
That wording, which is based on the most widespread business practice, cannot, however, 
be interpreted as intending to exclude the right of the parties to agree on two or more 
courts for the purpose of settling any disputes which may arise.… Although such an 
agreement coincides with the scope of Article 2 it is nevertheless effective in that it 
excludes, in relations between the parties, other optional attributions of jurisdiction, such 
as those detailed in Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention.562  
Since Article 17 of the Brussels Convention was applicable only to the exclusive jurisdiction 
clauses, this judgment should be interpreted to allow exclusive non-unique jurisdiction 
agreements within the Brussels Regime. In other words, when the parties designate one 
exclusive jurisdiction for each party and exclude all otherwise competent courts for each 
party, such jurisdiction must be classified as an exclusive choice-of-court agreement. 563 The 
Meeth v Glacetal case practically relates exclusive jurisdiction to the perspective of each 
                                                          
559 A. BRIGGS, Private International Law in English Courts, Oxford University Press, 2014, para 4.40. See also 
ECJ, Case C-281/02, Owusu, where ECJ expressly stated though in relation to Article 2 of the Brussels I 
Regulation, that the rules of the Brussels I Regulation are compulsory and do not allow any discretion. The 
discretion of the courts permitted according to the English law on the basis of doctrine of forum non conveniens 
has no space under the Brussels regime. 
560 M. KEYES, B. A. MARSHALL, Jurisdiction agreements: exclusive, optional and asymmetrical, op. cit., p. 355. 
561 J. FAWCETT, Non-Exclusive Jurisdiction Agreements in Private International Law, op. cit., p. 239-240. 
562 ECJ, Case 23/78, Meeth, p. 2141, 2142. 
563 On this conclusion, see M. KEYES, B. A. MARSHALL, Jurisdiction agreements: exclusive, optional and 
asymmetrical, op. cit., p. 351, 352 
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party. Doubts arise with the classification of the non-unique exclusive jurisdiction agreements 
when the parties nominate two or more jurisdictions for both parties excluding the jurisdiction 
of any other court for both parties.564 However, such jurisdiction agreements do not provide 
one-sided exclusivity. In any case, both types of non-unique exclusive jurisdiction clauses 
create a potential for a “rush to court”. Moreover, a gap caused by the new lis pendens rule 
according to Article 31 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation and Recital 22 n 2 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation565 may result in parallel proceedings and even in inconsistent 
judgments.566  
The non-exclusive choice-of-court clauses are agreements that are not exclusive.567 Non-
exclusive choice-of-court agreements have the same positive effect as exclusive jurisdiction 
clauses since they oblige the seized, designated court to decide. However, the adverse effect 
differs. The non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements do not require the parties to seize a 
designated court. Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation does not exclude possibility to 
conclude non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements. It is worth mentioning that the general “first 
seized” lis pendens rule according to Article 29 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation applies to the 
non-exclusive choice-of-court clauses.568 
 
11.2. Asymmetric Choice-of-Court Agreement 
Finally, some jurisdiction clauses do not fall under exclusive jurisdiction clauses, nor are they 
under non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses.569 For example, the clause inserted into the main 
contract in the French case Rotschild570 provided:  
                                                          
564 On the criticism see R. FENTIMAN, Jurisdiction – When Non-Exclusive Means Exclusive, The Cambridge Law 
Journal, 51:2 (1992), p. 234. 
565 Recital 22 n. 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation provides: «This exception should not cover situations where 
the parties have entered into conflicting exclusive choice-of- court agreements or where a court designated in an 
exclusive choice-of-court agreement has been seized first. In such cases, the general lis pendens rule of this 
Regulation should apply.». 
566 On this problem see infra Section 14.1.3. of this Subchapter. 
567 A. BRIGGS, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, op. cit., par. 4.19. 
568 See Recital 22 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. On details see infra Section 14.1.3. of this Subchapter. 
569 A. BRIGGS, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, op. cit., par. 4.24-4.25. 
570 Mme X v Société Banque Privé Edmond de Rothschild 13, Case No. 11-26022. On the more details of the 
judgment see M. E. ANCEL, L. MARION, L. WYNAENDTS, Reflections on One-Sided Jurisdiction Clauses in 
International Litigation (About the Rothschild Decision, French Cour de Cassation, 26 September 2012) 
available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2258419, (2013), pp. 3-9; R. FENTIMAN, Unilateral jurisdiction 
agreements in Europe, The Cambridge Law Journal 72:1 (2013), p. 24-27. 
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Any dispute which arises between the client and the Bank will be submitted to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Luxembourg. The Bank nonetheless reserves the 
right to proceed against the client in the courts of the client’s domicile or before any 
other court with jurisdiction in default of an election of the preceding jurisdiction.571  
This jurisdiction clause can often be founded in international financial agreements often 
favouring the financial institutions. There is a degree of certainty since such clauses indicate 
ex ante the designated jurisdiction for both parties, but at the same time, they allow parties to 
seize ex post any other jurisdiction favourable only to one party to the dispute. In other words, 
the jurisdiction clause is exclusive from the perspective of one party, but non-exclusive from 
the perspective of another party. In consequence, they are called optional or asymmetric 
jurisdiction clauses. This clause is reminiscent of Article 17 par. 5 of the Brussels Convention 
providing that if a choice-of-court agreement was concluded for the benefit of only one of the 
parties, that party should retain the right to bring proceedings in any other court which has 
jurisdiction by virtue of the Brussels Convention. Nevertheless, Article 17 par. 5 of the 
Brussels Convention has been removed; it is disputed whether such clauses are admissible 
according to the Brussels Regulations572 and if they continue to have non-exclusive effect as 
according to Article 17 par. 5 of the Brussels Convention.573 Concerning Article 17 par. 5 of 
the Brussels Convention the ECJ in case Anterist v Credit Lyonnais, C-22/85,574 stated that the 
common intention to confer an advantage on one of the parties must be clear from the terms 
of the choice-of-court clause or from all the evidence to be found therein or from the 
circumstances in which the contract was concluded.575 
In the above-mentioned French case Rothschild, the Cour de Cassation decided that the 
clause was “potestative”, for the sole benefit of one party, and was contrary to the objectives 
                                                          
571 On the translation, see M. KEYES, B. A. MARSHALL, Jurisdiction agreements: exclusive, optional and 
asymmetrical, op. cit., p. 364. 
572 In the positive way, see U. MAGNUS, Article 25, in Brussels I Bis Regulation, 2016, op. cit., p. 659; F. 
GARCIMARTIN, Chapter 9 - Article 25, in The Brussels I Regulation Recast, op. cit., p. 302; R. FENTIMAN, 
International Commercial Litigation, Oxford University Press, 2015, par. 2.130 and 2.135. 
573 Cour d’Appel, Paris, 18 October 2011, No 11/03572. See also ECJ, Case C-189/08, Zuid-Chemie, par. 18, 
which provided that: «Second, in so far as Regulation No 44/2001 now replaces, in the relations between 
Member States, the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters, as amended by the successive conventions relating to the accession of new Member 
States to that convention, the interpretation provided by the Court in respect of the provisions of the Brussels 
Convention is also valid for those of Regulation No 44/2001 whenever the provisions of those Community 
instruments may be regarded as equivalen.t». 
574 ECJ, Case C-22/85, Anterist v Credit Lyonnais, 24 June 1986, ECLI:EU:C:1986:255. 
575 ECJ, Case C-22/85, Anterist, par. 14. 
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of the prorogation of jurisdiction laid down in Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation. It is 
interesting to note that the French court applied the French concept of “potestativité”, and 
implicitly ruled on the substantive validity under the French law. As stated in Section 8.2. of 
this Subchapter, the new rule on substantive validity refers to the law of the designated 
Member State court. Thus, the application of French law, including French concept of 
“potestativité” would be excluded under the Brussels Ibis Regulation. This conclusion of the 
Cour de Cassation in the Rothschild case, followed the opinions of the courts of lower 
instance, where, according to the courts, the jurisdictional clause gave to one party vast 
discretional choice, and such is contrary to the Brussels I Regulation, which is based on the 
predictability and certainty of the jurisdictional rules.576 The Cour de Cassation confirmed this 
approach in another judgment ICH v. Crédit Suisse, this time concerning the 2007 Lugano 
Convention, and invalidated the clause since the “objective factors” were not defined.577 
However, in the subsequent case of Apple v eBizcuss578, the Cour de Cassation retained the 
clause as valid since it satisfied the “predictability requirement” when the competent courts 
were clearly identified. Afterwards, the Cour de Cassation in the case of Diemme Enologia v 
Chambon validated an optional unilateral clause which gave an unlimited option to only one 
party.579 In the most recent judgment (3 October 2018), the Cour de Cassation decided that 
the following clause was invalid: “Whenever the French laws permit, the disputes about the 
present are subject to the District Court of and Luxembourg. However, the bank reserves the 
right to waive this attribution of jurisdiction if it considers it appropriate.”. The Cour de 
Cassation refused to give effect to this clause, since it did not contain any objective element 
sufficiently precise to identify the jurisdiction of the court which might be seised and it did 
not meet a high degree of predictability in virtue of Recital 11 and Article 23 of the Brussels I 
Regulation.580 
The national case law is not unified in the other Member States. In Bulgaria, the same 
approach as in French case Rothschild was upheld by the Bulgarian Supreme Court in 
                                                          
576 Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, Madame X v Banque Privée Edmond de Rothschild, 18 January 2011, 
No 09/16659; Cour d’Appel de Paris, Madame X v Banque Privée Edmond de Rothschild, 18 October 2011, No 
11/03572. 
577 Cour de Cassation Chambre Civile 1, ICH v Crédit Suisse, 25 March 2015, No. 13-27264 
578 Cour de Cassation Chambre Civile 1, Apple v eBizcuss, 7 October 2015, No 14-16.898 
579 Cour de Cassation Chambre Commerciale, Case Diemme Enologia v Chambon, 11 May 2017, No 15-18758. 
580 Cour de Cassation, Chambre civile 1, Saint Joseph v Dexia banque internationale, 3 October 2018, No 17-
21.309. 
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September 2011. The Bulgarian court stated that unilateral asymmetric clauses might have a 
“potestative right” and therefore, are not permitted according to the Bulgarian law.581 In Italy, 
Corte Suprema admitted a unilateral asymmetric clause in 2012 and declined jurisdiction in 
the case concerning the choice-of-court agreement when one of the parties could seize the 
English courts, whereby the other party could seize the Italian court or any other court having 
jurisdiction according to the international conventions.582 The court stated that the fact that, 
with respect to the jurisdiction, the position of the parties to the contract is asymmetric, since 
Cuna is bound by the jurisdiction of the English courts and the other has the option of opting 
eventually also for different forums, falls within the scope of possible different agreements by 
means of which the aforementioned art. 23 which makes possible to reconcile the exclusivity 
of the criterion of conventional jurisdiction, but it does not legitimise the derogation from this 
criterion even in favour of the party to whom that option has not been recognized in the 
contract.583  
According to the English case law, unilateral asymmetric clauses have been considered as 
enforceable and legitimate according to the Brussels Convention,584 Lugano Convention,585 
and English national law.586 The High Court in Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft v Liquimar 
Tankers Management Inc upheld the validity of an asymmetric jurisdiction clause also under 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation.587 
It can be summarized from the national case law that unilateral asymmetric clauses are in the 
most cases upheld if the parties identify clearly the competent courts having jurisdiction on 
the basis of the jurisdiction clause. Moreover, although Article 17 par. 5 of the Brussels 
                                                          
581 Bulgarian Supreme Court of Cassation, Commercial Chamber, 2 September 2011, judgment No. 71, in 
commercial case No. 1193/2010. 
582 Corte di Cassazione, 8 March 2012, no 3624, Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (2013), p. 
142. On the same conclusion see aso Tribunale di Milano, 22 September 2011, in Rivista di diritto internazionale 
privato e processuale (2012), p. 918. See also F. C. VILLATA, Rapporto sull'applicazione in Italia del 
Regolamento (CE) n. 44/2001, del 22 dicembre 2000 («Bruxelles I»), e del Regolamento (UE) n. 1215/2012, del 
12 dicembre 2012, («Bruxelles I-bis») concernenti la competenza giurisdizionale, il riconoscimento e 
l'esecuzione delle decisioni in materia civile e commerciale, in S. BARIATTI, I. VIARENGO, F. C. VILLATA (eds), 
La giurisprudenza italiana sull'applicazione dei regolamenti europei in materia civile e commerciale e di 
famiglia, Kluwer/Cedam, 2016, p. 62; M. A. LUPOI, Optional choice of court agreements in Italy, Annuario di 
diritto comparato e studi legislativi, special edition (2018), p. 165-166; 
583 Translation provided by the author. 
584 Continental Bank NA v Aeakos Compania Naviera, [1994], 1 WLR 588, 594. 
585 Lornamead Acquisitions Ltd v Kaupthing Bank HF, [2011], EWHC, 2611 (Comm). 
586 NB Three Shipping v Harebell Shipping, [2004], EWHC 509 (QB). 
587 Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft v Liquimar Tankers Management Inc, [2017] EWHC 161 (Comm). 
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Convention was repealed, unilateral asymmetric clauses represent a specific type of the 
clauses which benefit only one party. Therefore, it might be recommended that the parties 
entering into the unilateral asymmetric clauses could follow the ECJ case Anterist v Credit 
Lyonnais and could expressly indicate their intention to favour one party in the jurisdiction 
clause.588  
 
12. Relationship with other Rules in the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation takes precedence over the other jurisdictional rules 
of the Brussels Ibis Regulation with few exceptions. One of the exceptions is Article 24 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation governing exclusive jurisdiction (for example, proceedings 
concerning rights in rem in immovable property or tenancies; validity of the constitution, 
nullity, or the dissolution of companies; validity of entries in public registers; registration or 
validity of patents, trademarks, designs). The reason for providing for exclusive jurisdiction 
which cannot be overridden by other rules of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is given by the 
close connection between the dispute and the Member State589 and the nature of the listed 
matters, which are in most of the Member States considered as mandatory rules.590 Moreover, 
Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is overturned if the choice-of-court agreement 
contradicts the protective provisions set out in Articles 15, 19, and 23 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation, which is analysed further.  
 
13. Choice-of-Court Agreement in respect of the Weaker Parties 
Adequate protection in procedural law is offered to the parties which are regarded as weaker 
from the socio-economic point of view in a contractual relationship.591 As stated in Chapter I, 
Subchapter III, Section 2.3., the protective jurisdictional rules aim at counterbalancing the 
information or economic or social dependence asymmetries between the parties. The 
                                                          
588 U. MAGNUS, Article 25, in Brussels I Bis Regulation, 2016, op. cit., p. 659. 
589 ECJ, Case C-412/98, Group Josi, par. 46. 
590 H. GAUDAMET-TALLON, Compétence et exécution des jugements en Europe, Règlement no 44/2001, 
Conventions de Bruxelles et de Lugano, op. cit., par. 98; L. DE LIMA PINHEIRO, Article 24 in U. MAGNUS, P. 
MANKOWSKI (eds.),), Brussels I Bis Regulation: Commentary. European Commentaries on Private International 
Law, volume I., Otto Schmidt, Sellier European Law Publishers, 2016, p. 561. 
591 V. LAZIC, Procedural justice for weaker parties in cross-border litigation under the EU regulatory scheme, 
Utrecht Law Review, 10 (2014). 
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counterbalancing of the powers of the parties in the context of the party autonomy is 
represented by virtue of the Brussels Ibis Regulation in two ways: (i) by establishing 
additional protective norms, whereby the protection is provided by the possibility of applying 
the general rule offered to the weak parties and simultaneously introducing an additional rule 
favouring the weaker party in the jurisdiction agreement; and (ii) by establishing a time factor 
limiting the freedom of the parties, which fixes possibility of the conclusion of the jurisdiction 
agreement to a specific time moment. 
The Brussels Ibis Regulation has established a protective jurisdictional regime which is 
included in the Sections 3, 4, and 5. Paragraph 4 of Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
provides a protective regime for the policyholder, the insured, a beneficiary, the consumer, 
and the employee since Recital 18 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation provides:  
In relation to insurance, consumer and employment contracts, the weaker party should be 
protected by rules of jurisdiction more favourable to his interests than the general rules. 
The Brussels Convention has already regulated this protective regime, where the jurisdiction 
clause could not contrast with Article 12 (insurance) or with Article 15 (instalment sales). It is 
interesting to remark that some of the national legislation or national case law provided for the 
protection of employees in the context of the choice-of-court agreements in 1968, but the 
Brussels Convention included employees under the special protection only in 1989.592 
The jurisdiction agreement, which is contrary to Articles 15, 19 or 23 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation, is without any legal force. In insurance, consumer, and employment contracts the 
jurisdiction clause has common aspects: (i) the requirements of formal and substantive 
validity of the agreement must comply with Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation: and 
(ii) the designated jurisdiction must benefit the weaker party. 
It must be borne in mind that in the case of infringement of Articles 15, 19, or 23 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation (in contrast with Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) 
constitutes a ground for denial of the recognition according to Article 45 par. 1 lett. e) point ii) 
                                                          
592 The Convention, signed in San Sebastian on 26 May 1989, upon the accession of the Kingdom of Spain and 
the Portuguese Republic to the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters. See Jenard-Möller Report, par. 60-61, which gave rise to Article 17 para 5 of the Brussels 
Convention.  
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of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, but only when the policyholder, the insured, a beneficiary, the 
consumer, and the employee are in a position of the defendant. 
 
13.1. Choice-of-Court Agreements in Insurance Contracts 
As recorded in the Jenard Report, the purpose of Article 15 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is 
to prevent the parties from limiting the choice offered by the Brussels regime to the policy-
holder.593 Like other provisions in Section 3, this Article was designed to protect the weaker 
parties to insurance transactions, i.e., the policy-holder, the insured, or the beneficiary. Article 
15 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation regulates the situation when the agreement between the 
parties overrides the special jurisdictional rules laid down in Articles 10 to 14 of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation. 
The parties to this jurisdiction agreement are the insurer and the policy-holder. This rule aims 
at benefiting the policy-holder and the third-party beneficiary by permitting a specific 
jurisdiction agreement and by allowing them to bring an action to the Member State court 
other than indicated in Section 3 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. As stated in Section 9.3. of 
this Subchapter, the effect of the jurisdiction agreement is extended to the insured or the 
beneficiary if it was concluded for their benefit nevertheless he has not agreed (Gerling 
Konzern), but not against a beneficiary who has not expressly subscribed to the jurisdiction 
clause (Société financière et industrielle du Peloux). 
Article 15 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation does not regulate any requirement of form for the 
insurance jurisdiction agreement. It seems clear that the form prescribed in Article 25 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation must be satisfied.594 As a consequence, all considerations in this text 
as to the validity (including substantive validity) may be used in the context of Article 15 of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
The jurisdiction agreements in insurance contracts are permitted only in a limited number of 
cases.595  
                                                          
593 Jenard Report, p. 33. 
594 S. O’MALLEY, A. LAYTON, European Civil Practice, 1989, op. cit., p. 483. 
595 On the general considerations see S. DOMINELLI, Party autonomy and insurance contracts in private 
international law: a European Gordian knot, Aracne, 2016. 
  
140 
 
According to this provision, the jurisdiction agreements are effective only if they are entered 
into after the dispute has arisen (point 1 of Article 15 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation). The 
weaker party, which is aware of the risk of the jurisdiction agreement, may freely choose to 
enter into the agreement conferring jurisdiction to any Member State court.596 According to 
some scholars, the use of this provision is rare.597 The Jenard Report states that the point at 
which the dispute has arisen should be comprehended “as soon as the parties disagree on a 
specific point and legal proceedings are imminent or contemplated”.598 However, due to no 
indications in this regard, it might be difficult to determine the moment when the dispute has 
arisen. At least, it can be affirmed that the jurisdiction agreement is permitted to be concluded 
before or after the proceedings are brought in front of the Member State court.599 
Point 2 of Article 15 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation states that the parties may agree on the 
jurisdiction of additional Member States, other than listed in Section 3 in order to benefit the 
policyholder, the insured, or a beneficiary. The jurisdiction clause must widen the choice 
available to the weaker party, and in consequence, this provision cannot be understood as 
limiting the choice.600 In this case, the jurisdiction agreement may be entered into at any time, 
also when the dispute has not arisen.  
The parties may derogate from Articles 12 and 13 by a jurisdiction agreement concluded 
according to point 3 of Article 15 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation if three conditions are met: 
(i) a policyholder and an insurer are domiciled or habitually resident in the same Member 
State at the time of conclusion of the contract; (ii) the jurisdiction agreement is in favour of 
such Member State courts, even if the harmful event were to occur abroad; and (iii) an 
agreement is not contrary to the law of that Member State. 
If a Third State policyholder is in the position of a claimant, he apparently cannot sue the 
insurer in a Third State where the policyholder is domiciled. Nevertheless, it would be 
possible to sue where the insurer domiciled (or has a branch, agency, or another 
                                                          
596 H. HEISS, Introduction to Articles 10-16, in U. MAGNUS, P. MANKOWSKI (eds), Brussels I Bis Regulation: 
Commentary. European Commentaries on Private International Law, volume I., Otto Schmidt, Sellier European 
Law Publishers, 2016, p. 431. 
597 L. COLLINS, The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act, Butterworth, 1982, p. 73. 
598 Jenard Report, p. 33. On the disagreement with this approach see: G. A. L. DROZ, Pratique de la Convention 
de Bruxelles du 27 September 1968, Dalloz, 1973, par. 128; L. MAXWELL, Report of the Scottish Committee on 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement, H.M. Stationery Off., 1980, par. 5.120. 
599 F. GARCIMARTIN, Chapter 9 - Article 25, in The Brussels I Regulation Recast, op. cit., p. 208. 
600 S. O’MALLEY, A. LAYTON, European Civil Practice, 1989, op. cit., p. 485. 
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establishment) in a Member State on the basis of other jurisdictional grounds in the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation (e.g., in the Member State court of insurer’s domicile according to Article 11, 
or place where the harmful event occurred according to Article 12 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation). However, these jurisdictional grounds can be excluded by a jurisdiction 
agreement unless one of the exceptions according to Article 15 point 4 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation applies (i.e., where the insurance is compulsory and when it relates to immovable 
property in a Member State).601 Section 3 is not applicable to the Third State defendants. If a 
Third State policy-holder or insurer is in the position of a defendant, Section 3 is not 
applicable, and the Member State courts will be able to decide according to the national law 
and Article 6 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.602 In such a case a Third State policy-holder may 
conclude the jurisdiction agreement with the insurer603 according to Article 25 of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation and to sue in the designated Member State court.  
Article 15 point 5 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation then allows to the parties to the insurance 
contract, which covers specific risk listed in Article 16 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, to 
agree freely on the jurisdiction of the Member State court. There is no need to protect the 
policy-holder since such types of the insurance contracts are concluded typically by the 
policy-holders not requiring special protection.604 
 
13.2. Choice-of-Court Agreements in Consumer Contracts 
Article 19 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is similar to Article 15 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation. The origin may be found in Article 13 of the Brussels Convention when this 
section was named “jurisdiction in matters relating to instalment sales and loans”. The word 
“consumer” did not appear in the text. The ECJ in the case Bertrand605 specified that the 
persons who are subject to the protection in this Section are “private final consumers” who are 
“not engaged…in a trade or professional activities.”606 In 1978 the Brussels Convention was 
amended by virtue of the ECJ interpretation in the Bertrand case, and gave rise to the use of 
                                                          
601 T. HARTLEY, Choice-of-Court Agreements under the European and International Instruments: The Revised 
Brussels I Regulation, the Lugano Convention, and the Hague Convention, op. cit., p. 245. 
602 S. O’MALLEY, A. LAYTON, European Civil Practice, 1989, op. cit., p. 488. 
603 H. HEISS, Introduction to Articles 10-16, in Brussels I Bis Regulation, op. cit., p.431, 
604 Schlosser Report, par. 140. 
605 ECJ, Case 150/77, Bertrand v Paul Ott KG, 21 June 1978, ECLI:EU:C:1978:137. 
606 ECJ, Case 150/77, Bertrand, par. 21. 
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the word “consumer”. It must be borne in mind that in case that the consumer assigns his right 
to a professional, who brings the proceedings, the special protection under Section 4 is not 
provided.607 The EU has adopted the Directive on consumer rights,608 which clearly indicates 
that e-consumers are served with the same protection as “traditional” consumers. 
On the other side of the contractual relationship stand suppliers who act in their trade or 
professional activities. In consequence, such persons must be non-consumers for the special 
provision to apply.609 In addition, the contract must fall into the three categories listed in 
Article 17: (i) it is a contract for the sale of goods on instalment credit terms; 610 (ii) it is a 
contract for a loan repayable by instalments, or for any other form of credit, made to finance 
the sale of goods;611 or (iii) in all other cases the contract has been concluded with the supplier 
who pursues his commercial or professional activities in the Member State of the consumer’s 
domicile or directs such activities to that Member State or to several States including that 
Member State and the contract falls within the scope of such activities.612 
Article 19 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation regulates the condition when the agreement 
between the parties overrides the special jurisdictional rules laid down in Section 4 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation. Moreover, the Directive on unfair terms in consumer contracts 613 
has priority over the Brussels Ibis Regulation according to Article 67 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation. In the case Océano Grupo Editorial, (Joined cases C-240/98 to C-244/98) the 
ECJ upheld that where a jurisdiction clause without being individually negotiated and 
included in a contract between a consumer and a seller within the meaning of the Directive 
confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court of a seller’s principal place of business, it must be 
                                                          
607 ECJ, Case C-89/91, Shearson Lehmann Hutton Inc. v TVB Treuhandgesellschaft für Vermögensverwaltung 
und Beteiligungen mbH, 19 January 1993, ECLI:EU:C:1993:15. 
608 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, 
amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
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the Council Text with EEA relevance, OJ L 304, 22 November 2011. 
609 T. HARTLEY, Choice-of-Court Agreements under the European and International Instruments: The Revised 
Brussels I Regulation, the Lugano Convention, and the Hague Convention, op. cit., p. 253. 
610 On the interpretation of this term, see ECJ, Case 150/77, Bertrand, where the ECJ stated that it is “sale of 
goods on instalment credit terms is to be understood as a transaction in which the price is discharged by way of 
several payments”. 
611 On the interpretation of this term, see ECJ, Case 150/77, Bertrand, where the ECJ simply stated it is applied 
to a financing contracts linked to a contract of sale. 
612 On the latter case see the interpretation provided by the ECJ, Joined cases C-585/08 and C-144/09, Peter 
Pammer v Reederei Karl Schlüter GmbH & Co. KG and Hotel Alpenhof GesmbH v Oliver Heller, 7 December 
2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:740, par. 75-84. 
613 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, OJ L 95, 21 April 1993. 
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regarded as unfair within the meaning of Article 3 of the Directive because it causes, contrary 
to the requirement of good faith, a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights.614 
The choice-of-court agreements in consumer contracts under Section 4 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation are valid if the requirements prescribed in Article 19, and to a certain extent in 
Article 25, of the Brussels Ibis Regulation are satisfied. Article 19 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation does not regulate any requirement of form for the jurisdiction agreement in 
consumer contracts as in case of the insurance contracts. The form prescribed in Article 25 of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation must also be satisfied in the context of Article 19 of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation.615 The substantive validity of the jurisdiction agreement is governed by the 
conflict-of-laws rules of the chosen Member State.616 As a consequence, all considerations in 
this text as to the formal and substantive validity may be used in the context of Article 15 of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
Article 19 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation permits the jurisdiction clauses in three 
exhaustively listed situations. 617 
The provisions of Section 4 may be departed from by an agreement which is entered into after 
the dispute has arisen. This provision was designed to protect consumers. In consumer 
contracts, the clauses are often written in the small print of the seller's general terms and 
conditions, and for this reason, they must be treated with special protection.618 In 
consequence, point 1 of Article 19 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation guarantees that such clause 
will not be valid in principle, unless the consumer concludes such a clause after the dispute 
has arisen. 619 
A jurisdiction agreement is also available for the consumers in order to broaden the range of 
jurisdiction of the Member State courts other than available according to Article 18 of the 
                                                          
614 ECJ, Joined cases C-240/98 to C-244/98, Océano Grupo Editorial, par. 24. 
615 S. O’MALLEY, A. LAYTON, European Civil Practice, 1989, op. cit., p. 483. 
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Commentary. European Commentaries on Private International Law, volume I., Otto Schmidt, Sellier European 
Law Publishers, 2016, p. 516. 
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Brussels Ibis Regulation.620 Point 2 of Article 19 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation envisages 
asymmetric, optional jurisdiction agreements which can be only unilaterally applied by the 
consumer for his benefit.621 There is no derogatory effect of jurisdiction clauses to the 
detriment of consumers. On the contrary, it regulates the prorogatory effects in the 
consumer’s favour. In other words, the jurisdiction agreement does not exclude the 
jurisdiction of the courts according to Article 18, but it extends the consumer’s possibility of 
choosing between several courts with jurisdiction.622 Although if the clause does not contain 
the precise wording “for the benefit of” the consumer, it does not make any difference.623 This 
clause can be freely inserted in the original contract and does not require the dispute have 
arisen.624 
The third situation, where the jurisdiction clause in the consumer contracts is permitted, it 
allows a consumer and a supplier to agree on the jurisdiction of the Member State court of 
their own State if an agreement is not contrary to the law of such Member State. It means that 
at the time of the conclusion of the jurisdiction agreement, the agreement is merely domestic, 
and the element of internationality arises subsequently. This provision enhances the legal 
certainty that when one of the parties change domicile to another Member State, the 
jurisdiction of a court of a Member State of the previous domicile of the parties will be 
maintained.625 On the contrary to the previous point, this provision concerns the derogation 
from the jurisdiction of the Member State courts which would have otherwise jurisdiction 
according to Article 18 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.626  
Is it relevant if the supplier or consumer is domiciled outside the EU?  
When the supplier sues the consumer, which is not domiciled in the Member State, the special 
jurisdictional rules are not applicable, and national law applies instead.627 However, the parties 
                                                          
620 On the same conclusions regarding choice-of-court agreements in employment contracts see ECJ; Case C-
154/11, Ahmed Mahamdia v People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, 19 July 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:491, par. 
63. 
621 P. MANKOWSKI, P. NIELSEN, Article 19, in Brussels I Bis Regulation, 2016, op. cit., p. 522. 
622 On the same conclusions regarding choice-of-court agreements in employment contracts see, ECJ Case C-
154/11, Ahmed Mahamdia, par. 63. 
623 S. O’MALLEY, A. LAYTON, European Civil Practice, 1989, op. cit., p. 515. 
624 S. O’MALLEY, A. LAYTON, European Civil Practice, 1989, op. cit., p. 514. 
625 P. MANKOWSKI, P. NIELSEN, Article 19, in Brussels I Bis Regulation, 2016, op. cit., p. 527, 528. 
626 S. O’MALLEY, A. LAYTON, European Civil Practice, 1989, op. cit., p. 515. 
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may conclude a jurisdiction agreement according to Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation. When the consumer sues the supplier, the position must be distinguished under 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation and the Brussels I Regulation. In cases that the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation applies, the supplier without a domicile, a branch, agency, or another 
establishment in the EU may be still sued on the basis of the special jurisdictional rules if the 
consumer is domiciled in the Member State. Such amendment was inserted into Article 6 of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation by stating that:  
…if the defendant is not domiciled in a Member State, the jurisdiction of the courts of 
each Member State shall, subject to Article 18(1), Article 21(2) and Articles 24 and 25, 
be determined by the law of that Member State. 
Article 18 par. 1 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation then provides:  
A consumer may bring proceedings against the other party … regardless of the domicile 
of the other party, in the courts for the place where the consumer is domiciled. 
It means that if, for example, a Russian supplier concludes a jurisdiction agreement with the 
consumer habitually resident in France in favour of the Dutch court, the consumer should not 
be deprived from its protection to sue the supplier in a French court according to Article 18 
par. 1 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation or to sue the supplier in a Dutch court according to 
Article 19 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.628  
This protection is not provided to the consumers under the Brussels I Regulation. In case, that 
the supplier without a domicile, a branch, agency, or another establishment in the EU is sued 
by the consumer habitually resident in the EU, the Brussels I Regulation does not apply. The 
defendant must be domiciled in the Member State to activate the special rules according to the 
Brussels Regulation. If a Russian supplier concludes the jurisdiction agreement with the 
consumer domiciled in France in favour of the Dutch court and the consumer would be 
                                                          
628 On the opposite result, see T. HARTLEY, Choice-of-Court Agreements under the European and International 
Instruments: The Revised Brussels I Regulation, the Lugano Convention, and the Hague Convention, op. cit., p. 
267 and 268, which does not distinguish between the regime under the Brussels I Regulation and the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation. Thus, according to the author, the question on the jurisdiction and effectiveness of the choice-of-
court agreement is subject to national law.  
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interested in seizing a French court, the choice-of-court agreement should be governed by 
Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation629  
 
13.3. Choice-of-Court Agreements in Employment Contracts 
Section 5 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation lays down rules whose objective is to protect the 
employee by means of jurisdiction rules that are more favourable to his interests.630 As stated 
by ECJ in the several occasions, the jurisdiction rules over employment contracts should 
ensure the proper protection for the employee as the weaker of the contracting parties.631  
The position regarding the agreement on jurisdiction in individual contracts of employment is 
similar to that concerning consumer contracts. Article 23 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
restricts the possibility to conclude an agreement on jurisdiction in a contract of employment 
and regulates the conditions when the agreement between the parties overrides the special 
jurisdictional rules laid down in Section 5 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. Also as with 
insurance and consumer contracts, the choice-of-court agreements under Section 5 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation are valid if the requirements prescribed in Article 23, and to a certain 
extent in Article 25, of the Brussels Ibis Regulation are satisfied. It means that the formal 
requirements of Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation must also be satisfied in the context 
of Article 23 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation,632 as well as the substantive validity of the 
jurisdiction agreement is governed by the conflict-of-laws rules of the designated Member 
State according to Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.633  
                                                          
629 On the opposite result see T. HARTLEY, Choice-of-Court Agreements under the European and International 
Instruments: The Revised Brussels I Regulation, the Lugano Convention, and the Hague Convention, op. cit., p. 
267, 268. According to the author, the national law should govern the jurisdiction and the effectiveness of the 
choice of court agreement. 
630 ECJ, Case C-462/06, Glaxosmithkline and Laboratoires Glaxosmithkline v Jean-Pierre Rouard, 22 May 
2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:299, par. 17. 
631 ECJ, Case 133/81, Roger Ivenel v Helmut Schwab, 26 May 1982, ECLI:EU:C:1982:199, par. 14; Case C-
125/92, Mulox IBC Ltd v Hendrick Geels, 13 July 1993, ECLI:EU:C:1993:306, par. 18; Case C-383/95, Petrus 
Wilhelmus Rutten v Cross Medical Ltd, 9 January 1997, ECLI:EU:C:1997:7, par. 22; Case C-437/00 Giulia 
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Moreover, Article 23 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation permits jurisdiction clauses in two 
exhaustively listed situations which coincide with the list in points 1 and 2 of Article 19 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation governing consumer contracts. 
Such an agreement must be concluded: (i) after the dispute has arisen; or (ii) must allow the 
employee to bring proceedings before courts other than those on which those rules confer 
jurisdiction. In both cases, it may be referred to the previous two Sections. It is worth 
mentioning that Article 23 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation does not allow an employer and an 
employee to agree on the jurisdiction of the Member State court of their own State if an 
agreement is not contrary to the law of such Member State as Article 19 par. 3 of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation does for the consumer contracts. 
Is it relevant if the employer or employee is domiciled in a Third State? When the employer 
sues the employee, which is not domiciled in the Member State, the special jurisdictional 
rules are not applicable, and the national law applies instead.634 However, the parties may 
conclude a jurisdiction agreement according to Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
When the employee sues the employer, the position must be distinguished under the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation and the Brussels I Regulation. In cases that the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
applies, the employer without a domicile, a branch, agency, or another establishment in the 
EU may be still sued on the basis of the special jurisdictional rules under Section of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation. Such an amendment was inserted into the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation.635 It means that if for example, a Russian employer concludes a jurisdiction 
agreement with the employee carrying out his work in France in favour of the Dutch court, the 
employee may sue the employer in a French court according to Article 21 par. 2 in 
conjunction with Article 21 par. 1 lett. b) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation or in the Dutch court 
according to Article 23 point 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.636  
This protection is not provided to the employee under the Brussels I Regulation. In case, that 
the employer without a domicile, a branch, agency, or another establishment in the EU is sued 
by the employee habitually carrying out his work in the EU, the Brussels I Regulation does 
                                                          
634 T. HARTLEY, Choice-of-Court Agreements under the European and International Instruments: The Revised 
Brussels I Regulation, the Lugano Convention, and the Hague Convention, op. cit., p. 280. 
635 See Article 6 par 1 and Article 21 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
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not apply since the defendant must be domiciled in the Member State to activate the special 
rules according to the Brussels Regulation. If a Russian supplier concludes a jurisdiction 
agreement with the consumer domiciled in France in favour of the Dutch court and the 
employee would be interested in seizing a French court, the choice-of-court agreement should 
be governed by Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation.637  
 
14. Lis Pendens Rule among the Member States 
The purpose of the rule on lis pendens according to the Brussels regime was to facilitate the 
proper administration of justice in the EU and to avoid the risk of conflicting judgments,638 by 
preventing parallel proceedings which have the potentiality to give rise to such judgments.639 
Article 21 of the Brussels Convention and Article 27 of the Brussels I Regulation required 
any Member State court other than the one first seized to stay its proceedings involving the 
same cause of action640 and between the same parties641 of its motion in favour of the first 
seized Member State court. This lis pendens rule was subject of the criticism due to its 
applicability to the jurisdiction agreements. It means that a second seized Member State court 
whose jurisdiction was claimed under a jurisdiction agreement nevertheless had to stay the 
proceedings until the Member State court first seized had declared lack of its jurisdiction. 
Although one exception as to the operation of lis pendens in relation to the exclusive 
                                                          
637 On the opposite result see T. HARTLEY, Choice-of-Court Agreements under the European and International 
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jurisdiction was admitted by the ECJ, 642 the proper application of “first seized lis pendens” 
rule was confirmed by the ECJ in C-116/02, Gasser in the context of jurisdiction agreements. 
MISAT, an Italian company, brought proceedings against Gasser, Austrian company before 
the Italian court, whereby six months after Gasser brought an action against MISAT before 
the Austrian court. According to Gasser, a jurisdiction clause in favour of the Austrian court 
was inserted into all invoices sent by Gasser to MISAT, without the latter having raised any 
objection. Such a jurisdiction agreement was constituted within the meaning of Article 17 of 
the Brussels Convention due to the usage prevailing in trade between Austria and Italy. The 
Austrian court asked the ECJ whether the existence of the jurisdiction clause allows non-
application of Article 21 of the Brussels Convention and whether it may render a judgment 
without waiting for a declaration from the court first seized stating that it has no 
jurisdiction.643  
The Government of the UK suggested answering in an affirmative way, supporting its 
argument with the interpretation provided by the ECJ in case C-351/89, Overseas Union 
Insurance, where the ECJ accepted that exclusive jurisdiction based on Article 16 of the 
Brussels Convention prevails over Article 21 of the Brussels Convention. Thus, the Member 
State court having exclusive jurisdiction could entertain the proceedings notwithstanding 
other first seized Member State court. It is worth mentioning that in this judgment the 
exclusive jurisdiction was not expressly distinguished between Article 16 and 17 of the 
Brussels Convention.644 In order to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments, the 
Government of the UK proposed to reverse the lis pendens rule in a way that a first seized 
Member State court whose jurisdiction is contested due to the jurisdiction agreement should 
stay proceedings until the designated second seized Member State court gives a decision on 
its own jurisdiction.645 Advocate General Léger suggested that a designated second seized 
Member State court may, by way of derogation from Article 21 of the Brussels Convention, 
give the judgment without waiting for a declaration from the (non-competent) first seized 
                                                          
642 ECJ, Case C-351/89, Overseas Union Insurance Ltd and Deutsche Ruck Uk Reinsurance Ltd and Pine Top 
Insurance Company Ltd v New Hampshire Insurance Company, 27 June 1991, ECLI:EU:C:1991:279. 
643 ECJ, Case C-116/02, Gasser, par. 26. 
644 For this possible assimilation with Article 17 of the Brussels Convention, see also ECJ, Case C-351/89, 
Overseas Union Insurance, Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven, 7 March 1991, ECLI:EU:C:1991:105, 
par. 13. 
645 ECJ, Case C-116/02, Gasser, par. 33. 
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Member State court where there are no doubts as to the jurisdiction of the designated Member 
State court.646 His solution tolerated the risk of parallel proceedings, whereby the risk of 
inconsistent judgments as regards the validity of a jurisdiction agreement would be reduced 
due to the strict formal conditions required by Article 17 of the Brussels Convention.647 
However, the ECJ did not accept the proposed solution and held that the parties always have 
the option to invoke the jurisdiction clause and the defendant has the option of entering an 
appearance before the Member State court first seized.648 The first seized Member State court 
must verify the existence of the agreement and decline jurisdiction if it is established 
according to Article 17 of the Brussels Convention.649 Legal certainty as to the jurisdiction 
clauses sought by the Brussels Convention and clear and precise rules in cases of lis pendens 
prevails.650 In consequence, a second seized Member State court whose jurisdiction has been 
claimed under a jurisdiction agreement must nevertheless stay proceedings until the Member 
State court first seized has declared that it has no jurisdiction.651 
The ECJ did not accept the suggestions of the Government of the UK to recognise an 
exception to Article 21 of the Brussels Convention also in relation to the proceedings brought 
in bad faith before a non-competent Member State court for the purpose of blocking 
proceedings.652 On the contrary, according to the ECJ, it would not be compatible with the 
Brussels Convention to respect rules on lis pendens only to assume that the Member State 
court first seized will give judgment within a reasonable period: the delays cannot be settled 
in the context of the Brussels Convention.653 
This judgment was called a shocking case 654 and was highly criticised.655 This interpretation 
gives a recalcitrant party the opportunity to seize a Member State court in breach of 
                                                          
646 ECJ, Case C-116/02, Gasser, Opinion of Advocate General Léger, 9 September 2003, par. 83. 
647 ECJ, Case C-116/02, Gasser, Opinion of Advocate General Léger, par. 80. 
648 ECJ, Case C-116/02, Gasser, par. 49. 
649 ECJ, Case C-116/02, Gasser, par. 49. 
650 ECJ, Case C-116/02, Gasser, par. 51. 
651 ECJ, Case C-116/02, Gasser, par. 54. 
652 ECJ, Case C-116/02, Gasser, par. 63. 
653 ECJ, Case C-116/02, Gasser, par. 68, 69. 
654 A. BRIGGS, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, op. cit.,, p. 276. 
655 See e.g., U. MAGNUS, P. MANKOWSKI, Brussels I on the Verge of Reform, A Response to the Green Paper on 
the Review of the Brussels I Regulation, ZVglRWissZeitschrift für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft 109 
(2010), p. 11; R. FENTIMAN, Case note on Case C-116/02 (Erich Gasser GmbH v. MISAT Srl), Common Market 
Law Review, 42 (2005), p. 255; P. BŘÍZA, Choice-of-court Agreements: Could the Hague Choice-of-court 
Agreements Convention and the Reform of the Brussels I Regulation be the way out of the Gasser-Owusu 
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jurisdiction agreement and prevent thus the institution of the proceedings before the 
designated Member State court. Therefore, the institution of the proceedings in front of the 
“slow” Member State court blocks the proceedings, which gives one party the tactical 
advantage. In consequence, this interpretation was often perceived as a legitimation of 
“Torpedo” actions,656 i.e., a mechanism to undermine a choice-of-court agreement.657 The 
other party, which suffered from the blocking of the proceedings, is often forced to settle.658 
Moreover, the institution of the proceedings in front of the non-designated Member State 
court could also result in the Member State court declining jurisdiction due to the prescriptive 
period laid down by the substantial law, which is identified by the rules of private 
international law of the designated Member State,659 or due to the evaluation of the 
jurisdiction agreement of the first seized Member State court as ineffective.660 In the latter 
case, the first seized Member State court may reach a solution on the merits, rather than the 
designated Member State court.661  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Disillusion, Journal of Private International Law, 5 (2009), p. 537; R. FENTIMAN, Parallel Proceedings and 
Jurisdiction Agreements in Europe, in P. DE VAREILLES-SOMMIÈRES (ed), Forum Shopping in the European 
Judicial Area, Hart Publishing, 2007, p. 27-54; R. FENTIMAN, Access to Justice and Parallel proceedings in 
Europe, Cambridge Law Journal, 63:2 (2004); A. NEIL, Abuse of process and obstructive tactics under the 
Brussels jurisdictional system: Unresolved problems for the European authorities Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT 
Srl Case C-116/02 (9 December 2003) and Turner v Grovit Case C-159/02 (27 April 2004), Zeitschrift für 
Gemeinschaftsprivatrecht, 2005, p. 8-15; L. G. RADICATI DI BROZOLO, Choice-of-court and arbitration 
agreements and the review of the Brussels I regulation, in IPRax, 30:2 (2010), p. 121 et seq. See also 
Questionnaire of the Heidelberg Report, the national report of the U.K. (questions III 3.1, 3.2, 3.3., 3.7); German 
national report (questions III 3.2 and 3.7); Greek report (Klamaris - 3rd questionnaire, 3.7); national report of the 
Netherlands (3rd questionnaire, 3.2); Austrian national report (3rd questionnaire, 3.7). See Heidelberg Report, 
para 438. See also House of Lords, European Union Committee, 21st Report of Session 2008–09, 27 July 2009, 
p. 18 
656 J. VLEK, Lis Pendens, Choice-of-court Agreements and Abuse of Law Under Brussels Ibis, Netherlands 
International Law Review 63: 297 (2016), p. 301. On the principle of abuse of right in context of Gasser case, 
see also A. NUYTS, The Enforcement of jurisdiction Agreements Further to Gasser and the Community Principle 
of Abuse of Right, in P. DE VAREILLES-SOMMIÈRES (ed.), Forum Shopping in the European Judicial Area, Hart 
Publishing, 2007, pp. 55 et seq. 
657 See M. FRANZOSI, Worldwide Patent Litigation and the Italian Torpedo, European Intellectual Property 
Review, 7:19 (1997), p. 384, where the author stressed the possibility that the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights could be paralysed by seizing the Member States with “slow-moving” jurisdictions. 
658 P. BŘÍZA, Volba práva a volba soudu v mezinárodním obchodě, op. cit., p. 541. 
659 P. FRANZINA, Successive Proceedings over the Same Cause of Action: A Plea for e New Rule on Dismissals 
for Lack of Jurisdiction, in F. POCAR, I. VIARENGO, F. C. VILLATA (eds.), Recasting Brussels I: Proceedings of 
the Conference Held at the University of Milan on 25-26 November 2011, CEDAM, 2012, p. 253-271; F. C. 
VILLATA, L’attuazione degli accordi di scelta del foro nel regolamento Bruxelles I, op. cit., p. 130. 
660 R. FENTIMAN, Parallel proceedings and Jurisdiction Agreements, in Forum shopping in European Judicial 
Area, op. cit., p. 41. 
661 R. FENTIMAN, Parallel proceedings and Jurisdiction Agreements, in Forum shopping in European Judicial 
Area, op. cit., p. 42. 
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The Gasser judgment, subsequent national judgments following the Gasser case,662 and the 
discussions on the possible solutions gave rise to the common purpose of improving the 
effectiveness of the choice-of-court agreements. In the Green Paper, main solutions were 
proposed. The first one corresponded to the solution proposed by the Advocate General Léger 
in the Gasser case when the designated Member State court would not be prevented from its 
obligation to stay proceedings under the lis pendens rule.663 However, in this case, parallel 
proceedings leading to irreconcilable judgments would be possible. The second proposed 
option corresponded to the solution proposed by the Government of the United Kingdom in 
the Gasser case, in particular, the priority rule would be reversed insofar as the designated 
Member State court would have priority to determine its jurisdiction, and any other Member 
State court seized would stay proceedings until the jurisdiction of the designated Member 
State court is established. Alternatively, the Commission proposed664 to: (i) maintain status 
quo, but to establish direct communication and cooperation between the seized Member State 
courts combined with deadlines and reports on the progress of the proceedings;665 (ii) grant 
damages for breach of jurisdiction agreements;666 (iii) exclude the application of the lis 
                                                          
662 JP Morgan Europe Ltd./ v. Primacom AG and Others, [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 665. Comm. It was a very 
disputable judgment of the English court that stayed proceedings, in the light of the Gasser case, since the 
German court was first seized in breach of a choice-of-court clause designating the English courts. 
663 Green Paper on the review of Council Regulation (EC) no 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, COM/2009/0175 final, 21 April 2009, p. 7. On 
support of this solution see House of Lords, European Union Committee, 21st Report of Session 2008–09, 27 
July 2009, p. 21. 
664 Green Paper on the review of Council Regulation (EC) no 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, COM/2009/0175 final, 21 April 2009, p. 7. See also 
other solutions proposed in R. FENTIMAN, Parallel proceedings and Jurisdiction Agreements, in Forum shopping 
in European Judicial Area, op. cit., p. 49-51. See also Commission staff working paper. Impact Assessment, 
Accompanying document to the Proposal for Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, (Recast), 
SEC(2010) 1547 final, 14 December 2010, p. 31, where according to the Commission, «Setting a deadline would 
be helpful to speed up proceedings in some countries where the judicial system is very slow but would not as 
such discourage abusive litigation in a non-competent court.». 
665 House of Lords, European Union Committee, 21st Report of Session 2008–09, 27 July 2009, p. 21, this 
solution was supported only to the certain extent – it might improve the situation, but it will still be essential to 
provide clear rules. See discussion against this solution: Opinion of the European Economic and Social 
Committee on the ‘Green Paper on the review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters’ COM (2009) 175 final, 22 
September 2010, point 4.7. 
666 House of Lords, European Union Committee, 21st Report of Session 2008–09, 27 July 2009, p. 21, such a 
solution was not supported due to «the Regulation’s general philosophy of non-interference by the courts of 
one State in the affairs of the courts of another State.». This option was not subsequently considered in the 
Commission staff working paper. Impact Assessment. Accompanying document to the Proposal for Regulation 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters, (Recast), SEC(2010) 1547 final, 14 December 2010, p. 31. 
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pendens rule in a situation where the parallel proceedings are proceedings on the merits, on 
the one hand and proceedings for declaratory relief, on the other hand,667 or at least to ensure a 
suspension of the running of limitation periods; and (iv) prescribe the standard choice-of-
court clause.668 
According to the Commission in the Impact Assessment, the last options have been discarded 
because they did not receive sufficient support from stakeholders. 669 The option concerning 
the exemption of the chosen court from the obligation to stay proceedings would, according to 
the Commission, limit the risk of abusive litigation. However, as stated above, it would create 
the risk of time and cost in parallel litigation and result in conflicting judgments “which the 
rules of the Regulation generally seek to avoid”.670 According to this Impact Assessment, 
7.7% of companies have faced a situation where their contractual counterpart did not respect 
the jurisdiction agreement and brought proceedings in a different Member State court. The 
risk of parallel proceedings resulting in conflicting outcomes would affect 1.5% of companies 
per year. In consequence, the option concerning the reverse priority rule was evaluated as the 
better solution since it “would eliminate the costs and delays which businesses incur today 
due to their partners’ bad faith attempts to circumvent choice-of-court agreements”.671 
                                                          
667 However, some procedural laws do not allow an action for negative declaratory relief, e.g. in Ireland, see Irish 
National Report (3rd questionnaire, 3.7), Heidelberg Report. This proposal was discarded by the Commission 
since: «Stakeholders also pointed out that this option would not be in line with the solution adopted by the 
Hague Choice-of-court Convention. It was therefore decided not to pursue it further.», see Commission staff 
working paper. Impact Assessment. Accompanying document to the Proposal for Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters, (Recast), SEC (2010) 1547 final, 14 December 2010, p. 31. 
668 See e.g. Heidelberg Report, para 451: «[Party 1] and [Party 2] agree that the courts of [Member State] have 
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine any suit, action or proceeding, and to settle any dispute or disputes 
which may arise out of or in connection with the [Agreement], including, without limitation, a dispute or 
disputes regarding existence, validity, termination, authority to conclude the agreement, or the consequences of 
nullity.». See also House of Lords, European Union Committee, 21st Report of Session 2008–09, 27 July 2009, 
p. 21, it was opposed to such proposal since: «Parties are likely to prefer to draft their own agreements, suitable 
to their particular circumstances…». Against this solution see: Opinion of the European Economic and Social 
Committee on the ‘Green Paper on the review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters’ COM (2009) 175 final, 22 
September 2010, point 4.8.1. This option was not subsequently considered in the Commission staff working 
paper. Impact Assessment, Accompanying document to the Proposal for Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters, (Recast), SEC(2010) 1547 final, 14 December 2010, p. 31. 
669 Commission staff working paper. Impact Assessment. Accompanying document to the Proposal for 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters, (Recast), SEC(2010) 1547 final, 14 December 2010, p. 31. 
670 Ibidem, p. 33. 
671 Ibidem, p. 33. 
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Subsequently, the Commission proposed the new lis pendens rule concerning exclusive 
jurisdiction agreements, which provided:  
With the exception of agreements governed by Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this Chapter, where 
an agreement referred to in Article 23 confers exclusive jurisdiction to a court or the 
courts of a Member State, the courts of other Member States shall have no jurisdiction 
over the dispute until such time as the court or courts designated in the agreement decline 
their jurisdiction.672 
 This wording was very doubtful: new Article 32 par. 2 of the Proposal did not require the 
non-chosen Member State court to stay its proceedings, but this wording provided “shall have 
no jurisdiction”. This wording seemed to require the non-designated Member State court to be 
obliged to declare that it has no jurisdiction, and to dismiss the claim whatever the designated 
Member State court would have decided.673 
 
14.1. Lis Pendens Rule according to Article 31 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
The wording of the current lis pendens rule in relation to the jurisdiction agreement according 
to the Brussels Ibis Regulation has clarified some of the criticised aspects. Article 31 par. 2, 3, 
and 4 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation must be read in conjunction with new Recital 22 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation.674 Article 31 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation gives priority to 
the Member State court designated in an exclusive agreement, as referred to in Article 25, to 
decide on the validity of the exclusive jurisdiction agreement and to determine its jurisdiction 
in proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the same parties. The first 
seized non-designated Member State court must stay its proceedings until such time as the 
subsequently seized chosen Member State court declares that it has no jurisdiction under the 
jurisdiction agreement. Article 31 par. 3 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation then specifies that 
once the designated Member State court has established jurisdiction in accordance with the 
                                                          
672 See new Article 32 of the Proposal for a Recast of the Brussels I Regulation. 
673 C. HEINZE, Choice-of-court agreements, coordination of proceedings and provisional measures in the reform 
of the Brussels I regulation, op. cit., p. 585; U. Magnus, Choice-of-court Agreements in the Review Proposal for 
the Brussels I Regulation, in The Brussels I Review Proposal Uncovered, p. 96; A. DICKINSON, The Proposal for 
a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast), op. cit., p. 19-20. 
674 Although as stated by ECJ, the Articles prevail over recitals, see ECJ, Case C-346/88, Schweizerische Lactina 
Panchaud AG v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft, 14 December 1989, ECLI:EU:C:1989:653; C-
308/97, Giuseppe Manfredi v Regione Puglia, 25 November 1998, ECLI:EU:C:1998:566. 
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jurisdiction agreement, any Member State court shall decline jurisdiction in favour of that 
Member State court. Recital 22 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation then clarifies that the 
designated Member State court can proceed without waiting for the decision of the non-
designated Member State court to stay its proceedings.  
The wording of the Brussels Ibis Regulation leaves several questions regarding the operation 
of this new lis pendens rule, regarding the fulfilment of the conditions of the non-chosen 
Member State court before staying its proceedings and regarding the effects of this 
determination on the designated Member State court. 
 
14.1.1. Review of the Choice-of-Court Agreement 
The wording of Article 31 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation provides for two 
prerequisites in respect of the non-chosen Member State court’s obligation to stay its 
proceedings: (i) the other Member State court is seized; and (ii) such a Member State court is 
the chosen under an exclusive jurisdiction clause according to Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation.  
In case that the proceedings are pending in front of both Member State courts, as required in 
Article 31 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, difficulty arises in the context of its 
imprecise wording regarding to what extent (if at all) the exclusive jurisdiction clause may be 
reviewed by the non-designated Member State court, according to Article 25 of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation. The question of the review was one of the most controversial points during 
the preparatory works on the Recast.675 Three possible approaches to this issue may be 
available:676 
i) No review 
It is debatable if the non-chosen Member State court does not need to make any determination 
that an exclusive jurisdiction agreement has been concluded. In such a case, it would suffice 
                                                          
675 C. HEINZE, B. STEINROTTER, The Revised Lis Pendens Rules in the Brussels Ibis Regulation, in S. STUIJ, V. 
LAZIĆ (eds), Brussels Ibis Regulation: Changes and Challenges of the Renewed Procedural Scheme, Springer, 
2017, p. 14. 
676 On the division see J. VLEK, Lis Pendens, Choice-of-court Agreements and Abuse of Law Under Brussels 
Ibis, op. cit., p. 308; I. BERGSON, The death of the torpedo action? The practical operation of the Recast's 
reforms to enhance the protection for exclusive jurisdiction agreements within the European Union, Journal of 
Private International Law, 11:1 (2015), p. 7. 
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to assert the existence of the jurisdiction clause.677 However, at least the non-chosen Member 
State court should examine whether there is an exclusive jurisdiction agreement, as suggested 
in Recital 22 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, which provides that the new lis pendens rule 
does not apply where the parties have concluded conflicting exclusive choice-of-court 
agreements, where the general lis pendens rules of the Brussels Ibis Regulation applies. 
Moreover, paragraph 4 of Article 31 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation provides that this new lis 
pendens rule according to Article 31 par. 2 and 3 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is not 
applicable in respect of the policyholder, the insured, a beneficiary of the insurance contract, 
the injured party, the consumer, or the employee as the claimant when the jurisdiction 
agreement is not valid under a provision contained within Sections 3, 4, or 5 of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation. This exception from the “reverse lis pendens rule” is justified by the fact that 
those sections include the provisions aimed at protecting the weaker party by providing an 
exhaustive list of the Member States to have jurisdiction. This exception should be applicable 
also for any ground of the exclusive jurisdiction according to Article 24 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation, although it is not expressed in Article 31 par. 4 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.678 
It means that the seized non-chosen Member State court must, at least, ascertain whether the 
jurisdiction agreement is exclusive and should examine the validity of the choice-of-court 
agreements in respect to sections 3 to 6 of Chapter 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.  
This approach could result in a “reverse torpedo” since it would open the door to the abusive 
litigation tactics when the defendant seeking to avoid a dispute being litigated in a seized 
forum, would assert that there is a choice-of-court agreement in favour of other Member State 
court, and the defendant would bring proceedings in the putatively chosen Member State 
                                                          
677 Such an approach was suggested by A. DICKINSON, The Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters (Recast), op. cit., p. 34, providing that: «The courts of Member State whose jurisdiction is 
contested on the ground that the parties have agreed that the court or courts of another Member State have 
exclusive jurisdiction under Article 23(1) shall … stay proceedings once the Member State court or courts which 
are claimed to have been chosen are seized of proceedings to determine, as their main object or as an incidental 
question, the existence, validity or effects of the choice-of-court agreement with respect to the dispute between 
the parties.». 
678 M. WELLER, Choice of Forum Agreements under the Brussels I Recast and under the Hague Convention: 
Coherences and Clashes, op. cit., p. 27. 
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court.679 The reverse lis pendens rule based on the no review from the non-chosen Member 
State court would drawback the advantage of this new mechanism. 
ii) Entire Review 
In this case, the opposite approach is concerned for the non-chosen Member State court. Such 
a Member State court would thoroughly review the existence and the validity of the 
jurisdiction agreement in the same way as the designated Member State court by virtue of 
Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. On the basis of this evaluation, the non-chosen 
Member State court would decide on its stay. Although the wording of Article 31 par. 2 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation states “conferring” exclusive jurisdiction agreement, it might 
indicate a full review approach by the first seized non-chosen Member State court.680 On the 
contrary, this approach seems to contravene to the wording of Recital 22 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation providing that “…the designated court has priority to decide on the validity of the 
agreement and on the extent to which the agreement applies to the dispute pending before it.“. 
In other words, the non-designated Member State is not entitled to decide as to the validity of 
the jurisdiction clause. Moreover, the purpose of Article 31 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation is to grant priority to the chosen Member State court to determinate whether it has 
jurisdiction. It is difficult to find the rationae to grant to the second seized designated 
Member State court the priority to decide when the first seized Member State court could 
conduct such a complete investigation. 
The disadvantage of the full review approach is represented by more financial resources and 
more time than a limited review. In order to prevent the time-consuming blocking of the 
proceedings, Article 31 par. 2 preferred to tolerate parallel proceedings for a limited period. 
However, under a full review, there is a much more significant probability that the parallel 
proceedings would take place, and the non-designated Member State court could determine 
more easily the invalidity of the jurisdiction agreements.681 Suppose that the non-chosen 
                                                          
679 T. HARTLEY, The "“Italian torpedo"” and choice-of-court agreements: sunk at last?, in P. LINDSKOUG (ed), 
Essays in Honour of Michael Bogdan, Juristförlaget, 2013, p. 95, 100; J. VLEK, Lis Pendens, Choice-of-court 
Agreements and Abuse of Law Under Brussels Ibis, op. cit., p. 308; I. BERGSON, The death of the torpedo 
action? The practical operation of the Recast's reforms to enhance the protection for exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements within the European Union, op. cit., p. 8. 
680 M. WELLER, Choice of Forum Agreements under the Brussels I Recast and under the Hague Convention: 
Coherences and Clashes, op. cit., p. 27. 
681 M. WELLER, Choice of Forum Agreements under the Brussels I Recast and under the Hague Convention: 
Coherences and Clashes, op. cit., p. 29. 
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Member State court would make a full review of the existence and validity of the jurisdiction 
agreement, and the designated Member State court would be able to proceed irrespective of 
whether the non-designated court has already decided on the stay of proceedings by virtue of 
Recital 22 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.682 Such a situation would quickly lead to parallel 
proceedings and might result in a race to judgment683 or even in the irreconcilable judgments. 
Or, if the non-chosen Member State court would decide as the first on the invalidity of the 
choice-of-court agreement, the judgment as to the merits would be recognisable and 
enforceable throughout Chapter III of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, as well as the interim 
judgment as to the validity of the jurisdiction agreement in light of the Gothaer684 case. 
iii) Prima facie review 
If the previous two options cannot be accepted due to the reasons specified above, logically a 
compromise should be considered. In this case, it would be required by the non-chosen 
Member State court to stay its proceedings once it is satisfied that there is some evidence that 
a jurisdiction agreement exists. This solution was already proposed in 2008 by Professor 
Fentiman. According to his opinion, the mere allegation that the jurisdiction agreement exists 
would be insufficient.685 In consequence, a stay would be granted on the basis of prima facie 
evidence as to the existence of the jurisdiction agreement. However, does it mean the review 
prima facie concerning the existence of the jurisdiction agreement, or also concerning 
“manifestly” invalid jurisdiction agreement?686 The ECJ has recognised that the Brussels 
Convention does not govern the standard of proof. Thus, the evidence must be adduced by a 
claimant before a national court in order to enable to decide on the merits of the case.687 It 
means that this approach could bring a problem of inconsistent application in the Member 
States, introducing a new category of jurisdiction agreement as the “evidently valid” or 
                                                          
682 This was the ratio of the original proposal which involved tolerating parallel proceedings, see Heidelberg 
Report, par. 388 et seq. 
683 C. HEINZE, Choice-of-court agreements, coordination of proceedings and provisional measures in the reform 
of the Brussels I regulation, op. cit., p. 593. 
684 ECJ, Case C-456/11, Gothaer Allgemeine Versicherung AG et al v Sampskip, 15 November 2012, 
EU:C:2012:719. 
685 R. FENTIMAN, Parallel proceedings and Jurisdiction Agreements, in Forum shopping in European Judicial 
Area, op. cit., p. 51. 
686 M. WELLER, Choice of Forum Agreements under the Brussels I Recast and under the Hague Convention: 
Coherences and Clashes, op. cit., p. 29. 
687 ECJ, C-68/93, Fiona Shevill, Ixora Trading Inc., Chequepoint SARL and Chequepoint International Ltd v 
Presse Alliance SA, 7 March 1995, ECLI:EU:C:1995:61, par. 37-39, in the context of determining jurisdiction 
under Article 7 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
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“prima facie existent” jurisdiction agreements, which can lead to uncertainty and divergent 
opinions between the Member States courts.688 It is difficult to predict whether the ECJ will 
develop any standard to be applied by all Member States for ensuring a uniform approach to 
the interpretation of Article 31 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation and for minimising the 
potential for inconsistent decisions between the non-designated and designated Member State 
court. 
The question also arises whether there is any distinction between the existence and validity of 
the jurisdiction clause according to Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.689 Since Recital 
22 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation provides that the designated Member State court has 
priority to decide on the validity of the jurisdiction clause and on the extent to which the 
jurisdiction agreement applies to the dispute, such wording indicates that the first seized non-
designated court should ascertain only the existence of the jurisdiction clause. Such existence 
would be proven by the submission of the evidence as to the existence of jurisdiction clauses, 
such as presenting copies of the agreement or direct communication between the courts would 
be possible.690 In consequence, the first seized Member State could examine the jurisdiction 
clause only as to its existence, exclusivity, and validity in respect to sections 3 to 6 of Chapter 
2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.  
The second sub-approach could also concern prima facie review as to the “manifestly invalid” 
choice-of-court agreement. It was suggested by some scholars to find an answer in formal 
requirements of the jurisdiction agreement according to Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation.691 This standard of review could use as a model by virtue of Article 23 par. 3 of 
the Brussels I Regulation, which was abolished, once the domicile of the parties to the 
                                                          
688 On this critique see C. HEINZE, Choice-of-court agreements, coordination of proceedings and provisional 
measures in the reform of the Brussels I regulation, op. cit., p. 593. 
689 I. BERGSON, The death of the torpedo action? The practical operation of the Recast's reforms to enhance the 
protection for exclusive jurisdiction agreements within the European Union, op. cit., p. 12, 13. 
690 C. HEINZE, B. STEINROTTER, The Revised Lis Pendens Rules in the Brussels Ibis Regulation, in Brussels Ibis 
Regulation: Changes and Challenges of the Renewed Procedural Scheme, op. cit., p. 20. Professor Garcimartin 
considers the information from the parties as sufficient, see F. GARCIMARTIN, Chapter 9 - Article 25, in The 
Brussels I Regulation Recast, op. cit., par. 11.52. 
691 C. HEINZE, B. STEINROTTER, The Revised Lis Pendens Rules in the Brussels Ibis Regulation, in Brussels Ibis 
Regulation: Changes and Challenges of the Renewed Procedural Scheme, op. cit., p. 20; M. WELLER, Choice of 
Forum Agreements under the Brussels I Recast and under the Hague Convention: Coherences and Clashes, op. 
cit., p. 29. 
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jurisdiction agreement outside the EU was no longer relevant.692 This provision stating “such 
an agreement“ had supported the view that the jurisdiction agreement had to be upheld if the 
formal requirements were met.693 However, also, in this case, a risk of abuse may appear if the 
jurisdiction agreements were concluded in a form which accords with the practices which 
have parties have established according to Article 25 par. 1 lett. b) or in a form according to 
international trade usage as specifies in Article 25 par. 1 lett. c) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation. According to this sub-approach, the second seized designated Member State 
would verify all issues governed by its law.694 
 
14.1.2. Coordination between the Member State Courts  
Before to move out with the considerations on the possible scenarios, the ECJ case C-456/11 
Gothaer must be briefly introduced. The dispute concerned a German claimant and four 
German insurance companies who engaged another German subsidiary of the company to 
deliver brewing installation to a Mexican purchaser. The action for compensation was brought 
in the Belgian courts. The Belgian courts had dismissed a claim as inadmissible since the bill 
of lading contained a jurisdiction clause stating that any dispute arising thereunder was to be 
decided by Icelandic courts. Consequently, the insurers brought an action for compensation 
against in front of the German courts. The German court observed that the actions were 
inadmissible due to the judgment of Belgian court which produces legal effects not only in 
relation to the Belgian courts’ lack of jurisdiction but also in relation to the jurisdiction of the 
Icelandic courts. According to the ECJ, Article 32 of the Brussels I Regulation covers a 
judgment by which the Member State court declines jurisdiction on the basis of a jurisdiction 
clause, irrespective of categorisation of the judgment according to the national law, extending 
its effect also to ratio decidendi (i.e., validity of the jurisdiction agreement).695 Therefore, 
                                                          
692 M. WELLER, Choice of Forum Agreements under the Brussels I Recast and under the Hague Convention: 
Coherences and Clashes, op. cit., p. 29 
693 However, only the national rules including the conflict-of-laws rules had regulated the formal validity, since 
the Brussels I Regulation did not cover the choice-of-court agreements “from outside“, see U. MAGNUS, Article 
23, in Brussels I Regulation, 2012, op. cit., p. 464. 
694 M. WELLER, Choice of Forum Agreements under the Brussels I Recast and under the Hague Convention: 
Coherences and Clashes, op. cit., p. 30. 
695 In this regards, see E. D’ALESSANDRO, L’influenza esercitata dal diritto nazionale nell’elaborazione di 
concetti ‘europei’ad opera della Corte di giustizia. Il caso Gothaer, Scritti dedicati a Maurizio Converso, Roma 
tre Press, 2016, pp. 142-146, where the author analyzes three alternatives of the objective limits of the efficacy 
of the declinatory decisions, when the Gothaer case inspired by the French concept. 
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other Member State courts are bound by the finding of such a final judgment regarding the 
validity of the jurisdiction clause. The ECJ did not make any distinction drawn according to 
the content of the judgment according to Article 32 of the Brussels I Regulation.696 It justified 
its interpretation on mutual trust, which would be undermined if a Member State court refuses 
to recognise a judgment by which a court of another Member State declined jurisdiction on 
the basis of a jurisdiction clause and such a refusal would be liable to compromise the 
effective operation of the rules on the distribution of jurisdiction. The ECJ refused to create a 
category of judicial decisions which are not among the exhaustively listed exceptions set out 
in Articles 34 and 35 of the Brussels I Regulation which are not entitled to recognition.  
i) Single Proceedings in front of the Non-Chosen Member State Court 
In order to activate the mechanism of lis pendens according to Article 31 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation, the proceedings must be pending in both the designated and the non-designated 
Member State court. And, as Recital 22 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation specifies, the 
designated Member State court must be second seized. The seized non-designated Member 
State court may rule on its jurisdiction and on the validity of the jurisdiction agreements as 
long as the designated Member State court is not seized.697 There is no time limit for the 
institution of the proceedings in the designated Member State court, which might create 
specific room for abuse. It is questionable whether the non-designated Member State court 
should set a time limit according to its national procedural rules.698 For example, the time limit 
could be set by the non-designated Member State court when the defendant enters an 
appearance to contest the jurisdiction of such a Member State court.699  
Such a decision is then capable of recognition and enforcement. The ECJ did not distinguish 
the issue on merits and the issue of jurisdiction in the case C-456/11, Gothaer. As a 
consequence, once the Member State court had decided on the validity of the jurisdiction 
clause, the other Member State courts are bound by the outcome.700 This has the practical 
                                                          
696 Case C-456/11, Gothaer, par. 23. 
697 A. NUYTS, La refonte du règlement Bruxelles I, Revue Critique de Droit International Privé, (2013), p. 56; 
Garcimartín, Chapter 9 - Article 25, in The Brussels I Regulation Recast, p. 339; J. VLEK, Lis Pendens, Choice-
of-court Agreements and Abuse of Law Under Brussels Ibis, op. cit., p. 305. 
698 On the positive response see M. WELLER, Choice of Forum Agreements under the Brussels I Recast and 
under the Hague Convention: Coherences and Clashes, op. cit., p. 25 and footnote No 109. 
699 M. WELLER, Choice of Forum Agreements under the Brussels I Recast and under the Hague Convention: 
Coherences and Clashes, op. cit., p. 25 
700 Case C-456/11, Gothaer, par. 23 and 33 
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consequence to the other party - he is forced to litigate in front of the designated Member 
State court in order to trigger a stay in the first seized Member State court and in order to 
prevent res iudicata as to the merits,701 as well as to the validity of the jurisdiction clause.702 
ii) Parallel Proceedings 
As stated above, the lis pendens rule according to Article 31 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation applies when the non-chosen Member State court is first seized, and the 
designated Member State is second seized under an exclusive jurisdiction clause according to 
Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. It is helpful to imagine one practical scenario: 
Party X and party Y concluded an exclusive jurisdiction agreement in favour of the Czech courts. 
Party X brought an action in front of the Italian courts. Eight months after, party Y brought an 
action in front of the Czech courts. 
 
A) The designated Member State issues a judgment prior to any decision by the non-
designated Member State court 
A1) Valid Choice-of-Court Agreement 
Pursuant to Article 31 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the Czech court is no longer obliged to 
stay its proceedings and will determine the existence and validity of the jurisdiction clause. It may 
happen that the Czech court will be quicker in issuing a preliminary ruling on its jurisdiction or 
even as to merits, than the Italian court when deciding to stay its proceedings. The decision of the 
Czech court is capable of recognition, as to the merits according to Chapter III of Brussels Ibis 
Regulation, as well as to its jurisdiction by virtue of the Gothaer judgment. The Italian court shall 
decline jurisdiction in favour of the Czech court according to Article 31 par. 3 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation. In such a case, the risk of a torpedo action is significantly reduced since the Czech 
courts did not have to wait for the decision of the Italian court. 
 
                                                          
701 There were also proposals to make unenforceable any judgment obtained in breach of the jurisdiction 
agreements. However, such proposal was not adopted. See R. FENTIMAN, Parallel proceedings and Jurisdiction 
Agreements, in Forum shopping in European Judicial Area, op. cit., p. 49. 
702 R. FENTIMAN, Article 31, in Brussels I Bis Regulation, 2016, op. cit., p. 752. 
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A2) Invalid Choice-of-Court Agreement 
However, what will happen if the Czech court finds the jurisdiction agreement invalid?  
We may presume that although the Czech court finds the jurisdiction agreement invalid, it has 
jurisdiction pursuant to other grounds of jurisdiction according to the Brussels Ibis Regulation. This 
situation is not expressly dealt with in the Brussels Ibis Regulation, but the wording of Article 31 
par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation providing “…it has no jurisdiction under the agreement” 
suggests that the Czech court has priority only to establish its jurisdiction according to the 
jurisdiction agreement.703 In such a case, the “first seized lis pendens” should apply and the Italian 
court will be entitled to decide first. In consequence, a Czech decision on its invalidity will bound 
the Italian court by virtue of the Gothaer judgment. Moreover, the “first seized lis pendens” rule 
according to Article 29 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation will be activated.704 Thus, the Italian court 
will be entitled to decide on its jurisdiction, and the Czech court will stay its proceeding. The role of 
the courts is, in this case, reversed. If the Italian court establishes its jurisdiction, the Czech court 
                                                          
703 M. WELLER, Choice of Forum Agreements under the Brussels I Recast and under the Hague Convention: 
Coherences and Clashes, op. cit., p. 26; I. BERGSON, The death of the torpedo action? The practical operation of 
the Recast's reforms to enhance the protection for exclusive jurisdiction agreements within the European Union, 
op. cit., p. 27. 
704 M. WELLER, Choice of Forum Agreements under the Brussels I Recast and under the Hague Convention: 
Coherences and Clashes, op. cit., p. 26. 
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shall decline jurisdiction in favour of the Italian court according to Article 29 par. 3 of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation. In case the Italian court determines it lacks jurisdiction, the Czech court will be 
entitled to decide its jurisdiction according to other grounds laid down in the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation.  
 
B) The non-designated Member State court stays its proceedings 
B1) Valid Choice-of-Court Agreement 
This scenario concerns another situation: when the Italian court stays its proceedings after making a 
prima facie evaluation of the existence (and maybe the prima facie validity) of the jurisdiction 
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clause before the Czech court considers its jurisdiction. The preliminary evaluation on the existence 
(and maybe the prima facie validity) of the Italian court will not bind the Czech court in its 
determination of the jurisdiction clause. If the Czech court establishes its jurisdiction in accordance 
with the jurisdiction agreement, the Italian court shall decline jurisdiction in favour of Czech court 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B2) Invalid Choice-of-Court Agreement 
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In case of a ruling of the Czech court on the invalidity of the jurisdiction agreement, the 
scenario will be almost the same as in point A2) above. 
 
C) Non-Chosen Member State Court Does Not Stay 
This last scenario case seems to be more problematic. It concerns a case when the Italian court 
prima facie finds that the jurisdiction agreement does not exist or is “manifestly invalid”. 
What effect does this have on the designated Member State court? 
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C1) No Disagreement on the Invalidity of the Choice-of-Court Agreements between the 
designated and the non-designated Member State Court 
It is unlikely that the Czech court and the Italian court give conflicting results. In case that Czech 
and Italian court find the jurisdiction agreement as invalid, the Czech court will decide on its lack of 
jurisdiction concerning the jurisdiction agreement which will bind the Italian court by virtue of 
Gothaer case. Even although the Italian court would decide first on the invalidity of the jurisdiction 
agreement, such a decision will bind the Czech court by virtue of Gothaer case. In any case, there is 
no discrepancy in relation to this issue between the Member State courts. Subsequently, the Italian 
court may conduct its proceedings according to “first seized” lis pendens rule in Article 29 par. 1 of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation. Subsequently, the scenario may continue as described under point A2). 
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C2) Disagreement on the Invalidity of the Choice-of-Court Agreements between the 
designated and the non-designated Member State Court 
However, what would happen if the Italian court finds the jurisdiction agreement invalid and 
the Czech court valid? Such a situation cannot be excluded and is even more probable if the 
Italian court decides to apply the “full review” approach. It is likely that the “full review” of 
the jurisdiction clause may be provided by the non-designated Member State court when the 
designated Member State court is seized a long time after its institution.705 Until then, the first 
non-designated Member State court was the only seized court (e.g., for 1 year) and might 
examine the validity of the jurisdiction clause.  
The Brussels Ibis Regulation does not tackle the possibility of disagreement between two 
seized Member State courts, which may be perceived as a lacuna. The problem arises when 
both seized Member State courts decide their jurisdiction when the Recital 22 of the Brussel 
bis Regulation states that the designated Member State court should be able to proceed, 
irrespective of whether the non-designated Member State court has already decided whether 
to stay its proceedings.  
When we go back to our example: 
Both Member State courts will proceed according to Article 31 par. 2 in conjunction with Recital 22 
of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. The Italian court reaches its decision first on the inexistence or 
invalidity of the jurisdiction clause.706 In such a case, the decision of the Italian court will bind the 
Czech court707 by virtue of the Gothaer judgment. Subsequently, the Italian court would have the 
door open to proceed according to Article 29 par. 1 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, since in case of 
invalidity of the jurisdiction agreement, it is the first seized court. Such a situation results in a 
                                                          
705 See M. WELLER, Choice of Forum Agreements under the Brussels I Recast and under the Hague Convention: 
Coherences and Clashes, op. cit., p. 26, where the author suggests that once the designated Member State court 
is seized, the non-designated Member State court should reduce the standard of review from a full review of the 
jurisdiction agreement to the reduced standard. 
706 See M. WELLER, Choice of Forum Agreements under the Brussels I Recast and under the Hague Convention: 
Coherences and Clashes, op. cit., p. 26. According to the author’s opinion, preliminary ruling on the invalidity 
of the jurisdiction agreements issued before the designated Member State court is violation of Article 31 par. 2 of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation. However, there is no support in the wording in Article 31 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation providing for the obligation of the non-designated Member State court to wait for the decision of the 
designated Member State court. 
707 On the opinion that the chosen Member State court should recognise the decision of the non-chosen court, see 
C. HEINZE, B. STEINROTTER, The Revised Lis Pendens Rules in the Brussels Ibis Regulation, in Brussels Ibis 
Regulation: Changes and Challenges of the Renewed Procedural Scheme, op. cit., p. 22. 
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nondesirable race to a decision. Professor Dickinson has already noted the loophole during the 
preparatory works of the Commission when the objectives could be frustrated if the non-designated 
Member State court makes a preliminary ruling on the invalidity of the jurisdiction clause.708 It 
might seem to be ironic to introduce the new rule giving the designated Member State court the 
priority to decide, but at the end of the day, the designated Member State court is bound by the 
decision of the non-designated Member State court. For example, the opposite conclusion may be 
defended by the fact that the preliminary ruling of the non-designated Member State concerns the 
non-existence, not the invalidity of the jurisdiction agreement, as was held in Gothaer case.709 
However, such a conclusion cannot succeed, when there is no consensus on the extent of the review 
on the jurisdiction agreement provided by the non-designated Member State court. Other arguments 
for non-recognition of the preliminary ruling on invalidity (or non-existence) of the jurisdiction 
agreement may be deduced from the textual wording of Recital 22 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
when it states that the designated Member State court “should be able to proceed irrespective of 
whether the non-designated court has already decided on the stay of proceedings.” (emphasis 
added). A broad interpretation may cover any decision of the non-designated Member State court, 
which does not bind the designated Member State court and the designated Member State court can 
direct to its own judgment.710 However, the Gothaer judgment confirmed that any category of the 
decisions, which are not susceptible to enforcement that is not provided in the exhaustively-listed 
exceptions in Article 45 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, cannot be created.711  
                                                          
708 A. DICKINSON, The Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction 
and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast), op. cit., p. 20. 
709 I. BERGSON, The death of the torpedo action? The practical operation of the Recast's reforms to enhance the 
protection for exclusive jurisdiction agreements within the European Union, op. cit., p. 19. 
710 On this consideration see: I. BERGSON, The death of the torpedo action? The practical operation of the 
Recast's reforms to enhance the protection for exclusive jurisdiction agreements within the European Union, op. 
cit., p. 19. 
711 Case C-456/11, Gothaer, par. 31. 
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14.1.3. Other Uncertainties arising out of the Application of the New Lis Pendens Rule 
a) Non-Exclusive and Asymmetric Choice-of-Court Agreements and Lis 
Pendens 
The new lis pendens rule represents an exception to the general lis pendens rule and is 
applicable only with respect to the exclusive jurisdiction clauses. 712 The general lis pendens 
rule on the non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses and conflicting exclusive choice-of-court 
clauses shall apply. The first problem concerns the interpretation of the “conflicting exclusive 
choice-of-court agreements”. Maybe it is the jurisdiction clause of Meeth v. Glacetal case, 
when the parties designate one exclusive jurisdiction for each party with the exclusion of all 
otherwise competent courts for each party, subsumed under the term of “conflicting exclusive 
choice-of-court agreements”? It was already stated that such jurisdiction must be classified as 
exclusive choice-of-court agreements. 713 Professor Nuyts suggested that Recital 22 addresses 
the problem of the battle of forms when each party invokes its own standard terms including 
different jurisdiction clauses.714 The Council of the European Union inserted this Recital 
without further explanation.715 It might be perceived that Meeth v. Glacetal does not enter into 
the categorisation of the “conflicting exclusive choice-of-court agreements” when once a 
court is seized under Meeth v. Glacetal clause, this clause becomes uniquely exclusive.716 This 
interpretation can be upheld when the first seized Member State court is none of the 
designated Member State courts and the second seized court is one of the designated Member 
State courts. On the other hand, when both “exclusively designated” Member State courts are 
seized, it logically follows that the “first seized” lis pendens should be applied instead. 
Moreover, whether the jurisdiction agreement is evaluated as exclusive or non-exclusive, is a 
question of the construction of the jurisdiction clause and is left to the national law.717 If we 
                                                          
712 See Recital 22 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation and Article 29 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation providing that: 
«Without prejudice to Article 31(2)…». 
713 On this conclusion see M. KEYES, B. A. MARSHALL, Jurisdiction agreements: exclusive, optional and 
asymmetrical, op. cit., p. 351, 352. 
714 A. NUYTS, La refonte du règlement Bruxelles I, op. cit., p. 16, 53. On the same approach see Q. FORNER-
DELAYGUA, Changes to jurisdiction based on exclusive jurisdiction agreements under the Brussels I Regulation 
Recast, op. cit., p. 386. 
715 The Presidency of the Council of the European Union, Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters, Draft Recitals, 10711/12, 2010/0383 (COD), 6 June 2012, p. 8. 
716 M. KEYES, B. A. MARSHALL, Jurisdiction agreements: exclusive, optional and asymmetrical, op. cit., p. 359. 
717 A. BRIGGS, P. REES, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgements, 2009, op. cit., par. 2.126. 
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presume that the national law considers the Rothschild jurisdiction agreement as valid, the 
problem of evaluating asymmetric jurisdiction clauses as to the “exclusivity” or the 
“conflicting exclusivity” of the Rothschild jurisdiction clause comes into play in the context 
of the application of lis pendens rule according to Article 31 par. 2 by virtue of Recital 22 of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation. As said in Section 10.2. of this Subchapter, the jurisdiction 
clause is exclusive from the perspective of one party but non-exclusive from the perspective 
of another party. We may imagine a scenario where the parties conclude an agreement 
conferring jurisdiction to the French court, but the other party (e.g., a bank) has right to sue in 
front of any other Member State court having jurisdiction according to the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation.  
For instance, the borrower could sue the bank in Spanish court and the bank then seizes the 
French court, or any other Member State court having jurisdiction according to the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation. In such a case Article 31 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation would provide 
a protection for the “exclusive jurisdiction agreement for one party”, that might be affected by 
application of the Gasser case.718 Article 31 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation could be 
therefore engaged in the situation when the counterparty (often borrower) sues the beneficiary 
in front of the Member State court other than designated on the basis of its “exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement”.719 Such a conclusion may occur only in the Member States which 
considered such jurisdiction agreements as valid and exclusive from the perspective of one 
side. However, if the first seized Member State court considers the jurisdiction agreement to 
be invalid or non-exclusive, and the second seized designated Member State court considers it 
to be valid and exclusive, both courts could simultaneously assume their jurisdiction 
according to Article 29 par. 1 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation and according to Article 31 par. 
2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
 
b) Temporal Application of Lis Pendens 
A second unresolved situation concerns the temporal application. As stated in Section 3.2. of 
this Subchapter, the Brussels Ibis Regulation applies to the legal proceedings instituted on or 
                                                          
718 On similar considerations see R. FENTIMAN, Article 31, in Brussels I Bis Regulation, 2016, op. cit., p. 753. 
719 On a similar conclusion see R. FENTIMAN, Article 31, in Brussels I Bis Regulation, 2016, op. cit., p. 753. 
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after 10 January 2015.720 Moreover, the saving provision states that the Brussels I Regulation 
continues to apply to the proceedings instituted before 10 January 2015.721 However, the 
transitional provisions of the Brussels Ibis Regulation do not tackle the struggle of applying 
Brussels I Regulation and the Brussels Ibis Regulation, in particular, when the non-designated 
Member State was seized before 10 January 2015 and the designated Member State court 
after 10 January 2015. In this case, does the “old” “first seized lis pendens” rule according to 
Article 27 of the Brussels I Regulation apply, or does the “new” reversed lis pendens rule 
according to Article 31 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation prevail? Should the Czech court 
stay its proceedings by virtue of Gasser case or should the Italian court stay its proceedings 
according to Article 31 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation? Unfortunately, the answer to 
this question remains open.  
 
15. Derogation Effect in favour of the Third State courts 
As stated in Chapter I, Subchapter II, Section 1, the exclusive jurisdiction agreements have 
two effects – they confer jurisdiction to a specific court, and they oust jurisdiction to a court 
which would have jurisdiction otherwise. Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation expressly 
addresses only the prorogation effect but leaves open the considerations on which basis the 
derogation effect is determined.722 It is doubtful whether Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation applies when the parties agree to exclude the jurisdiction of certain Member State 
courts without prorogating any competent Member State court (“mere derogation”). The 
uniform treatment of the different kinds of the choice-of-court agreements and the prevention 
of the misuse of such a derogation agreement favours the application of Article 25 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation.723 However, such a conclusion cannot be accepted when all 
competent Member State courts are excluded according to the Brussels Ibis Regulation, which 
would lead to the denial of the access of justice.724  
The prorogation effect is fully covered by Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. It does 
not matter if the parties domiciled in the Third States derogates from the jurisdiction of a 
                                                          
720 See Article 66 and 81 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
721 See Article 66 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
722 U. MAGNUS, Article 25, in Brussels I Bis Regulation, 2016, op. cit., p. 605. 
723 U. MAGNUS, Article 23, in Brussels I Regulation, 2012, op. cit., p. 458. 
724 Ibidem, p. 459. 
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Third State court.725 However, what happens when the parties confer jurisdiction to a Third 
State court? The Brussels Ibis Regulation does not provide for an explicit rule enabling 
prorogue exclusive choice-of-court agreements in favour of a Third State court. The Brussels 
Ibis Regulation also does not provide a rule expressly banning the derogation of the 
jurisdiction of the Member State courts in favour of a Third State court. As a starting point, it 
is necessary to stress that Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation cannot regulate the 
prorogation effect in respect of the courts outside the EU.726 Thus, the question arises if 
derogation of jurisdiction of a Member State court that could establish jurisdiction in 
accordance with Article 4 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (when the defendant is domiciled in 
the Member State) is possible in favour of a designated Third State court. 
It was disputed if Article 17 of the Brussels Convention and Article 23 of the Brussels I 
Regulation were applicable in the context of the derogation effect of the jurisdiction 
agreement in favour of Third State courts. The specific rule on the exclusive choice-of-court 
agreements in favour of a Third State court has not been introduced into the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation in order to motivate Third States into ratifying the Hague Convention of 30 June 
2005 on the Choice-of-court Agreements.727 Only the new rule on lis pendens and on related 
actions was established by Article 33 and 34 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, which as we see 
further, they might resolve some of the demonstrated problems. Also, the ECJ case law 
(Coreck, C–387/98; Owusu, C–281/02; Lugano Opinion 1/03; Mahamdia, C–154/11) 
regarding choice-of-court agreements in favour of Third States courts have not provided 
insight into this issue.  
 
15.1. Case law 
The ECJ has defined specific guidelines connected with problematic points and the gap in the 
Brussels I Regulation regarding the possibility of designating a Third State court. However, a 
unique and clear solution has not been provided. 
                                                          
725 U. MAGNUS, Article 25, in Brussels I Bis Regulation, 2016, op. cit., p. 605. 
726 Schlosser Report, par. 176; S. O’MALLEY, A. LAYTON, European Civil Practice, 2004, op. cit., par. 20.014; 
U. MAGNUS, Article 25, in Brussels I Bis Regulation, 2016, op. cit., p. 608. 
727 Committee on Legal Affairs, 20 September 2011, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-
live/en/committees/video?event=20110920-0900-COMMITTEE-JURI. 
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In the Coreck case, the ECJ for the first time addressed the question on the validity of choice-
of-court agreements in favour of a Third State court. Coreck, a company incorporated in 
accordance with German law, issued the bills of lading for consignments of groundnut kernels 
from China to the Netherlands aboard a ship belonging to a company incorporated under 
Russian law. The bills of lading contained a choice-of-court agreement in favour of a court in 
the State where the carrier had his principal place of business, i.e., a Russian court. The ECJ 
held that the court of the Member State should consider the validity of choice-of-court 
agreements in favour of a Third State in accordance with its national conflict-of-laws rules:  
...Article 17 of the Convention does not apply to clauses designating a court in a third 
country. A court situated in a Contracting State must, if it is seized notwithstanding such 
a jurisdiction clause, assess the validity of the clause according to the applicable law, 
including conflict-of-laws rules, where it sits…728 
The ECJ has not given any precise answer regarding the possibility of a derogation from 
jurisdiction under the Brussels I Regulation in favour of Third State courts on the basis of the 
choice-court-agreement. However, it may be deduced from the judgment that the Dutch court 
was entitled to decline jurisdiction in favour of the Russian court. Such a conclusion 
corresponds to the opinion expressed by some authors729 and can be found as well in the 
Schlosser Report. The Schlosser Report stated that:  
In cases where parties agree to bring their disputes before the courts of a State which is 
not a party to the 1968 Convention there is obviously nothing in the 1968 Convention to 
prevent such courts from declaring themselves competent, if their law recognizes the 
validity of such an agreement…730 
If, when these tests are applied, the agreement is found to be invalid, then the 
jurisdictional provisions of the 1968 Convention become applicable.731  
In other words, the Brussels regime is not applicable when the jurisdiction agreement is valid 
according to the national conflict-of-laws rules and the non-designated Member State court 
                                                          
728 Case C-387/98, Coreck, par. 19. 
729 See F. GARCIMARTIN, Chapter 9 - Article 25, in The Brussels I Regulation Recast, op. cit., p. 280: «The 
derogation effect is, in principle (and subject to the future effect of the Hague Convention on choice-of-court 
agreements), determined by the national law of the corresponding Member State. This is so even when the 
choice-of-court agreement purports to exclude the jurisdiction granted by the Recast Regulation, for example 
because the defendant is domiciled in that Member State.». 
730 Schlosser Report, par. 176. 
731 Schlosser Report, par. 176. 
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having jurisdiction according to the other jurisdictional grounds set in the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation might decline its jurisdiction.732 On the contrary when the jurisdiction agreement is 
invalid, the Brussels regime applies. However, this impacts the question posed in Owusu. 
The well-known and the most controversial approach was taken by the ECJ in the Owusu 
judgment. Mr Owusu, domiciled in the United Kingdom, suffered a serious accident during a 
holiday in Jamaica. He subsequently brought an action in the United Kingdom for breach of 
contract against Mr Jackson, also domiciled in the United Kingdom and for tort against 
certain Jamaican companies. The English Court of Appeal stayed its proceedings and referred 
the question to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. The English Court of Appeal asked the ECJ 
if in the case when the court’s jurisdiction is founded on Article 2 of the Brussels Convention 
(Article 4 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), jurisdiction in favour of the courts of a non-
Contracting State based on forum non conveniens might be declined. The ECJ confirmed the 
compulsory system of jurisdiction set out by the Brussels Convention and held that Article 2 
is mandatory in nature and therefore cannot be derogated from, unless expressly provided for 
by the Brussels Convention. Although the Owusu case did not deal directly with the choice-
of-court agreement in favour of a Third State court, such a decision must lead to the 
conclusion that the court of the Member State establishing jurisdiction on the defendant’s 
domicile, pursuant to Article 4 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, is not permitted to decline its 
jurisdiction when the parties concluded a jurisdiction agreement in favour of the court of a 
non-Member State.733 Such a conclusion seems to be even more apparent in English law 
which does not mandate dismissal of proceedings in the presence of a foreign choice-of-court 
agreement because the grant of a stay is discretional.734  
In Lugano opinion 1/03, the ECJ practically confirmed the conclusion contained in the Owusu 
case. In 2006, the ECJ was consulted by the Council regarding the conclusion of the 2007 
Lugano Convention. The ECJ was requested to take a position regarding exclusive or shared 
                                                          
732 R. FENTIMAN, Civil Jurisdiction and Third States: Owusu and After, in Common Law Market Review, 43, 
(2006), p. 708. 
733 See the opposite approach of F. GARCIMARTIN, Chapter 9 - Article 25, in The Brussels I Regulation Recast, 
op. cit., p. 280: «Neither the Owusu case nor the introduction of a new provision on lis pendens vis-a-vis non-
Member States should undermine that conclusion. Unlike the forum non conveniens doctrine, the protection of 
party autonomy is one of the main goals of the Regulation and, in principle, there are no grounds to restrict such 
autonomy to choice-of-court agreements in favour of the courts of a Member State.». 
734 R. FENTIMAN, Civil Jurisdiction and Third States: Owusu and After, op. cit., p. 723. See the difficulties 
arising out of the Owusu case in Konkola Copper Mines v Coromin [2005] EWHC 898 (Comm.). 
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powers between the Community and the Member States. The ECJ verified its ability to affect 
Community rules on jurisdiction (the Brussels I Regulation) by international agreements (the 
2007 Lugano Convention) and concluded that the new 2007 Lugano Convention falls within 
the Community’s exclusive competence. As one of the examples leading to this conclusion, 
the ECJ revealed two possible scenarios regarding the derogation effect in favour of a court in 
the Third States:  
Thus, where the new Lugano Convention contains Articles identical to Articles 22 and 23 
of Regulation No 44/2001 and leads on that basis to selection as the appropriate forum of 
a court of a non-member country which is a party to that Convention, where the 
defendant is domiciled in a Member State, in the absence of the Convention, that latter 
State would be the appropriate forum, whereas under the Convention it is the non-
member country.735  
In other words, the first scenario refers to the situation when the 2007 Lugano Convention 
was concluded. For example, a Swiss court was designated by the parties, and the defendant 
was domiciled in Germany. In this case, the 2007 Lugano Convention prevails. A Swiss court 
will have jurisdiction pursuant to Lugano Convention 2007. A German court, that could 
establish jurisdiction on the basis of Article 2 of the Brussels I Regulation, must decline its 
jurisdiction in favour of a Swiss court. The second scenario refers to the opposite situation 
when the 2007 Lugano Convention is absent. The German court is obliged to establish its 
jurisdiction in accordance with Article 2 of the Brussels I Regulation in breach of the choice-
of-court agreement conferring jurisdiction to a Swiss court. The ECJ mentioned the Owusu 
case in the Lugano interpretation but failed to mention its diverse approach expressed in the 
Coreck case. 
In the last case, the Mahamdia case, the ECJ had a similar approach as in the Coreck case. 
However, the Mahamdia case refers only to individual employment contracts containing an 
exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of a Third State court. Mr Mahamdia, a German and 
Algerian citizen, domiciled in Germany, concluded a contract of employment with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria. The contract 
                                                          
735 See Lugano opinion 1/03, par. 153. For further details on the opinion, see P. FRANZINA, Le condizioni di 
applicabilità del regolamento (CE) n. 44/2001 alla luce del parere 1/03 della Corte di giustizia, Rivista diritto 
internazionale, (2006), p. 948 et seq.; N. LAVRANOS, Opinion 1/03, Lugano Convention, Common Market Law 
Review, (2006), p. 1087 et seq.; F. POCAR (ed), The External Competence of the European Union and Private 
International Law: The EC Court’s Opinion on the Lugano Convention, CEDAM, 2007. 
  
178 
 
contained a prorogation clause in favour of the Algerian court. Mr Mahamdia filed an action 
against the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria in the Arbeitsgericht Berlin and he 
claimed overtime pay and subsequently for a declaration of the unlawfulness of the 
employment contract termination. Article 21 of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 23 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation) gives the possibility of designating the courts other than those 
indicated in Article 18 and 19 of the Brussels I Regulation in accordance with prorogation 
agreement. Moreover, this provision does not specify the presumption that the designated 
court must be the court of a Member State (unlike Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation). As 
a consequence, the ECJ concluded that the employee could also take proceedings to the courts 
outside the EU in compliance with the jurisdiction clause. Such an interpretation might be 
extended to matters relating to insurance, consumer contracts, and individual contracts of 
employment determined by the Brussels regime. This ECJ position seems to be peculiar – a 
prorogation of the court of the third State by two equal parties (e.g., business-to-business 
transactions) is not allowed. However, choice-of-court agreements in favour of the court of a 
Third State concluded with a weaker party are permitted. 
 
15.2. Theory of Reflexive Effect 
The term reflexive effect seems to be first used by Professor Droz referring to the problem of 
immovable property in a Third State.736 The theory of reflexive effect has been extended and 
consists in an analogous application of the jurisdiction rules set out in the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation in relation to Third States. Three areas are affected: (i) parallel proceedings in a 
Member State and in a Third State; (ii) a strong connection between the subject matter and the 
Third State court, such as in case of exclusive jurisdiction; and (iii) exclusive choice-of-court 
agreement in favour of Third State courts. In order to resolve the problem of the mandatory 
nature of the Brussels regime, the theory of reflexive effect suggests the reflexive application 
of Articles 29, 25, and 24 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. As we see further, the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation grapples only with parallel proceedings. 
                                                          
736 See G. A. L. DROZ, Compétence judiciaire et effets des jugements dans le Marché commun, op. cit., p. 109, 
where the author defined the doctrine of ‘a mirror effect’ of the Brussels Convention rules on the exclusive 
jurisdictions, in particular ‘a mirror effect’ refers to cases when connecting factors of the exclusive jurisdictions 
are located outside the EU (e.g., an. action in rem concerning a property located in a Third State). 
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The theory of reflexive reflect was admitted by the English court in the famous case 
Ferrexpo,737 concerning the validity of the company resolution. Andrew Smith j. justified the 
stay in favour of the Ukrainian court by giving reflexive effect to Article 22 of the Brussels I 
Regulation, although the defendants were domiciled in England.738  
 
15.3. Non-Uniform Outcomes in the Member States 
From the interpretation provided by the ECJ, it is evident that there is no unique and clear 
solution in this respect yet. Therefore, EU economic individuals and legal entities entering 
into choice-of-court agreements in favour of Third State courts face legal uncertainty because: 
(i) choice-of-court agreements in favour of a Third State court are respected in the EU; (ii) 
choice-of-court agreements in favour of a court in the EU are respected in the Third States; 
(iii) a judgement given by the chosen Third State court has the capacity to be recognised and 
enforced in the EU; and (iv) a judgement given by the chosen Member State court has the 
capacity to be recognised and enforced outside the EU. 
The practical consequences of uncertainty are serious – if Member State courts cannot decline 
jurisdiction in favour of the designated Member State court, parallel litigation may ensue, 
resulting in the conflicting judgments. Thus, the proceedings can be pointless, and party 
autonomy associated with the certainty of the jurisdiction agreement in favour of the Third 
State courts is lost.739  
Therefore, if the parties designate a court in a Third State and jurisdiction of a Member State 
court is based on the Brussels system, four different scenarios are possible:740 
1. The Member-State court verifies the validity of the choice-of-court agreements according 
to the national conflict-of-laws rules and declines jurisdiction in favour of the Third State 
court (Coreck case); 
                                                          
737 Ferrexpo AG v Gilson Investments Ltd & Ors [2012] EWHC 721. 
738 On other cases referring to theory of reflexive reflect, see among others, for example, Plaza BV v Law 
Debenture Trust Corp plc [2015] EWHC 43 (Ch); contra Catalyst Investments Group Ltd v Lewinsohn [2009] 
EWHC 1964 (Ch). 
739 R. FENTIMAN, Civil Jurisdiction and Third States: Owusu and After, op. cit., p. 708. 
740 See similar results demonstrated by R. FENTIMAN, Introduction to Arts. 27-30, in U. MAGNUS, P. 
MANKOWSKI (eds), Brussels I Regulation, Sellier European Law Publishers, 2007, 2eds, p. 498. 
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2. The Member State court establishes its jurisdiction without taking into consideration the 
choice-of-court agreement in favour of a Third State court (Owusu case, Lugano opinion 
1/03);741 
3. The Member State court declines jurisdiction in favour of a Third State court in the event 
of a choice-of-court agreement concluded with an employee, consumer, policyholder, 
insured party, or a beneficiary (Mahamdia case);  
4. The Member State court declines its jurisdiction in favour of a Third State court in 
accordance with Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, i.e., on the grounds of the effet 
réflexe doctrine. 
The legal practice of courts in all 28 Member States proves the non-uniformity, some 
Member State courts apply Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, other Member State 
court applies the national rules.742 The jurisdiction agreements in favour of Third States court 
are in fact respected, notwithstanding Owusu. A study of Professor Nuyts shows that a vast 
majority of interviewed Member States declined jurisdiction pursuant to national law without 
                                                          
741 T. HARTLEY, Choice-of-court agreements under the European and international instruments: the revised 
Brussels I Regulation, the Lugano Convention and the Hague Convention, op. cit., p. 95, that admits possibility 
that declination in favour of Third State court is not possible on the basis of choice-of-court agreements. 
742 See Heidelberg Report, p. 164, 165. See questionnaire n 3 to the Heidelberg Report. Austria applies national 
law according to the Coreck case; in Belgium it was not yet the subject of any judgment, but the new Belgian 
Code of Private International Law provides a framework for choice-of-court clauses and requires a Belgian court 
to decline jurisdiction when parties have chosen to submit their disputes to the Third State court; in England and 
Wales the Owusu problem seems to be more problematic due to forum non conveniens - Konkola Copper Mines 
v Coromin [2005] EWHC 898 (Comm.) where Colman J. has distinguished the Owusu case (forum non 
conveniens) and the exclusive jurisdiction in favour of a Third State court and held that a stay was permitted. In 
France, the Brussels regime is not applicable for the jurisdiction clause designating a third State court, in such a 
case, the French courts apply the rules of the common law of conflicts of jurisdiction which have been 
established by the case law. It has thus been held that the clause designating a foreign jurisdiction is, in principle, 
lawful when the dispute is of an international order and provided that it does not defeat the imperative territorial 
jurisdiction of a French Cour de Cassation Chambre Civile 1, Cie de Signaux et d’Enterprises Electriques v. 
Soc. Sorelec, 17 December 1985, No 84-16338 (see Annex 2.2.25.5); in Germany, the Oberlandesgericht 
Nürnberg holds Brussels Regulation inapplicable in case of the prorogation of jurisdiction in favour of a third 
State court, the derogation of the jurisdiction of the Member State courts has been judged according to the 
national law; In Greece the prevailing practice is that jurisdiction clauses designating a third State court are to be 
examined according to the Brussels regime thus excluding the application of domestic law; in Spain the 
judgment of court of appeal of Valencia 27th of January 2003 declared without any problem that choice-of-
forum agreements in Third States must be respected. See also more recent case law. In England: Winnetka 
Trading Corp v Julius Baer International Ltd [2008] EWHC 3146 (Ch), Norris J. held that Owusu did not 
prevent a stay, and in a similar vein, in Masri v Consolidated Contractors International UK Ltd, [2008] EWCA 
(Civ) 303 at [125], Lawrence Collins L.J. opined that it would be “odd” if there was no possibility of a stay in 
such a situation; English Court of Appeal in case Jong v HSBC Private Bank (Monaco) SA [2015] EWCA Civ 
1057 where the court upheld an order declining English jurisdiction over a claim in the presence of an exclusive 
jurisdiction clause in favour of the Monaco courts. 
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distinction between the situation where the defendant is domiciled in a Third State and in a 
Member State.743  
In the Czech Republic, there is not yet any judgment in this respect, but the opinions of the 
authors of the commentaries differ. One of the commentaries states that the Czech court must 
proceed by virtue of Coreck case. 744 The opposite approach is taken by Bříza which provided 
an example that the Czech courts cannot respect the choice-of-court agreement in favour of a 
New York court when the jurisdiction of Czech court is given on the basis of Article 2 of the 
Brussels I Regulation (i.e., Owusu case).745  
 
                                                          
743 A. NUYTS, Study on Residual Jurisdiction (Review of the Member States' Rules Concerning the 'Residual 
Jurisdiction' of Their Courts in Civil and Commercial Matters Pursuant to the Brussels I and II Regulations), 
(JLS/C4/2005/07-30-CE)0040309/00-37, p. 83. In this respect see opposite approach taken in the L. COLLINS, C. 
G. J. MORSE, D. MCCLEAN, A. BRIGGS, J. HARRIS, C. MCLACHAN, J. HILL (eds), Dicey, Morris, and Collins on 
the Conflict of Laws, Sweet & Maxwell, 2018, 15ed., par. 12-033: «113. At paragraph 12-033, the editors of 
Dicey note the classic exposition of Lord Goff's forum non conveniens test in the Spiliada case, but add: Lord 
Goff could not have foreseen, however, the subsequent distortion which would be brought about by the decision 
of the European Court in Owusu v Jackson. The direct effect of that case is that where proceedings in a civil or 
commercial matter are brought against a defendant who is domiciled in the United Kingdom, the court has no 
power to stay those proceedings on the ground of forum non conveniens. Its indirect effect is felt in a case in 
which there are multiple defendants, some of whom are not domiciled in a Member State and to whom the plea 
of forum non conveniens remains open: it is inevitable that the ability of those co-defendants to obtain a stay (or 
to resist service out of the jurisdiction) by pointing to the courts of a non-Member State which would otherwise 
represent the forum conveniens, will be reduced, for to grant jurisdictional relief to some but not to others will 
fragment what ought to be conducted as a single trial … There is no doubt, however, that the Owusu factor will 
have made things worse for a defendant who wishes to rely on the principle of forum non conveniens when a co-
defendant cannot.». This approach was confirmed in the recent English case, Angola v Perfectbit, [2018] EWHC 
965 (Comm), where the court drew a distinction between a case where proceedings are commenced in England, 
in breach of an exclusive foreign jurisdiction clause, against a single defendant, and a case where there are 
multiple defendants. The court affirmed that against non-EU defendants whose case is anchored with an EU 
defendant in a dispute where there are multiple co-defendants, some of whom are English, forum non conveniens 
may be applied but has become more unlikely. 
744 P. SIMON, in L. DRÁPAL, J. BUREŠ, (eds), Občanský soudní řád I, II, C. H. Beck, 2009, p. 2959. 
745 P. BŘÍZA, Nový český zákon o mezinárodním právu soukromém v kontextu práva EU a mezinárodních smluv, 
Právní rozhledy (2013), p. 584; BŘÍZA P., § 86 Sjednání příslušnosti zahraničního soudu, in Zákon o 
mezinárodním právu soukromém: komentář, op. cit., p. 521. 
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15.4. Proposal of the Brussels Ibis Regulation as to the Choice-of-Court Agreements 
in favour of Third State Court 
In 2010, the European Parliament advocated amending the Brussels I Regulation and to allow 
reflexive effect in relation to the exclusive choice-of-court clauses in favour of Third States 
courts, stressing the necessity for the wide-ranging consultations and political debate.746 
During the legislative process, the Commission did not address the problem regarding the 
jurisdiction agreements in favour of the Third State courts in the context of the Owusu 
judgment. The Committee on Legal Affairs stated in September 2011, “…nobody has any 
interest in concluding 2005 Convention with us, so that was the reason why the Proposal does 
not contain a rule on the extension of the respect of choice-of-court agreements.”747 The non-
introduction of the explicit rule governing the choice-of-court agreements in favour of the 
Third State court was the subject of the critique.748  
At least, the Green Paper highlighted the necessity of the equal access to justice on the basis 
of clear and precise rules on international jurisdiction, not only for defendants, but also for 
claimants domiciled in the EU.749 The Proposal introduced a discretionary lis pendens rule for 
disputes on the same subject matter and between the same parties which are pending before 
the Member State courts and Third State courts, whereby:  
                                                          
746 European Parliament Resolution of 7 September 2010 on the implementation and review of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters, P7 TA(2010) 0304, 7 September 2010, point 15, 17. 
747 Committee on Legal Affairs, 20 September 2011, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-
live/en/committees/video?event=20110920-0900-COMMITTEE-JURI.  
748 F. C. VILLATA, Choice-of-Court Agreements in Favour of Third States’ Jurisdiction in Light of the 
Suggestions by Members of the European Parliament, in F. POCAR, I. VIARENGO, F. C. VILLATA (eds), Recasting 
Brussels I: Proceedings of the Conference Held at the University of Milan on 25-26 November 2011, CEDAM, 
2012, p. 224; C. KOHLER, Agreements Conferring Jurisdiction on Courts of Third States, in F. POCAR, I. 
VIARENGO, F. C. VILLATA (eds), Recasting Brussels I: Proceedings of the Conference Held at the University of 
Milan on 25-26 November 2011, CEDAM, 2012, p. 217; A. DICKINSON, The Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast), op. cit., p. 16; J. WEBER, Universal jurisdiction and third states in the 
reform of the Brussels I Regulation, The Rabel Journal of Comparative and International Private Law, 3 (2011), 
p. 630. 
749 Green Paper on the review of Council Regulation (EC) no 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, COM/2009/0175 final, 21 April 2009, point 2. On 
the relevance of the domicile of the defendant as a ground triggering the application of the jurisdiction rules in 
the Brussels regime see among others, T. KRUGER, Civil Jurisdiction Rules of the EU and Their Impact on Third 
States, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 59 et seq. 
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A court of a Member State can exceptionally stay proceedings if a non-EU court was 
seized first and it is expected to decide within a reasonable time and the decision will be 
capable of recognition and enforcement in that Member State. 750  
Although the general extension of the scope of the Brussels I Regulation to the EU claimant 
has not been achieved, Article 33 Brussels Ibis Regulation has been maintained with small 
modifications. Moreover, it was supplemented with Article 34 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
governing the related proceedings in a Third State court.751 It seems that Article 33 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation was inspired by the European Group for Private International Law 
Proposal drafted in Bergen in 2008, which has proposed the introduction of a new mechanism 
of lis pendens.752 It is regrettable that the new rule on the choice-of-court in favour of a Third 
State court proposed by the European Group for Private International Law, 753 which has been 
sent to the EU institutions,754 did not appear in the Proposal. As a result, the only rules which 
                                                          
750 Proposal for a Recast of the Brussels I Regulation, p. 8. 
751 Article 34 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation appeared for the first time in a draft circulated by the Danish 
Presidency in 2012, The Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 8855/12, 2010/0383 (COD), 17 April 
2012; see also The delegation of the United Kingdom, 8000/12, 2010/0383 (COD), 22 March 2012. On the 
comments of this proposal see: L. FUMAGALLI, Lis alibi pendens. The rules on Parallel Proceedings in the 
Reform of the Brussels I Regulation, in F. POCAR, I. VIARENGO, F. C. VILLATA (eds), Recasting Brussels I: 
Proceedings of the Conference Held at the University of Milan on 25-26 November 2011, CEDAM, 2012, p. 
237-252; F. MARONGIU BONAIUTI, La disciplina della litispendenza nei rapporti tra giudici di paesi membri e 
giudici di paesi terzi nella proposta di revisione del regolamento n. 44/2001, Rivista diritto internazionale, 
(2011), p. 496; P. ROGERSON, Lis Pendens and Third States: The Commission’s Proposed Changes to the 
Brussels I Regulation, in E. LEIN (ed), The Brussels I Review Proposal Uncovered, British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law, 2012, pp. 103-124. 
752 The European Group for Private International Law in its meeting in Bergen on 19-21 September 2008 
proposed the amendment of chapter II of Brussels I Regulation in order to apply external situations, available at: 
https://www.gedip-egpil.eu/documents/gedip-documents-18pe.htm. See text of proposed Article 30bis: «In the 
case of lis pendens or related actions as understood in Articles 27 and 28, when the claim is pending before the 
courts of a non-Member State, the court of a Member State seized second may stay the proceedings before it 
until the court seized first gives judgment, if it appears that judgment will be given within a reasonable time and 
that it will be subject to recognition under the law of the Member State in question. It shall decline jurisdiction 
once the court seized first has given a judgment entitled to recognition under the law of that Member State.». 
753 The European Group for Private International Law in its meeting in Bergen on 19-21 September 2008, 
available at: https://www.gedip-egpil.eu/documents/gedip-documents-18pe.htm See Article 23bis of the 
Proposal: «1. A court of a Member State seized of proceedings over which it has jurisdiction under this 
Regulation, and with regard to which the parties have given exclusive jurisdiction to a court or the courts of a 
non-Member State under an agreement complying with the conditions laid down by Article 23, shall not hear the 
proceedings unless and until the chosen court has declined jurisdiction. It shall stay the proceedings as long as 
the chosen court has not been seized or, if it has been seized, has not declined jurisdiction. It shall decline 
jurisdiction once the chosen court has given a judgment entitled to recognition under the law of the State of the 
court seized. Nevertheless, it may hear the proceedings if it appears that: (a) the chosen court will not give 
judgment within a reasonable time; (b) the chosen court will give a judgment which will not be entitled to 
recognition under the law of the State of the court seized.». 
754 A. BORRÁS, The Application of the Brussels I Regulation to Defendants Domiciled in Third States: From the 
EGPIL Proposal to the Commission Proposal, in E. LEIN, (ed), The Brussels I Review Proposal Uncovered, 
British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2012, p. 62. 
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give indirectly to the Third State’s jurisdiction in the presence of the choice-of-court 
agreement are Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation dealing the parallel 
proceedings. 
 
15.5. Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
Due to the lack of an express rule giving effect to the jurisdiction clauses in favour of the 
Third State court, specific problems could be solved at least by the new rules on lis pendens 
and related actions established in Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.755 The 
aim of the lis pendens rule is to handle parallel litigation and irreconcilable judgments, 
whereby Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation should eliminate the risk of 
parallel proceedings and the irreconcilable judgments outside the EU. This must be 
highlighted in the context of the fact that the legal activity in the Third State court is not 
irrelevant to the Brussels regime. Article 45 par. 1 lett. d) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
establishes as one of the grounds for non-recognition irreconcilability of the judgment with an 
earlier judgment given in a Third State involving the same cause of action and between the 
same parties, provided that the earlier judgment fulfils the conditions necessary for its 
recognition in the Member State addressed. 
These provisions aim at providing “for a flexible mechanism allowing the courts of the 
Member States to take into account proceedings pending before the courts of third 
States…”756 The extra-EU rules on lis pendens and related actions operate unilaterally without 
the obligation of reciprocity.  
While Article 33 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation refers to the “same cause of action”, Article 
34 refers to “an action which is related to the action in the court of the Third State”. Both 
Articles are similar to the structure. However, due to the failure to provide for a definition of 
“same cause of action” in Article 33 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation and “irreconcilability” in 
Article 34 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, according to some scholars the rules are regarded 
                                                          
755 For a more detailed analysis, see also F. SALERNO, Giurisdizione ed efficacia delle decisioni straniere nel 
regolamento (UE) n.1215/2012 (rifusione), Wolters Kluwer, 2015, p. 284-288; P. FRANZINA, Lis pendens 
involving a Third Country under the Brussels I-bis Regulation: an overview, Rivista di diritto internazionale 
privato e processuale, (2014), p. 32. 
756 Recital No 23 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
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as incomplete.757 It is disputed whether the “same cause of action” and “irreconcilability” 
should be interpreted autonomously by virtue of Article 29 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation in 
order to prevent a clash between a Third State and Member State’s judgment. Or should these 
terms be assessed with reference to the national law of the Member State court seized.758 
Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation may be applied only upon the fulfilment of 
certain conditions. It is necessary to point out that the effectiveness of new rules on lis 
pendens and related actions is weakened by the fact that a seized Member-State court is 
granted discretionary power. In other words, the Brussels Ibis Regulation does not oblige a 
Member State court to suspend or dismiss proceedings even if conditions for its application 
are met. Thus, the decision to stay the proceedings falls entirely within the competence of a 
specific Member State court. Some of the rigid conditions are described further in this text. 
Moreover, the Member State court may change its mind and may continue the proceedings at 
any time. According to paragraph 2 of Article 33 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, it may 
happen, if the proceedings in the Third State court is stayed or discontinued; or if the 
proceedings in the Third State court are unlikely to be concluded within a reasonable time; or 
if the continuation of the proceedings is required for the proper administration of justice. 
Paragraph 3 of Article 33 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation then provides that the Member State 
court shall dismiss the proceedings if the proceedings in the Third State court has resulted in a 
judgment capable of recognition and enforcement in that Member State. Paragraph 4 of 
Article 33 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation specifies that all the mentioned procedures relating 
to the stay of proceedings, its continuation and its dismissal, are subject to the application of 
one of the parties or of its own motion where possible and under the national law.759 
The new rules on lis pendens and related actions refer only to Articles 4, 7, 8, and 9 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation. The new rules on lis pendens and the related actions rule cannot 
operate in proceedings in matters relating to insurance, consumer agreements, and individual 
contracts of employment, i.e., in proceedings with a weaker party either in the position of 
                                                          
757 S. M. CARBONE, C.E. TUO, Non-EU States and Brussels I: New Rules and some Solutions for Old Problems, 
Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale, (2015), p. 12. 
758 On the later interpretation, see J. WEBER, Universal jurisdiction and third states in the reform of the Brussels 
I Regulation, op. cit., p. 619. 
759 e.g.,. in Italy, see P. FRANZINA, Litispendenza e connessione tra Stati membri e Stati terzi nel regolamento 
Bruxelles I bis, Diritto di commercio internazionale, 2014, p. 625 referring to Article 7 of the Italian Act on 
Private International Law and to Corte Suprema di Cassazione, 28 November 2012, n. 21108. 
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defendant or plaintiff (in accordance with Article 18 and 21 par. 1 lett. b) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation). Moreover, as a consequence of jurisdiction based on Article 4, 7, 8, and 9 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation, Articles 33 and 34 cannot be applied as well when the jurisdiction of 
a Member State court is based on an exclusive jurisdiction agreement according to Article 25, 
or when the Member State court has exclusive jurisdiction according to Article 24 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation. This means that the EU proceedings based on the above-mentioned 
jurisdiction grounds cannot be stayed or dismissed in favour of parallel Third State 
proceedings. However, the recognition of the judgments stemming from such proceedings 
may be denied in another Member State if the earlier judgment fulfils the conditions 
necessary for its recognition in the Member State, irrespective of when the court was 
seized.760 
However, the new rules on lis pendens and related actions might be applied when the 
jurisdiction agreement is in favour of a Third State court, even if the new provisions do not 
expressly state so. In relation to the assessment of proper administration of justice, Recital No 
24 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation only provides:  
That assessment may also include consideration of the question whether the court of the 
third State has exclusive jurisdiction in the particular case in circumstances where a 
court of a Member State would have exclusive jurisdiction.  
But as a consequence of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, silence regarding the validity of the 
choice-of-court agreements in favour of Third State courts, it may create an additional 
problem in practice. The GEDIP proposed in this regard that the seized Member State court 
should exercise the formal and substantial validity of the extra-EU choice-of-court agreements 
under the conditions laid down by Article 23 of the Brussels Regulation.761 Although, as 
already stated, the express rule of the choice-of-court agreements in favour of the Third States 
                                                          
760 On the similar considerations see S. M. CARBONE, C. E. TUO, Non-EU States and Brussels I: New Rules and 
some Solutions for Old Problems, op. cit., p. 12; G. VITELLINO, La nuova disciplina in tema di litispendenza e 
connessione “extra-europee”, in in A. Malatesta (ed), La riforma del regolamento di Bruxelles I: il regolamento 
(UE) n. 1215/2012 sulla giurisdizione e l’efficacia delle decisioni in materia civile e commerciale, Giuffrè 
Editore, 2016, p. 110; F. MARONGIU BONAIUTI, Lis alibi pendens and Related Actions in the Relationships with 
the Courts of Third Countries in the Recast of the Brussels I Regulation, Yearbook of Private International Law, 
15 (2014), p. 94. However, the recognition of judgments issued by Third State courts is left to the national law of 
the Member States or to international conventions.  
761 The European Group for Private International Law in its meeting in Bergen on 19-21 September 2008, 
available at: https://www.gedip-egpil.eu/documents/gedip-documents-18pe.htm See Article 23bis of the 
Proposal: «….with regard to which the parties have given exclusive jurisdiction to a court or the courts of a non-
Member State under an agreement complying with the conditions laid down by Article 23…» 
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has not been adopted, this clear solution gives a uniform answer in all Member States in for 
extra-EU parallel proceedings seems to be in line with the wording of Recital No 24 “…in 
circumstances where a court of a Member State would have exclusive jurisdiction.” 
According to Professor Fentiman, a seized Member State court must apply Article 25 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation reflexively to the extent that it must ascertain whether the Third State 
court has exclusive jurisdiction mutatis mutandis according to this provision. For example, it 
must decide on the exclusivity of the jurisdiction agreement according to Article 25 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation.762 
 The second condition (that is not subject to the discretionary power of a Member-State judge) 
is already pending proceedings before the Third State court at the time when the Member 
State court is seized.763 The necessity of the court to be first seized was doubted due to the 
unclear English version which provides “when a court in a Member State is seized”764, and 
thus it opened the door to the opposite interpretation.765 Nevertheless, the Proposal for a 
Recast of the Brussels I Regulation providing that the Third State court must have been 
“seized first in time”766 and the other linguistic versions of Article 33 and 34 of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation,767 support the view that the Member State court must be second seized. 
In consequence, we might imagine two specific situations: the parties concluded a valid and 
effective court agreement in favour of a Russian court, where the Russian court was seized 
first and the Belgian court second. In this case, the Belgian court may consider declining 
jurisdiction in favour of the Russian court (if all conditions set out in Articles 33 and 34 were 
satisfied). However, the Brussels Ibis Regulation in practice excludes the opposite situation 
from the application of Articles 33 and 34 when the Member State court is seized first. It was 
observed that in such a case, the national law should be applied.768 However, when Owusu 
situation appears, i.e., when the defendant is domiciled in a Member State, such affirmation 
does not seem to be very unambiguous.  
                                                          
762 R. FENTIMAN, Article 31, in Brussels I Bis Regulation, 2016, op. cit., p. 766. 
763 Article 32 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation lays down the rule in order to determine when the court was seized. 
764 Emphasis added. 
765 P. ROGERSON, Lis Pendens and Related Actions, in A. DICKINSON, A. JAMES, E. LEIN (eds), The Brussels I 
Regulation Recast, Oxford University Press, 2015, para 11.79; C. HEINZE, B. STEINROTTER, The Revised Lis 
Pendens Rules in the Brussels Ibis Regulation, op. cit., p. 10. 
766 Proposal for a Recast of the Brussels I Regulation, p. 38. 
767 See e.g., French version: « ...au moment où une juridiction d’un État membre est saisie d’une demande entre 
les mêmes parties ayant le même objet et la même cause que la demande... ». 
768 C. HEINZE, B. STEINROTTER, The Revised Lis Pendens Rules in the Brussels Ibis Regulation, op. cit., p. 10. 
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If the party intentionally and abusively first seized the court in Belgium in breach of the 
choice-of-court agreement and subsequently the proceedings were brought to a Russian court, 
the Belgian court cannot decline jurisdiction in favour of the Russian court. Thus, the new 
rules on lis pendens and related actions leave a broad space for procedural tactics – the party 
may bring the proceedings to a Third State court in conformity with the choice-of-court 
agreement or may just “ignore” the choice-of-court agreement. In the latter case, it suffices to 
first seize a court in a Member State in breach of the choice-of-court agreement. This must 
lead to the assumption that in case that the defendant is domiciled in the Member State and 
the exclusive jurisdiction clause confers the jurisdiction to the Third State court, which was 
second seized, the Brussels Ibis Regulation must be applied, and a different interpretation can 
be difficultly assumed.769 Such situation might result in a rush-to-court tactic in order to seize 
the most advantageous forum and rush to judgment,770 and would limit the efficacy of choice-
of-court agreements in favour of Third State court whenever the Member State court is first 
seized. 
As to the third condition, unfortunately, Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation do 
not require a stay of the proceedings in a Member State court if the prorogation agreement 
was not respected. The court must simply verify whether a stay is necessary for the proper 
administration of justice. Recital No 24 indicates factors that must be taken into account in 
order to evaluate the proper administration of justice, such as: (i) connections between the 
facts of the case and the parties and the Third State concerned; (ii) the stage to which the 
proceedings in the Third State have progressed by the time of proceedings in the Member 
State court; and (iii) whether or not the Third State court can be expected to give a judgment 
within a reasonable time. It can be summarised that the Brussels Ibis Regulation is concerned 
with three matters: the allocation of the proceedings to the court with the closest factual 
connection to the dispute; the avoidance of delay; and the prevention of the irreconcilable 
judgments. However, it is uncertain, in what way these terms should be understood and the 
term “proper administration of justice” may be difficult to prove.771  
                                                          
769 J. P. COOK, Pragmatism in the European Union: recasting the Brussels I Regulation to Ensure the 
Effectiveness of Exclusive Choice-of-Court Agreements, Aberdeen Student Law Review, (2013), available at 
https://www.abdn.ac.uk/law/documents/Pragmatism_in_the_European_Union. 
770 F. C. VILLATA, L’attuazione degli accordi di scelta del foro nel regolamento Bruxelles I, op. cit., p. 214. 
771 On the similar considerations, see R. FENTIMAN, Article 31, in Brussels I Bis Regulation, 2016, op. cit., p. 
763. On the preoccupation regarding the introduction of these flexible rules belonging to the common law in the 
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The meaning of proper administration of justice laid down by Article 33 and 34 and Recital 
No 24 gives a sensation that is a kind of “hybrid” between lis pendens and forum non 
conveniens.772 As already stated, according to ECJ opinion in Owusu judgment, forum non 
conveniens undermines the predictability of the Brussels Convention rules on jurisdiction and 
the principle of legal certainty of the Brussels Convention. It is regrettable that the principle 
of forum non conveniens was admitted into the Brussels Ibis Regulation, but other problems 
connected with the Owusu case have remained unresolved. 
As to the fourth condition laid down in Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, a 
judgment that will be delivered by a Third State court must be recognisable and, where 
applicable, enforceable in that Member State. Thus, the specific court of the Member State 
must examine the likelihood of the judgment being recognised and enforced in the future and 
in accordance with its national rules or international conventions.773 There is no harmonisation 
of national rules in this respect.  
For example, in the Czech Republic, the court would verify the fulfilment of conditions 
determined by Article 14 of the Czech on Private International Law (the legal effect of the 
foreign judgment and the recognition of the judgment by the Czech court). At the same time, 
if the recognition cannot be refused on the grounds established by Article 15 of the Czech Act 
on Private International Law (i.e., res judicata, lis pendens, public policy, reciprocity, breach 
of right of defence, or indirect jurisdiction). As to indirect jurisdiction, the Czech court must 
determine whether it has the right to establish its exclusive jurisdiction or if the jurisdiction of 
the Third State court was established on the basis of the rules on territorial jurisdiction set out 
in Czech Act No. 99/1963 Coll. on Civil Procedure.774 Thus, the provisions on territorial 
jurisdiction set out by the Act on Civil Procedure are reflected in the rules of the Third State 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
other Member States courts which are acquainted with forum non conveniens see F. MARONGIU BONAIUTI, Lis 
alibi pendens and Related Actions in the Relationships with the Courts of Third Countries in the Recast of the 
Brussels I Regulation, op. cit., p. 110. 
772 It is the same requirements for the granting of a stay on the basis of forum non conveniens grounds under 
English law, by the well-known case of Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1986] AC 460. 
773 See S. M. CARBONE, What about the Recognition of Third States’ Foreign Judgments?, in F. POCAR, I. 
VIARENGO, F. C. VILLATA (eds), Recasting Brussels I: Proceedings of the Conference Held at the University of 
Milan on 25-26 November 2011, CEDAM, 2012, p. 299- 302. 
774 See Article 6 of the Czech Act on Private International Law. The direct international jurisdiction of Czech 
courts is determined in accordance with the procedural regulations governing territorial jurisdiction in the Czech 
Republic, unless the provisions of the Act on Private International Law stipulates otherwise. 
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court.775 Moreover, in matters of contractual rights, the parties may agree in writing on the 
jurisdiction of a foreign court in accordance with Article 86 of the Czech on Private 
International Law, thereby excluding the jurisdiction of Czech courts.  
In Slovakia, the Slovak on Private International Law is based on the same principle – a 
judgment is recognized unless grounds of non-recognition exist (the breach of the right of 
defence, public policy, indirect jurisdiction, res judicata, judgment is without legal effect or is 
not as to the substance).776 As to the indirect jurisdiction, the Slovak court refuses recognition 
of a foreign judgment, if the foreign court assumed its jurisdiction on a criterion of 
jurisdiction that does not apply in Slovakia.777  
Also, in Italy, Article 64 par. 1 lett. a)778 of the Italian Act on Private International Law 
provides for indirect jurisdiction, conditions, and criterion for the jurisdiction of choice-of-
court agreements, are regulated by Article 4 of the same Act,779 where the conditions for 
derogation should be required by the Italian Act on Private International Law as well.780  
As a result, problems connected with the possibility of derogating from jurisdiction might also 
arise in front of Czech and Slovak courts as in Italy. Since the subject matter enters into the 
scope of application of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, should derogation conditions be verified 
in light of the rules laid down by the Brussels Ibis Regulation, and by virtue of Owusu case? 
                                                          
775 See commentary to Article 15: P. BŘÍZA, IN P. BŘÍZA, T. BŘICHÁČEK, Z. FIŠEROVÁ, Zákon o mezinárodním 
právu soukromém, p. ; M. Pauknerová, N. Rozehnalová, M. Zavadilová, Zákon o mezinárodním právu 
soukromém. Komentář, Wolters Kluwer ČR, Praha, 2013; V. VAŠKE, Uznání a výkon cizích rozhodnutí v České 
republice, C. H. Beck, Praha, 2007, p. 434. 
776 Provision Articles 63 and 64 of Act No 97/1963 Coll. on Private International Law. (“Slovak Act on Private 
International Law”). 
777 M. HAŤAPKA, Priznávanie účinkov cudzím rozhodnutiam v občianskych veciach v Slovenskej republike 
(uznávanie a výkon), Justičná revue, (3) (2015,), p. 282. As to the jurisdiction regarding a choice-of-jurisdiction 
clause, Article 37( lett. e) of the Slovak Act on Private International Law determines jurisdiction rule in this 
respect. 
778 Article 64 par. 1 lett. a) of the Italian Act on Private International Law provides: «A judgement rendered by a 
foreign authority shall be recognized in Italy without requiring any further proceedings if: a) the authority 
rendering the judgement had jurisdiction pursuant to the criteria of jurisdiction in force under Italian law…». 
On Article 64 of the Italian Act on Private International Law see E. D’ALESSANDRO, Commento agli artt.64-71 l. 
31 maggio 1995, n.218, in Codice di procedura civile commentato, Vol 1, UTET, 2010, pp. 3466-3485. 
779Article 4 of the Italian Act on Private International Law provides: «Where jurisdiction cannot be determined 
pursuant to Article 3, Italian courts shall nonetheless have jurisdiction if the parties have agreed to it and such 
acceptance is evidenced in writing, or if the defendant enters an appearance without pleading the lack of 
jurisdiction in his statement of defence. 2. The jurisdiction of any Italian court may be derogated from by an 
agreement in favour of a foreign court or arbitration if such derogation is evidenced in writing and the action 
concerns alienable rights. 3. Derogation shall have no effect if the court or the arbitrators decline jurisdiction or 
cannot hear the action.». 
780 F. C. VILLATA, L'attuazione degli accordi di scelta del Foro nel regolamento Bruxelles I, op. cit., p. 220. 
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Such a scenario would lead to undesirable results, i.e., to the impossibility of the proper 
application of Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation and the impossibility of 
recognition of the judgments based on the choice-of-court agreement conferring jurisdiction 
to Third State court when a defendant is domiciled in the requested Member State.781 In other 
words, the Member States determining indirect jurisdiction in their PIL Acts as a condition 
for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments might face the previously mentioned 
problem. 
 
15.5.1. Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation as an Exclusive Regime for 
Allocating Disputes between the Member State Courts and the Third State 
Courts?  
The introduction of Articles 33 and 34 into the Brussels Ibis Regulation emphasises the 
conclusion that the new rules on lis pendens and related actions are the only two exceptions 
allowing jurisdiction to be declined in favour of a Third State court.782 In consequence, the 
Member State courts might be faced with more difficulties in being able to decline 
jurisdiction in favour of a Third State court in presence of the choice-of-court agreement 
designating such a Third State court in two situations: (i) when the Member State court is first 
seized; and (ii) when there are no parallel proceedings. However, some authors have tried to 
justify the declination on favour of the Third State court in the absence of parallel proceedings 
on the ground of the Third State’s exclusive jurisdiction by reference to the national law, 
which would be an independent evaluation of the application of Articles 33 and 34 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation.783 In this regard, Recital No 24 may support the view that a Third 
State court may exercise its exclusive jurisdiction, which represents an independent ground 
for declining jurisdiction distinct from Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.784 In 
such a case, Recital 24 might be engaged and the Member State “may also include 
consideration of the question whether the court of the third State has exclusive jurisdiction”. 
However, due to the allocation of this wording into the Recital 24 which addresses the 
                                                          
781 F. C. VILLATA, L'attuazione degli accordi di scelta del Foro nel regolamento Bruxelles I, op. cit., p. 220 
782 S. CARBONE, Il Nuovo Spazio Giudiziario Europeo in Materia Civile E Commerciale: Il Regolamento UE N. 
1215/2012, op. cit., p. 306. 
783 R. FENTIMAN, Article 31, in Brussels I Bis Regulation, 2016, op. cit., p. 767. 
784 R. FENTIMAN, Article 31, in Brussels I Bis Regulation, 2016, op. cit., p. 766. 
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complexity of the extra-EU lis pendens and the interpretation of the proper administration of 
justice, the practical effect remains uncertain. 
As we could see, Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation address only a problem 
related to the extra-EU parallel proceedings and may be perceived as the result of a partial 
solution. On the contrary, the practical consequences of this partial solution embodied in 
Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation may be even counterproductive. First, in 
cases of parallel proceedings in the Member State and Third State in the presence of a 
jurisdiction agreement in favour of such a Third State, whereby the Member State court is 
first seized, it is difficult to defend the position of declining jurisdiction in such a case. 
Second, as stated above, in the absence of lis pendens it is arguable whether Articles 33 and 
34 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation do not forbid any remission to the national law for Third 
State derogation agreements. If we admit that the national law could still have a role, does the 
interpretation given in Owusu case prevail?  
The lack of any express rule in the Brussels Ibis Regulation providing for a uniform guideline 
in order to resolve the Owusu problem is regrettable. As mentioned above, such a partial 
solution was intended to motivate other States in ratifying the Hague Convention on the 
Choice of Court Agreements. Although it would be a desirable objective, it does not 
sufficiently cover the current problem arising out of the absence of a rule on the jurisdiction 
agreements in favour of a Third State court.  
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II. Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
1.  The Historical Background 
In 1992, the US Department of State proposed to the Hague Conference of Private 
International Law a judgment convention in civil and commercial matters.785 The letter of the 
US Department proposed to take up the negotiations of the convention “on the recognition of 
and enforcement of judgments” even if the failure of the single Hague Convention on 
recognition and enforcement of judgments from 1971 in terms of ratifications was 
admitted.786 This letter was accompanied by report of Professor von Mehren containing an 
idea of a “classical mixed convention”.787 The classical mixed convention is a convention 
which contains a: (i) whitelist, a list of grounds under which the court is required to assume 
the jurisdiction; (ii) blacklist, a list of grounds under which the courts are not required to 
assume jurisdiction; and (iii) grey area, when the courts may assume jurisdiction on grounds 
neither in the whitelist nor the blacklist.788 The Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference 
on Private International Law foresaw the risk that such a classical mixed convention would 
press the Brussels and Lugano States to “stick as closely as possible to the existing Brussels 
and Lugano texts”.789 In consequence, the Permanent Bureau proposed more than a classical 
“single” convention, which determines the indirect rules of jurisdiction that could form the 
basis for recognition and enforcement. They suggested a “mixed convention”.790 A “flexible 
mixed convention” does not contain any positive direct rules of jurisdiction, but it operates 
                                                          
785 Letter of 5 May 1992 sent by Edwin Williamson, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State to the Hague 
Conference. 
786 Convention of 1 February 1971 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, which has been ratified only by Cyprus, Kuwait, the Netherlands, and Portugal. 
787 See A. T. VON MEHREN, Recognition Convention Study: Final Report. 
788 A. T. VON MEHREN, The Case for a Convention-mixte Approach to Jurisdiction to Adjudicate and 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, Rabels Zeitschiftfiir ausldndisches und internationales 
Privatrecht, 61 (1997), p. 86; A. T. VON MEHREN, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A New 
Approach for the Hague Conference?, Law and Contemporary Problems 57 (1994), p. 271. See also in this 
regard: P. NYGH, Arthur's Baby: The Hague Negotiations for a World-Wide Judgments Convention, in J. 
NAFZIGER AND S. SYMEONIDES (eds), Law and Justice in a Multistate World: Essays in Honor of Arthur T. von 
Mehren, Brill- Nijhoff, 2002, p. 151. 
789 Prel. Doc. No 17 of May 1992 in Proceedings of the Seventeenth Session (1993), Vol I – Some reflections of 
the Permanent Bureau on a general convention on enforcement of judgments, p. 237. 
790 A. T. VON MEHREN, Enforcing Judgments Abroad: Reflections on the Design of Recognition Conventions, 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law (1998), p.19. 
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only with the “blacklist” of direct jurisdiction grounds and list of positive indirect jurisdiction 
grounds, under which the judgment can be recognized or enforced.791  
In 1992, the Working Group supported the view of the classical mixed convention,792 but the 
Hague Conference on Private International Law decided to study further the matter within the 
Special Commission. The study lasted from 1994 to 1996, and the formal negotiations based 
on the study started in 1997, resulting in the Draft Preliminary Text.793 Due to the large 
support for the convention to be a “double” convention,794 which was caused by the presence 
of the delegations coming from more than 25 “ Brussels Regime Member States”, the draft 
text often reflected the double conventions, in particular, the Brussels Convention. It became 
apparent that it was too ambitious of a project and it was not possible to draw up the 
convention within a reasonable time.795 Moreover, the agreement was not possible to reach in 
particular as regards to the black and white lists. Special attention was given to e-commerce, 
intellectual property, consumer, and employment contracts and to the relationship with other 
international instruments.796 
In February 2002, the Permanent Bureau identified the issues on which the consensus was 
achieved, as “the provisions on scope, defendant's forum, choice-of-court in the business to 
business context, lis pendens and exceptional circumstances for declining jurisdiction along 
                                                          
791 The flexible mixed rules can be found for example in the Hague Convention of 23 November 2007 on the 
International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance. 
792 Prel. Doc. No 19 of November 1992 - Proceedings of the Seventeenth Session (1993), Vol I – Conclusions of 
the Working Group meeting on enforcement of judgments, p. 257. 
793 Prel. Doc. No. 11 of August 2000 - Report on the preliminary draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, drawn up by Peter Nygh and Fausto Pocar. 
794 A. T. VON MEHREN, Drafting a Convention on International Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign 
Judgments Acceptable World-Wide: Can the Hague Conference Project Succeed?, American Journal of 
Comparative Law (2001), p. 199; R. A. BRAND, S. R. JABLONSKI, Forum Non Conveniens: History, Global 
Practice, and Future under the Hague Convention on Choice-of-court Agreements, op. cit., p. 145; A. 
ZANOBETTI, EU Cooperation in Civil Matters and Multilevel Unification of Private International Law: Some 
Remarks, in P. FRANZINA (ed), The External Dimension of EU Private International Law After Opinion 1/13, 
Intersentia, 2017, p. 129. 
795 Prel. Doc. No 11 of August 2000 - Report on the preliminary draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, drawn up by Peter Nygh and Fausto Pocar, p. 27; Interim Text - 
Summary of the Outcome of the Discussion in Commission II of the First Part of the Diplomatic Conference (6-
22 June 2001), prepared by the Permanent Bureau and the Co-reporters Interim Text - Summary of the Outcome 
of the Discussion in Commission II of the First Part of the Diplomatic Conference (6-22 June 2001), prepared by 
the Permanent Bureau and the Co-reporters. On the details of the history backgrounds of this project see R. A. 
BRAND, The 1999 Hague Preliminary Draft Convention Text on Jurisdiction and Judgments: A View from the 
United States, in F. POCAR, C. HONORATI (eds), The Hague Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and 
Judgments, CEDAM, 2005, pp. 31-62. 
796 Prel. Doc. No 12 of August 1996 - Proceedings of the Nineteenths Session (1996), Vol 1 – Miscellaneous 
matters, p. 81-83. 
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with most of the chapter on recognition and enforcement.”,797 stating that the starting point 
should be choice-of-court agreements.798 The Informal Working Group met three times 
aiming at preparing a text to be submitted to the Special Commission.799 The three meetings 
of the Special Commission took place between 2003 and 2005. The definitive text was 
prepared at the Twentieth Session of the Hague Conference in June 2005, and was approved 
by the Plenary Session on 30 June 2005. The Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements was opened to the signature on that date. 
The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements aims at promoting international trade 
and investment through enhanced judicial co-operation by the introduction of the uniform 
rules on jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil or 
commercial matters.800 The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreement should provide 
certainty and should ensure the effectiveness of exclusive choice-of-court agreements in 
business to business transactions.801 As explained in Section 15 of the Subchapter II, there is a 
risk that that: (i) choice-of-court agreements in favour of a Third State court will not be 
respected in the EU; (ii) choice-of-court agreements in favour of a court in the EU will not be 
respected in Third States; (iii) a judgement given by the chosen Third State court will not 
have the capacity to be recognised and enforced in the EU; and (iv) a judgement given by the 
chosen Member State court will not have the capacity to be recognised and enforced outside 
the EU. The survey carried out by the ABA revealed that almost 40 % of respondents stated 
that enforcing a Third State choice-of-court agreement had been difficult or extremely 
difficult.802 According to the ICC survey, almost 40% stated that obtaining recognition or 
enforcement of judgments had been difficult and 7,4% stated that this had been extremely 
difficult or practically insurmountable.803 
Furthermore, small and the medium enterprises faced with difficulty in accessing information 
on risks stemming from the trade with the Third States. Barriers were identified, especially for 
                                                          
797 Prel. Doc. No 16 of February 2002 - Some reflections on the present state of negotiations on the judgments 
project in the context of the future work programme of the Conference, p. 431. 
798 Prel. Doc. No 16 of February 2002 - Some reflections on the present state of negotiations on the judgments 
project in the context of the future work programme of the Conference, p. 433. 
799 Prel. Doc. No 22 of June 2003 - Report on the work of the Informal Working Group on the Judgments 
Project, in particular a text achieved at its third meeting of March 2003. 
800 Preamble of the Hague Convention on Choice- of-court Court Agreements. 
801 Preamble of the Hague Convention on Choice- of-court Court Agreements. 
802 Impact Assessment on the Ratification of the Hague Convention on Choice-of-Court Agreements, p. 25. 
803 Ibidem. 
  
196 
 
small businesses or individuals, as difficulties: enforcing rights; costs of proceedings; lack of 
easily accessible and readily understood specialist knowledge; and high level of uncertainty of 
success in pursuing a case.804 
Although Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation may be perceived as a partial 
solution on the EU level in case of lis pendens in a Third State court in the presence of choice-
of-court agreement in favour of a Third State court (if the conditions are fulfilled), in other 
cases the Owusu problem seems to be unresolved. Since the non-introduction of the explicit 
rule on choice-of-court agreements in favour of Third State courts which would fill this “gap” 
was caused by the intention on motivating other States in ratifying the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements,805 it is necessary to analyse the rules on the Hague Convention 
on Choice of Court Agreements and their compatibility with the Brussels Ibis Regulation. In 
2008, several impact assessments on the conclusion of the Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements by the EU were published.806 It concluded that the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements would be beneficial in terms of promoting legal certainty and 
predictability for European businesses in respect of Third States.807 
 
2. Scope of Application 
2.1.  Temporal and Territorial Scope 
On 5 September 2008, the European Commission issued a proposal for a Council Decision on 
signing by the European Community of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements. According to the European Commission, the European Community had 
exclusive competence to conclude the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and 
                                                          
804 Commission Staff Working Document. Accompanying the Proposal for a Council Decision on the signing by 
the European Community of the Convention on Choice-of-Court Agreements, SEC (2008) 2390, 5 September 
2009, p. 11. 
805 Committee on Legal Affairs, 20 September 2011, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-
live/en/committees/video?event=20110920-0900-COMMITTEE-JURI. 
806 Impact Assessment on the Ratification of the Hague Convention on Choice-of-Court Agreements; 
Commission Staff Working Document. Accompanying the Proposal for a Council Decision on the signing by the 
European Community of the Convention on Choice-of-Court Agreements, SEC (2008) 2390, 5 September 2009. 
807 Commission Staff Working Document. Accompanying the Proposal for a Council Decision on the signing by 
the European Community of the Convention on Choice-of-Court Agreements, SEC (2008) 2390, 5 September 
2009, p. 46. 
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referred to the ECJ’s jurisprudence, in particular to Lugano opinion 1/03.808 The European 
Commission proposal on the exclusive competence of the European Community was 
approved by the Council on 26 February 2009.809 The EU deposited the instrument of 
approval on 11 June 2015, on the basis of the decision to approve the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements on behalf of the Member States adopted by the Council of the 
European Union on 4 and 5 December 2014.810  
Almost after ten years after its adoption, the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements entered into force on 1 October 2015 under Article 31 par. 1 of the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreement in 32 Contracting State – the EU, all Member 
States,811 Mexico,812 Singapore,813 and Montenegro.814 Moreover, the People’s Republic of 
China,815 Ukraine,816 and the United States of America817 have signed the Hague Convention 
                                                          
808 Proposal for a Council Decision on the signing by the European Community of the Convention on Choice-of-
Court Agreements, 5 September 2008, COM (2008) 538 final, point 11. 
809 Council Decision of 26 February 2009 on the signing on behalf of the European Community of the 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, (2009/397/EC), OJ L 133, 29 May 2009. The existence of an 
exclusive external competence of the EU concerning judicial cooperation in civil matters was affirmed by the 
ECJ in the already analysed the Lugano Opinion 1/03, 7 February 2006. Opinions of the Court, Avis 1/13, 
Adhésion d'États tiers à la convention de La Haye, 14 October 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2303, strengthen the idea 
of the EU’s exclusive external competence, when the ECJ upheld that the acceptance of the accession of third 
States to the Hague Convention of 1980 on international child abduction fell within the exclusive external 
competence of the EU. 
810 Council Decision of 4 December 2014, on the approval, on behalf of the European Union, of the Hague 
Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice-of-Court Agreements, (2014/887/EU), OJ L 353, 10 December 2014. 
811 The Member States are bound by the approval according to Article 30 of the Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements, except of Denmark, as specified in the Recital 8 and 9 of the Council Decision of 4 
December 2014, on the approval, on behalf of the European Union, of the Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on 
Choice-of-Court Agreements, (2014/887/EU) OJ L 353, 10 December 2014. Article 30 of the Hague Convention 
on Choice of Court Agreements authorizes a Regional Economic Integration Organisation to be the only 
Contracting Party, whereby the Member States are bound by the Convention, when the Regional Economic 
Integration Organisation exercises the external competence over the whole matter. On 30 May 2018, Denmark 
had deposited its instrument of accession to the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and entered 
into force for Denmark on 1 September 2018. In accordance with article 21 of the Hague Convention on Choice 
of Court Agreements, Denmark made a declaration to exclude certain types of insurance contracts from the 
Convention’s scope. 
812 Mexico acceded to the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements on 26 September 2007 and entered 
into force for Mexico on 1 October 2015. 
813 Singapore signed the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements on 25 March 2015, ratified it on 2 
June 2016 and entered into force on 1 October 2016. On the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
from the perspective of Singapore see: T. M. YEO, Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005: A 
Singapore Perspective, Journal of International Law and Diplomacy, (2015), p. 50 et seq. 
814 Montenegro signed the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements on 5 October 2017, ratified it on 
18 April 2018, and the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements entered into force for Montenegro on 
1 August 2018. 
815 The People’s Republic of China signed the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements on 12 
September 2017. On the Chinese perspective see G. TU, The Hague Choice-of-court Convention - A Chinese 
Perspective, American Journal of Comparative Law, (2007), p. 347 et seq.  
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on Choice of Court Agreements.818 Although until now, the Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements does not seem to be as successful as its arbitration counterpart (the 1958 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, that is applied 
within over 130 Contracting States819) the US ratification could motivate other States to begin 
the ratification process.820 According to the Council on General Affairs and Policy of the 
Hague Conference, countries such as Australia, Canada, Tunisia, and Brazil are considering 
joining the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and countries such as 
Argentina, Costa Rica, New Zealand, and Serbia participate in the Permanent Bureau’s 
Implementation Dialogue.821 Lastly, in the context of the territorial scope, it must be 
highlighted that the chosen court must be a court or courts of a Contracting State.822  
Two other situations must be distinguished: first when the Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements comes into force for a particular State; second, when the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements applies to a particular legal contract or 
proceedings. As to the first issue, Article 31 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
816 Ukraine signed the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements on 21 March 2016 
817 The United States of America has signed the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements on 19 
January 2009. There is a support for ratification of the Hague Convention on Choice- of-court Court 
Agreements. However, the reason of the non-ratification is due to the complicated state and federal issues in 
context of the implementation of the Convention in the legal system. See P. H. PFUND, Federalism and U.S. 
Implementation of PIL Conventions - Implementing the Hague Convention on Choice-of-court Agreements, in A 
Commitment to Private International Law: Essays in honour of Hans van Loon, Intersentia, 2013, p. 477 et seq.; 
R. A. BRAND, Implementing the 2005 Hague Convention: The EU Magnet and the US Centrifuge, in J. FORNER 
DELAYGUA (ed), Entre Bruselas y La Haya. Estudios Sobre La Unificación Internacional Y Regional Del 
Derecho International Privado: Liber Amicorum Alegría Borrás, Marcial Pons, 2013, p. 267 et seq. See also: G. 
P. HENDRIX, Memorandum of the American Bar Association - Section of International Law Working Group on 
the implementation of the Hague Convention on Choice-of-court Agreements, The International Lawyer 
International Lawyer, 49:3 (2016), p 255-272: «the Convention enjoys universal support in the United States, but 
its transmittal to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification has been held up by disagreements over 
whether it should be implemented by federal law or by a combination of federal and state law.». 
818 Such commitment of the States which have signed the convention is not irrelevant from an international 
law perspective. See Article 18 lett. a) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: «(a) State is 
obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when … it has signed the 
treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until 
it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty.». 
819 See List of Contracting States available at: 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html.  
820 P. D. TROOBOFF, Proposed Principles for United States Implementation of the New Hague Convention on 
Choice-of-court Agreements, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 42 (2009), p. 237, 
244; M. B. BERLIN, Hague Convention on Choice-of-court Agreements: Creating an International Framework 
for Recognizing Foreign Judgments, International Law & Management Review 3:1 (2007), p. 76. 
821 Prel. Doc. No 5 of January 2017 - Suggested Further Work in Support of Forum and Law Selection in 
International Commercial Contracts. 
822 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 100. 
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Agreements specifies that the rules take effect in the Contracting States on the first day of the 
month following the expiration of three months after the deposit of the instrument of the 
ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession.823 As to the second case, Article 16 of the 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements differs from the situation when the seized 
court is the chosen one and when the non-designated court is seized. Article 16 par. 1 of the 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements provides that it applies to the choice-of-
court agreements concluded after the entry into the force at the chosen State. On the other 
hand, the seized non-chosen court may rely upon the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements only when: (i) the choice-of-court agreement was concluded after the entry into 
the force at the chosen State; or (ii) the proceedings were instituted after the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements’ entry into force in the seized State. In other 
words, the time of the institution of the proceedings is irrelevant for the chosen court. Only 
the non-designated court will be required to ascertain whether the proceedings are instituted 
after the entry into force of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, i.e., it 
must identify the point of time of the institution of the proceedings. However, the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements is silent in this respect. Since the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements should not affect the procedural law of the 
Contracting States, unless otherwise provided, the procedural law of the Contracting States 
determines the proceedings (for example, the time limits) within the Hague Convention 
regime.824 In consequence, it can be assumed that the point of time determining the institution 
of the proceedings should be governed by lex fori. 
 
2.2. Material Scope 
The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements limits its scope to the civil and 
commercial matters, as provided in Article 1. The notion of civil and commercial matters has 
an autonomous meaning and it does not refer to the national law.825 However, this notion is 
                                                          
823 According to Article 27 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreement, every State may become a 
Party to the Hague Convention on Choice-of-court Agreement either by signature followed by ratification, 
acceptance, approval, or accession, it depends on the State which of the methods is most convenient.  
824 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 88-92. 
825 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 49. 
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not defined in the Convention.826 As explained in the Hartley-Dogauchi Report, this notion 
primarily intends to exclude public law and criminal law, whereby the use of the words 
“civil”, as well as “commercial” is because of the strict division of this category in the legal 
systems of some States. In case that a State acts as a private person, such an act should fall 
under the term of “civil and commercial matters”.827  
Article 2 excludes from the scope of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreement 
the specific matters expressly listed in two paragraphs. The long list of the excluded matters is 
a consequence of the existence of: international conventions; the categorisation of the matter 
as exclusive with the special ground of jurisdiction; or because consensus was not reached.828 
First, paragraph 1 of Article 2 excludes from the scope of the Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreement the choice-of-court agreements: (i) where a natural person acts primarily for 
personal, family, or household purposes; or (ii) employment contracts. Such exclusions serve 
the purpose protecting vulnerable persons which often are subject to national protective 
rules.829 These two categories of vulnerable persons suggest the difference between them – 
the consumer’s exclusion depends on the primary scope of “acting”, but the employment’s 
exclusion is based on the subject matter – employment contracts. In comparison with the 
Brussels regime, as we could see in Section 12 of Subchapter I, the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
does not exclude from its scope consumers and employees, but it offers the protective fora to 
the weaker parties in accordance with Article 19 and 23 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. It 
means that consumers and employees will not be deprived of the protective regime of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation. However, the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
excludes only consumers-natural persons, which obviously do not cover legal persons not 
acting in the course of business, such as charity, government, department, or another 
organisation. Due to the restriction of “consumer” to “private final consumers” 830 and the 
                                                          
826 On the uncertainties relating to the lack of the definition see: M. B. BERLIN, Hague Convention on Choice-of-
court Agreements: Creating an International Framework for Recognizing Foreign Judgments, op. cit., p. 66. 
827 R. A. BRAND, P. HERRUP, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Commentary and 
Documents, op. cit., p. 47. 
828 M. PERTEGÁS, The Brussels I Regulation and the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, ERA 
Forum. 11:1 (2010), p. 24. 
829 R. A. BRAND, P. HERRUP, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Commentary and 
Documents, op. cit., p. 55 
830 ECJ, Case 150/77, Bertrand, par. 21. 
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exclusion of a corporation831 as interpreted by the ECJ,832 and also due to the notion of 
“consumer” defined in the various directives as “natural persons”,833 it can be concluded that 
the notion of “consumer” provided in the Brussels Ibis Regulation is in line with the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements.  
Paragraph 2 of Article 2 in the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
exhaustively listed matters within its scope of application.834 At first, it can seem that the list 
is much longer than the list of the matters excluded from the scope of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation. However, the difference is less significant than it might appear. Both the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and the Brussels Ibis Regulation exclude the 
status or legal capacity of natural persons,835 matrimonial property rights,836 maintenance,837 
wills and successions,838 insolvency proceedings,839 social security,840 and arbitration.841 
                                                          
831 ECJ, Joined cases C-541/99 and C-542/99, Cape Snc v Idealservice Srl and Idealservice MN RE Sas v OMAI 
Srl, 22 November 2001, ECLI:EU:C:2001:625, in context of interpretation of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 
April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, OJ L 95, 21 April 1993. 
832 In certain Member States, the notion of consumer covers also legal persons, e.g. Belgium, Denmark, Germany 
etc., see H. SCHULTE-NÖLKE, C. TWIGG-FLESNER, M. EBERS, EC Consumer Law Compendium – Comparative 
Analysis- Annotated Compendium including a comparative analysis of the Community consumer acquis, 
Universität Bielefeld 52 (2007), pp. 341-366. 
833 For examples see Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on 
credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC, OJ L 133, 22 May 2008; Council 
Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, OJ L 95, 21 April 1993; Directive 
1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of the sale of 
consumer goods and associated guarantees, OJ L 171, 7 July 1999; Directive 2002/65/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 concerning the distance marketing of consumer financial 
services and amending Council Directive 90/619/EEC and Directives 97/7/EC and 98/27/EC, OJ L 271, 9 
October 2002. 
834 Article 2 par. 2 excludes these matters from its scope: a) the status and legal capacity of natural persons; b) 
maintenance obligations; c) other family law matters, including matrimonial property regimes and other rights or 
obligations arising out of marriage or similar relationships; d) wills and succession; e) insolvency, composition, 
and analogous matters; f) the carriage of passengers and goods; g) marine pollution, limitation of liability for 
maritime claims, general average, and emergency towage and salvage; h) anti-trust (competition) matters; i) 
liability for nuclear damage; j) claims for personal injury brought by or on behalf of natural persons; k) tort or 
delict claims for damage to tangible property that do not arise from a contractual relationship; l) rights in rem in 
immovable property, and tenancies of immovable property; m) the validity, nullity, or dissolution of legal 
persons, and the validity of decisions of their organs; n) the validity of intellectual property rights other than 
copyright and related rights; o) infringement of intellectual property rights other than copyright and related 
rights, except where infringement proceedings are brought for breach of a contract between the parties relating to 
such rights, or could have been brought for breach of that contract; p) the validity of entries in public registers. 
835 Article 2 par. 2 lett. a) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and Article 1 par. 2 lett. a) of 
the Brussels I-bis Regulation. 
836 Article 2 par. 2 lett. c) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and Article 1 par. 2 lett. a) of 
the Brussels I-bis Regulation. 
837 Article 2 par. 2 lett. b) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and Article 1 par. 2 lett. e) 
of the Brussels I-bis Regulation. However, maintenance mattes are still covered in the 2007 Lugano Convention. 
838 Article 2 par. 2 lett. d) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and Article 1 par. 2 lett. f) of 
the Brussels I-bis Regulation. 
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Moreover, certain matters which are governed by the rules on exclusive jurisdiction according 
to the Brussels Ibis Regulation, and thus, exclude party autonomy, are excluded as well from 
the scope of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, such as immovable 
property,842 validity, nullity or dissolution of legal persons and their decisions,843 validity and 
infringement of intellectual property rights other than copyrights issues,844 and validity of 
entries in public registers.845 There are also matters which are excluded from the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreement, but not from the Brussels Ibis Regulation, such as 
carriage of persons and goods,846 maritime matters,847 antitrust and competition,848 nuclear 
liability,849 personal injury,850 and damage to tangible property.851  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
839 Article 2 par. 2 lett. e) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and Article 1 par. 2 lett. b) 
of the Brussels I-bis Regulation. However, the winding-up of the non-insolvent companies is covered by the 
exclusive jurisdiction according to Article 24 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, but they are excluded from the 
scope of application of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements pursuant to Article 2 par. 2 lett. 
m). 
840 This can be found in Article 1 par. 2 lett. c) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, but there is no equivalent in the 
Hague Convention on Choice-of-court Agreements. However, it is regarded as a public-law matter which does 
not fit with the term of civil and commercial matters. See Hartley, book, p. 80. 
841 Article 2 par. 4 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and Article 1 par. 2 lett. d) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
842 Article 2 par. 2 lett. l) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements excludes rights in rem in 
immovable property, and tenancies of immovable property. It means that the rights in rem must be regarded as 
proceedings concerning ownership and not other proceedings where the subject/object of the proceedings do not 
have rights in rem (e.g. damage to an immovable, damage for breach of contract for the sale of immovable). The 
tenancies were excluded for two reasons: first, the tenants are subject of the protection in the certain legal 
systems; second, the tenancies are in some jurisdictions considered as rights in rem.  
843 Article 2 par. 2 lett. m) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. 
844 Article 2 par. 2 lett. n) and o) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. 
845 Article 2 par. 2 lett. p) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. 
846 Article 2 par. 2 lett. f) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. Two reasons led to the 
exclusion: (i) the States were afraid of the unfavourable standard-form contracts, (ii) there are a number of other 
international conventions, which could lead to the conflicts of the conventions. See T. HARTLEY, Choice-of-
Court Agreements under the European and International Instruments: The Revised Brussels I Regulation, the 
Lugano Convention, and the Hague Convention, op. cit., p. 84. 
847 Article 2 par. 2 lett. g) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, which means marine 
pollution, limitation of liability for maritime claims, general average, and emergency towage and salvage. 
However, the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements applies to marine insurance, non-emergency 
towage and salvage, shipbuilding, ship mortgages and liens. See Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 59. 
848 Article 2 par. 2 lett. h) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. The different terms are 
caused by the US denomination “anti-trust” and Europe denomination “competition law”. The exclusion covers 
also private-law proceedings arisen from the contractual relationship (e.g., tort damages for breach of 
antitrust/competition law), unless they arise as preliminary question. See Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 62 and 
63. 
849 Article 2 par. 2 lett. i) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, this matter is also covered 
by various international conventions. See Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 64. 
850 Article 2 par. 2 lett. j) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements specifies that from its scope 
are excluded claims for personal injury brought by or on behalf of natural persons. 
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Furthermore, the Contracting States are entitled to make a declaration that a particular matter 
falls outside the scope of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements under Article 
21. The Contracting State must pay attention so that it is “no broader than necessary” and that 
the exclusion is “clearly and precisely defined”. The basic principles are applied in this 
regard: transparency and non-retroactivity, reciprocity, and review of the declaration.852 The 
transparency and non-retroactivity principle basically means that the declaration must be 
notified according to Article 32 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements to 
the depositary and is posted on the websites of the Hague Conference (i.e., transparency). 
Non-retroactivity is secured by the fact that such a declaration takes effect on the first day of 
the month following the expiration of three months after the date on which the notification is 
received by the depositary, in accordance with Article 32 par. 4 of the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements. The reciprocity principle means that the Convention is not 
applicable in the other Contracting States for the excluded subject matter, where an exclusive 
choice-of-court agreement designates the courts of the Contracting State that made the 
declaration. Lastly, the review of declaration principle is based on the fact that the Secretary 
General of the Hague Conference makes arrangements at regular intervals for review of the 
operation of such declarations, in accordance with article 24 of the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements. Although this provision aims at enabling adherence to the 
Convention,853 it might be perceived negatively, in so far as it might undermine predictability 
and reduce utility.854 It can be argued that the strong interest in not applying this Convention 
to a specific matter can often be replaced by the public policy exception according to Article 6 
lett. c) and Article 9 lett. e),855 or by the nullity and voidability of the jurisdiction agreement 
according to Articles 5, 6 lett. a), and 9 lett. a) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements.856 The EU made the declaration excluding the insurance matters from the scope 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
851 Article 2 par. 2 lett. k) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements specifies that from its scope 
are excluded tort or delict claims for damage to tangible property that do not arise from a contractual 
relationship. 
852 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 236. 
853 A. SCHULZ, The Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, op. cit., p. 260. 
854 R. GARNETT, The Hague Choice of Court Convention: Magnum Opus or Much Ado About Nothing?, Journal 
of Private International Law 5:1 (2009), p. 167. 
855 For the sufficiency of the application of public policy according to Article 6 of the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements without necessity to make a declaration see F. RAGNO, Forum Selection under the 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements – A European Perspective, NYU Lectures, 2018, p. 88. 
856 L. E. TEITZ, The Hague Choice of Court Convention: Validating Party Autonomy and Providing an 
Alternative to Arbitration, The American Journal of Comparative Law 53:3 (2005), p. 553. 
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of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements in order to maintain consistency 
with the Brussels Ibis Regulation, which protects policyholders, insured parties, and 
beneficiaries.857 
Lastly, paragraph 3 of Article 2 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
provides that the matter is excluded from the scope where a matter arises merely as a 
preliminary question. 
 
2.3.  Personal Scope of Application 
For the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, it is not relevant whether the 
persons are resident in the Contracting States. The only condition is that the seized courts 
(designated, as well as non-designated) are situated in the Contracting States. The Hague 
Convention applies when the parties are parties to the choice-of-court agreement, are bound 
by it, or are entitled to invoke it.858 However, as it will be demonstrated further, the residence 
of the parties is relevant for the consideration of the international element and of the 
application of the “give-way” rules in case of conflicting treaties, according to Article 26 of 
the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements.859  
 
2.4.  Internationality 
Article 1 provides that the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreement applies in 
international cases to exclusive choice-of-court agreements. Paragraphs 2 and 3 then provide 
that a case is international “unless the parties are resident in the same Contracting State and 
the relationship of the parties and all other elements relevant to the dispute…are connected 
only with that State.” In other words, the rules on the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements do not apply to entirely domestic cases. On the contrary, the rules apply if the 
                                                          
857 See Annex 1 of Council Decision of 4 December 2014 on the approval, on behalf of the European Union, of 
the Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, (2014/887/EU), OJ L 353, 10 December 
2014. The text corresponds largely to the wording of Article 15 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
858 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 97 and 294. According to this Report: «the agreement may bind third parties 
who did not expressly consent to if, if their standing to bring the proceedings depends on the their taking over 
the rights and obligations of one of the original parties. Whether this is the case will depend on national law.». 
In this regard see also Minutes No 2 of the Twentieth Session, Commission II, par. 2 to 10. However, see par. 
142 of the Hartley-Dogauchi Report.  
859 On the “give way” rule, see infra Sections 2 and 3, Subchapter III of this Chapter. 
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parties are not resident in the same State, even when all other elements are connected only 
with the State of residence of one of the parties, or if the parties reside in the same State, but 
another element is located in other State. In case all facts are wholly domestic, but the parties 
choose a court in another Contracting State, Article 1 par. 2 of the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements specifies that such cases cannot be considered as international.860 
In the first place, Article 1 par. 2 of the Hague Convention refers to the residence of the 
parties - if the parties are resident in different States, the case is international. Such 
ascertainment requires the application of national law in respect of the natural persons since 
the residence of natural persons remained undefined. 861 The residence of an entity or person 
other than a natural person is governed by Article 4 par. 2 of the Hague Convention on Choice 
of Court Agreements which may result in more residences.862  
The wording referring to the residence of the parties in the same Contracting State is 
important. This wording means that the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreement 
distinguishes between the parties, that are resident in the Contracting States, and the parties, 
that are resident in the non-Contracting States, for the purpose of identification of the 
internationality. We may imagine two (domestic) situations. The first situation concerns the 
parties, that are resident in Mexico, with all other elements of the case situated in Mexico, and 
they designate the Italian court. The second situation concerns the parties, that are resident in 
California, with all elements of the case situated in California, and they designate the Italian 
court. In the first case, the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements is not 
applicable due to the lack of an international element. In the second case, it can be assumed 
that Article 1 par. 2 of the Hague Convention does not impede its application. Thus, it may be 
recommended to disregard the reference to the Contracting State,863 which would otherwise 
lead to the different treatment of Third State parties and the Contracting State parties for the 
determination of the international element. 
                                                          
860 On the doubts in this regard under the Brussels regime, see supra Section 3.4., Subchapter I of this Chapter. 
861 R. A. BRAND, P. HERRUP, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Commentary and 
Documents, op. cit., p. 50. 
862 The four different definitions of residence of entities other than natural persons were assumed on the basis of 
the conceptions provided in the civil and common law countries. See Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 120-123. 
863 On the similar recommendation see M. WELLER, Choice of Forum Agreements Under the Brussels I Brussels 
I-bis Regulation and Under the Hague Convention: Coherences and Clashes, op. cit., p. 4. 
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When the parties are resident in the same Contracting State, what kind of “international” 
elements should be regarded? There is no guideline in this regard, but it can be deduced that 
the factors as the conclusion of the contract, the place of performance or parties’ nationality 
may establish “internationality”, but not, for example, if the goods are manufactured 
abroad.864 Such elements should be determined by national law.865 It is disputable whether the 
choice-of-law agreement coupled with the choice-of-court agreement may establish the 
international element within the meaning of article 1 par. 2 of the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreement. Also, in this case, the Hartley-Dogauchi Report is silent in this 
respect. Its counterpart, the Explanatory Report on Principles on Choice of Law in 
International Commercial Contracts specifies that the parties cannot establish internationally 
of the contract solely by selecting a foreign law accompanied by a foreign choice-of-court.866 
The silence in the Hartley-Dogauchi Report favours the conclusion that a combination of the 
two choices is not deemed to be sufficient for the establishment of the international case.867 
On the contrary, the partie’s choice-of-law may be considered as the subjective connection 
based entirely on party autonomy just like the parties’ choice of the forum.868 
Moreover, article 19 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreement enables to the 
Contracting States to make a declaration “that its courts may refuse to determine disputes to 
which an exclusive choice-of-court agreement applies if, except for the location of the chosen 
court, there is no connection between that State and the parties or the dispute.” By making 
this declaration, the Contracting State would prevent the parties from designating a foreign 
                                                          
864 On these considerations see Commentary on the Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial 
Contracts, HCCH Publications, 2015, par. 1.18, whereby Article 1 par. 2 of the Principles on Choice of Law in 
International Commercial Contracts provides for the similar rule as Article 1 of the Hague Convention on 
Choice-of-court Agreements. 
865 R. A. BRAND, P. HERRUP, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Commentary and 
Documents, op. cit., p. 51. 
866 Commentary on the Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts, HCCH Publications, 
2015, par. 1.22. This can be found as well in the Recital 15 of the Rome I Regulation which relates to Article 3 
par. 3 and provides: «This rule should apply whether or not the choice of law was accompanied by a choice-of-
court or tribunal.». 
867 P. BEAUMONT, Hague Choice of Court Agreements Convention 2005: Background, Negotiations, Analysis 
and Current Status, Journal of Private International Law 5:1 (2009), p. 150. On the conclusion that choice of law 
represents a sufficient international factor, since the choice-of-law coupled with choice-of-court clause evade to 
the mandatory provisions, see F. RAGNO, Forum Selection under the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements – A European Perspective, op. cit., p. 92. 
868 M. WELLER, Choice of Forum Agreements Under the Brussels I Brussels I-bis Regulation and Under the 
Hague Convention: Coherences and Clashes, op. cit., p. 4. 
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neutral forum869 or a foreign specialised commercial court. It means that although the case 
would be international within the meaning of Article 1 of the Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreement, the court would also be obliged to identify the connection between the 
designated court and the parties or the dispute. 
As in the case of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, it is necessary to analyse at what point of time 
the case must be considered as international. Due to the silence in the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements, such an answer must be searched for in national law.870 In 
consequence, the courts may come out with different results, depending on whether the 
internationality of the case is determined at the time of making an agreement; at the time the 
proceedings are instituted; at both times; or at either time.871 The identification of the relevant 
point of time is a significant aspect mainly when the residence or other international element 
has changed. The fixation of the time to the conclusion of the agreement guarantees the 
predictability for the parties, but the wording of “case” not “agreement” in Article 1 of the 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements might support the opinion that it refers to 
the time of institution of the proceedings.872 This restrictive approach can be assumed when 
the international element of the case is ascertained at the time of the conclusion of the 
agreement, as well as at the time of institution of the proceedings. The broadest scope 
guarantees the use of reference to either the time of the conclusion of the agreement or the 
time of institution of the proceedings.873 
Moreover, for the purpose of the rules on recognition and enforcement of the judgments, 
paragraph 3 of Article 1 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements provides 
that a case is international where recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment is sought. 
In other words, it suffices to request recognition and enforcement in the Contracting State 
different from the Contracting State that issued such judgment. As Article 19 limits 
jurisdiction, Article 20 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements restricts the 
meaning of the “international case” to the recognition and the enforcement of the foreign 
                                                          
869 See Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 230. Some States welcome this solution, such as England or USA. 
870 R. A. BRAND, P. HERRUP, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Commentary and 
Documents, op. cit., p. 51. 
871 Ibidem. 
872 Ibidem. 
873 On the advantageous and disadvantageous see R. A. BRAND, P. HERRUP, The 2005 Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements: Commentary and Documents, op. cit., p. 52. 
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judgment. In particular, Article 20 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
gives the possibility to a Contracting State to declare that its courts may refuse to recognise or 
enforce a judgment when the parties were resident in the requested State, all other elements 
relevant to the dispute were connected only with the requested State, and only the designated 
court was located in other Contracting State. 
Lastly, it is worth mentioning the consequences of a purely domestic case. The designated 
court is not required to hear the case according to Article 5 of the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements, but is not precluded from hearing a case through the exercise of 
jurisdiction based on its national law. On the other hand, the non-designated court is not 
obliged to suspend or dismiss proceedings according to Article 6 of the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements, but the exercise of its jurisdiction is subject to national law.874 
 
3.  Exclusivity of the Choice-of-Court Agreements 
The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements applies only to exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements.875 As in the case of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements provides as well for the “deeming rule”.876 Choice-of-court 
agreements are presumed to be exclusive unless the parties expressly agreed otherwise by 
virtue of Article 3 lett. b) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements.877 The 
exclusivity of the jurisdiction agreement represents a condition for application of the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. 
Moreover, Article 3 lett. a) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements defines 
the “exclusive choice-of-court agreement” as an agreement which: 
…designates, for the purpose of deciding disputes which have arisen or may arise in 
connection with a particular legal relationship, the courts of one Contracting State or 
                                                          
874 R. A. BRAND, P. HERRUP, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Commentary and 
Documents, op. cit., p. 52. 
875 See Article 1 par. 1 of the Hague Convention on Choice-of-court Agreements. 
876 A. SCHULZ, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Clauses, ILSA Journal of International & 
Comparative Law, 12:2 (2006), p. 436. 
877 In contrast with the US system where jurisdiction agreements are presumed to be non-exclusive, see R. A. 
BRAND, P. HERRUP, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Commentary and Documents, 
op. cit., p. 42.  
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one or more specific courts of one Contracting State to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of 
any other courts. 
 In other words, the parties may designate the Italian court without the necessity to specify 
which Italian court will hear a case. Or, the parties are entitled to designate a specific court 
such as a Milanese Court or specific courts of the same Contracting State such as either a 
Milanese court or Bolognese Court.  
Although the Hartley-Dogauchi Report acknowledges the importance of the asymmetric 
jurisdiction clauses in international loan agreements, it continues, that the Diplomatic Session 
had agreed that they “are not exclusive choice-of-court agreements for the purposes of the 
Convention”.878 The position is not so clear when an earlier report suggested clarifying the 
position of the asymmetric jurisdiction clauses in order to be excluded from the definition of 
Article 3 lett. a) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements.879 Moreover, 
Cranston J in the English judgment Commerzbank v Liquimar admitted that asymmetric 
jurisdiction clauses are covered by the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements.880 
It must be noted that Article 22 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreement 
permits to the Contracting State to make declarations allowing reciprocal declarations on non-
exclusive agreements concerning the recognition and enforcement of judgments (Articles 8-
15). Article 22 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements poses the strict 
requirements which must be met for its operation.881 Such declarations also cover the 
                                                          
878 Minutes No. 3 of the Second Commission Meeting of Wednesday 15 June 2005, Proceedings of the 
Twentieth Session, par. 2-11; Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 105 and 106. On the non-applicability of the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements to asymmetric jurisdiction clauses see also A. SCHULZ, The Hague 
Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, op. cit., p. 243, 263; M. KEYES, B. A. MARSHALL, 
Jurisdiction Agreements: Exclusive, Optional and Asymmetrical, op. cit., p. 345, 366, stating that Switzerland 
proposed that unilateral agreements should be covered within the scope of the Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements, but that such a proposal was rejected. 
879 L. MERRETT, The Future Enforcement of Asymmetric Jurisdiction Agreements, International & Comparative 
Law Quarterly, 67:1 (2018), p. 58, where the author suggests to add the words «such an agreement must be 
exclusive irrespective of the party bringing the proceedings.». 
880 See Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft v Liquimar Tankers Management Inc, [2017] EWHC 161 (Comm), 
[39]. See also R. A. BRAND, P. HERRUP, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: 
Commentary and Documents, op. cit., p. 44, which does not classify the asymmetric agreements as non-
exclusive jurisdiction agreements, but he deems that such clauses may represent “a potential problem”. 
881 The conditions are: (i) the State of origin and the State requested for the recognition and enforcement must be 
in the Contracting States; (ii) both Contracting States made a declaration; (iii) the court of origin was chosen in 
the non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement; (iv) such the court of origin was the court first seized; (v) there exists 
neither a judgment given by any other court before which proceedings could be brought in accordance with the 
non-exclusive choice-of-court agreement, nor a proceeding pending between the same parties in any other such 
court on the same cause of action; and (vi) the choice-of-court agreement meets the formal requirements of 
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recognition and enforcement of non-exclusive choice-of-court agreements without 
limitation,882 non-exclusive choice-of-court agreements with limitation,883 and asymmetric 
agreements. 
 
4.  Formal Validity 
Article 3 lett. c) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements provides that an 
exclusive choice-of-court agreement must be concluded or documented in writing. Or the 
agreement must be concluded by any other means of communication which renders 
information accessible and usable for subsequent reference. The text regarding the electronic 
communication was modelled from the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce 
1996.884 
Exclusive jurisdiction clauses fall into the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
if they comply with the exhaustive formal requirements: the national law cannot add any 
further formal requirements.885 The national law cannot prescribe invalidity of the jurisdiction 
clause where it is not notarized,886 it is written in a foreign language, written in special bold or 
small types, or where it is not signed separately from the main contract.887 On the contrary, if 
the national law or other treaties or regulations888 impose no formal requirements or less rigid 
formal requirements than Article 3 lett. c) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements, a court may give effect to such a jurisdiction clause according to its national law 
and hear a case. However, a seized non-designated court would not be prohibited from 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Article 3lett. c) and designates a court or courts of one or more Contracting States in disputes which have arisen 
or may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship. 
882 According to Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 246, the non-exclusive choice-of-court agreements without 
limitation do not impose restrictions as to the designated courts, such as e.g. «Proceedings may be brought in 
Milan court or any other court which may exercise jurisdiction under its own law.». 
883 According to Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 247, non-exclusive choice-of-court agreements with limitations 
impose the restrictions as to the designated courts, such as «Proceedings may be brought in Milan court or any 
in Paris court». The authors of this report categorise exclusive non-unique jurisdiction agreements such as in 
ECJ, Case 23/78, Meeth in the non-exclusive choice-of-court agreements with limitation. 
884 A. SCHULZ, The Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, op. cit., p. 250. 
885 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 110. 
886 R. A. BRAND, P. HERRUP, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Commentary and 
Documents, op. cit., p. 45. 
887 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 110, provides for these non-exhaustive examples. 
888 Except where the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the 2007 Lugano Convention and other international conventions 
are not affected by the Convention pursuant to Article 26 of the Hague Convention on Choice-of-court 
Agreements. See A. SCHULZ, The Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, op. cit., p. 
250. 
  
211 
 
hearing a case according to Article 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreement 
or from non-recognition or non-enforcement of a judgment rendered by a designated court, 
according to Article 8 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements.889 In 
general, such a jurisdiction clause would not fall within the scope of the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements.890 The text distinguishes between the agreement “concluded” 
and “documented”. The Hague Conference has rejected the phrase “evidenced in writing”891 
due to the impression to constitute a rule of evidence.892 The agreement concluded or 
documented in writing does not require a signature. Nevertheless, it might be more difficult to 
prove its existence.893 The same level of the difficulty may arise in the context of the proof of 
existence of the oral agreement – it is recommended to put into writing also only by one of the 
party, but the writing must mirror the consent of the parties to the original oral agreement.894 
In the absence of the agreement in writing, the parties may rely on the other form of the 
jurisdiction agreement. This includes electronic means of data transmission or storage where 
the data are retrievable.  
 
5.  Substantive Validity 
The validity of the jurisdiction agreement covers all issues that may invalidate the agreement, 
such as grounds for the nullity, lack of formal requirements and the sufficient consent of the 
parties.895 As to the consent, as we could see in Section 8.1., Subchapter I of this Chapter, the 
ECJ upheld on several occasion that consensus is presumed where the formal requirements of 
the jurisdiction agreement are met.896 However, the severability of the formal and substantive 
validity was recognized by the introduction of the new rule on substantive validity in Article 
25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation and has removed the doubts in this context.  
                                                          
889 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, see note no 141. 
890 A. SCHULZ, The Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, op. cit., p. 250. 
891 See article 25 par. 1 lett. c) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, which provides for the wording «evidenced in 
writing».  
892 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 113. 
893 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 112. 
894 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 114. 
895 M. WELLER, Choice of Forum Agreements Under the Brussels I Brussels I-bis Regulation and Under the 
Hague Convention: Coherences and Clashes, op. cit., p. 7. 
896 ECJ, Case C-159/97, Trasporti Castelletti; Case C-116/02, Gasser, par. 51. 
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In the regime of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreement the existence of the 
consent is attributed to the substantive validity, whereby the formal requirements “merely 
requires the objective existence of a written text and does not contain any element of 
knowledge or consent.”897 Hartley and Dogauchi Report provides:  
Whether there is consent is normally decided by the law of the State of the chosen court, 
including its rules of choice of law ... However, the Convention as a whole comes into 
operation only if there is a choice-of-court agreement, and this assumes that the basic 
factual requirements of consent exist. If, by any normal standard, these do not exist, a 
court would be entitled to assume that the Convention is not applicable, without having 
to consider foreign law…898  
Probably on the basis of this affirmation, Professors Brand and Herrup presumed that the 
existence of consent is a distinct term from the legal concept “null and void” and thus, it 
would generate a gap which should be refilled by the law of forum including its conflict-of-
law rules.899 Once the dispute falls within the scope of the Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements, the court would be obliged to ascertain validity according to lex fori and 
the whether the agreement is null and void according to the law of the chosen court by virtue 
of Articles 5 and 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreement. Assuming this 
interpretation, a double test with two different standards would be necessary.900 On the other 
hand, according to Professor Beamont, consent was always treated as an aspect of the 
substantive validity (like restrictions and limitations), and such conclusions were never 
contested by the Special Commissions and Diplomatic Session.901 The Hartley-Dogauchi 
Report must be read as that the questions on “consent” are governed by the conflict-of-laws 
rules for substantive validity and capacity and only “in some extreme cases where the 
applicable law has very silly rules on consent we can treat some of the basic questions of 
consent as questions of fact”.902 Professor Beamont even urged courts to reject both 
approaches as not being consistent with the text of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
                                                          
897 A. SCHULZ, The Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, op. cit., p. 253. 
898 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 94 and 95. 
899 R. A. BRAND, P. HERRUP, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Commentary and 
Documents, op. cit., p. 79. 
900 Similarly, see M. WELLER, Choice of Forum Agreements Under the Brussels I Brussels I-bis Regulation and 
Under the Hague Convention: Coherences and Clashes, op. cit., p. 7. 
901 P. BEAUMONT, Hague Choice of Court Agreements Convention 2005: Background, Negotiations, Analysis 
and Current Status, op. cit., p. 138, note no 44. 
902 Ibidem, p. 139. 
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Agreements.903 However, this assumption may also be opposed by the fact that the original 
consent of the parties to the jurisdiction agreement may have a binding effect on third parties, 
and such question should be resolved by the national law according to the Hartley and 
Dogauchi Report.904 Due to the ambiguous wording, it cannot be stated with certainty that the 
Hartley-Dogauchi Report refers to the application of lex fori of the seized court including 
conflict-of-laws rules,905 as suggested by Professors Brand and Herrup concerning the 
existence of consent. Consent is a condition of the existence of the jurisdiction agreement, 
which the seized derogated court would need to verify prima facie and that the allegation on 
the existence of the jurisdiction agreement is not only purpose-built.906 Moreover, 
interpretation supporting the application of the lex fori of the seized court would be in line 
with the law of seized derogated court governing capacity of the parties pursuant to Article 6 
lett. b) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. 
The substantive validity operates according to Article 5, 6, and 9 of the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements. In particular, the law of the chosen State determines whether the 
jurisdiction agreement is null and void. According to the Hartley-Dogauchi Report, the phrase 
“law of the State” covers conflict-of-laws rules, since otherwise, the text would have used the 
phrase “internal law of the State”,907 although such a reading may not be convincing.908 There 
might be different interpretations of this rule,909 but the rule should be understood mainly as 
applying only to substantive (not formal) grounds of invalidity,910 which under the law of the 
chosen court is sufficient to lead to the jurisdiction agreement being “null and void”.911 It 
                                                          
903 Ibidem. 
904 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 97 
905 F. C. VILLATA, L’attuazione degli accordi di scelta del foro nel regolamento Bruxelles I, op. cit., p. 84. 
906 F. C. VILLATA, L’attuazione degli accordi di scelta del foro nel regolamento Bruxelles I, op. cit., p. 86. 
907 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 125 and note no 158 
908 Similarly, see M. WELLER, Choice of Forum Agreements Under the Brussels I Brussels I-bis Regulation and 
Under the Hague Convention: Coherences and Clashes, op. cit., p. 9, footnote no 37; Some doubts on the 
interpretation provided in the Hartley-Dogauchi Report, see F. POCAR, Brevi riflessioni in tema di revisione del 
regolamento Bruxelles I e clausole di scelta di foro, op. cit., p. 332. 
909 See R. A. BRAND, P. HERRUP, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Commentary and 
Documents, op. cit., p. 80, where the authors offer three different interpretations. First interpretation concerns 
“any grounds for declining to give legal effect to a meeting of the minds that has occurred”, second interpretation 
concerns “coextensive with 'lack of substantive validity' or (depending on the concept of 'substantive') to refer to 
any ground of invalidity which is not purely formal” and the last interpretation concerns “some subset of grounds 
under national law for declining to give effect to a meeting of the minds which has occurred”. 
910 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 126 
911 P. BEAUMONT, Hague Choice of Court Agreements Convention 2005: Background, Negotiations, Analysis 
and Current Status, op. cit., p. 145. 
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intends to cover the grounds such as misrepresentation, duress, and lack of capacity.912 The 
law of the chosen State including its conflict-of-laws rules should ensure that all courts would 
consider the substantive validity of a choice-of-court agreement under the same substantive 
national law.913 
Lastly, it must be stressed that the question on incapacity to conclude the jurisdiction 
agreement is governed by lex fori of the chosen court and is included in the “null and void” 
jurisdiction agreement in virtue of Article 5 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreement. However, the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements does not opt for 
the same solution for the seized non-designated court. It distinguishes the jurisdiction 
agreement as “null and void” on one hand and capacity to enter into jurisdiction agreements, 
on the other hand. Thus, the seized non-designated court must apply two different laws in 
order to verify capacity: the law of the State of the chosen court according to Article 6 lett. a) 
and the law of the State of the seized non-designated court according to Article 6 lett. b) of the 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements.914  
 
6. Severability 
Article 3 lett. d) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements provides for a 
severability rule between the jurisdiction clause and main contract. In particular, this 
provision provides that where a jurisdiction agreement forms part of a contract, the 
jurisdiction agreement shall be treated independently from other terms of the contract. It aims 
at maintaining the validity of the jurisdiction agreement even if the main contract is in whole 
or in part invalid.915 Conversely, the main contract remains valid although the jurisdiction 
clause is invalid, and such an issue will be a matter of national law.916  
 
                                                          
912 Lack of capacity is dealt separately in Article 6 lett. b) and Article 9 lett. b) of the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements. 
913 A. SCHULZ, The Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, op. cit., p. 253. 
914 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 150. Similarly, see R. A. BRAND, P. HERRUP, The 2005 Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements: Commentary and Documents, op. cit., p. 91.  
915 The presence of the rule may be attributed to the experience of the 1958 New York Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, which resulted in diverging case law. See A. SCHULZ, 
The Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, op. cit., p. 251. 
916 R. A. BRAND, P. HERRUP, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Commentary and 
Documents, op. cit., p. 47. 
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7. Operative Rules of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements is based on three “key” rules, which 
are addressed to the different courts. All rules are subject to the further analysis. 
1) The seized chosen court must hear the case if the jurisdiction agreement is valid 
according to Article 5 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements; 
2) The non-designated seized court must suspend or dismiss the case unless one of the 
exceptions established in Article 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements applies; and 
3) Any judgment given by the designated court must be recognised and enforced in the other 
Contracting States unless one of the exceptions established in the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements applies. 
 
7.1.  Jurisdiction of a Chosen Court 
According to Article 5 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, the chosen 
court must hear a case when it is seized with the dispute unless the jurisdiction agreement is 
null and void according to its own law, including its own conflict-of-law rules. The wording 
“null and void under the law of that State” represents the only exception when the seized 
designated court of the Contracting State is not obliged to hear the case.  
Moreover, the obligation of the chosen court is highlighted by virtue of paragraph 2. The 
chosen court cannot refuse to exercise its jurisdiction claiming the dispute should be decided 
in a court of another State, in particular on the basis of forum non conveniens or lis pendens 
rule.917 
 
7.2.  Obligations of a Non-Chosen Court 
The second key rule is laid down in Article 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements, and it is addressed to a court of the Contracting State other than a court of a 
Contracting State designated in an exclusive choice-of-court agreement. Such non-designated 
                                                          
917 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 3, 132-133. On the interplay of the rules on lis pendens according to the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation and Lugano Convention see infra Section 1, Subchapter III of this Chapter. 
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court is obliged to suspend or dismiss proceedings unless one of five exceptions applies. The 
wording “suspend or dismiss” suggests the possibility to be entitled to choose the most 
appropriate approach in the circumstances.918 This rule constitutes an obligation which 
overrides inconsistent provisions of national law.919 It must be remembered that in the first 
place the non-designated court must interpret whether the jurisdiction agreement covers the 
dispute “which have arisen or may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship” by 
virtue of Article 3 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. In case of an 
affirmative answer, the non-designated court may avoid its obligation to suspend or dismiss 
only due to: (i) a null and void jurisdiction agreement pursuant to the law of the State of the 
chosen court; (ii) incapacity (of one) of the parties to conclude the jurisdiction agreement 
under its own law; (iii) a manifest injustice or contrariety to the public policy; (iv) failure of 
performance on the basis of the exceptional reasons beyond the control of the parties; or (v) 
not hearing the case by the chosen court.920  
It must be stressed that Article 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
does not constitute a ground of jurisdiction and it does not require the court to exercise its 
jurisdiction according to its national law, “the law of the court seized determines whether or 
not it has jurisdiction and whether or not it can exercise that jurisdiction”.921 The Hartley-
Dogauchi Report also states in the footnotes two important facts: in case that the non-
designated court does not have jurisdiction under its own law, it is not obliged to consider 
whether any of the exceptions apply, pursuant to Article 6. Although according to the national 
law it may be prevented from exercising jurisdiction due to a lis pendens rule, according to 
the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements the designated court is not obliged to 
suspend or dismiss proceedings when the non-designated court continues with its 
                                                          
918 R. A. BRAND, P. HERRUP, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Commentary and 
Documents, op. cit., p. 89. 
919 R. A. BRAND, P. HERRUP, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Commentary and 
Documents, op. cit., p. 87. 
920 Hartley-Dogauchi Report in par. 147 provides that null and void and incapacity correspond to the provision in 
Article II(3) of the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
and paragraphs d) and e) which deals with grounds such as “inoperative or incapable of being performed” which 
may be found in the same provision of the New York Convention, when letter c) was necessary to add. On the 
different approach, where the author affirms that only letter e) adds a new ground in respect of the 1958 New 
York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, see A. SCHULZ, The Hague 
Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, op. cit., p. 255. 
921 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 146. 
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proceedings.922 Thus, the legal risk of pre-emptive proceedings in breach of an exclusive 
choice-of-court agreement is reduced, but it is not completely removed.923 Parallel 
proceedings are possible according to the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements.924 However, only the judgment rendered by the chosen court will be eligible for 
recognition and enforcement in the requested Contracting State under the Hague Convention 
on Choice of Court Agreements.925 
The discussion on null and void jurisdiction agreements was examined in the previous 
discussion on substantive validity. Both Article 5 of the Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements and Article 6 lett. a) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements refers to the law of the chosen court in order to determine whether the 
jurisdiction agreement is null and void.926 Thus, it avoids the non-uniformity between the 
designated court and seized non-designated court927 and inconsistent judgments on the 
validity of the jurisdiction agreement.928 Although there might be a risk that the non-
designated seized court might make a mistake in applying foreign law, its benefits outweigh 
the difficulties: the rule minimises parallel proceedings and denial of justice.929 
The second exception concerns the lack of capacity to enter into jurisdiction agreement 
according to the law of the State of the seized non-designated court including its conflict-of-
law rules.930 However, since Article 6 lett. a) provides for a conflict-of-laws rule on 
substantive validity and also covers the issue of capacity, the seized non-designated court is 
obliged to perform a double test: both the law of the State of the chosen court and the law of 
                                                          
922 R. A. BRAND, P. HERRUP, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Commentary and 
Documents, op. cit., p. 88. 
923 M. AHMED, P. BEAUMONT, Exclusive choice-of-court agreements: some issues on the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements and its relationship with the Brussels I Brussels I-bis Regulation especially anti-suit 
injunctions, concurrent proceedings and the implications of BREXIT, Journal of Private International Law, 13:2 
(2017), p. 395; R. FENTIMAN, International Commercial Litigation, op. cit., p. 97. 
924 T. HARTLEY, Choice-of-court Agreements under the European and International Instruments, op. cit., p. 231; 
Hartley-Dogauchi Report par. 132-134. 
925 R. A. BRAND, P. HERRUP, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Commentary and 
Documents, op. cit., p. 88. 
926 This is different from the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards which does not specify which law should be applied. 
927 R. A. BRAND, P. HERRUP, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Commentary and 
Documents, op. cit., p. 90. 
928 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 149. 
929 A. SCHULZ, The Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, op. cit., p. 256. 
930 The text does not specify conflict of law rules. However according to the Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 125 
and footnote no 158, the phrase “law of the State” covers conflict-of-laws rules, since otherwise the text would 
have used the phrase “internal law of the State”. 
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the State of the seized non-designated court determines the capacity of the parties to enter into 
jurisdiction agreement.931 However, it is likewise that the double test does not have to be 
applied by all Contracting States since some national laws do not categorise the question of 
capacity as substantive validity.932 
The third exception represents a situation where the jurisdiction agreement would lead to 
manifest injustice or would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the State of the 
court seized. The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements distinguishes between 
these two terms due to the fact that in certain legal systems they are considered as synonyms, 
but in other legal systems, they have different meanings. The public policy exception refers to 
the general public interest (i.e., basic norms and principles of the State) rather the interest of 
the party,933 and it does not permit the seized court to disregard the jurisdiction agreement 
only because it would violate its mandatory rules.934 In contrast, manifest injustice is 
understood to be more than an infringement of the right to fair trial, covering reasons as bias, 
corruption, or fraud.935 However, the term injustice and public policy may often overlap936 
and the word “manifest or manifestly”, used in the context of both terms, has two common 
aspects: it must be clear and extremely serious937 and it suggests its use only as a last resort.938 
The designated court is obliged to make a double check. First, the court must ascertain that 
“giving effect to the agreement” in the specific case would lead to the mentioned 
consequence, i.e., it would lead to manifest injustice or would be manifestly contrary to the 
                                                          
931 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 150. Similarly, see R. A. BRAND, P. HERRUP, The 2005 Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements: Commentary and Documents, op. cit., p. 91.  
932 This problem of categorisation was a ratio for differentiation between these two rules, see R. A. BRAND, P. 
HERRUP, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Commentary and Documents, op. cit., p. 
90. 
933 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 151, R. A. BRAND, P. HERRUP, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements: Commentary and Documents, op. cit., p. 92. 
934 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 153. 
935 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 152. 
936 R. A. BRAND, P. HERRUP, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Commentary and 
Documents, op. cit., p. 92. 
937 R. A. BRAND, P. HERRUP, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Commentary and 
Documents, op. cit., p. 92. The word of manifest or manifestly is used already in a number of the conventions. 
See e.g. the most recent convention: Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts, article 
11. 
938 Prel. Doc. No 11 of August 2000 - Report on the preliminary draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, drawn up by Peter Nygh and Fausto Pocar, p. 1114. 
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public policy. Second, the threat of violation of these two legal institutions is not only 
hypothetical but is highly probable.939 
The fourth exception refers to the incapability of the parties to performance for exceptional 
reasons beyond the control of the parties. In practice, the parties are not able to bring the 
proceedings in the designated court, which do not have to be necessary impossible, but 
exceptional, as in case of war or inexistence of the designated court.940 This rule can be 
qualified as a doctrine of frustration: the contract cannot be performed where an unanticipated 
and fundamental change of circumstances after its conclusion occurs.941 Lex fori governs this 
exception.942 
Where the designated court cannot hear the case is the last exception of Article 6 of the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. Such an exception is crucial for avoiding a 
denial of justice.943  
 
7.3.  Recognition and Enforcement 
The last “key rule” provides that the judgment rendered by a designated court shall be 
recognised and enforced in the other Contracting State unless one of seven grounds of non-
recognition or non-enforcement according to Article 9 of the Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreement occurs. There are three conditions to be satisfied. Both courts, i.e., the court 
requested for recognition or enforcement and a court which rendered judgment, must be 
located in the Contracting States. Moreover, there must be an international element, and thus, 
a court which rendered a judgment must be in a different Contracting State than a requested 
court.944 Lastly, a court must be designated in an exclusive choice-of-court agreement.  
No review on the merits is permitted: the requested court is bound by the findings of the court 
of origin concerning its jurisdiction unless the judgment was given by default (Article 8 par. 2 
                                                          
939 R. A. BRAND, P. HERRUP, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Commentary and 
Documents, op. cit., p. 91. 
940 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 154, R. A. BRAND, P. HERRUP, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements: Commentary and Documents, op. cit., p. 94. 
941 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 154. 
942 R. A. BRAND, P. HERRUP, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Commentary and 
Documents, op. cit., p. 94. 
943 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 155. 
944 R. A. BRAND, P. HERRUP, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Commentary and 
Documents, op. cit., p. 100. 
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of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements). The judgment is recognised and 
enforced only if it has an effect or if it is enforceable in the State of origin (Article 8 par. 3 of 
the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements). Moreover, even if it is already 
enforceable, the requested court may postpone or refuse recognition or enforcement where the 
judgment is reviewed in the State of origin within the time limit for seeking regular review 
(Article 8 par. 4 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements). 
When one of the exceptions applies, the requested court is not obligated to recognise or 
enforce the judgments. However, it is not precluded from doing so.945 The list of grounds of 
non-recognition or non-enforcement is exhaustive.946 Two grounds mentioned in Article 6 
lett. a) and b) are repeated in letter a) and b) of Article 9 of the Hague Convention on Choice 
of Court Agreement. The grounds are: (i) the invalidity of the choice-of-court agreement 
under the law of the chosen court, including its conflict-of-law rules; and (ii) the lack of 
capacity to conclude such a jurisdiction agreement under the law of the requested State. Letter 
a) of Article 9 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreement aims at avoiding 
conflicting judgments by applying the same law to substantive validity, i.e., the designated 
court according to its lex fori pursuant to Article 5; the seized non-designated court according 
to the law of chosen court pursuant to Article 6 lett. a); and the requested court according to 
the law of chosen court pursuant to Article 9 lett. a) of the Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements. Although letter b) assumes the same solution as Article 6 lett. b), the 
consequence is different than in letter a) – all courts, the designated court, the seized non-
designated court, and the requested court, apply their own conflict of laws rules to capacity. It 
means that three different results as to the incapacity may be obtained due to the application 
of the different laws. In addition, there are other “traditional Brussels Regime grounds”, such 
as public policy, incompatible judgments, and a defective service of process may be found in 
letters c), e), f). and g) of Article 9 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements.  
In Ermgassen & Co Ltd v Sixcap Financials Pte Ltd [2018] SGHCR, the High Court of 
Singapore granted the enforcement application under Article 8 of the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements of the judgment rendered by the English High court. This 
                                                          
945 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par 182. 
946 R. A. BRAND, P. HERRUP, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Commentary and 
Documents, op. cit., p. 101. 
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appears to be the first application brought under the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements since its enactment.   
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III. Compatibility between the International Legal Instruments concerning Choice-of-
Court Agreements 
1. Compatibility between the Brussels Ibis Regulation and the 2007 Lugano 
Convention  
The relationship between the Brussels I Regime and the 2007 Lugano Convention is 
determined by Article 64 of the 2007 Lugano Convention. In particular, the Brussels Regime 
takes priority over the Lugano Convention according to Article 64 par. 1 of the 2007 Lugano 
Convention in the Member States, unless one of the exceptions applies. For the purpose of 
jurisdiction and jurisdiction agreements, paragraph 2 lett. a) and b) of Article 64 of the 2007 
Lugano Convention is relevant. The 2007 Lugano Convention shall be applied where the 
defendant is domiciled in a State bound by the 2007 Lugano Convention but not by the 
Brussels regime, or where Article 23 of the 2007 Lugano Convention confers jurisdiction on 
the courts of a State where the 2007 Lugano Convention but not Brussels Regime applies. In 
relation to lis pendens, the 2007 Lugano Convention prevails when proceedings are instituted 
in a State where the 2007 Lugano Convention but not the Brussels Regime applies, and in a 
State where either the 2007 Lugano Convention or the Brussels Regime applies. The 
compatibility of the rules laid down in the Brussels I Regulation and the 2007 Lugano 
Convention do not have to be analysed since the rules on the prorogation of jurisdiction and 
on lis pendens are almost identical, and thus, no clashes are expected. However, as we could 
see in Subchapter I of this Chapter, the Brussels Ibis Regulation has been significantly 
amended. The 2007 Lugano Convention practically mirrors the application of the Brussels I 
Regulation before its recast, and thus, three fundamental problems remain unresolved: (i) the 
problem concerning the lack of a rule on the substantive validity of the jurisdiction 
agreement; (ii) the possibility of “torpedo actions” caused by Gasser case; moreover, and (iii) 
the problematic requirement that at least one of the parties is domiciled in a State bound by 
the 2007 Lugano Convention.947 Article 73 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation provides that the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation shall not affect the application of the 2007 Lugano Convention.  
                                                          
947 On the problems concerning the status quo of the 2007 Lugano Convention in presence of the amendments 
effective under the Brussels Ibis Regulation see A. BRIGGS, P. REES, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments, 2015, op. 
cit., p. 375. 
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The proper interplay of the rules will play a significant role Post-Brexit, since the United 
Kingdom will leave the European Union on 29 March 2019. According to the White Paper 
published in July 2018, the government seeks to participate in the Lugano Convention,948 
provided that “However, while the UK values the Lugano Convention, some of its provisions 
have been overtaken…”.949 In this context, the discussions suggest reflecting on “the 
subsequent developments at EU level in civil judicial cooperation between the UK and the 
Member States”,950 in which might be implied the necessity to resolve the problem of the 
Italian torpedo951 (beyond the ratification of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements).952 Unfortunately, the renegotiation of the 2007 Lugano Convention as to the 
                                                          
948 On the scenario favouring the 2007 Lugano Convention as to the jurisdiction see HM Government, Providing 
a Cross-Border Civil Judicial Cooperation Framework – A Future Partnership Paper, published 22 August 2017, 
available at <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/providing-a-cross-border-civil-judicial-cooperation-
framework-a-future-partnership-paper>, par. 50; R. AIKENS, A. DINSMORE, Jurisdiction, Enforcement and the 
Conflict of Laws in Cross-Border Commercial Disputes: What Are the Legal Consequences of Brexit? European 
Business Law Review, 7 (2016), p. 915, 917, 920; A. DICKINSON, Close the Door on Your Way Out, Zeitschrift 
für Europäisches Privatrecht, (2017), p. 558. 
949 See the future relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union, Presented to Parliament by 
the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty, July 2018, par. 147, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-future-relationship-between-the-united-kingdom-and-the-
european-union. See also Herbert Smith Freehills – Litigation notes at 
https://hsfnotes.com/litigation/2018/07/12/brexit-white-paper-reiterates-aims-for-civil-judicial-cooperation/ 
which deduces that the provision which must be overtaken regards the stronger protections for exclusive 
jurisdiction clauses under the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
950 The future relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union, Presented to Parliament by the 
Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty, July 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-
future-relationship-between-the-united-kingdom-and-the-european-union, par. 148. On the scenario favouring 
the continuation of application of the Brussels Ibis Regulation see: Report of the European Union Committee of 
the House of Lords, Brexit: Justice for Families, Individuals and Businesses? (17th Report of Session 2016–17, 
HL Paper 134, 20 March 2017), 11, par. 23 and 42 par. 1, available at <https://www. 
publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldeucom/134/134.pdf>. 
951 G. RÜHL, Judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters after Brexit: Which way forward?, 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 67:1 (2018), p. 127; A. DICKINSON, Back to the Future: The UK’s 
EU Exit and the Conflict of Laws, Journal of Private International Law, 12 (2016), p. 202. 
952 On the intention to participate in Hague Conventions to which the UK is already a party also in by virtue of 
our membership of the EU listing the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements see: HM Government, 
Providing a Cross-Border Civil Judicial Cooperation Framework – A Future Partnership Paper, available at 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/providing-a-cross-border-civil-judicial-cooperation-framework-a-
future-partnership-paper>, p. 8; see N. NEWING, L. WEBSTER, Could the Hague Convention Bring Greater 
Certainty for Cross-Border Disputes Post-Brexit: And What Would This Mean for International Arbitration, 
Dispute Resolution International, (2016) p. 105, 115. On the discussion that the UK will not be longer a party to 
the 2007 Lugano Convention and the Hague Convention, see: A. DICKINSON, Back to the Future: The UK’s EU 
Exit and the Conflict of Laws, op. cit., p. 195; P. J. ROGERSON, After BREXIT: Is international commercial 
litigation in London doomed?, New Law Journal, (2017), p. 4; Final Report of the House of Lords European 
Union Justice Sub-Committee, Implications of Brexit for the justice system, (14 March 2017). The UK has on 28 
December 2018 signed and ratified the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, which applies 
to the UK by virtue of its membership of the EU but may cease to be applied for UK, when it leaves the EU on 
29 March 2019. By ratifying the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements on 28 December 2018, it 
seems that UK have reduced a transition period gap to two days it will enter into force for the UK on 1 April 
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Gasser problem does not seem to be on the agenda in the near future;953 at least the 
discussions of the Experts’ Meeting pursuant to Article 5 Protocol 2 of the 2007 Lugano 
Convention may accelerate the potential renegotiation.954 
Firstly, the interplay between the rules will be examined.955 Second, the national case law is 
briefly presented. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
2019: «In accordance with Article 29 of the 2005 Hague Convention, the United Kingdom is bound by the 
Convention by virtue of its membership of the European Union, which approved the Convention on behalf of its 
Member States. The United Kingdom intends to continue to participate in the 2005 Hague Convention after it 
withdraws from the European Union. The Government of the United Kingdom and the European Council have 
reached political agreement on the text of a treaty (the “Withdrawal Agreement”) on the withdrawal of the 
United Kingdom from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community. Subject to signature, 
ratification and approval by the parties, the Withdrawal Agreement will enter into force on 30 March 2019. The 
Withdrawal Agreement includes provisions for a transition period to start on 30 March 2019 and end on 31 
December 2020 or such later date as is agreed by the United Kingdom and the European Union (the “transition 
period”). In accordance with the Withdrawal Agreement, during the transition period, European Union law, 
including the 2005 Hague Convention, would continue to be applicable to and in the United Kingdom. The 
European Union and the United Kingdom have agreed that the European Union will notify other parties to 
international agreements that during the transition period the United Kingdom is treated as a Member State for 
the purposes of international agreements concluded by the European Union, including the 2005 Hague 
Convention. In the event that the Withdrawal Agreement is not ratified and approved by the United Kingdom and 
the European Union, however, the United Kingdom wishes to ensure continuity of application of the 2005 Hague 
Convention from the point at which it ceases to be a Member State of the European Union. The United Kingdom 
has therefore submitted the Instrument of Accession in accordance with Article 27(4) of the 2005 Hague 
Convention only in preparation for this situation. The Instrument of Accession declares that the United Kingdom 
accedes to the 2005 Hague Convention in its own right with effect from 1 April 2019. In the event that the 
Withdrawal Agreement is signed, ratified and approved by the United Kingdom and the European Union and 
enters into force on 30 March 2019, the United Kingdom will withdraw the Instrument of Accession which it has 
today deposited. In that case, for the duration of the transition period as provided for in the Withdrawal 
Agreement as stated above, the United Kingdom will be treated as a Member State of the European Union and 
the 2005 Hague Convention will continue to have effect accordingly.The Embassy of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Kingdom of the Netherlands avails itself of the opportunity to renew to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands the assurances of its highest consideration.». 
See the notification by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
https://verdragenbank.overheid.nl/nl/Verdrag/Details//011343/011343_Notificaties_13.pdf.   
953 On the 2007 Lugano Convention in context of the revision of the Brussels I Regulation see F. POCAR, A 
Partial Recast: Has the Lugano Convention been forgotten? in F. POCAR, I. VIARENGO, F. C. VILLATA (eds), 
Recasting Brussels I: Proceedings of the Conference Held at the University of Milan on 25-26 November 2011, 
CEDAM, 2012, pp. 117 et seq..; A. R. MARKUS, Harmonisation of the EU rules of jurisdiction regarding 
defendants putside the EU: What about the Lugano countries?, in F. POCAR, I. VIARENGO, F. C. VILLATA (eds., 
Recasting Brussels I: Proceedings of the Conference Held at the University of Milan on 25-26 November 2011, 
CEDAM, 2012, p. 123 et seq.; A. FURRER, The Brussels I Review Proposal: Challenge for the Lugano 
Convention?, in E. LEIN, (eds), The Brussels I Review Proposal Uncovered, British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law, 2012, p. 165 et seq. 
954 The last Experts’ Meeting pursuant to Article 5 Protocol 2 of the 2007 Lugano Convention took place on 16 
and 17 October 2017 in Basel. See M. AHMED, I thought we were exclusive? Some issues with the Hague 
Convention on Choice-of-court, Brussels Ia and Brexit, published on 24 September 2017 on conflictoflaws.net  
955 On the different examples, see also T. HARTLEY, Choice-of-Court Agreements under the European and 
International Instruments: The Revised Brussels I Regulation, the Lugano Convention, and the Hague 
Convention, op. cit., p. 107 and 108. 
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1) Parties concluded jurisdiction agreement designating a Swiss court. The Swiss, as well as the 
Italian court was seized. 
According to Article 64 par. 2 lett. a) of the 2007 Lugano Convention, Article 23 of the 2007 
Lugano Convention applies since Switzerland is the only party to the 2007 Lugano Convention, 
even though the defendant would be domiciled in the Member State.956 In consequence, both the 
Swiss and the Italian courts determine conditions for the application and validity of the jurisdiction 
agreement according to Article 23 of the 2007 Lugano Convention. Article 27 of the 2007 Lugano 
Convention governs the lis pendens by virtue of Article 64 par. 2 lett. b) of the 2007 Lugano 
Convention, since the proceedings were instituted in Switzerland (a State where the 2007 Lugano 
Convention but not Brussels Ibis Regulation applies) and in Italy (a State where both the 2007 
Lugano Convention and the Brussels Ibis Regulation applies). It practically mirrors the application 
of the Brussels I Regulation before its recast, and thus, the problems concerning lack of the rule on 
the substantive validity of the jurisdiction agreement and the possibility of the “torpedo actions” 
caused by Gasser case remains unresolved. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the domicile of 
one of the parties in a State bound by the 2007 Lugano Convention is required. 
 
2) Defendant domiciled in Switzerland and plaintiff domiciled in Italy concluded a jurisdiction 
agreement designating an Italian court. The Italian court, as well as the Swiss court, were 
seized. 
According to Article 64 par. 2 lett. a) of the 2007 Lugano Convention, the Italian court applies the 
2007 Lugano Convention since the defendant is domiciled only in the Contracting State. In 
consequence, the Italian court determines conditions for application and validity of the jurisdiction 
agreement according to Article 23 of the 2007 Lugano Convention. Also, the Swiss court 
determines the conditions for application and validity of the jurisdiction agreement according to 
Article 23 of the of the 2007 Lugano Convention. 
Moreover, Article 27 of the 2007 Lugano Convention governs the lis pendens by virtue of Article 
64 par. 2 lett. b) of the 2007 Lugano Convention, since the proceedings were instituted in 
Switzerland (a State where the 2007 Lugano Convention but not Brussels Ibis Regulation applies) 
                                                          
956 See Lugano opinion 1/03, where the ECJ upheld that where Article 23 of the 2007 Lugano Convention leads 
to a court of a non-Member State, party to the 2007 Lugano Convention, such a non-Member State would be the 
appropriate forum, although where the defendant is domiciled in a Member State. 
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and in Italy (a State where both the 2007 Lugano Convention the Brussels Ibis Regulation applies). 
Also, in this case, it practically mirrors the application of the Brussels I Regulation before its recast, 
and thus, the problems concerning lack of the rule on substantive validity of the jurisdiction 
agreement and the possibility of the “torpedo actions” caused by Gasser case remains unresolved. 
 
3) Defendant domiciled in Italy and plaintiff domiciled in Switzerland concluded a jurisdiction 
agreement designating an Italian court. The Italian court, as well as the Swiss court, were 
seized. 
According to Article 64 par. 2 lett. a) of the 2007 Lugano Convention, Italian court applies the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation since the defendant is domiciled in the EU and the Swiss court is not the 
designated court and is a State where the 2007 Lugano Convention but not the Brussels Regime 
applies. In consequence, the Italian court determines conditions for application and validity of the 
jurisdiction agreement according to Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. The Swiss court is 
bound only by the 2007 Lugano Convention; this means that it determines the conditions for 
application and validity of the jurisdiction agreement according to Article 23 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation. It must be stressed that the new rule on the substantive validity of the jurisdiction 
agreement is not applicable by the Swiss court, but the Italian court determines the substantive 
validity of the jurisdiction agreement according to Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
Moreover, Article 27 of the 2007 Lugano Convention governs the lis pendens by virtue of Article 
64 par. 2 lett. b) of the 2007 Lugano Convention, since the proceedings were instituted in 
Switzerland (a State where the 2007 Lugano Convention but not Brussels Ibis Regulation applies) 
and in Italy (a State where both the 2007 Lugano Convention and the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
applies).  
This case practically mirrors the application of the Brussels I Regulation before its recast 
concerning the rule on lis pendens and the possibility of “torpedo actions”. However, the new rule 
on the substantive validity will be applicable only by the designated Member State, but not by the 
non-designated Contracting State which is bound only by the 2007 Lugano Convention. 
 
4) The defendant is domiciled in the USA and the plaintiff is domiciled in Russia, they concluded a 
sale contract whereby the place of delivery was in Switzerland. The sale contract contained the 
jurisdiction agreement designating an Italian court. The Italian court, as well as the Swiss 
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court, were seized. 
The Italian court determines the conditions for application and validity of the jurisdiction agreement 
according to Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. The 2007 Lugano Convention is not 
applicable since Article 23 of the 2007 Lugano Convention requires domicile of one of the parties 
in the Contracting State bound by the 2007 Lugano Convention. In consequence, Article 27 of the 
2007 Lugano Convention governing the lis pendens rule is not applicable. The question of the 
validity of the jurisdiction agreement and lis pendens must be resolved by the Swiss court pursuant 
to its own national law.  
 
In the first place, it must be remembered that the Contracting States must “pay due account” 
to the case law of the courts of other Contracting States, including the case law of the ECJ 
within the meaning of the Protocol No 2. However, the Contracting States are not obliged to 
follow the ECJ’s case law as closely as possible, but they may give reasons for the 
deviation.957 There are no penalties for the national courts of the Contracting States when 
deviating from the case law of the ECJ. The Swiss Federal Tribunal has deviated from the 
ECJ’s interpretation on several occasions since it has not paid regard to the relationship with 
other EU instruments due to the fact that is not bound by other EU instruments.958 
Additionally, it has deviated from the ECJ’s interpretation without giving an explanation and 
has interpreted the Lugano Conventions in a way not fully in line with the interpretation 
provided by the ECJ.959 According to Professor Hess, as a consequence of the absence of any 
sanctions for the deviations, there is no uniform interpretation of the 2007 Lugano Convention 
in the light of the Brussels Regime.960 On the basis of this assumption, it can also be deduced 
                                                          
957 B. HESS, The Unsuitability of the Lugano Convention (2007) to Serve as a Bridge between the UK and the EU 
after Brexit, op. cit., p. 5. 
958 BGE 131 III 227, where Switzerland, not bound by the Insolvency Regulation, the departed from the ECJ 
case law. 
959 B. HESS, The Unsuitability of the Lugano Convention (2007) to Serve as a Bridge between the UK and the EU 
after Brexit, op. cit., p. 6, where the author maintains that in 2016, the Swiss Federal Tribunal issued judgments 
concerning the Lugano Convention and in 4 cases it deviated from the interpretation provided by the ECJ (e.g. 
BGE 142 III 170). 
960 B. HESS, The Unsuitability of the Lugano Convention (2007) to Serve as a Bridge between the UK and the EU 
after Brexit, op. cit., p. 6. 
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that the deviation from the ECJ interpretation provided in the Gasser case is possible, where 
the national courts of the Contracting State “give reasons for the deviation”.961  
Moreover, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court has gone even further. In its decision from 
March 2018, it reduced the requirement for the legal interest in a negative declaratory 
judgment in an international context and thereby allowed forum running, securing an 
advantageous place of jurisdiction in Switzerland.962 This leading case may in extremis lead to 
the “Swiss torpedo”. The party may seek to seize the most favorable courts by filing a 
negative declaratory action. Such a negative declaratory action establishes an obstacle of lis 
pendens for other seized court that is to the detriment of the party that has filed the adverse 
declaratory action. Furthermore, it is of vital importance that according to the ECJ in the case 
Schlömp,963 the Swiss conciliation proceedings constitute the lis pendens of the action under 
the 2007 Lugano Convention.964 This may even allow a party that is threatened with a court 
action to act very quickly in the Swiss court.  
 
2. Compatibility between the Hague Convention on the Choice-of-Court Agreements 
and the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
In Subchapters I and II of this Chapter, the general aspects of the rules of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation and the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements were analysed 
separately. Since the ratification of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
has a direct impact on the Brussels Regime,965 the focus must be on their simultaneous 
application, the compatibility of their rules, and the “give way” rules giving precedence to one 
or other legal instruments in case of a clash of their rules. However, it is true that clashes 
                                                          
961 On the opinion that the courts should reject the Gasser doctrine, see T. HARTLEY, Choice-of-Court 
Agreements under the European and International Instruments: The Revised Brussels I Regulation, the Lugano 
Convention, and the Hague Convention, op. cit., p. 231. 
962 4A_417/2017. The previous judgment of the Federal Supreme Court, ATF 136 III 523 was rejected since the 
legitimate interest to file an action for a negative declaratory judgment exists. 
963 ECJ, Case C-467/16, Brigitte Schlömp v Landratsamt Schwäbisch Hall, 20 December 2017, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:993. 
964 It was already upheld by the English Court in Lehman Brothers Finance AG v. Klaus Tschira Stiftung GmbH 
[2014] EWHC 2782 (Ch). 
965 Council Decision of 26 February 2009 on the signing on behalf of the European Community of the 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, (2009/397/EC), OJ L 133, 29 May 2009 and referred to the already 
analysed ECJ, Lugano Opinion 1/03, 7 February 2006, where the ECJ upheld the existence of an exclusive 
external competence of the EU concerning judicial cooperation in civil matters and interference to the Brussels 
regime. 
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should be restricted since the European legislator while working on the Proposal of the 
Brussels I Regulation underlined the necessity to strengthen choice-of-court agreements and 
to reach the coherence of the Brussels Regime with the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements.966 In consequence, the specific rules of these two instruments are compared in 
this chapter, in particular: the internationality of the case, substantive validity of the choice-
of-court agreement, the public policy control, the mechanisms for coordinating parallel 
proceedings between the Member States and between the Member State and Contracting 
State. On the other hand, where the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreement is more 
restricted than the Brussels Ibis Regulation, e.g., the scope of application or non-exclusive 
jurisdiction agreements, there is no contradiction between these two legal regimes and the 
dispute only falls into the scope of application of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.  
Before moving to the comparison of the specific rules, it is necessary to understand the 
interplay of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation. These two legal regimes may overlap when: (i) the chosen court and the seized 
court are situated in the Contracting State and in the Member State; (ii) the jurisdiction 
agreement is exclusive; and (iii) the dispute is not excluded from the scope of application of 
the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.967  
When both legal instruments are in line, they are applied simultaneously by the Member State 
courts (the courts of the Contracting State are not bound by the Brussels Ibis Regulation; 
therefore, they simply apply the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements). Only in 
the event of conflicting rules does Article 26 par. 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements comes into play.968 The relationship between the conflicting rules 
determined by the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation is resolved by two “give way” rules of Article 26 par. 6 of the Hague Convention 
                                                          
966 Commission staff working paper. Impact assessment. Accompanying document to the Proposal for 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters (Recast), SEC(2010) 1548 final, 14 December 2010, p. 7. 
967 F. RAGNO, Forum Selection under the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements – A European 
Perspective, op. cit., p. 109 
968 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 292 that refers to the first “give-way” rule on conflicting treaties, see par. 267: 
«The first is that there must be an actual incompatibility between the two treaties. In other words, the 
application of the two treaties must lead to different results in a concrete situation. Where this is not the case, 
both treaties can be applied.». 
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on Choice of Court Agreements. Article 26 par. 6 lett. a) provides for a “give way” rule 
regarding jurisdiction:  
This Convention shall not affect the application of the rules of a Regional Economic 
Integration Organisation that is a Party to this Convention, whether adopted before or 
after this Convention a) where none of the parties is resident in a Contracting State that 
is not a Member State of the Regional Economic Integration Organisation. 
 Also, Article 26 par. 6 lett. b) provides for a “give way” rule regarding recognition and 
enforcement of judgments: “…b) as concerns the recognition or enforcement of judgments as 
between Member States of the Regional Economic Integration Organisation.” In other words, 
Article 26 par. 6 lett. a) gives preference to the Brussels Regime if: 
(i) All parties involved reside exclusively within the Member States; 
(ii) All parties involved reside exclusively in the Third States that are not Contracting States; 
(iii) Parties involved reside exclusively within the Member States and in the Third States that 
are not Contracting States. 
In contrast, the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements prevails if at least one 
party resides in the Contracting State of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements that is not a Member State. It must be remembered that the designated or seized 
derogated court must be situated in the Member State, and only such a court uses a give way 
rule. 
As to the recognition and enforcement of judgments, Article 26 par. 6 lett. b) of the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements provides for the second “give way” rule and does 
not affect rules on recognition and enforcement between Member States courts. 969 
 
2.1.  Internationality 
The Brussels Ibis Regulation considers a case to be international as soon as the parties 
designate a foreign court.970 But in contrast to this assumption the Hague Convention on 
                                                          
969 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 305 refers to the par. 286 that provides: «Where a judgment granted by a State 
that is a Party to such a treaty is sought to be recognised or enforced in another such State, the Convention will 
not affect the application of that treaty, provided that the judgment is not recognised or enforced to a lesser 
extent than under the Convention.». 
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Choice of Court Agreements requires the parties to be resident in different States or requires 
other factual international elements beyond the choice-of-court.971 On the first view, the 
evaluation of the “international case” within these two regimes may seem to be governed 
differently. The conclusions within the regime of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements concerning the question on the internationality of the case and the necessity of 
the link may be perceived as much more restrictive than according to the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation. It means that only one situation does not fit within both regimes: when the parties 
are resident in the same State, all other elements are situated in that State, and they designated 
a court in different State. This specific example demonstrates that there is no clash between 
these two regimes. 972 
The parties are resident in Mexico and they designate a court in Italy in an exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement. An Italian court, as well as a Mexican court, are seized. 
According to Article 1 par. 2 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements the case is 
not considered as international and therefore, the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements is not applicable. Thus, the Italian court exercises its jurisdiction only according to 
Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation and the Mexican court according to its own national 
law.973 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
970 If the two parties domiciled in the same Member State confer jurisdiction by agreement to other Member 
State court, this situation should be considered as sufficiently international, when the case had links also to other 
States, for example when the subject-matter has an international character (e.g., delivery). However, such an 
answer is not so unequivocal where an objective link between the legal relationship and the chosen court is 
missing. Although a genuine autonomy is sometimes considered as a situation when a chosen court accepts its 
jurisdiction although there is no connection to the forum, the opinions differ in the context of the Brussels 
regime. On the negative approach see Schlosser Report, par. 174; in context of the 2007 Lugano Convention see 
Pocar Report, par. 104; A. BRIGGS, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, op. cit., p. 245 and footnote 
No 25; contra G. A. L. Droz, Compétence judiciaire et effets des jugements dans le Marché commun, op. cit., 
par. 191; M. WELLER, Choice of Forum Agreements Under the Brussels I Brussels I-bis Regulation and Under 
the Hague Convention: Coherences and Clashes, op. cit., p. 5. On more details see supra Section 3.4., 
Subchapter I of this Chapter. 
971 The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements applies if the parties are not resident in the same 
State even when all other elements are connected only with the State of the residence of one of the parties or if 
the parties reside in the same State, but another element is located in other State. In case that all facts are wholly 
domestic, but the parties choose a court in other Contracting State, Article 1 par. 2 of the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements specifies that such case cannot be considered as international. On more details see 
supra Section 2.4., Subchapter II of this Chapter. 
972 On the opposite approach where the author argues that there is a clash between these two instruments see: M. 
WELLER, Choice of Forum Agreements Under the Brussels I Brussels I-bis Regulation and Under the Hague 
Convention: Coherences and Clashes, op. cit., p. 6. 
973 Ibidem. 
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It is evident, that in such a case, examination of jurisdiction is subject to the national law, 
which in case of the designated court in a Member State, is the Brussels Ibis Regulation. In 
consequence of the exclusion of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, there 
is no certainty that the jurisdiction agreement will be respected in the designated Contracting 
State as well as in the other seized derogated court of the Contracting States. However, such a 
consequence does not result in the clash between the two analysed legal instruments.  
 
2.2.  Formal Validity 
As stated in Section 4, Subchapter II of this Chapter, Article 3 lett. c) of the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements provides that an exclusive choice-of-court 
agreement must be concluded or documented in writing; or it must be concluded or 
documented by any other means of communication which renders information accessible so 
as to be usable for subsequent reference; the national law cannot add any further formal 
requirements.974 The Brussels Ibis Regulation lays down the formal requirements more 
generously than Article 3 lett. c) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. 
Article 25 par. 1 lett. c) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation allows the jurisdiction agreement also 
in a form, which accords with practices which the parties have established between 
themselves. Article 25 par. 1 lett. d) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation allows the jurisdiction 
agreement “in international trade or commerce, in a form which accords with a usage of 
which the parties are or ought to have been aware and which in such trade or commerce is 
widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the 
particular trade or commerce concerned”. In case that the jurisdiction agreement concluded 
by virtue of article 25 par. 1 lett. c) or d) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation does not fulfil the 
conditions laid down in article 3 lett. c) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements, a Member State court may give effect to such a jurisdiction clause only under 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation since such a jurisdiction clause would not fall within the scope of 
the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreement.975 Therefore, a clash cannot arise 
between the two regimes. 
                                                          
974 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 110. 
975 A. SCHULZ, The Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, op. cit., p. 250. 
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The party A is resident in Mexico, and the party B is resident in Italy. The contract was concluded 
orally in international trade and the parties agreed on conferring jurisdiction to the Italian court. 
Subsequently, the Mexican party did not react to a commercial letter of confirmation sent by the 
Italian party. However, the Mexican party repeatedly paid the invoices where the conditions on the 
reverse contained a jurisdiction clause designating the Italian court. A continuing trading 
relationship between the parties was based on the general conditions of the Italian party. The 
Italian court, as well as the Mexican court, are seized. 
Both courts, the Italian and the Mexican court, deem that the formal requirements according to 
Article 3 lett. c) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements are not met since there is 
no proof that party A consented to the oral jurisdiction agreement, and thus, the Hague Convention 
on Choice of Court Agreements is not applicable. However, the Italian court establishes its 
jurisdiction according to Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation since the formal requirements 
are met within the meaning of Article 25 lett. d) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.976 The examination 
of jurisdiction of the Mexican court is subject to the national law. 
Conversely, the formal requirements of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreement 
may be more generous in respect of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. For example, this may 
concern the standard terms on the back of an invoice, since the Contracting States do not 
obviously follow the interpretation of the ECJ concerning the formal requirements of Article 
25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation and may interpret Article 3 lett. c) of the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreement differently.977 In this context, it must be borne in 
mind that the Member State courts cannot interpret the formal requirements of the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements in the same manner as interpreted by the ECJ in 
regards of the Brussels regime. It means that the seized designated Member State court must 
interpret the formal requirements laid down in both regimes independently. However, clashes 
between the two regimes should not arise in most cases. The problem of simultaneous 
application of Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation and Article 3 lett. c) of the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreement may occur only in front of the seized designated 
Member State court, since Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is applicable only in 
respect of the agreement conferring the jurisdiction to the Member States. In such a case, 
                                                          
976 ECJ, Case 25/76, Galeries Segoura, par. 11. 
977 A. SCHULZ, The Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, op. cit., p. 250. 
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where the defendant is resident in the designated Member State, such a designated Member 
State court may establish the jurisdiction according to Article 4 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation in conjunction with Article 5 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreement. On the contrary, where the defendant is not resident in a Member State, the 
designated Member State cannot establish jurisdiction under the Brussels regime. The only 
problem which can occur is where the other Member State court could have jurisdiction 
according to Article 4 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. The first example describes a proper 
application of both regimes. The second example demonstrates a difficulty if the Member 
States interpret the formal requirements laid down in both regimes independently. 
1) The invoice issued by party A contained an agreement conferring jurisdiction to the Italian 
court. The Italian court, as well as the Mexican court, are seized. 
Both courts, the Italian and the Mexican courts, deem that the formal requirements according to 
Article 3 lett. c) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements are met, and thus, the 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements is applicable. However, the Italian court cannot 
establish its jurisdiction according to Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, since the formal 
requirements within the meaning of Article 25 lett. a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation are not met.978 
In consequence, the Italian court hears the case according to Article 5 of the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements (in conjunction with Article 4 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation where 
applicable) and the Mexican court suspends or dismisses proceedings according to Article 6 of the 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. 
 
2) Party A is resident in the Czech Republic (the residence of party B is dealt with in the text and is 
a part of a solution). The invoice issued by party B contained an agreement conferring 
jurisdiction to the Italian court. The Italian court is seized by Czech party and the Czech court is 
seized by party B as well. 
Both courts, the Italian and the Czech court, deem that the formal requirements according to Article 
3 lett. c) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements are met, and thus, the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements should be applicable. However, both Member State 
courts cannot establish jurisdiction according to Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, since the 
                                                          
978 ECJ, Case C-64/17, Saey Home & Garden. 
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formal requirements within the meaning of Article 25 lett. a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation are not 
met.979 Moreover, the Italian court does not have jurisdiction according to Article 4 of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation. Article 5 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements requires the 
Italian court to hear the case, but according to Articles 4 and 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation it 
cannot establish jurisdiction. Instead, the Czech court should suspend or dismisses the proceedings 
according to Article 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, but it is obliged to 
establish its jurisdiction according to Article 4 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. Article 26 par. 2 of 
the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements must resolve the incompatibility: 
a) the Brussels Ibis Regulation prevails if for example, (i) the party B is resident in Italy; or (ii) if 
the party B is resident in Russia; 
b) the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements prevails if, for example, the party B is 
resident in Mexico. 
If the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements prevails, it practically prevails over the 
interpretation of the ECJ concerning the formal requirements prescribed by Article 25 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
 
2.3.  Parallel Proceedings between the Member States 
The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements does not establish the rule on lis 
pendens as in the Brussels Ibis Regulation. Therefore, the chosen court cannot refuse to 
exercise its jurisdiction on the ground that the dispute should be decided in a court of another 
State, in particular on the basis of lis pendens rule.980 The non-designated court is obliged to 
suspend or dismiss proceedings unless one of five exceptions applies according to Article 6 of 
the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. However, it does not constitute the 
ground of jurisdiction when one of the exceptions applies – such assumption whether to 
exercise its jurisdiction is subject of the national law.981 If the non-designated court continues 
with its proceedings, the designated court is not obliged to suspend or dismiss proceedings 
and vice versa.982 Thus, parallel proceedings are not excluded according to the Hague 
                                                          
979 ECJ, Case C-64/17, Saey Home & Garden. 
980 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 3, 132 and 133. On the interplay of the rules on lis pendens according to the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation and the 2007 Lugano Convention, see supra Section 1, Subchapter III of this Chapter.  
981 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 146. 
982 R. A. BRAND, P. HERRUP, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Commentary and 
Documents, op. cit., p. 88. 
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Convention on Choice of Court Agreements,983 but the independent evaluation of the validity 
by both courts should reduce the risk of irreconcilable judgments.984  
The whole Section 14, Subchapter I of this Chapter, was dedicated to the new rule on lis 
pendens according to Article 31 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation giving precedence to 
the chosen Member State court to decide on its validity. Thus, the “court first seized rule” rule 
which gave rise to the “torpedo actions” was abolished in respect of the jurisdiction 
agreements.  
The new lis pendens rule laid down in Article 31 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation gives 
precedence to the chosen court which does not contrast with the operation of Articles 5 and 6 
of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. However, Article 6 of the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements provides for the exceptions from the obligation 
to suspend the proceedings and may be problematic under the Brussels regime. Thus, two of 
the exceptions are analysed in this part: the substantive validity and the public policy 
exception.  
2.3.1.  Compatibility of the Regimes in the Presence of One of the Exceptions Provided 
in Article 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
a) Substantive Validity 
It must be remembered that solutions concerning substantive validity are in the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and in the Brussels Ibis Regulation.  
The substantive validity according to Article 5, 6, and 9 of the Hague Convention on Choice 
of Court Agreements is governed by the law of the chosen State including its conflict-of-laws 
rules.985 As stated in Section 5, Subchapter II of this Chapter, the rule should be understood 
mainly to address misrepresentation, duress, and lack of capacity.986 It is questionable whether 
the question of the existence of “consent” should be treated separately by lex fori, or as an 
aspect of substantive validity. However, it seems that the latter solution corresponds to the 
                                                          
983 T. HARTLEY, Choice-of-Court Agreements under the European and International Instruments: The Revised 
Brussels I Regulation, the Lugano Convention, and the Hague Convention, op. cit., p. 231; Hartley-Dogauchi 
Report, par. 132-134. 
984 A. SCHULZ, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Clauses, op. cit., p. 438. 
985 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 125 and note no 158 
986 Lack of capacity is dealt separately in Article 6 lett. b) and article 9 lett. b) of the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements. 
  
237 
 
intention of the Special Commissions and Diplomatic Session. 987 The law of the chosen State 
including its conflict-of-laws rules should ensure that all courts would consider the 
substantive validity of a choice-of-court agreement under the same substantive national law. 
However, the question of the capacity of the parties is partially separated from the substantive 
validity whenever the non-designated court is seized. Then the question of capacity and is 
governed by the lex fori including its conflict-of-laws rules according to Article 6 lett. b) and 
simultaneously by the law of the chosen court according to Article 6 lett. a) of the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements.988  
Almost same solution on the substantive validity was introduced into the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation. The explanatory memorandum to the Commission Proposal provided that new 
rule on substantive validity should reflect the solution adopted in the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements.989 Also, Recital 20 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation was probably 
inspired by the Hartley-Dogauchi Report, which also suggests application of the conflict-of-
laws rules of the chosen Member State court. The most problematic issue concerns the 
capacity of the parties. According to Professor Magnus, substantive validity covers all issues 
which may invalidate the formally valid jurisdiction clause, which covers incapacity.990 
However, because of the silence of the EU legislator in respect of the capacity of the parties, it 
is ambiguous whether the lex fori991 should govern the capacity or if it should be subordinated 
to the new rule on substantive validity.  
However, neither of the solutions entirely corresponds to the wording of the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, since Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
                                                          
987 See P. BEAUMONT, Hague Choice of Court Agreements Convention 2005: Background, Negotiations, 
Analysis and Current Status, op. cit., p. 138, footnote no 44, where the author affirms that the consent making 
part of the substantive validity was never contested by the Special Commissions and Diplomatic Session. 
Against R. A. BRAND, P. HERRUP, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Commentary 
and Documents, op. cit., p. 79, which presumed that the existence of the consent is a distinct term from a legal 
concept “null and void” and thus, it creates a gap which should be probably refilled by the law of forum 
including its choice of law rules. 
988 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 150. Similarly, see R. A. BRAND, P. HERRUP, The 2005 Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements: Commentary and Documents, op. cit., p. 91. 
989 Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, COM/2010/0748 final, 14 December 2010, p. 9. 
990 U. MAGNUS, Choice-of-court Agreements in the Review Proposal for the Brussels I Regulation, in The 
Brussels I Review Proposal Uncovered, op. cit., p. 93. 
991 See Article 1 par. 2 lett. a) of the Rome I Regulation where the question of capacity is excluded from the 
scope of its application. On the similar conclusion see F. C. VILLATA, L’attuazione degli accordi di scelta del 
foro nel regolamento Bruxelles I, op. cit., p. 109; M. WELLER, Choice of Forum Agreements Under the Brussels 
I Brussels I-bis Regulation and Under the Hague Convention: Coherences and Clashes, op. cit., p. 10. 
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does not provide for the “double test” as to capacity made by the non-designated Member 
State court, as prescribed in Article 6 lett. a) and b) of the Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements.  
First, the proper simultaneous operation of the rules of both regimes in the presence of an 
invalid jurisdiction agreement is demonstrated.  
1) Party A and party B concluded an exclusive jurisdiction agreement in favour of the Czech 
courts. Party A brought an action in front of the Italian court and subsequently, party B brought 
an action in front of the Czech courts. 
Perspective from the point of view of the Czech court: The Czech court applies simultaneously the 
rules on substantive validity according to Article 5 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements and according to Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, which lead to the 
application of its own conflict-of-laws rule. As to the capacity to conclude the jurisdiction 
agreement, this question is also covered by the conflict-of-laws rule on the substantive validity 
according to Article 5 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. The same result 
would be gained by the application of the new conflict-of-laws rule on substantive validity under 
Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation qualifying capacity as a part of substantive validity. If 
capacity were qualified as a separate aspect from the substantive validity, the lex fori including 
conflict-of-laws would lead to the same result: application of the conflict-of-laws rules of the Czech 
court. Consequently, the Czech court presumes that the jurisdiction agreement is invalid according 
to its own Czech conflict-of-laws rules. As to the lis pendens rule, this situation is not expressly 
dealt in the Brussels Ibis Regulation, but the wording of Article 31 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation providing “…it has no jurisdiction under the agreement” suggests that the Czech court 
has priority only to establish its jurisdiction according to the jurisdiction agreement.992 In such a 
case, the “first seized lis pendens” according to Article 29 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation should 
apply and the Italian court is entitled to decide first. A Czech decision on its invalidity binds the 
Italian court by virtue of the Gothaer judgment. In consequence, the Czech court of its own motion 
stays its proceedings until such time the jurisdiction of the Italian court is established. If the 
jurisdiction of the Italian court is established, the Czech court declines jurisdiction in favour of the 
Italian court. 
                                                          
992 M. WELLER, Choice of Forum Agreements Under the Brussels I Brussels I-bis Regulation and Under the 
Hague Convention: Coherences and Clashes, op. cit., p. 26; I. BERGSON, The death of the torpedo action? The 
practical operation of the Recast's reforms to enhance the protection for exclusive jurisdiction agreements 
within the European Union, op. cit., p. 27. 
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Perspective from the point of view of the Italian court: The Italian court applies Article 6 of the 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and Article 31 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation concerning parallel proceedings and should suspend the proceedings. The question 
arises whether the Italian court should independently ascertain if the jurisdiction agreement is null 
and void even although the Italian court is directly bound by the decision of the Czech court 
concerning the lack of jurisdiction of the Czech court under the agreement by virtue of the Gothaer 
case. In any case, if the jurisdiction agreement is null and void, “the law of the court seized 
determines whether or not it has jurisdiction and whether or not it can exercise that jurisdiction”,993 
whereby the law of the seized Italian court is the Gothaer judgment and the reversed “first seized lis 
pendens” rule based on Article 29 par. 1 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. Thus, the Italian court may 
establish its jurisdiction or decline its jurisdiction in favour of the Czech court according to the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
 
The second example concerns a more problematic situation which was described in Section 
14.1., Subchapter I of this Chapter concerning the new lis pendens rule when both the 
designated and the derogated Member State courts disagree whether the jurisdiction 
agreement is valid. Such a situation cannot be excluded and is even more probable if the non-
designated Member State court decides to apply a “full review” approach or when the 
designated Member State court is seized a long time after the institution of the non-designated 
Member State court.994 Until then, the first non-designated Member State court is the only 
seized court (e.g., for 1 year) and might examine the validity of the jurisdiction clause. The 
Brussels Ibis Regulation does not tackle the possibility of a disagreement between two seized 
Member State courts, which may be perceived as a lacuna. Moreover, this situation is 
complicated by the simultaneous application of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements.995 It is evident from this example, that when the Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements prevails over the Brussels Regime pursuant to Article 26 par. 6 of the 
                                                          
993 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 146. 
994 See M. WELLER, Choice of Forum Agreements Under the Brussels I Brussels I-bis Regulation and Under the 
Hague Convention: Coherences and Clashes, op. cit., p. 26, where the author suggests that once the designated 
Member State court is seized, the non-designated Member State court should reduce the standard of review from 
a full review of the jurisdiction agreement to the reduced standard. 
995 On the disagreement concerning validity of the jurisdiction agreement between the Member States under the 
Brussels regime see supra Section 14.1., Subchapter I of this Chapter. 
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Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, such a situation may even lead to parallel 
proceedings and irreconcilable judgments rendered by two Member State courts. 
2) Party A and party B concluded an exclusive jurisdiction agreement in favour of the Czech 
courts. Party A brought an action in front of the Italian courts. Eight months after, party B 
brought an action in front of the Czech courts. 
Perspective from the point of view of the Italian court: The Italian court should suspend or dismiss 
proceedings according to Article 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
(Article 31 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is not applicable since there is no lis pendens). 
However, the Italian court, which is seized eight months before the Czech court, assumes that the 
jurisdiction agreement is invalid. The Italian court applies simultaneously conflict-of-laws rules on 
substantive validity according to Article 6 lett. a) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements and according to Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, which lead to the 
application of the conflict-of-laws rules of the Czech court. As to the capacity to conclude the 
jurisdiction agreement, this question is governed by the conflict-of-laws rules of the Italian court by 
virtue of Article 6 lett. b) and simultaneously by conflict-of-laws rules of the Czech court according 
to Article 6 lett. a) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. The question arises 
whether the capacity should be qualified as a part of the substantive validity under Article 25 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation, that is governed by the law of the chosen court; or should be qualified as a 
separate aspect from the substantive validity, that is governed by the lex fori. Thus, two different 
results may occur if we presume that capacity is governed under the Brussels regime. The situations 
are governed”: (i) by the lex fori: the Italian court applies its own conflict-of-laws rules; such a 
solution is in line with Article 6 lett. b), but not with Article 6 lett. a) of the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements; or (ii) by the law of the chosen court (conflict-of-laws rules of the 
Czech court) according to Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. Such a solution is in line with 
Article 6 lett. a) but not with Article 6 lett. b) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements. Moreover, other question arises whether this partial conformity and partial conflict 
should be resolved through the application of Article 26 par. 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice 
of Court Agreements.996 If so, the law applicable to capacity will be dependent on which legal 
instrument prevails. In any case, the “double test” under the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
                                                          
996 See Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 273: «The problem of conflicting treaties arises only if two conditions are 
fulfilled. The first is that there must be an actual incompatibility between the two treaties. In other words, the 
application of the two treaties must lead to different results in a concrete situation. Where this is not the case, 
both treaties can be applied.». 
  
241 
 
Agreements on capacity may constitute the invalidity of the jurisdiction clause. If the Italian court 
reaches the decision as to invalidity of the jurisdiction clause before the Czech court, which was 
seized eight months after,997 such a decision is binding for the Czech court by virtue of the Gothaer 
judgment.998 This may happen if Article 31 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is applied a certain 
period after the institution of the proceedings (there is no lis pendens) or when the Italian court 
decides to apply “full review” approach.999 Where one of the exceptions in Article 6 of the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court arises (invalidity or no consent), “the law of the court seized 
determines whether or not it has jurisdiction and whether or not it can exercise that jurisdiction”. 
 The law of the seized Italian court is represented by Article 29 par. 1 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation, 1000 since in case of invalidity of the jurisdiction agreement, it is the first seized court.1001 
Thus, the Italian court may establish its jurisdiction or decline its jurisdiction in favour of the Czech 
court according to the Brussels Ibis Regulation.  
Perspective from the point of view of the Czech court: The Czech court applies Article 5 of the 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and simultaneously Article 31 par. 2 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation concerning parallel proceedings and may hear the case. According to the 
Czech court, the jurisdiction agreement is valid pursuant to its own conflict-of-laws rules: the Czech 
court applies simultaneously the rule on substantive validity according to Article 5 of the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and according to Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation, which lead to the application of its own conflict-of-laws rule. As to the capacity to 
conclude the jurisdiction agreement, this question is also covered by the conflict-of-laws rule on 
                                                          
997 See M. WELLER, Choice of Forum Agreements Under the Brussels I Brussels I-bis Regulation and Under the 
Hague Convention: Coherences and Clashes, op. cit., p. 26. According to his opinion, preliminary ruling on the 
invalidity of the jurisdiction agreements issued before the designated Member State court is violation of Article 
31 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. However, there is no support in the wording in Article 31 par. 2 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation providing for the obligation of the non-designated Member State court to wait for the 
decision of the designated Member State court. 
998 On the opinion that the chosen Member State court should recognise the decision of the non-chosen court, see 
C. HEINZE, B. STEINROTTER, The Revised Lis Pendens Rules in the Brussels Ibis Regulation, op. cit., p. 22. 
999 On details see see supra Section 14.1., Subchapter I of this Chapter. It is likely that the “full review” of the 
jurisdiction clause may be provided by the non-designated Member state court when the designated Member 
State court is seized after a long time after its institution. See M. WELLER, Choice of Forum Agreements Under 
the Brussels I Brussels I-bis Regulation and Under the Hague Convention: Coherences and Clashes, op. cit., p. 
26, where he suggests that once the designated Member State court is seized, the non-designated Member State 
court should reduce the standard of review from a full review of the jurisdiction agreement to the reduced 
standard. 
1000 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 146., where it is stated that «For example, according to the law applied by the 
court, it may be prevented from exercising jurisdiction due to a lis pendens rule.». 
1001 M. WELLER, Choice of Forum Agreements Under the Brussels I Brussels I-bis Regulation and Under the 
Hague Convention: Coherences and Clashes, op. cit., p. 26 ; I. BERGSON, The death of the torpedo action? The 
practical operation of the Recast’s reforms to enhance the protection for exclusive jurisdiction agreements 
within the European Union, op.cit., p. 27. 
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substantive validity according to Article 5 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements. The same result would be gained by the application of the new conflict-of-laws rule on 
substantive validity under Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation defining capacity as a part of 
substantive validity. Although capacity would be qualified as a separate aspect from substantive 
validity, the lex fori including conflict-of-laws would lead to the same result: application of conflict-
of-laws rules of the Czech law. However, the decision of the Italian court on the invalidity of the 
jurisdiction clause is binding for the Czech court by virtue of the Gothaer judgment.1002 Contrary to 
the Brussels regime, according to Article 5 par. 2 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreement provides the Czech court “shall not decline to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that 
the dispute should be decided in a court of another State”. In consequence, two regimes seem to be 
in conflict – the result is dependent on which legal instrument prevails 
a) If the Brussels Ibis Regulation prevails by virtue of Article 26 par. 6 of the Hague Convention 
on Choice of Court Agreements (i.e., party A resides in Italy, party B in the Czech Republic), 
the Gothaer judgment is binding for the Czech courts. Although such a situation results in a 
nondesirable race to a decision, it is perfectly in line with the Brussels Ibis Regulation.1003 This 
result will not lead to irreconcilable judgments which do not undermine the Brussels regime. 
b) If the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements prevails by virtue of Article 26 par. 6 
(i.e., party A resides in Italy, party B in Mexico), in such a case, the Gothaer judgment is not 
binding for the Czech courts, and the Czech court may proceed independently according to 
Article 5 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. The Czech court may hear 
the case. This result may lead to irreconcilable judgments rendered by two Member State 
courts. 
 
b) Public Policy Exception 
According to the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, the seized non-
designated court is relieved from its duty to suspend or dismiss proceedings according to 
Article 6 lett. c) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, where giving the 
effect to the jurisdiction agreement would lead to manifest injustice or would be manifestly 
contrary to its own public policy. In such a case, the seized non-designated court is not 
prevented from continuing proceedings and may even render a judgment. However, only the 
                                                          
1002 On the opinion that the chosen Member State court should recognise the decision of the non-chosen court, 
see C. HEINZE, B. STEINROTTER, The Revised Lis Pendens Rules in the Brussels Ibis Regulation, op. cit., p. 22 
1003 On the flowchart and details see see supra Section 14.1., Subchapter I of this Chapter. 
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judgment rendered by the chosen court is eligible for recognition and enforcement in the 
requested Contracting State.1004  
The situation concerning the interference of public policy and the overriding mandatory rules 
with the validity of jurisdiction agreements under the Brussels Regime was analysed in detail 
in Section 2.1., Subchapter III, Chapter One. The ECJ expressly stated in Trasporti Castelletti 
that: “Considerations about the links between the court designated and the relationship at 
issue, about the validity of the clause, or about the substantive rules of liability applicable 
before the chosen court are unconnected with those requirements.”1005 This conclusion was 
then confirmed by ECJ in CDC and it was built on the conviction that mutual trust between 
the Member States for the predictability of jurisdictional rules should prevail over the public 
policy of the derogated forum and the protection of specific State interests. Furthermore, 
according to Professor Basedow the enforcement of overriding mandatory provisions or 
international public policy of the non-selected forum under the Brussels Regime should be 
classified as relating to the substantive validity of choice-of-court agreements.1006 Therefore, 
the introduction of the new conflict-of-law rule on substantive validity of jurisdiction 
agreements according to Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation practically results in the 
complete exclusion of the overriding mandatory rules of the lex fori of the derogated Member 
State, unless the conflict-of-laws rule refers back to the derogated forum.1007 Therefore, such 
an interpretation would seemingly lead to the conclusion that the rules laid down in the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court and the rules laid down in the Brussels Ibis Regulation are not 
compatible. A seized non-designated court is entitled to proceed under the Hague Convention 
on Choice of Court if the choice-of-court agreement would lead to a manifest injustice or 
would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of its lex fori. However, according to Article 
25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, a seized non-designated Member State court is not entitled 
to consider public policy. The example below demonstrates that the interference of public 
                                                          
1004 R. A. BRAND, P. HERRUP, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Commentary and 
Documents, op. cit., p. 88 
1005 ECJ, Case C-159/97, Trasporti Castelletti, par. 52. 
1006 J. BASEDOW, Exclusive choice-of-court agreements as a derogation from imperative norms, op. cit., p. 20. 
1007 Recital 20 Brussels Ibis Regulation: «Where a question arises as to whether a choice-of-court agreement in 
favour of a court or the courts of a Member State is null and void as to its substantive validity, that question 
should be decided in accordance with the law of the Member State of the court or courts designated in the 
agreement, including the conflict-of-laws rules of that Member State.». J. BASEDOW, Exclusive choice-of-court 
agreements as a derogation from imperative norms, op. cit., p. 20. 
  
244 
 
policy under the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements with the Brussels 
Regime is excluded between the Member States. 
1) Party A and party B concluded an exclusive jurisdiction agreement in favour of the Czech 
courts. Then party A brought an action in front of the Italian court and party B brought an 
action in front of the Czech courts. 
Perspective from the point of view of the Czech court: The Czech court applies Article 5 of the 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and simultaneously Article 31 par. 2 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation. If the jurisdiction agreement is not “null and void”, the Czech court may 
hear the case. 
Perspective from the point of view of the Italian court: The Italian court applies Article 6 of the 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and simultaneously Article 25 and 31 par. 2 of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation. According to the Italian court, giving effect to the jurisdiction 
agreement in favour of the Czech court would be manifestly contrary to its public policy because of 
Article 6 lett. c) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. Where one of the 
exceptions in Article 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court arises, “the law of the court 
seized determines whether or not it has jurisdiction and whether or not it can exercise that 
jurisdiction”:1008 the law of the seized Italian court is represented by Article 25 (which does not 
allow the court to disregard the jurisdiction agreement due to the public policy of the seized 
Member State court) and by Article 31 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation as to lis pendens. Since 
the Czech court established its jurisdiction in accordance with the agreement, the Italian court 
declines jurisdiction in favour of Czech court.  
 
2) Party A and party B concluded an exclusive jurisdiction agreement in favour of the Czech 
courts. Then, party A brought an action in front of the Italian courts. Eight months after, party B 
brought an action in front of the Czech courts. 
Perspective from the point of view of the Italian court: The Italian court applies Article 6 of the 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
(Article 31 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is not applicable since there is no lis pendens). The 
Italian court, which is seized eight months before the Czech court, assumes that the jurisdiction 
                                                          
1008 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 146. 
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agreement is valid, but giving effect to the jurisdiction agreement in favour of the Czech court 
would be manifestly contrary to its public policy because of Article 6 lett. c) of the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. Where one of the exceptions in Article 6 of the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court arises, “the law of the court seized determines whether or not it has 
jurisdiction and whether or not it can exercise that jurisdiction”.1009 Article 25 does not allow the 
court to disregard the jurisdiction agreement due to the public policy of the seized Member State 
court and Article 31 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation addresses lis pendens. Thus, the Italian 
court must stay its proceedings in favour of the Czech court according to the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation.  
Perspective from the point of view of the Czech court: The Czech court applies Article 5 of the 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and simultaneously Article 31 par. 2 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation concerning parallel proceedings and might hear a case (the jurisdiction 
agreement is not null and void). 
The rules are not in conflict and thus, Article 26 par. 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreement is not applicable.1010 In consequence, the residence of the parties is 
irrelevant. The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements does not interfere with the 
conclusions of the ECJ in judgment Trasporti Castelletti, which excludes any effect of 
violation of public policy on a valid jurisdiction agreement. Thus, the legal certainty laid 
down in the Brussels Regime and mutual trust between the Member States prevails over 
securing the public policy of the derogated Member State also under the Hague Convention 
on Choice of Court Agreement.  
 
                                                          
1009 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 146. 
1010 On the opposite approach see F. RAGNO, Forum Selection under the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements – A European Perspective, op. cit., p. 149, where the author provides the similar example, but 
stating that «This theoretically falls into the scope of both the Brussels and Hague regimes. One must rely on 
Article 26(6)(a) of the Hague Convention to determine the applicable instrument.». The author refuses the 
approach that the lis pendens mechanism provided by the Brussels I-bis Regulation is not affected by Article 6 of 
the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements; contra Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 301; M. AHMED, 
P. BEAUMONT, Exclusive choice-of-court agreements: some issues on the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements and its relationship with the Brussels I Brussels I-bis Regulation especially anti-suit injunctions, 
concurrent proceedings and the implications of BREXIT, op. cit., p. 405; F. C. VILLATA, L’attuazione degli 
accordi di scelta del foro nel regolamento Bruxelles I, op. cit., p. 165–66. 
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2.4.  Parallel Proceedings between the Member State and Contracting State  
As to the regime on parallel proceedings, the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements obviously does not differ between the Member States and the Contracting States.  
As to the Brussels regime, in Section 15, Subchapter I of this Chapter, it was pointed out that 
the ECJ case law (Coreck C-387/98; Lugano Opinion 1/03; and Mahamdia, C-154/11) 
regarding derogation from the jurisdiction of the Member States on the basis of choice-of-
court agreements in favour of Third States courts have not provided insight into this issue. On 
the contrary, the Owusu judgment, C-281/02, where the ECJ upheld that the general ground of 
the jurisdiction based on the domicile of the defendant cannot be derogated from,1011 brought 
even more doubts. The specific rule on exclusive choice-of-court agreements in favour of a 
Third State court has not been introduced into the Brussels Ibis Regulation in order to 
motivate the Third States into ratifying the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements.1012 Only new rules on lis pendens and related actions were established by Article 
33 and 34 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation: Section 15.5., Subchapter I of this Chapter, was 
partially dedicated to these two provisions, and the basic conditions for their application are 
only briefly mentioned: there must be already pending proceedings before the Third State 
court at the time the Member State court is seized; the new rules on lis pendens and on related 
actions refer only to Articles 4, 7, 8, and 9 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation; a judgment that 
will be issued by a Third State court must be recognisable and, where applicable, enforceable 
in that Member State (a prognosis rule); and a stay must be necessary for the proper 
administration of justice. Moreover, the effectiveness of these new provisions is weakened by 
the fact that a seized Member State court is granted with the discretionary power. These rules 
must be applied in the context of the parallel proceedings with the Contracting State where 
Article 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements is simultaneously applied. 
It is difficult to justify the operation of Article 25 and Article 31 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation when this rule governs only intra-EU proceedings. The application of Article 25 
and Article 31 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation in respect of Third States could be 
admissible only because of the effet réflexe doctrine. This doctrine is not considered a strong 
                                                          
1011 ECJ, C–281/02, Owusu, par. 40. 
1012 Committee on Legal Affairs, 20 September 2011, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-
live/en/committees/video?event=20110920-0900-COMMITTEE-JURI. 
  
247 
 
argument for declination of jurisdiction where Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation deal specifically with the extra-EU proceedings. 
In consequence, it is necessary to analyse whether the new rules coordinating the parallel 
proceedings with Contracting States by virtue of Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation in the presence of choice-of-court agreement operate properly with the rules laid 
down in the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. 
The following two examples demonstrate the proper mixed application of both regimes. The 
first example concerns the application of Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
and the second example concerns a situation where Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation cannot operate. However, no difficulties were identified. 
1) Party A is resident in Italy, party B is resident in Singapore, and they designate a court in 
Mexico. The Italian court is second seized by the Singaporean party, with a court in Mexico 
being seized first by the Italian party.  
Perspective from the point of view of the Mexican court: The Mexican court applies Article 5 of the 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and may hear a case unless the agreement is 
null and void according to its own conflict-of-laws rules. 
Perspective from the point of view of the Italian court: The Italian court applies Article 33 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation (if the conditions are fulfiled) in conjunction with Article 6 of the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (where no exception of Article 6 of the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements occurs). It is likely that all conditions of Article 33 of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation are fulfilled when: (i) the Italian court is second seized; (ii) the 
jurisdiction of the Italian court is based on Article 4 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation; (iii) judgment 
that will be issued by a Mexican court might be recognisable and enforceable in Slovakia where 
Articles 8 and 9 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements governs the recognition 
and enforcement of the judgments rendered by the chosen court of the Contracting State; (iv) 
Recital No 24 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation provides that the assessment of proper administration 
of justice may also include consideration of the question whether the court of the Third State has 
exclusive jurisdiction in the particular case. According to Article 33 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, 
the Italian court may stay the proceedings, and according to Article 6 of the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements the Italian court should suspend or dismiss the proceedings. If the 
Italian court stays the proceedings, Article 26 par. 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
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Agreements is not applicable, and the rules of both regimes are properly in line. 
 
2) Party A is resident in Italy, party B is resident in Singapore, and they designate a court in 
Mexico. The Italian court is first seized by the Singaporean party, with a court in Mexico being 
seized second by the Italian party. 
Perspective from the point of view of the Mexican court: The Mexican court applies Article 5 of the 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and may hear a case unless the agreement is 
null and void according to its own conflict-of-laws rules.  
Perspective from the point of view of the Italian court: The Italian court applies Article 6 of the 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (no exception of Article 6 of the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements occurs). However, Article 33 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation cannot operate since the Italian court is first seized. In such a case, two different 
interpretations may be provided: 
i) Owusu judgment. The Italian court could establish jurisdiction according to Article 4 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation by virtue of Owusu case. Article 4 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
contradicts Article 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. Therefore, 
the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements prevails according to Article 26 par. 6 
of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. The Italian court suspends or 
dismisses the proceedings according to Article 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements.  
ii) Lugano Opinion 1/03. It must be reminded of the ECJ interpretation: “Thus, where the new 
Lugano Convention contains articles identical to Articles 22 and 23 of Regulation No 
44/2001 and leads on that basis to selection as the appropriate forum of a court of a non-
member country which is a party to that Convention, where the defendant is domiciled in a 
Member State, in the absence of the Convention, that latter State would be the appropriate 
forum, whereas under the Convention it is the non-member country.”1013 It is true that Article 
5 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements is not identical to Article 25 of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation, but the extension of this interpretation into jurisdiction clauses 
                                                          
1013 See Lugano opinion 1/03, par. 153. For further details on the opinion, see P. FRANZINA, Le condizioni di 
applicabilità del regolamento (CE) n. 44/2001 alla luce del parere 1/03 della Corte di giustizia, op. cit., pp. 948-
977; N. LAVRANOS, Opinion 1/03, Lugano Convention, op. cit., pp. 1087-1100; F. POCAR (ed.), The External 
Competence of the European Union and Private International Law: The EC Court’s Opinion on the Lugano 
Convention, op. cit. 
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falling into the scope of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements seems to 
represent a reasonable expectations for the parties that their jurisdiction agreement will be 
respected. This interpretation does not contradict the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements, and the Italian court suspends or dismisses the proceedings according to Article 
6 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements.  
 
2.4.1.  A Gap in the “Give Way” rule under the Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements? 
However, the following scenario demonstrates that the problem may arise where all parties 
involved reside exclusively within the Member States and agree on a court in a Contracting 
State. According to the first “give way” rule provided in Article 26 par. 6 of the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, the Brussels Ibis Regulation should prevail in 
case of conflicting rules. For better understanding, the first example demonstrates a proper 
combined application of Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation and Article 6 of 
the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and compatibility of their rules 
(similar example as example No 1): 
1) Party A is resident in Italy, party B is resident in the Czech Republic, and they designate a court 
in Mexico. The Italian court is second seized by the Czech party in accordance with Article 4 of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation, with a court in Mexico being seized first by the Italian party. 
Perspective from the point of view of the Mexican court: The Mexican court applies Article 5 of the 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and may hear a case unless the agreement is 
null and void according to its own conflict-of-laws rules. 
Perspective from the point of view of the Italian court: The Italian court applies Article 33 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation (if the conditions are fulfiled) in conjunction with Article 6 of the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (where no exception of Article 6 of the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements occurs). It is likely that all conditions of Article 33 of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation are fulfilled when: (i) the Italian court is second seized; (ii) the 
jurisdiction of the Italian court is based on Article 4 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation; (iii) the 
judgment that will be issued by a Mexican court might be recognisable and enforceable in Slovakia 
where Articles 8 and 9 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements governs the 
recognition and enforcement of the judgments rendered by the chosen court of the Contracting 
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State; (iv) Recital No 24 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation provides that the assessment of proper 
administration of justice may also consider whether the court of the Third State has exclusive 
jurisdiction in the particular case. According to Article 33 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation the Italian 
court may stay the proceedings, and according to Article 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements the Italian court should suspend or dismiss the proceedings. If the Italian court 
stays the proceedings, Article 26 par. 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements is 
not applicable, and the rules of both regimes are properly in line. As to the recognition or 
enforcement of the judgment, the judgment issued by the Mexican court may be recognised and 
enforced in Italy or the other Contracting States according to Article 8 of the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements, and there is no conflicting judgment rendered by the Italian court.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Italian court suspends or 
dismisses proceedings
No conflicting rules, article 26 (6) 
of the Hague Convention does
not apply
Simultaneous application of the BI-bis and 
the Hague Convention by the Italian court
Articles 33 and 34 of 
the BI-bis (if all 
conditions are fulfilled, 
the Italian court has 
right to suspend the 
proceedings)
Article 6 of the Hague 
Convention (the Italian 
court, as the non-
chosen court, should 
suspend or dismiss 
proceedings )
Mexican court issues a 
judgment
Application of article
5 of the Hague 
Convention by the 
Mexican court
The judgment issued by the Mexican court 
can be recognised and enforced according 
to article 8 of the Hague Convention 
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The following example is very similar to the previous one, with the exception that the Italian 
court is seized first and as a consequence, Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
cannot be applied. This example demonstrates the difficulties. 
2) Party A resident in Italy and the party B resident in Czech Republic, they designate a court in 
Mexico. The Italian court is seized first by the Czech party in accordance with Article 4 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation, with a court in Mexico being seized second by the Italian party.  
Perspective from the point of view of the Mexican court: The Mexican court applies Article 5 of the 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and may hear a case unless the agreement is 
null and void according to its own conflict-of-laws rules. 
Perspective from the point of view of the Italian court: The Italian court applies Article 6 of the 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (no exception of Article 6 of the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements occurs). However, Article 33 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation cannot operate since the Italian court is first seized. In such a case, two different 
interpretations may be provided: 
i) Lugano Opinion 1/03. It must be reminded of the ECJ interpretation: “Thus, where the new 
Lugano Convention contains articles identical to Articles 22 and 23 of Regulation No 44/2001 
and leads on that basis to selection as the appropriate forum of a court of a non-member 
country which is a party to that Convention, where the defendant is domiciled in a Member 
State, in the absence of the Convention, that latter State would be the appropriate forum, 
whereas under the Convention it is the non-member country.”1014 It is true that Article 5 of the 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements is not identical to Article 25 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation, but the extension of this interpretation into the jurisdiction clauses 
falling into the scope of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements seems to 
represent a reasonable expectations for the parties that their jurisdiction agreement will be 
respected. This interpretation does not contradict the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements, and the Italian court suspends or dismisses the proceedings according to Article 6 
of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements.  
ii) Owusu judgment. The Italian court could establish jurisdiction according to Article 4 of the 
                                                          
1014 See Lugano opinion 1/03, par. 153. 
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Brussels Ibis Regulation by virtue of the Owusu case. Article 4 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
contradicts Article 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. Therefore, the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation prevails according to Article 26 par. 6 of the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements (both parties are resident in the Member States). The Italian court 
hears a case according to Article 4 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. As a result, there are two 
judgments issued by the Contracting States. The enforcement or recognition of the judgment 
issued by the Mexican court can be denied in Italy according to Article 9 lett. f) of the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. This problematic scenario is demonstrated in the 
flowchart. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Italian court hears the case 
according to article 4 of the BI-bis
Conflicting rules: article 6 of the Hague 
Convention and article 4 of the BI-bis
BI-bis prevails on the basis of article 26 (6) a) of 
the Hague Convention (both parties resident in 
Member states)
Simultaneous application of the BI-bis and 
the Hague Convention by the Italian court
Articles 25, 31(2), 33 
and 34 of the BI-bis 
not applicable, 
application of article 4 
of the BI-bis ? 
Article 6 of the Hague 
Convention (the Italian 
court, as the non-
chosen court, should 
suspend or dismiss 
proceedings )
Mexican court issues
a judgment
Application of article
5 of the Hague 
Convention by the 
Mexican court
Judgment issued by the Mexican court 
do not have to be recognised or 
enforced in Italy according article 9 f) 
of the Hague Convention 
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However, according to the authors of the Impact Assessment, the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements prevails also in case when all the parties involved reside 
exclusively within the Member States and agree on a court in the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements Contracting State as well:  
Finally, a situation may arise under which all parties to a choice-of-court agreement are 
resident in EU Member States but they have agreed to a court in a non-EU Member State 
which is a Contracting Party to the Hague Convention. In this case, Art. 26 para 6 of the 
Hague Convention which refers to residence of the parties only, gives priority to Brussels 
I. However, if in such a case there is no exclusive jurisdiction of any court in a EU 
Member State under Brussels I, the Hague Convention could still apply even if, this 
situation is not exactly covered by any provision of the Hague Convention.1015  
Despite this statement, does it mean that when the Member State court may establish 
jurisdiction according to Article 4 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (i.e., Owusu case), the court 
may simply apply the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements? If the intention 
was also to cover this situation, why does the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements not expressly provide for a specific rule? 1016 Unfortunately, Article 26 par. 6 lett. 
a) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements is silent in this respect, and it is 
likely that the Member State courts will give way to the Brussels Ibis Regulation in case of 
conflicting rules. However, if we assume that the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements prevails instead of the Brussels Ibis Regulation in light of the Impact 
Assessment, then the Italian court in example No 4 might be allowed to suspend or dismiss 
proceedings in accordance with Article 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements.  
The same result, as identified in example No 4 above, may occur when the plaintiff is 
domiciled in a Third State that is not a Contracting State (Russia), the defendant is domiciled 
in a Member State (Italy), court of the Contracting State is designated and is seized second 
(Mexico) with the Member State court of the defendant’s domicile seized first (Italy). Also, in 
                                                          
1015 A Study to Inform an Impact Assessment on the Ratification of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements by the European Community, 105. 
1016 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 291-301. The authors only tackle an issue regarding choice-of-court 
agreements in favour of a Member State court.  
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this case, Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation cannot operate if the proceedings 
in a Third State court are not pending when a Member State court is seized. However, Article 
4 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation may find the application on the basis of Owusu case, which 
would be in contrast with Article 6 of the Hague Convention. Consequently, the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation should prevail in accordance with Article 26 par. 6 lett. a) of the Hague 
Convention (one party is domiciled in a Member State and another party in a third State that 
is not Contracting State).  
In any case, a precise rule for these two problematic situations should be adopted, such as an 
amendment to Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation or an exception specified in 
Article 26 par. 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. Otherwise, the 
practice of Member State courts may differ – some Member States court may: (i) suspend 
proceedings according to Article 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
by virtue of the Impact Assessment (the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
prevails); (ii) suspend proceedings according to Article 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice 
of Court Agreements by virtue of Lugano Opinion 1/03 (the Brussels I-bis Regulation 
prevails); or (iii) establish jurisdiction in accordance with Article 4 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation by virtue of the Owusu judgment (the Brussels Ibis Regulation prevails). 
Moreover, if the latter situation occurs, there exists the possibility of two inconsistent 
judgments. This situation is a gap that can create legal uncertainty and unpredictability for the 
parties in the future. 
 
2.4.2.  Compatibility of the Regimes in the Presence of One of the Exceptions 
Provided in Article 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
Lastly, it is necessary to analyse the mixed operation of the rules when one of the exceptions 
in Article 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements occurs. For instance: (i) 
the jurisdiction agreement is null and void pursuant to the law of the State of the chosen court; 
(ii) one of the parties lack capacity to conclude the jurisdiction agreement under its own law; 
(iii) the jurisdiction agreement is manifestly unjust or contrary to the public policy; (iv) the 
agreement cannot reasonably be performed on the basis of the exceptional reasons beyond the 
control of the parties; or (v) the chosen court has decided not to hear the case. The following 
examples tackle one of the most problematic situations described in Section 2.1.2, 
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Suhchaptaer III, Chapter One – the possibility to disregard the jurisdiction agreement in 
favour of the court of the Contracting State when giving effect to the agreement would be 
contrary to the public policy of the State of the court seized. However, the same result would 
be gained also when other exceptions in Article 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements occur.  
First, for better understanding we examine a specific situation demonstrating the proper 
application of Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
1) Party A is resident in Italy party B is resident in Singapore, and they designate a court in 
Mexico. An Italian court is seized second by the Singaporean party, with a court in Mexico being 
seized first by the Italian party.  
The Italian court simultaneously applies Article 33 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation and Article 6 of 
the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. The Italian court presumes that giving 
effect to the jurisdiction agreement in favour of the Mexican court would be manifestly contrary to 
its public policy by virtue of Article 6 lett. c). The Brussels Ibis Regulation does not seem to 
conflict with the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, since Article 33 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation does not prescribe suspending the proceedings and Article 6 of the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements does not require hearing the case. Therefore, Article 26 
par. 6 lett. a) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements is not applicable. According 
to Article 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, “the law of the court seized 
determines whether or not it has jurisdiction and whether or not it can exercise that 
jurisdiction”.1017 The national law embodies the Brussels Ibis Regulation. In consequence, the 
Italian court re-verifies Article 33 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation in order to determine whether to 
stay the proceedings or not. It is likely that all conditions of Article 33 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation are not fulfilled. A judgment rendered by a Mexican court would not be probably 
recognisable and enforceable in Italy, since Articles 8 and 9 of the Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements should be applied for the recognition and enforcement of the judgments rendered 
by the chosen court of the Contracting State. According to Article 9 lett. c) of the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, recognition or enforcement may be refused if such 
recognition or enforcement would be manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the 
requested State. In consequence, the Italian court cannot stay the proceedings.  
                                                          
1017 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 146. 
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The second specific situation is the same as the previous one, but the Member State court is 
seized first. In consequence, Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation cannot 
operate. 
2) Party A is resident in Italy, party B is resident in Singapore, and they designate a court in 
Mexico. An Italian court is seized first by the Singaporean party, with a court in Mexico being 
seized second by the Italian party. 
The Italian court applies Article 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. Since 
Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation are not applicable, the Italian court applies 
Article 4 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation on the basis of the Owusu case due to the defendant’s 
domicile in Italy. The Italian court presumes that giving effect to the jurisdiction agreement in 
favour of the Mexican court would be contrary to its public policy by virtue of Article 6 lett. c) of 
the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. Also, in this case, Article 4 of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation does not conflict with Article 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements since Article 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements does not 
require a court to suspend proceedings or on the contrary, to hear a case when one of the exceptions 
apply, stating, “the law of the court seized determines whether or not it has jurisdiction and whether 
or not it can exercise that jurisdiction”.1018 The law of the Italian court seized is bound by Article 4 
of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, which necessarily prescribes establishing its jurisdiction. Thus, the 
Italian court cannot suspend or dismiss the proceedings. 
As we can see, the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements gives an answer to the 
question of disregarding the jurisdiction agreement in favour of the Contracting States in 
order to protect the public policy of the seized Member State court or even of EU legislation. 
Such a result is opposite to the result which was reached in Section 2.3.1. of this Subchapter 
regarding parallel proceeding between the Member States. It is obvious that the level of 
protection of the fundamental principles of the derogated States is different between the 
Member States, where mutual trust should be guaranteed, and between the Member State and 
the Third State. This “permission” to disregard the jurisdiction agreement in the presence of 
                                                          
1018 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 146. 
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public policy given by the regime based on the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements also corresponds to the ECJ’s interpretation in the Ingmar case.1019  
 
3.  Compatibility between the Hague Convention on the Choice of Court Agreements 
and the 2007 Lugano Convention 
The rules on the 2007 Lugano Convention were analysed simultaneously with the rules of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation, whereby the “old” Brussels I Regulation contains almost identical 
wording as the 2007 Lugano Convention concerning the rules on the prorogation of 
jurisdiction and on lis pendens. The compatibility between the Brussels Ibis Regulation and 
the 2007 Lugano Convention was exercised in the Section 1 of this Subchapter. Furthermore, 
it is necessary to examine the interplay of the rules on choice-of-court between the 2007 
Lugano Convention and the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. This 
scenario may become relevant if the UK becomes a Contracting State to the 2007 Lugano 
Convention1020 and the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements.1021 
                                                          
1019 See supra Section 2.1.2., Subchapter III, Chapter One. 
1020 On the scenario favouring the 2007 Lugano Convention see HM Government, Providing a Cross-Border 
Civil Judicial Cooperation Framework – A Future Partnership Paper, Published 22 August 2017 available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/providing-a-cross-border-civil-judicial-cooperation-framework-a-
future-partnership-paper, 9 par. 50; The future relationship between the United Kingdom and the European 
Union, Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty, July 2018, par. 147, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-future-relationship-between-the-united-kingdom-and-the-
european-union. 
1021 On the intention to participate in Hague Conventions to which the UK is already a party also in by virtue of 
our membership of the EU listing the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements see: HM Government, 
Providing a Cross-Border Civil Judicial Cooperation Framework – A Future Partnership Paper, available at 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/providing-a-cross-border-civil-judicial-cooperation-framework-a-
future-partnership-paper>, p. 8. The UK has on 28 December 2018 signed and ratified the 2005 Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, which applies to the UK by virtue of its membership of the EU but 
may cease to be applied for UK, when it leaves the EU on 29 March 2019. By ratifying the Hague Convention 
on Choice of Court Agreements on 28 December 2018, it seems that UK have reduced a transition period gap to 
two days it will enter into force for the UK on 1 April 2019: «In accordance with Article 29 of the 2005 Hague 
Convention, the United Kingdom is bound by the Convention by virtue of its membership of the European Union, 
which approved the Convention on behalf of its Member States. The United Kingdom intends to continue to 
participate in the 2005 Hague Convention after it withdraws from the European Union. The Government of the 
United Kingdom and the European Council have reached political agreement on the text of a treaty (the 
“Withdrawal Agreement”) on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union and the 
European Atomic Energy Community. Subject to signature, ratification and approval by the parties, the 
Withdrawal Agreement will enter into force on 30 March 2019. The Withdrawal Agreement includes provisions 
for a transition period to start on 30 March 2019 and end on 31 December 2020 or such later date as is agreed 
by the United Kingdom and the European Union (the “transition period”). In accordance with the Withdrawal 
Agreement, during the transition period, European Union law, including the 2005 Hague Convention, would 
continue to be applicable to and in the United Kingdom. The European Union and the United Kingdom have 
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Article 26 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements determines the 
relationship between the treaties through different “give way rules”. It must be borne in mind 
that all treaties are to be applied simultaneously; the give way rule should only resolve a real 
incompatibility between the conventions which lead to different results in a concrete 
situation.1022 The give way rule is addressed only to the States which are party to all 
applicable treaties.1023 For the purpose of this Section, the give way rules are analysed only in 
respect to the 2007 Lugano Convention, although such give way rules are in generally 
applicable to the all applicable conflicting treaties. 
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements contains 
the first give way rule and is applicable irrespective of the fact whether the conflicting 
convention was concluded before or after the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements. Under this give way rule, the 2007 Lugano Convention prevails if:1024  
(i) All parties involved reside exclusively within the Contracting States to the Lugano 
Convention (e.g., party A is a resident in Switzerland and party B is a resident in Norway, 
in case Switzerland and Norway would become a party to the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements); 
(ii) Parties involved reside exclusively within the Contracting States to the Lugano 
Convention and in the Third States that are not Contracting States of the Hague 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
agreed that the European Union will notify other parties to international agreements that during the transition 
period the United Kingdom is treated as a Member State for the purposes of international agreements concluded 
by the European Union, including the 2005 Hague Convention. In the event that the Withdrawal Agreement is 
not ratified and approved by the United Kingdom and the European Union, however, the United Kingdom 
wishes to ensure continuity of application of the 2005 Hague Convention from the point at which it ceases to be 
a Member State of the European Union. The United Kingdom has therefore submitted the Instrument of 
Accession in accordance with Article 27(4) of the 2005 Hague Convention only in preparation for this situation. 
The Instrument of Accession declares that the United Kingdom accedes to the 2005 Hague Convention in its own 
right with effect from 1 April 2019. In the event that the Withdrawal Agreement is signed, ratified and approved 
by the United Kingdom and the European Union and enters into force on 30 March 2019, the United Kingdom 
will withdraw the Instrument of Accession which it has today deposited. In that case, for the duration of the 
transition period as provided for in the Withdrawal Agreement as stated above, the United Kingdom will be 
treated as a Member State of the European Union and the 2005 Hague Convention will continue to have effect 
accordingly.The Embassy of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands avails itself of the opportunity to renew to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands the assurances of its highest consideration.». See the notification by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs https://verdragenbank.overheid.nl/nl/Verdrag/Details//011343/011343_Notificaties_13.pdf.   
1022 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 267. 
1023 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 268. 
1024 The Brussels Ibis Regulation prevails also where all parties involved reside exclusively in the Third States, 
this rule cannot cover also the 2007 Lugano Convention, since Article 23 of the 2007 Convention requires one of 
the partiesparty to be domiciled in the State which is party to the Lugano Convention. 
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Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (e.g. party A is a resident in Switzerland and 
party B is a resident in Russia, in case Switzerland would become party to the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements). 
In contrast, the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements prevails if at least one 
party resides in a Contracting State of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
that is not a Contracting States to the 2007 Lugano Convention (e.g., party A resides in 
Mexico). The ratio behind this rule is that only the States which are parties to the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, but not to the conflicting treaty, has an interest 
and the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements prevails.1025 
The “second rule giving way” to the 2007 Lugano Convention is determined in paragraph 3 of 
Article 26 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. It is addressed to the 
States of the 2007 Lugano Convention which would become parties to the Hague Convention 
on Choice of Court Agreements and towards a State of the 2007 Lugano Convention which 
would not be party to the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements in order not to 
violate the obligation towards the latter State imposed by the 2007 Lugano Convention.1026 
This second give way rule applies only to the prior treaties, i.e., it applies in respect to the 
States which are parties to the 2007 Lugano Convention and which will ratify the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements in the future. However, Article 26 par. 3 of the 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements would not apply to the possible future 
amendments to the 2007 Lugano Convention, for example, amendments which would bring 
the contents of the 2007 Lugano Convention in line with the Brussels Ibis Regulation, “with 
regard to any new inconsistencies introduced by it”.1027 
The “third give way” rule concerns only question on the recognition and the enforcement of 
judgments given by a court of a Contracting State to the 2007 Lugano Convention in other 
Contracting State to the 2007 Lugano Convention.1028 However, the judgment cannot be 
recognised or enforced to a lesser extent than under the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements. 
                                                          
1025 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 273. 
1026 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 280. 
1027 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 285 and footnote n. 317. 
1028 If both Contracting States to the 2007 Lugano Convention will become parties to the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements. 
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Since the interplay between the rules on jurisdiction agreements and on lis pendens contained 
in the Brussels Ibis Regulation and in the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
were analysed in Section 2 of this Subchapter, it is only necessary to focus now on the 
interplay of the “old” non-amended rules of the Brussels I-2007 Lugano regime and the 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, i.e., the rule on substantive validity, the 
“first seized” lis pendens, and the restrictive approach as to the domicile of one of the parties 
in a Contracting State. All examples demonstrated further are built on the hypothesis that the 
2007 Lugano States ratify the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. 
 
3.1.  Substantive Validity 
The status quo of the question on substantive validity as provided in the 2007 Lugano 
Convention must be remembered.1029  
An explicit rule on the substantive validity of the jurisdiction agreement in the 2007 Lugano 
Convention is absent. There are two central doctrinal theses in the context of the Brussels I 
Regulation which may be extended to the 2007 Lugano Convention. The first doctrine is 
based on the interpretation of the ECJ regarding the formal validity of the jurisdiction clauses 
which extends this interpretation also to the questions of the substantive validity.1030 The 
second doctrine is based on the reference to the national law which determines the substantive 
validity of the jurisdiction clauses.1031 It is not clear whether Article 23 of the 2007 Lugano 
represents the independent regulation of the formation of the choice-of-court agreement, or if 
the referral to the domestic is allowed. Therefore, the solutions in the Contracting States may 
differ on the basis of various hypotheses leading to the application of lex fori or lex 
                                                          
1029 On details see supra Section 8.1., Subchapter I of this Chapter, concerning the substantive validity according 
to the Brussels Regulation 
1030 ECJ, Case 24-76, Estasis Salotti, par. 7; C-150/80, Elefanten Schuh, par. 25; C-159/97, Trasporti Castelletti, 
par. 49; C-116/02, Gasser, par. 51; Case C-116/02, Gasser, Opinion of Advocate General Leger, 9 September 
2003, par. 78. 
1031 The ECJ referred in a number of cases to the national law, see ECJ, Case C-214/89, Powell Duffryn, par. 13, 
21; Case 313/85, SpA Iveco Fiat, par. 7-8; Case, C-269/95, Benincasa, par. 31; C-387/98, Coreck Maritime, par. 
24. See also Case C-150/80, Elefanten Schuh, The Opinion of Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn, 20 May 
1981, p. 1699, where the Advocate General did not exclude the existence of “different” validity. 
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causae.1032 The divergences between the Contracting States might result in materially valid 
jurisdiction agreement in one Contracting State and invalid in other Contracting State.1033  
The substantive validity according to Article 5 and 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements is governed by the law of the court of the chosen State including conflict of 
laws rules.1034 However, the seized non-designated State must consider the question of the 
capacity of the parties under the lex fori, including conflict-of-laws rules according to Article 
6 lett. b) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, and simultaneously under 
the law of the chosen court according to Article 6 lett. a) of the Hague Convention on Choice 
of Court Agreements.1035  
1) The parties designate a court in Mexico in an exclusive jurisdiction agreement. Both, the 
Mexican court and the Swiss court are seized. 
The Mexican court applies a rule on substantive validity according to Article 5 of the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and applies conflict-of-laws rule of the Mexican court 
(the law of the chosen court).  
The Swiss court applies the conflict-of-laws rule on substantive validity according to Article 6 lett. 
a) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements which leads to the conflict-of-laws 
rules of the Mexican court. However, in the absence of the explicit rule in Article 23 of the 2007 
Lugano Convention, the Swiss court may apply lex fori or lex causae. In case the application of 
such a law would lead to different results in a concrete situation,1036 Article 26 par. 2 of the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements must resolve the incompatibility: 
a) The 2007 Lugano Convention prevails if for examples, (i) party A is resident in Norway and 
party B in is resident Switzerland; or (ii) if party A is resident in Norway and party B in Russia; 
                                                          
1032 On the solutions adopted by the Member States see Heidelberg Report: Cyprus, Greece, and Ireland apply 
lex fori. See Study JLS/C4/2005/03 “Compilation of All National Reports, Questionnaire No 3: Legal Problem 
Analysis”, http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_bxl1_compilation_quest_3_en.pdf, Austria, Estonia, 
Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Luxemburg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, 
and Spain, see Study JLS/C4/2005/03 “Compilation of All National Reports, Questionnaire No 3: Legal Problem 
Analysis”, http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_bxl1_compilation_quest_3_en.pdf, pp. 388–95 Italy, 
Slovenia see Study JLS/C4/2005/03 “Compilation of All National Reports, Questionnaire No 3: Legal Problem 
Analysis”, http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_bxl1_compilation_quest_3_en.pdf, pp. 388–95. 
1033 Heidelberg Report, par. 377. 
1034 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 125 and note no 158. 
1035 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 150. Similarly, see R. A. BRAND, P. HERRUP, The 2005 Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements: Commentary and Documents, op. cit., p. 91. 
1036 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 267 
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b) The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements prevails if, for example, party A is 
resident in Norway and party B in Mexico. 
 
3.2.  Parallel Proceedings  
As stated in Section 7, Subchaper II of this Chapter, the Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements does not establish the rule on lis pendens as does the Brussels-Lugano 
Regime. According to Article 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements the 
non-designated court is obliged to suspend or dismiss proceedings unless one of six 
exceptions applies. This rule does not constitute a ground for jurisdiction when one of the 
exceptions applies – the decision whether to exercise its jurisdiction or not is subject to the 
national law.1037  
Article 27 of the 2007 Lugano Convention requires any Member State court other than the 
one first seized to stay its proceedings on its own motion in favour of the first seized court of 
the Contracting State. This lis pendens rule in the context of the Brussels I Regulation was 
criticized because it applied to jurisdiction agreements as confirmed by the ECJ in C-116/02, 
Gasser and was often perceived as a legitimation of “Torpedo” actions.1038 Although the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation was modified and a new lis pendens rule was laid down in Article 31 
par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation gives precedence to the chosen court, the 2007 Lugano 
Convention remains unchanged. However, the following case No 1 b) demonstrates that the 
Torpedo Action would be limited if the Contracting States to the 2007 Lugano Convention 
would accede to the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. 
1) The parties concluded an exclusive jurisdiction agreement in favour of the Swiss courts. Party A 
brought an action in front of the Norwegian courts as the first, and party B brought an action in 
front Swiss of the courts as second. 
The Swiss court is obliged to hear the case according to Article 5 of the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements, but according to Article 27 of the 2007 Lugano Convention, it must 
stay its proceedings as a second seized court. The Norwegian court should suspend or dismisses the 
                                                          
1037 Hartley-Dogauchi Report, par. 146 
1038 J. VLEK, Lis Pendens, Choice-of-court Agreements and Abuse of Law Under Brussels Ibis, op. cit., p. 301. 
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proceedings according to Article 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, but 
according to Article 27 of the 2007 Lugano Convention, it should decide on its jurisdiction as the 
first. In consequence, the rule is conflicting for both courts. Article 26 par. 2 of the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements should resolve the incompatibility: 
i) The 2007 Lugano Convention prevails if for example, (i) party A is resident in Norway and 
party B in is resident Switzerland; or (ii) if party A is resident in Norway and party B in Russia. 
In consequence, the Swiss court must stay its proceedings, and the Norwegian court should 
decide on its jurisdiction as the first seized in accordance with Article 27 of the 2007 Lugano 
Convention. 
ii) The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements prevails if, for example, party A is 
resident in Norway and party B in Mexico. In consequence, the Swiss court must hear the case 
according to Article 5 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and the 
Norwegian court must suspend the proceedings according to Article 6 of the Hague Convention 
on Choice of Court Agreements.  
 
As to the parallel proceedings between the Contracting States to the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements and the 2007 Lugano Convention, it can be referred to the 
Section 2.4. of this Subchapter and to the practical examples therein where Articles 33 and 34 
of the Brussels Ibis Regulation are not applicable. The Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements does not distinguish between the parallel proceedings among the Contracting 
States to other treaties and the Contracting States to the Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements. The 2007 Lugano Convention which should “pay due account”1039 to the 
different interpretation of the ECJ concerning derogation from the jurisdiction of the Member 
States on the basis of choice-of-court agreements in favour of Third States courts (Coreck, 
case C–387/98; Lugano Opinion 1/03, Mahamdia, case C–154/11; and Owusu), leaves the 
questions without any answers.  
  
                                                          
1039 Protocol 2 on the uniform interpretation of the 1988 Lugano Convention. 
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CHAPTER THREE. LEGAL INSTRUMENTS GOVERNING THE CHOICE-OF-COURT 
AGREEMENTS IN FAMILY AND SUCCESSION MATTERS IN THE EU  
Almost five million persons immigrated to the European Union (“EU”) during 2015, more 
than two million of them are Third States citizens, and more than one million of EU citizens 
immigrated to a different EU Member State.1040 Increased immigration results in a growing 
number of international couples. A study from 20121041 demonstrates that the countries in 
which the immigration rate is lower results in a lower value of the “mixed marriages”.1042 
According to this study, on average one in twelve married persons was in a mixed marriage 
and persons born from the foreign marriage tend to enter into “mixed marriages” much more 
than the native-born persons.1043 In general, two million marriages and one hundred thousand 
divorces took place in the EU in 2011.1044 In consequence, the EU law should facilitate the 
personal life of cross-border families by providing for a transparent and predictable 
framework of family law for the international couples. Increased immigration also impacts 
cross-border succession proceedings. Therefore, the uniform jurisdiction rules, which should 
remove any obstacles for the cross-border family and succession disputes, should regulate the 
status of persons, parental responsibility matters, maintenance, property matters, and 
succession matters.  
As stated in Chapter One, Subchapter I, family law is prevalently characterized by substantive 
mandatory rules. Succession law also has significant limitations laid down by the national 
law, which, for example, protect the testator’s closest relatives. Indeed, through the selection 
of the court (where conflict-of-laws rules are not harmonized or unified), the parties derogate 
from the mandatory rules of the family and succession law of the otherwise competent court. 
                                                          
1040 On the data see Eurostat regarding migration and migrant population statistics: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics. 
1041 G. LANZIERI, Merging populations. A look at marriages with foreign-born persons in European countries, 
Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, 26 June 2012, available at: https://emnbelgium.be/news/eurostat-statistics-
marriages-foreign-born-persons-european-countries. 
1042 “Mixed marriage” is defined as «… mixed marriages are defined as those in which one partner is native-
born and the other was born abroad.». 
1043 43% of married foreign-born men and 46.9% of married foreign-born woman in 30 European States (27 EU 
countries and 3 EFTA States) concluded “mixed marriages”. G. Lanzieri, Merging populations. A look at 
marriages with foreign-born persons in European countries, Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, 26 June 2012, 
available at: https://emnbelgium.be/news/eurostat-statistics-marriages-foreign-born-persons-european-countries, 
p. 1 and 2. 
1044 On the data see Eurostat regarding marriages and divorces: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Marriage_and_divorce_statistics.  
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Therefore, it may be deduced that the jurisdiction agreements in cross-border family and 
succession disputes are permitted only to a precise extent, since the potential scale of the 
derogation from the mandatory rules of the otherwise competent courts are restricted, and 
sometimes party autonomy is excluded. Moreover, the effort to protect the weaker parties in 
the family law disputes requires an even higher level of mandatory regulations which play an 
essential role in the legal process of EU family law. 
In the first place, it must be borne in mind that family matters are fragmented in the different 
EU regulations covering the different scope of their application. In consequence, the parties 
entering into a jurisdiction agreement should know that two or more agreements, which 
prescribe different conditions, must be concluded at the same time. However, choice-of-court 
agreements are not permitted in all family matters, or, are not binding on the court. The rule 
on the choice-of-court agreements, which is subject to the discretional power of the 
designated court, is permitted for parental responsibility matters under the Brussels IIa 
Regulation. It was expected that the new rule on jurisdiction agreements for divorce, legal 
separation, or marriage would be proposed in the 2016 Proposal for a Recast of the Brussels 
IIa Regulation. Unfortunately, the Brussels IIa Regulation maintains the status quo in this 
matter. At least, the “true” rule on the choice-of-court agreements is provided only in the 
Maintenance Regulation, but it is rejected for the maintenance of a child under 18. Also, both 
new Regulations on the Property Regime gives priority to the concentration of the 
proceedings in divorce, legal separation, or marriage with the proceedings regarding property, 
when the agreement is required under the specific circumstances. Lastly, in succession law, 
choice-of-court agreements represent only a “mechanism” designed to ensure that the 
Member State court applies their own law.1045 All these rules are examined in this chapter. 
 
                                                          
1045 See Recital No 27 and 28 of the Succession Regulation. 
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I. Choice-of-Court Agreements in Family Matters 
1. Historical Background 
The Brussels IIa Regulation is the cornerstone of the EU judicial cooperation in matrimonial 
matters and parental responsibility matters.1046 The Brussels IIa Regulation has the same basic 
framework as the Brussels Convention and its successor - the Brussels I Regulation, and the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation.1047 The rationale was that the European integration “can no longer 
be purely economic, rather it must now inevitably address issues specifically affecting the life 
of the European citizen”.1048 Before the Brussels II Convention was drafted, the ECJ case law 
demonstrated some problems caused by judgments on divorces rendered by one Member 
State court and subsequently not recognized in another Member State.1049 Also, at that time, 
the Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations concerning recognition 
of the decisions on cross-border divorces and legal separations was drafted by the Hague 
Conference as a single convention, but it was ratified or adhered to by only eight of the 
Member States.1050 The extension of the scope of the Brussels Convention was for the first 
                                                          
1046 Commission Staff Working Document. Impact Assessment. Accompanying the document Proposal for a 
Council Regulation on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the 
matters of parental responsibility, and on international child abduction (recast), 30 June 2016, SWD/2016/0207 
final -, 30 June 2016/0190 (CNS), p. 6. 
1047 See Explanatory Report on the Convention, drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European 
Union, on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters (approved by 
the Council on 28 May 1998) prepared by Dr Alegría Borrás Professor of Private International Law University 
of Barcelona, OJ C 221, 16 July 1998, (“Borrás Report“), which in point 6 is provided: «The initial purpose of 
the Convention was to extend the 1968 Brussels Convention to cover matrimonial matters. Hence the starting-
point for the preparation of this Convention lies in the text of the 1968 Convention which is cited in the 
preamble. It would have been impossible to disregard such an important background text which has been 
demonstrably successful and is accompanied by extensive case-law from the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities, making it possible to pinpoint its most controversial features in the section applicable to this text. 
Nevertheless, the differing matters covered in both texts result in significant differences on a number of points (e. 
g. the fact that there is no general forum and the absence of any hierarchy in the grounds of jurisdiction) 
whereas in other areas the rules are more convergent (as for lis pendens and automatic recognition). The 
outcome is therefore a separate convention although the objectives pursued are the same: to unify the rules on 
international jurisdiction and to facilitate international recognition and enforcement of judgments.».  
1048 P. MCELEAVY, The Brussels II Regulation: How the European community has moved into family law, The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 51:4 (2002), p. 890. 
1049 ECJ, Case 145/86, Horst Ludwig Martin Hoffmann v Adelheid Krieg, 4 February 1988, ECLI:EU:C:1988:61. 
See also Jenard Report, p. 10-11. On further comments see S. L. UBERMAN, The Brussels II Convention: A Tool 
Necessary to Enforce Individual Rights Relating to Matrimonial Matters within the European Union, Suffolk 
Transnational Law Review, (1999), p. 169. 
1050 Hague Convention of 1 June 1970 on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations entered into force 
on 24 August 1975. In 1992, only Denmark, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and 
UK have ratified or adhered to the Convention. Also, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia ratified or 
adhered to Convention before they entered into the EU and Estonia adhered to the Convention in 2002. On more 
details concerning the Hague Convention of 1 June 1970 on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations 
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time suggested by the German delegation to the European Community Judicial Cooperation 
Working Group in 1992.1051 A questionnaire, which was circulated by the United Kingdom 
Presidency, enabled an exchange of views on jurisdiction in divorce and legal separation.1052 
At the same time, the European Group on Private International Law drafted a proposal for a 
convention on jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments in respect of 
marriage, matrimonial regimes, divorce, filiation, and succession.1053 This proposal was taken 
into account for the next draft of the Brussels II Convention with the exception of succession 
and filiation, which were dropped due to many technical difficulties.1054 In 1994, a first draft 
covered only divorce, legal separation, and marriage annulment, but in 1995, the French and 
Spanish delegations proposed to extend the scope of the draft of the Brussels II Convention to 
custody and related orders since the divorce court would normally have the competence to 
deal with such litigation.1055 For the first time, the new rule on jurisdiction respecting the 
party autonomy in family law was introduced to a certain extent. Article 3 par. 2 of the 
Brussels II Convention provided that where the child was not habitually resident in the 
Member State, which exercised jurisdiction on an application for divorce, legal separation, or 
marriage annulment by virtue of Article 2, the courts of that State had jurisdiction in such a 
matter. Such prorogation of jurisdiction was possible only when all the following 
requirements were met: (i) the child was habitually resident in one of the Member States; (ii) 
at least one of the spouses had parental responsibility in relation to the child; (iii) the 
jurisdiction of the court had been accepted by the spouses; and (iv) such jurisdiction was in 
the best interests of the child. The text of this provision, which provided for concurrent 
jurisdiction of the court of divorce, legal separation, or annulment of the marriage, was 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Convention see P. Bellet, B. Goldman. Explanatory Report on the 1970 Hague Divorce Convention, HCCH 
Publications, 1970; A. E. ANTON, The Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, (1969), pp. 620-643; P. BEAUMONT, G. MOIR, Brussels Convention II: A New 
Private International Law Instrument in Family Matters for the European Union or the European Community, 
European law review, 20:3 (1995), p. 272-73.  
1051 P. MCELEAVy, The Brussels II Regulation: How the European community has moved into family law, op. 
cit., p. 891. 
1052 Borrás Report, par. 7. 
1053 See European Group on Private International Law, Proposal for a Convention concerning jurisdiction and the 
enforcement of judgments in family and succession matters, 1993, Heidelberg, available at: https://www.gedip-
egpil.eu/documents/gedip-documents-3pe.html. 
1054 P. MCELEAVY, The Brussels II Regulation: How the European community has moved into family law, op. 
cit., p. 892. 
1055 There has been a strong opposition to the inclusion of custody matters, in particular from the United 
Kingdom, see P. MCELEAVY, The Brussels II Regulation: How the European community has moved into family 
law, op. cit., p. 893. 
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inspired by Article 10 par. 1 of the 1996 Hague Convention on parental responsibility and 
protection of children and aimed at guaranteeing the compatibility between these two legal 
rules.1056 Article 10 par. 1 of the 1996 Hague Convention on parental responsibility and 
protection of children compared to Article 3 par. 2 of the Brussels II Convention, required 
also that one of the parents habitually reside in that State at the time of the commencement of 
the proceedings and the law of the seized court had to provide so.1057 Despite the conflicts on 
the inclusion of custody matters into the Brussels II Convention,1058 the Brussels II 
Convention was adopted in May 1998,1059 but it was never ratified by the Member States. The 
reason was that in the meantime, the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed in 1997 and was due to 
come into force on 1 May 1999. The text of the Brussels II Convention provided that the legal 
basis is Article K.1(6), judicial cooperation in civil matters, and it was transferred from the 
third pillar to the Title IV of the first pillar (European Community). Thus, the Treaty of 
Amsterdam opened the door to increased Community competence and facilitated the adoption 
of the regulations.1060  
                                                          
1056 Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of 
Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children of 19 October 1996 (“1996 Hague 
Convention on parental responsibility and protection of children”). According to Article 15 of the Hague 
Convention of 5 October 1961 concerning the powers of authorities and the law applicable in respect of the 
protection of infants (1961 Hague Convention on protection of infants) enabled to the Contracting States to make 
a reservation where «Each Contracting State may reserve the jurisdiction of its authorities empowered to decide 
on a petition for annulment, dissolution or modification of the marital relationship of the parents of an infant, to 
take measures for the protection of his person or property.». Due to the fact that the majority of the States had 
reserved their competence, the divorce court did not have the jurisdiction to take measures of protection for the 
child, unless it coincides with one of the fora provided in the 1961 Hague Convention on protection of infants. In 
consequence, Article 8 and 9 of the 1996 Hague Convention on parental responsibility and protection of children 
enables the divorce court to take measures of protection for the child only on a subsidiary basis. See P. Lagarde, 
Explanatory Report on the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention, HCCH Publications, 1998, p. 563, Borrás 
Report, par. 38. 
1057 On the practical examples concerning Article 10 of the 1996 Hague Convention on parental responsibility 
and protection of children see: Practical Handbook on the Operation of the 1996 Child Protection Convention, 
HCCH Publications, 2014. 
1058 House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities rejected extension of the Brussels II 
Convention to child matters in the House of Lord Report (1997), par. 56 and 57. 
1059 The EU negotiations were compatible with parallel developments within the 1996 Hague Convention on 
parental responsibility and protection of children. See P. MCELEAVY, The Brussels II Regulation: How the 
European community has moved into family law, op. cit., p. 893. Nowadays, the 1996 Hague Convention on 
parental responsibility and protection of children has 48 Contracting States, all EU Member States are party to 
that convention), on the status table see: https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=70.  
1060 W. KENNETT, The Treaty of Amsterdam, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 48:2 (1999), p. 
465-466; W. KENNETT, Enforcement of Judgments in Europe, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 12; J. 
BASEDOW, The Communitarisation of Private International Law – Introduction, Rabels Zeitschrift fuer 
auslaendisches und internationales Privatrecht, 73:3 (2009), p. 455-460; J. ISRAËL, Conflicts of Law and the EC 
after Amsterdam a Change for the Worse?, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 81(2000), p. 
93 et seq. 
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A few days after the Treaty of Amsterdam came into force, the Commission issued a Proposal 
on the Brussels II Regulation, which practically incorporated a text of the Brussels II 
Convention.1061 The Brussels II Regulation was adopted on 29 May 2000, and became 
applicable in fifteen Member States on 1 March 2001.1062 Article 3 par. 2 of the Brussels II 
Regulation determined the rule for the “prorogation of jurisdiction” of the divorce forum to 
the forum with jurisdiction over parental responsibility matters for marital children. This 
approach mirrored the same wording as Article 3 par. 2 of the Brussels II Convention. 
The Brussels II Regulation was criticized due to its unfair treatment of the non-marital 
children.1063 Firstly, the Commission proposed a separate proposal concerning parental 
responsibility1064 and thus, extending the scope of the Brussels II Regulation to non-marital 
children, regardless of the nature of the relationship between the parents, which was to protect 
the children’s best interests.1065 However, it was assumed that it would be better to replace the 
Brussels II Regulation with a single regulation.1066 In consequence, the Commission 
submitted a proposal covering matrimonial matters and matters of parental responsibility 
which resulted in the adoption of the Brussels IIa Regulation.1067 By virtue of Article 72 of 
the Brussels IIa Regulation, the Brussels IIa Regulation entered into force on 1 August 2004, 
and is applicable from 1 March 2005. Article 12 par. 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation should 
                                                          
1061 Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
matrimonial matters and in matters of parental responsibility for joint children, COM/99/0220 final, 31 August 
1999. 
1062 Council Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 of 29 May 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in matrimonial matters and in matters of parental responsibility for children of both spouses, OJ L 
160, 30 June 2000. The UK communicated the intention to opt-in, but Denmark did not participate according to 
the Protocol No 22 on the Position of Denmark (at that time, Protocol No 5). On the temporal scope of 
application see Article 46 of the Brussels II Regulation. 
1063 On the implications see: M. JÄNTERÄ–JAREBORG, A European Family Law for Cross–Border Situations—
Some Reflections Concerning the Brussels II Regulation and its Planned Amendments, Yearbook of Private 
International Law, 4 (2002), p. 67, 72. 
1064 Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
matters of parental responsibility, COM(2001) 505 final, 27 November 2001. 
1065 Publications Office, Summaries of EU legislation, date of last review – 23 July 2002, available at: 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=LEGISSUM:l33166.  
1066 M. NÍ SHÚILLEABHÁIN, Ten Years of European Family Law: Retrospective Reflections from a Common Law 
Perspective, International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 59:4 (2010), p. 1024, footnote 21. 
1067 Proposal for a Council Regulation concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
in matrimonial matters and in matters of parental responsibility repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 and 
amending Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 in matters relating to maintenance, COM(2002)0222 final, 27 August 
2002.  
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guarantee the non-discriminatory treatment of both marital children and children born out of 
the marriage.1068 
Article 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation was criticised since it opened the door for the 
phenomena of forum shopping. The combination of the “court first seized” lis pendens rule 
and rule on the alternative grounds of jurisdiction,1069 may lead to abusive procedural 
tactics,1070 which is caused mainly by the differences between the national procedural and 
substantive rules.1071 In consequence, in 2006 it was proposed that the Brussels IIa Regulation 
should contain rules on the law applicable to divorce.1072 This proposal on “Rome III 
Regulation”, which should simultaneously cover the applicable law and the rules on 
jurisdiction laid down in the Brussels IIa Regulation, has not been accepted due to the 
significant opposition from specific Member States.1073 It is worth mentioning that this 
                                                          
1068 ECJ, Case C-656/13, L v. M, 12 November 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2364, par. 50. 
1069 On the explanation of the lack of hierarchy, see: Borrás Report, par. 28, or Case C-168/08, Laszlo Hadadi 
(Hadady) v Csilla Marta Mesko, épouse Hadadi (Hadady), 16 July 2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:474, the Opinion of 
Advocate General Kokott, 12 March 2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:152, par. 58, 59, confirming the flexible choice of 
jurisdiction. For the need of establishment of a hierarchy between jurisdictional grounds, see Responses to the 
Questionnaire of the project EUFam’s available at:  
http://www.eufams.unimi.it/2017/06/01/report-outcomes-online-questionnaire/, almost 62% of respondents 
answered that the efficacy of Article 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation should be improved by establishing a 
hierarchy among the existing grounds. 
1070 See Agata Rapisarda v Ivan Colladon [2014] EWFC 35. This English case concerned 180 cases of 
fraudulent forum shopping. A party in each case utilised the same address in the UK owned by an Italian 
company in order to obtain jurisdiction for divorce in England. All the divorces were declared void. See also CC 
v NC [2014] EWHC 703 (Fam); Wai FoonTan v Weng Kean Choy [2014] EWCA Civ 251; W Husband v W Wife 
[2010] EWHC 1843 (Fam); E v E [2015] EWHC 3742 (Fam); EA v AP [2013] EWHC 2344 (Fam). On the 
forum shopping in family matters see: ECJ, Case C-168/08, Laszlo Hadadi (Hadady) v Csilla Marta Mesko, 
épouse Hadadi (Hadady), 16 July 2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:474, par. 57; M. NÍ SHÚILLEABHÁIN, Cross-border 
divorce law. Brussels II bis, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 149; J. MEEUSEN, System shopping in European 
private international law in family matters, in J. MEEUSEN, M. PERTEGAS, G. STRAETMANS, F. SWENNEN (eds), 
International Family Law for the European Union, Intersentia, 2007, pp. 239; N. DENTHLOFF, Arguments for the 
Unification and Harmonisation of Family Law in Europe, in K. BOELE-WOELKI, Perspectives for the Unification 
and Harmonisation of Family Law in Europe, Intersentia, 2003, p. 51. On the possibility of forum shopping 
which should be resolved by the new regulation see: See A. BORRÁS, From Brussels II to Brussels II bis and 
Further, in K. BOELE-WOELKI, C. GONZÁLEZ BEILFUSS (eds), Brussels II bis: Its Impact and Application in the 
Member States European Family Law Series No 14, Intersentia, 2007, p 8. 
1071 On the differences in divorce law among the Member States see K. BOELE-WOELKI, To be, or not to be: 
enhanced cooperation in international divorce law within the European Union, Victoria University of 
Wellington Law Review, 39 (2008), p. 781. 
1072 Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 as regards jurisdiction and 
introducing rules concerning applicable law in matrimonial matters, COM/(2006/)0399 final, 17 July 2006. See 
F. POCAR, Osservazioni a margine della proposta di regolamento sulla giurisdizione e la legge applicabile al 
divorzio, in STEFANIA BARIATTI (ed), La Famiglia nel diritto internazionale privato comunitario, Giuffrè, 2007, 
p. 267-278. 
1073 For example, UK or Sweden, see A. FIORINI, Rome III – Choice of Law in Divorce: Is the Europeanization of 
Family Law Going Too Far?, International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family, 22 (2000), p. 181; M. 
JÄNTERÄ-JAREBORG, Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in Cross-Border Divorce Cases in Europe, in J. 
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proposal also addressed the question of choice-of-court clauses in matters concerning 
divorce.1074 Consequently, the “true” Rome III Regulation, which covers the law applicable to 
divorce and legal separation,1075 has been adopted and may be perceived as a partial solution 
to abusive procedural tactics.1076 Unfortunately, the Brussels IIa Regulation remained 
untouched concerning the proposed rule on the choice of forum.1077  
In 2005, a draft of the Maintenance Regulation was issued1078 and resulted in the adoption of 
the Maintenance Regulation, which covers jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and 
enforcement of decisions, and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations. The 
Maintenance Regulation, which replaced the Brussels I Regulation concerning jurisdiction in 
maintenance matters is applicable from 18 June 2011. The first model for the draft of the rule 
on choice-of-court agreements was Article 23 of the Brussels Regulation. Article 3 of the 
Proposal of the Maintenance Regulation proposed to enable agreement on jurisdiction of any 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
BASEDOW, H. BAUM, Y. NISHITANI (eds), Japanese and European Private International Law in Comparative 
Perspective Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 2008, p. 338 and 340; M. NÍ SHÚILLEABHÁIN, Cross-Border Divorce Law: 
Brussels II Bis, op. cit., par. 1.11. On the discussions concerning the proposal see T. DE BOER, The Second 
Revision of the Brussels II Regulation: Jurisdiction and Applicable Law, in K. BOELE-WOELKI, T. SVERDRUP 
(eds), European Challenges in Contemporary Family Law European Family Law Series No 19, Intersentia, 2008, 
p. 321-341. 
1074 See Article 3a of the Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 as regards 
jurisdiction and introducing rules concerning applicable law in matrimonial matters, COM(2006)0399 final, 17 
July 2006. 
1075 On the general comments to the Rome III Regulation see: I. VIARENGO, Il Regolamento UE sulla legge 
applicabile alla separazione e al divorzio e il ruolo della volontà delle parti, Rivista di diritto internazionale 
privato e processuale, (2011), p. 601 et seq; I. VIARENGO, The Rome III Regulation in legal practice: case law 
and comments, ERA Forum (2014), p. 547 et seq., P. FRANZINA, The law applicable to divorce and legal 
separation under Regulation (EU) no. 1259/2010 of 20 December 2010, Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional 
(2011), p. 85 et seq.; P. FRANZINA, L’autonomia della volontà nel regolamento sui conflitti di leggi in materia di 
separazione e divorzio, Rivista di diritto internazionale, (2011), p. 489 et seq.; J. BASEDOW, European Divorce 
law. Comments on the Rome III Regulation, in Confronting the Frontiers of Family and Succession Law, Liber 
Amicorum Walter Pintens, Intersentia (2012), p. 135–150; K. BOELE-WOELKI, For Better or for Worse: The 
Europeanization of International Divorce Law, Yearbook of Private International Law, 12 (2010), p. 1–26.  
1076 However, the Rome III Regulation is applicable only in 16 Member States. On the opposite approach where 
the Rome III Regulation may increase abusive tactics see A. BONOMI, Litigation in family matters: is it possible 
to reconcile uniformity and application of lex fori?, in International Family Law, Special Issue in Honour of 
William Duncan, 2012, p. 11, according to the author the jurisdictional grounds contained in Article 3 of the 
Brussels IIa Regulation are same as in the Rome III Regulation; as a consequence, the court may apply lex fori 
that will encourage even more forum shopping. See also M. JÄNTERÄ-JAREBORG, Unification of international 
family law in Europe, in BOELE-WOELKI, Perspectives for the Unification and Harmonisation of Family Law in 
Europe, Intersentia, 2003, p. 207. 
1077 The choice of forum was welcomed and one of the scenarios presumed was that the Brussels IIa Regulation 
would be revised in respect of choice-of-court clauses, see K. BOELE-WOELKI, To be, or not to be: enhanced 
cooperation in international divorce law within the European Union, op. cit., p. 784, 788. For further details see 
infra Section 2.6. of this Subchapter. 
1078 Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions 
and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, COM(2005)0649 final, 15 December 2005 
(“Proposal of the Maintenance Regulation”). 
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court of a Member State if one or more parties were habitually resident in any Member State. 
However, the modified text of Article 3 of the Proposal of the Maintenance Regulation, which 
limited the choice of the parties, was embodied in Article 4 of the Maintenance 
Regulation.1079  
At the same time, the Commission adopted Green Paper on Conflicts of Laws in Matters 
Concerning Matrimonial Property Regimes.1080 In 2011, a Proposal for a Council Regulation 
on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of 
matrimonial property regimes and a Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, 
applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions regarding the property 
consequences of registered partnerships were issued.1081 Due to the impossibility of reaching 
unanimity for the adoption of the two compromise texts of the Proposals,1082 a group of the 
Member States addressed requests to the Commission to establish enhanced cooperation in 
the area of the property regimes of international couples. 1083 After the Council authorised 
such enhanced cooperation,1084 both regulations were promulgated using the original 
proposals1085 (and do not mirror the political compromises)1086 and shall apply in 18 Member 
States from 29 January 2019.  
                                                          
1079 The major amendments to Article 4 of the Proposal of the Maintenance Regulation was proposed by the 
Presidency on 21 October 2008 and such text was adopted to the Maintenance Regulation. The Presidency of the 
Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition 
and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations – Political 
agreement, 14066/08 ADD1, 2005/0259 (CNS), 21 October 2008. 
1080 Green Paper on Conflicts of Laws in Matters Concerning Matrimonial Property Regimes, Including the 
Question of Jurisdiction and Mutual recognition of 17 July 2006, COM (2006) 400 final, 17 July 2006. On the 
Green Paper see S. BARIATTI, I. VIARENGO, I rapporti patrimoniali tra coniugi nel diritto internazionale privato 
comunitario, Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale, (2007), p. 603 et seq. 
1081 Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of 
decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes, COM(2011)0126 final, 16 March 2011; Proposal for a 
Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions regarding 
the property consequences of registered partnerships, COM(2011)0127 final, 16 March 2011. On the Proposal on 
Matrimonial Property Regime see I. VIARENGO, The EU Proposal on Matrimonial Property Regimes, Some 
General Remarks, Yearbook of Private International Law, 13 (2011), pp. 199-215. 
1082 Hungary and Poland vetoed the proposals in 2015. Video coverage available at 
https://video.consilium.europa.eu/en/webcast/ac1f65b6-b9b9-490d-8564-562692bd2539.  
1083 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Greece, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. Cyprus reiterated this wish during 
the work of the Council. Estonia announced its intention to take part in the cooperation after its adoption. 
1084 Council Decision (EU) of 9 June 2016 authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of jurisdiction, 
applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions on the property regimes of international 
couples, covering both matters of matrimonial property regimes and the property consequences of registered 
partnerships, (2016/954), OJ L 159, 16 June 2016, OJ L 159. 
1085 Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of 
decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes, COM(2016)0106 final, 2 March 2016; Proposal for a 
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2. Agreements on Jurisdiction under the Brussels IIa Regulation 
Article 12 of the Brussels IIa Regulation provides for a rule on “prorogation of jurisdiction” 
concerning parental responsibility. According to Recital No 12, the grounds of jurisdiction in 
matters of parental responsibility “are shaped in the light of the best interests of the child, in 
particular on the criterion of proximity.” It means that the Member State of the child’s 
habitual residence has jurisdiction (Article 8 of the Brussels IIa Regulation) except for certain 
cases, including the case of “an agreement between the holders of parental responsibility.”  
The aim of the provision is not only to ensure legal certainty and predictability, but also to 
allow consolidation of proceedings and to reduce the costs, which may be caused by 
simultaneous proceedings in different Member States.1087 The condition of the best interest of 
the child allows crucial judicial discretion. In consequence, although the parties conclude an 
agreement conferring jurisdiction to a Member State court, there is no certainty that their 
agreement will produce a legal effect since the Member State court has the discretion to 
disregard the agreement if it is not in best interest of the child. It means that the agreement 
does not have a binding effect on the chosen court.1088 The prorogation of jurisdiction, 
understood as “an independent alternative forum,”1089 does not represent an exclusive ground 
of jurisdiction, which would produce the negative effect of depriving the jurisdiction of all 
other Member States court under the Brussels IIa Regulation.1090 Since the agreement on 
jurisdiction does not have a binding effect on the chosen court, it does not have a binding 
effect on the seized non-designated Member State court. Due to the non-exclusive nature of 
this provision, the parties are still free to seize a Member State court according to Article 8 of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters 
of the property consequences of registered partnerships, COM(2016)0107 final, 2 March 2016. 
1086 See the last version: The Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 14655/15 INIT, 2011/0059 
(CNS) 2011/0060 (CNS), 26 November 2015. 
1087 E. PATAUT, E. GALLANT, Article 12, in U. MAGNUS, P. MANKOWSKI,(eds), Brussels IIbis Regulation: 2017, 
European Commentaries on Private International Law, Otto Schmidt, Sellier European Law Publishers, 2017, p. 
151; C. GONZÁLES BEILFUSS, Prorogation of Jurisdiction, in C. HONORATI (ed), Jurisdiction in Matrimonial 
Matters, Parental Responsibility and International Abduction: A Handbook on the Application of Brussels II-a 
Regulation in National Courts, Giappichelli, 2017, p. 186. 
1088 C. GONZÁLES BEILFUSS, Prorogation of Jurisdiction, in Jurisdiction in Matrimonial Matters, Parental 
Responsibility and International Abduction, op. cit., p. 194. 
1089 E. PATAUT, E. GALLANT, Article 12, in Brussels IIbis Regulation: 2017, op. cit., p. 151. 
1090 C. GONZÁLES BEILFUSS, Prorogation of Jurisdiction, in Jurisdiction in Matrimonial Matters, Parental 
Responsibility and International Abduction, op. cit., p. 187, 195. On the opposite approach which defines the 
prorogation of jurisdiction as “a derogation of the general rule on jurisdiction” see S. MARINO, La portata della 
proroga del foro nele controversie sulla responsabilità genitoriale, Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e 
processuale, (2015), p. 349. 
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the Brussels IIa Regulation. However, it was proposed by the Presidency of the Council in the 
General Approach to the Proposal of a Recast of the Brussels IIa Regulation issued on 30 
November 2018, that the jurisdiction shall be exclusive when the parties, as well as any other 
holder of parental responsibility,  have accepted the jurisdiction expressly in the course of the 
proceedings and the court has ensured that all the parties are informed of their right not to 
accept the jurisdiction.1091 
Although the Proposal for a Recast of the Brussels IIa Regulation endeavours to rename the 
title “Prorogation of jurisdiction” to “Choice of Court”,1092 the agreement on the prorogation 
of jurisdiction laid down in Article 12 of the Brussels IIa Regulation should not be confused 
with a “typical” agreement on jurisdiction, which is binding upon the parties and upon the 
Member State courts.1093 Comparing it to Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the 
wording of Article 12 of the Brussels IIa Regulation is very different. First, it is generally 
recognized that the Brussels Ibis Regulation is based on rules which are certain and highly 
predictable.1094 The Brussels IIa Regulation has established objective, alternative, mandatory 
rules on jurisdiction in divorce matters.1095 However, in parental responsibility matters, aside 
from the general rule of the jurisdiction of the court of the place of habitual residence of the 
child, no other rule makes reference to the “exclusive” or “non-exclusive” nature of the 
provisions.1096 The best interest of the child, which serves as a “watchdog”,1097 allows specific 
                                                          
1091 The Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 14784/18, 2016/0190(CNS), 30 November 2018, p. 
26. 
1092 See Article 10 of the Proposal for a Recast of the Brussels IIa Regulation. 
1093 U. MAGNUS, P. MANKOWSKI, Introduction, in U. MAGNUS, P. MANKOWSKI (eds), Brussels IIbis Regulation: 
2017, European Commentaries on Private International Law, Otto Schmidt, Sellier European Law Publishers, 
2017, p. 45. 
1094 See Recital No 15 of the Brussels I-bis Regulation. See for example ECJ, Case C-281/02, Owusu, par. 41: 
«Application of the forum non conveniens doctrine, which allows the court seized a wide discretion as regards 
the question whether a foreign court would be a more appropriate forum for the trial of an action, is liable to 
undermine the predictability of the rules of jurisdiction laid down by the Brussels Convention, in particular that 
of Article 2, and consequently to undermine the principle of legal certainty, which is the basis of the 
Convention»; or ECJ, Case C-533/07, Falco Privatstiftung and Thomas Rabitsch v Gisela Weller-Lindhorst, 23 
April 2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:257, par. 21 and 22: «…Regulation No 44/2001 pursues an objective of legal 
certainty which consists in strengthening the legal protection of persons established in the European Union, by 
enabling the applicant to identify easily the court in which he may sue and the defendant reasonably to foresee 
before which court he may be sued.». 
1095 Borrás Report, par. 28. This was confirmed by the ECJ, Case C-68/07, Kerstin Sundelind Lopez v Miguel 
Enrique Lopez Lizazo, 29 November 2007, ECLI:EU:C:2007:740. 
1096 A. BORRÁS, Lights and Shadows of Communitarisation of Private International Law: Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement in Family Matters with regard to Relations with Third States, in A. MALATESTA, S. BARIATTI, F. 
POCAR (eds), The External Dimension of EC Private International Law in Family and Succession Matters, 
CEDAM, 2008, p. 117.  
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control by the Member State court. Such discretionary power of the Member State court when 
evaluating the best interest of the child suggests non-exclusivity,1098 flexibility, and non-
binding effect1099 on the prorogued Member State court. Second, the Brussels IIa Regulation 
uses a term “acceptance” and is more akin to the tacit prorogation according to Article 26 of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation, but with considerable differences.1100  
 
2.1.  Scope of Application 
It must be borne in mind that, as analysed in the case of the application of the rule on choice-
of-court under the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the legal relationship must fall under the scope of 
application of the Brussels IIa Regulation in order to give effect to the rule on the prorogation 
of jurisdiction. Indeed, the territorial, material, temporal, and personal scope of application of 
the Brussels IIa Regulation in the context of Article 12 must be briefly analyzed. 
 
2.1.1. Territorial and Personal Scope of Application 
The Brussels IIa Regulation is applicable in 27 Member States,1101 except for Denmark where 
the special status applies. In accordance with the Protocol No 22 on the Position of Denmark 
(ex Protocol No 5), the measures adopted under Title V of Part III of the TFEU (ex Title IV of 
Part III of the EC Treaty) would not apply to Denmark, thus Denmark is not bound by the 
Brussels IIa Regulation. 1102  
With respect to the jurisdiction laid down in Article 12 of the Brussels IIa Regulation, the 
child is not required to be habitually resident in the agreed forum. On the contrary, Article 12 
accepts the assumption that a child is habitually resident in another Member State. However, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
1097 U. MAGNUS, P. MANKOWSKI, Introduction, in Brussels IIbis Regulation: 2017, op. cit., p. 46. 
1098 E. PATAUT, E. GALLANT, Article 12, in Brussels IIbis Regulation: 2017, op. cit., p. 153. 
1099 C. GONZÁLES BEILFUSS, Prorogation of Jurisdiction, in Jurisdiction in Matrimonial Matters, Parental 
Responsibility and International Abduction, op. cit., p. 194. 
1100 U. MAGNUS, P. MANKOWSKI, Introduction, in Brussels IIbis Regulation: 2017, op. cit., p. 46. 
1101 Article 52 TEU (ex Article 299 par. 1 EC Treaty) and Article 355 TFEU (ex 299 EC Treaty). Although the 
United Kingdom and Ireland reserved their rights not to participate in the adoption of measures under Title V of 
Part III of the TFEU (ex Title IV of Part III of the EC Treaty) in accordance with Protocol No 21 (ex Protocol No 
34) on the Position of the United Kingdom and Ireland The United Kingdom and Ireland, in accordance with 
Article 3 of the Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland annexed to the Treaty on European 
Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, notified their wish to take part in the adoption and 
application of the Brussels IIa Regulation. 
1102 See Article 2 of the Protocols.  
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one of the spouses must be habitually resident in a Member State or both spouses must be 
nationals of that Member State by virtue of Article 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation for the 
concentration of the proceedings according to Article 12 par. 1 of the Brussels IIa Regulation. 
Or there must be another substantial connection of the child with an agreed forum (Article 12 
par. 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation).  
It is not also relevant whether the child is habitually resident in the Third State.1103 However, 
attention must be paid to Article 60 lett. a) and Article 61 of the Brussels IIa Regulation. 
When the child is habitually resident in a Contracting State of the 1996 Hague Convention on 
parental responsibility and protection of children or 1961 Hague Convention on protection of 
infants, the Conventions prevail, and Article 12 of the Brussels IIa Regulation cannot enable 
the Member State courts to assert jurisdiction. It must be remembered that the 1961 Hague 
Convention on protection of infants does not allow the prorogation of jurisdiction and party 
autonomy is admitted only according to Article 10 of the 1996 Hague Convention on parental 
responsibility and protection of children. Moreover, Article 12 par 4 of the Brussels IIa 
Regulation aims at resolving an “artificial problem”1104 - when the child has habitual 
residence in a Third State which is not a contracting party to the 1996 Hague Convention on 
parental responsibility and protection of children, the Brussels IIa Regulation assumes that a 
child’s interest is in the agreed upon Member State court, particularly if it is impossible to 
                                                          
1103 On the critique see T. M. DE BOER, What we should not expect from a recast of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, 
in Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht (2015), p. 14: «My main objection to the extension of jurisdiction to 
cases in which the child is not habitually resident in one of the member States is the likelihood that the court’s 
decision will not be recognized outside the EU. Absent a convention on recognition and enforcement, there is no 
guarantee that protective measures rendered in one of the member States will be recognized and enforced in the 
non-member State of the child’s habitual residence.». 
1104 A. BORRÁS, From Brussels II to Brussels II bis and Further, in Brussels II Bis: Its Impact and Application in 
the Member States, op. cit., p. 14-15. 
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hold proceedings in the Third State.1105 According to Professor Borrás, such a rule is qualified 
as an “excessive exercise of communitarisation of judicial jurisdiction”.1106 
 
2.1.2. Temporal Scope of Application 
The Brussels IIa Regulation applies to: legal proceedings instituted; documents formally 
drawn up or registered as authentic instruments; and agreements concluded between the 
parties after 1 March 2005, in 24 Member States, on or after 1 January 2007, in Bulgaria and 
Romania, and on or after 1 July 2013 in Croatia.  
As to the rule on the prorogation of jurisdiction, Article 64 of the Brussels IIa Regulation 
specifies that it applies to agreements concluded between the parties after 1 March 2005.1107 
This rule differs from the Brussels Ibis Regulation, which requires only the Member State 
court to be seized with the dispute concerning Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
(Article 23 of the Brussels Regulation) at the time the Brussels Ibis Regulation has become 
applicable in that Member State.1108 It means that the parties, which agree on a Member State 
court after 1 March 2005, may rely on Article 12 of the Brussels IIa Regulation irrespective of 
the date of the institution of the proceedings. 
a) Relevant Point of Time 
Two questions arise in the context of Article 12 of the Brussels IIa Regulation. First, what 
point of time is relevant for determining the applicability of Article 12 of the Brussels IIa 
                                                          
1105 The extended approach of this rule may be found in judgment of English Supreme court, I (A Child) [2009] 
UKSC 10, [37]: «If the child is habitually resident in a country outside the EU which, like Pakistan, is not a 
party to the 1996 Hague Convention on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition, enforcement and co-operation 
in respect of parental responsibility and measures for the protection of children, then even if the EU country in 
question is a party to that Convention, there would be no provision for recognition and enforcement of one 
another’s orders. If, therefore, the parties have accepted the jurisdiction of an EU State, it makes sense for that 
State to determine the issue. The difficulty or otherwise of holding the proceedings in the third State in question 
are obviously relevant. It is not suggested that it would be impossible to hold these proceedings in Pakistan, but 
while neither party has had difficulty with the proceedings here, the mother would certainly face difficulties 
litigating in Pakistan.».  
1106 A. BORRÁS, From Brussels II to Brussels II bis and Further, in Brussels II Bis: Its Impact and Application in 
the Member States, op. cit., p. 15. See Općinski sud u Dubrovniku, Gž.1366/14, 15 October 2014, where this rule 
was used as “a false ground of jurisdiction” in order to justify the jurisdiction of the Croatian court over the child 
habitually resident in Bosna and Herzegovina.  
1107 Emphasis added. P. MANKOWSKI, Article 64, in U. MAGNUS, P. MANKOWSKI (eds), Brussels IIbis 
Regulation: 2017, European Commentaries on Private International Law, Otto Schmidt, Sellier European Law 
Publishers, 2017, p. 477. 
1108 U. MAGNUS, Article 25, in Brussels I Bis Regulation: Commentary, 2016, op. cit., p. 601. 
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Regulation? In other words, is the decisive moment the moment of the conclusion of the 
agreement, or the moment when the Member State court is seized? Second, is an agreement 
conferring jurisdiction to a Member State court limited in time? 
As to the relevant point of time for determining the applicability of Article 12 of the Brussels 
IIa Regulation, the determination is significant when circumstances relevant for the 
application of Article 12 of the Brussels IIa Regulation have changed, e.g., the holders of 
parental responsibility changed their habitual residence or the child changed nationality. Due 
to the wording of Article 12 par. 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation, which requires a substantial 
connection with the agreed upon Member State court, it can be presumed that the agreed upon 
Member State court is obliged to examine the conditions for application of Article 12 par. 3 of 
the Brussels IIa Regulation when it is seized. Otherwise, the designated Member State court 
would be obliged to declare on its own motion that it has no jurisdiction according to Article 
17 of the Brussels IIa Regulation since the substantial connection is lacking. (For example, if 
the child is not a national of that Member State, a substantial connection is lacking.) However, 
Article 12 par. 1 of the Brussels IIa Regulation aims mainly at consolidating the proceedings 
on divorce, legal separation, or marriage with the proceedings concerning parental 
responsibility and does not require a substantial connection. Jurisdiction is then based on 
Article 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation, and the examination is fixed to the time the Member 
State court is seized (Article 16 and 17 of the Brussels IIa Regulation). In both cases, the 
subsequent change of the habitual residence or nationality of the child should be taken into 
consideration for the purpose of identification of the best interest of the child. 
The second question concerns the limitation of time concerning the effects of the agreement, 
which is resolved by Article 12 par. 2 of the Brussels IIa Regulation. This provision refers 
only to Article 12 par. 1 of the Brussels IIa Regulation. The agreement is temporary in nature 
and ceases once: (i) the judgment allowing or refusing the application for divorce, legal 
separation, or marriage annulment has become final; (ii) a judgment in relation to parental 
responsibility has become final; or (iii) the proceedings above have come to an end for 
another reason, for example withdrawal or death of a party.1109 Whether a judgment is final, is 
                                                          
1109 Borrás Report, par. 39; E. PATAUT, E. GALLANT, Article 12, in Brussels IIbis Regulation: 2017, op. cit., p. 
160. The same provision contains the 1996 Hague Convention. on parental responsibility and protection of 
children. See P. Lagarde, Explanatory Report on the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention, p.565. 
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subject to the national procedural law,1110 but no further appeal is permitted.1111 The 
proceedings in parental responsibility matters cannot be considered as post-divorce litigation, 
which in some Member States is concentrated with the proceedings on patrimonial 
matters.1112 The post-divorce litigation on the basis of the agreement of the parents is 
permitted only for independent proceedings within the limits of Article 12 par. 3 of the 
Brussels IIa Regulation. As to the limitation of time concerning the effects of the agreement 
based on of Article 12 par. 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation, the ECJ in case C-436/13, E. v. B, 
held that the agreement on the prorogation of jurisdiction under Article 12 par. 3 of the 
Brussels IIa Regulation “ceases following a final judgment in those proceedings”.1113 The 
agreement does not continue “after those proceedings have been brought to a close or in 
relation to other matters which may come to light subsequently”. 1114 Article 10 par. 4 of the 
Proposal for a Recast of the Brussels IIa Regulation reacts to this ECJ judgment and confirms 
the ECJ approach by providing that “The jurisdiction conferred in paragraph 3 shall cease as 
soon as the proceedings have led to a final decision.”. On the other hand, according to the 
General Approach taken by the Presidency of the Council on 30 November 2018, the 
jurisdiction shall cease as soon as the decision given in those proceedings is no longer subject 
to ordinary appeal; or the proceedings have come to an end for another reason, unnless 
otherwise agreed by the parties.1115 It must be noted that this Council’s General Approach 
does not differ between the prorogation of jurisdiction within the meaning of the current 
Article 12 par. 1 of the Brussels IIa Regulation and the jurisdiction based on the current 
Article 12 par. 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation.  
 
                                                          
1110 E. PATAUT, E. GALLANT, Article 12, in Brussels IIbis Regulation: 2017, op. cit., p. 160. The same opinion in 
the context of Article 10 ar. 2 of the 1996 Hague Convention on parental responsibility and protection of 
children, see P. Lagarde, Explanatory Report on the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention, HCCH 
Publications, 1998, p.565. 
1111 Borrás Report, par. 39. 
1112 E. PATAUT, E. GALLANT, Article 12, in Brussels IIbis Regulation: 2017, op. cit., p. 159. 
1113 ECJ, Case C-436/13, E. v. B., 1 October 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2246, par. 50. 
1114 ECJ, Case C-436/13, E. v. B., par. 48. 
1115 The Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 14784/18, 2016/0190(CNS), 30 November 2018, p. 
26. 
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2.1.3. Material Scope of Application 
Article 1 of the Brussels IIa Regulation specifies that it applies to: (a) divorce, legal 
separation, or marriage annulment;1116 and (b) attribution, exercise, delegation, restriction or 
termination of parental responsibility. For the purpose of the analysis of Article 12 par. 1 of 
the Brussels IIa Regulation, which concerns the consolidation of the proceedings in parental 
responsibility with the proceedings in divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment, both 
matters must be considered. Article 1 par. 1 lett. b) is limited only to the “civil matters”.1117 
The attribution, the exercise, the delegation, the restriction or the termination of parental 
responsibility must be interpreted within the meaning of paragraph 2. This paragraph specifies 
that it covers: (a) right of custody and right of access;1118 (b) guardianship, curatorship, and 
similar institutions; (c) designation and functions of any person or body having charge of the 
child’s person or property, representing or assisting the child; (d) placement of the child in a 
foster family or in institutional care; and (e) measures for the protection of the child relating 
to the administration, conservation, or disposal of the child’s property. As provided by the 
ECJ, the list contained in paragraph 2 must be used as a guide.1119 
On the other hand, paragraph 3 excludes specific matters from the scope of application. The 
Brussels IIa Regulation does not apply to: (i) the establishment or contesting of a parent-child 
relationship; (ii) decisions on adoption, measures preparatory to adoption, or the annulment or 
revocation of adoption; (iii) the name and forenames of the child; (iv) emancipation; or (v) 
measures taken as a result of criminal offences committed by children. Moreover, the 
maintenance obligations in relation to the spouses’ maintenance as well as to the child’s 
maintenance are excluded from the scope of application of the Brussels IIa Regulation and are 
subject to the Maintenance Regulation. Although trusts or successions do not fall into the 
                                                          
1116 ECJ, Case C-294/15, Edyta Mikołajczyk v Marie Louise Czarnecka and Stefan Czarnecki, 13 October 2016, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:772, where the ECJ decided that an action for annulment of marriage brought by a third party 
following the death of one of the spouses falls within the scope of the Brussels IIa Regulation. 
1117 ECJ, Case C-435/06, C., 27 November 2007, ECLI:EU:C:2007:714, where the ECJ upheld that «a single 
decision ordering that a child be taken into care and placed outside his original home in a foster family is 
covered by the term ‘civil matters’, for the purposes of that provision, where that decision was adopted in the 
context of public law rules relating to child protection.». On the same conclusion see ECJ, Case C-523/07, A., 2 
April 2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:225. 
1118 ECJ, Case C-335/17, Neli Valcheva v Georgios Babanarakis, 31 May 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:359, where 
the ECJ upheld that the concept of “rights of access” must be interpreted as including rights of access of 
grandparents to their grandchildren. 
1119 Case C-435/06, C., par. 30. See also Case C-92/12 PPU, Health Service Executive v S.C. and A.C., 26 April 
2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:255; Case C-215/15, Vasilka Ivanova Gogova v Ilia Dimitrov Iliev, 21 October 2015, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:710. 
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scope of the Brussels IIa Regulation, the ECJ decided that approval of an agreement for the 
sharing-out of an estate of a guardian ad litem on behalf of minor children constitutes a 
measure relating to the exercise of parental responsibility and not a measure relating to 
succession.1120 Although the property regime is not expressly excluded, Recital No 8 of the 
Brussels IIa Regulation suggests that it does not deal with the grounds for divorce, property 
consequences of the marriage, or any other ancillary measures.1121 
 
2.2.  Article 12 par. 1 of the Brussels IIa Regulation 
Article 12 par. 1 extends the jurisdiction of the court having jurisdiction in divorce, legal 
separation, or marriage annulment to parental responsibility matters. As stated in Section 1 of 
this Subchapter in the context of Article 3 of the previous Brussels II Regulation, the text of 
Article 12 par. 1 is inspired by Article 10 par. 1 of the 1996 Hague Convention on parental 
responsibility and protection of children aiming at guaranteeing their compatibility. The 
conditions for application of Article 12 par. 1 of the Brussels IIa Regulation, which must be 
fulfilled cumulatively, are the following: (i) the court must have jurisdiction for divorce, legal 
separation, or marriage annulment according to Article 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation; (ii) at 
least one of the spouses have parental responsibility; (iii) the jurisdiction of the courts has 
been accepted expressly or otherwise in an unequivocal manner by the spouses and by the 
holders of parental responsibility, at the time the court is seized; and (iv) prorogation of 
jurisdiction is in the superior interests of the child. Since the formal requirements (point iii) 
are examined together with Article 12 par. 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation in the context of 
formal and substantive validity of the agreement, the focus will be on: (i) jurisdiction of the 
court in divorce, legal separation or marriage; ii) concerning the parties to the agreement; and 
(iii) the notion of superior interest of the child.  
The Presidency of the Council in the General Approach to the Proposal for a Recast of the 
Brussels IIa Regulation from 30 November 2018 proposed to modify Article 12 of the 
Brussels IIa Regulation in order to unify prorogation of jurisdiction in the single paragraph 
                                                          
1120 ECJ, Case C-404/14, Marie Matoušková, 6 October 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:653. See also Case C-565/16, 
Alessandro Saponaro and Kalliopi-Chloi Xylina, 19 April 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:265, par. 18, where according 
to ECJ application of the parents on behalf of the child for authorisation to renounce an inheritance as being 
concerned with the status and capacity of the person and does not fall within the law on succession. 
1121 ECJ, Case C-67/17, Todor Iliev v Blagovesta Ilieva, 14 June 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:459, par. 31. 
  
282 
 
and practically deletes paragraph 1 of Article 12 of the Brussels IIa Regulation. Only new 
Recital should specify that such prorogation within the meaning  of Article 12 par. 1 of the 
Brussels IIa Regulation is still possible 
…Under specific conditions laid down by this Regulation, jurisdiction in matters of 
parental responsibility might also be established in a Member State where proceedings 
for divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment are pending between the parents, or 
in another Member State with which the child has a substantial connection and which the 
parties have either agreed upon in advance, at the latest at the time the court is seised, or 
accepted expressly in the course of those proceedings, where the law of that Member 
State so provides, even if the child is not habitually resident in that Member State, 
provided that the exercise of such jurisdiction is in the best interests of the child. 
According to the case law of the Court of Justice, anyone other than the parents who, 
according to the national law, has the capacity of a party to the proceedings commenced 
by the parents, should be considered a party to the proceedings for the purposes of this 
Regulation and therefore, opposition by that party to the choice of jurisdiction made by 
the parents of the child in question, after the date on which the court was seised, should 
preclude the acceptance of prorogation of jurisdiction by all the parties to the 
proceedings at that date from being established.1122 
 
2.2.1. Jurisdiction of the Court in Divorce, Legal Separation, or Marriage 
Annulment 
In some national systems of the Member States, it is common that the court deciding over 
divorce, legal separation, or marriage annulment of the spouses has jurisdiction to decide over 
the parental responsibility too.1123 This rule aims at concentrating the proceedings. However, 
                                                          
1122 The Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 14784/18, 2016/0190(CNS), 30 November 2018, p. 
26. 
1123 For example, in Slovakia. According to the Slovak law, matters relating to divorce, maintenance, and 
parental responsibility must be decided in unique proceedings. In particular, Article 24, par. 1 of the Act No 
36/2005 Coll. on Family law provides: «The court determines parental rights and responsibilities over the child 
for a time after the divorce in the judgment of divorce, in particular the court determines which parent has 
custody rights over a child and who represents and administers child assets. The court simultaneously orders 
maintenance obligations to a parent whom a child was not entrusted into the personal care or approves the 
parents' agreement on the child maintenance obligations». Article 100 of Act No 161/2015 on Civil Procedure, 
expressly provides that proceedings for determination of parental responsibility for time after the divorce is 
connected with the divorce proceedings. By virtue of EU legal instruments in family matters prevailing over the 
national law rules, the Slovak courts are often obliged to exclude certain matters (parental responsibility, 
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the concentration of jurisdiction is possible only when the prorogued Member State has 
jurisdiction on divorce, legal separation, or marriage annulment according to Article 3 of the 
Brussels IIa Regulation. This implies that where a Member State court is seized by virtue of 
other jurisdictional grounds for divorce, legal separation, or marriage under the Brussels IIa 
Regulation, its jurisdiction cannot be extended to parental responsibility matters according to 
Article 12 par. 1 of the Brussels IIa Regulation.1124 In particular, Article 7 of the Brussels IIa 
Regulation, which permits the application of the national rules, cannot be used for the 
connection of the proceedings.  
Thus, what is the justification for such concentration of the proceeding, only when the 
prorogued Member State has jurisdiction in divorce, legal separation, or marriage annulment 
according to Article 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation? Each of the jurisdictional grounds listed 
in Article 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation may be perceived as a substitution for the condition 
of the “substantial connection” required by Article 12 par. 3 of the Brussels IIa 
Regulation.1125 However, due to a sharp critique of Article 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation, 
which opens the door for abusive procedural tactics, the “substantial connection” for the 
purpose of the proceedings concerning parental responsibility according to Article 12 par. 1 of 
the Brussels IIa Regulation, may leave an inevitable question on the adequacy of the adopted 
solution.  
 
2.2.2. Parties to the Agreement 
Article 12 par. 1 of the Brussels IIa Regulation requires an agreement between the spouses, 
which are subject to the proceedings, according to Article 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation. 
Simultaneously, at least one of the spouses must have parental responsibility in relation to the 
child. Furthermore, where one of the holders of the parental responsibility is not subject to the 
proceedings for divorce, legal separation, or marriage according to Article 3 of the Brussels 
IIa Regulation, the provision requires an additional agreement also with such a holder. This 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
maintenance etc.) from a single hearing although separation of proceedings from unique family proceedings is in 
not known to Slovak law. The case law demonstrates that the national courts still face with the problems 
regarding the “division” of the proceedings in divorce and parental responsibility. See for example Krajský súd 
Bratislava, 30 September 2011, 5 Co 414/2011. 
1124 E. PATAUT, E. GALLANT, Article 12, in Brussels IIbis Regulation: 2017, op. cit., p. 155. 
1125 On the similar conclusion see E. PATAUT, E. GALLANT, Article 12, in Brussels IIbis Regulation: 2017, op. 
cit., p. 155. 
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should guarantee that the parental responsibility proceedings over all siblings is before one 
Member State court.1126 However, certain linguistic versions suggest that is necessary either 
the agreement between the spouses or the agreement between the holders of parental 
responsibility.1127 On the other hand, other linguistic versions provide for the wording “and”, 
where both agreements are required.1128 Although the predecessor of Article 12 par. 1 of the 
Brussels IIa Regulation (i.e., Article 3 of the Brussels II Regulation) required only one 
agreement of the spouses, 1996 Hague Convention on parental responsibility and protection 
of children provides for the opposite answer – both agreements (the agreement of the spouses 
and the agreement of the holders of parental responsibility) are required. The Proposal for a 
Recast of the Brussels IIa Regulation, as well as other subsequent proposals of the European 
Parliament, do not offer any answer - the linguistic versions are still different.1129 Only 
Council’s General Approach issued on 30 November 2018 unifies the linguistic versions and 
provides that both the parties and holders of the parental responsibility must accept 
jurisdiction.1130 Also, the majority of the doctrine suggests that both the spouses and holder of 
the parental responsibility must accept jurisdiction.1131  
The term “holder of parental responsibility” is defined in Article 2 par. 8 of the Brussels IIa 
Regulation as a person having parental responsibility for a child. The term “parental 
responsibility” should be understood by virtue of Article 2 par. 7 of the Brussels IIa 
Regulation as all rights and duties relating to the person or the property of a child which are 
given to a natural or legal person by judgment, by operation of law or by an agreement having 
legal effect – this shall include the right of custody and right of access.1132 The question on the 
“holder of parental responsibility” represents a preliminary question1133 which should be 
                                                          
1126 E. PATAUT, E. GALLANT, Article 12, in Brussels IIbis Regulation: 2017, op. cit., p. 155. 
1127 Spanish and German versions. 
1128 English, French, and Italian version.  
1129 Compare English, French, and Italian version with German and Spanish version. 
1130 The Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 14784/18, 2016/0190(CNS), 30 November 2018, p. 
26. 
1131 E. PATAUT, E. GALLANT, Article 12, in Brussels IIbis Regulation: 2017, op. cit., p. 156. C. GONZÁLES 
BEILFUSS, Prorogation of Jurisdiction, in Jurisdiction in Matrimonial Matters, Parental Responsibility and 
International Abduction, op. cit., p. 190. 
1132 Emphasis added. 
1133 ECJ, Case C-404/14, Marie Matoušková, par. 30, where the ECJ referred to the Case C-404/14, Marie 
Matoušková, Opinion of Advocat General Kokott delivered on 25 June 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:428, par. 41 and 
expressed its view to the preliminary issues, in particular that «…legal capacity and the associated 
representation issues must be assessed in accordance with their own criteria and are not to be regarded as 
preliminary issues dependent on the legal acts in question. Therefore, it must be held that the appointment of a 
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resolved by operation of law, i.e., by the law applicable to the parental responsibility 
according to the 1996 Hague Convention on parental responsibility and protection of 
children.1134 The national courts do not always examine this question. The Spanish court 
Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona, 1135 decided that the agreement of the grandparents, 
which took care of the child on the basis of the agreement with legal effect and according to 
the law of the child’s habitual residence, was not necessary, whereby the acceptance by the 
parents was satisfactory. The Spanish court failed to examine the notion of the holder of 
parental responsibility according to the 1996 Hague Convention on parental responsibility and 
protection of children. Contrary to Article 12 par. 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation, it can be 
presumed that another party to the proceedings within the meaning of national procedural law, 
such as a legal representative of the child or the prosecutor, is not a party to the prorogation 
agreement according to Article 12 par. 1 of the Brussels IIa Regulation. This emerges from 
the Opinion of Advocate General Tanchev which stated that:  
This is confirmed by a juxtaposition of Articles 12(3) and 12(1) of Brussels IIbis. Article 
12(1) of Brussels IIbis, which allows prorogation of the jurisdiction of the courts of a 
Member State where divorce proceedings are brought, contains a precise description of 
those who have to accept the jurisdiction for prorogation to become effective, namely ‘the 
spouses and … holders of parental responsibility’. Article 12(3) of Brussels IIbis, in 
contrast, refers to ‘all the parties to the proceedings’, thereby using a reference to the 
particular procedure...1136 
 
2.2.3. Superior Interest of the Child 
The last condition is the superior interest of the child. The wording providing for “superior 
condition of the child” differs from the English wording of Article 12 par. 3 of the Brussels 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
guardian for the minor children and the review of the exercise of her activity are so closely connected that it 
would not be appropriate to apply different jurisdictional rules, which would vary according to the subject-
matter of the relevant legal act.». 
1134 Emphasis added. C. GONZÁLES BEILFUSS, Prorogation of Jurisdiction, in Jurisdiction in Matrimonial 
Matters, Parental Responsibility and International Abduction, op. cit., p. 191. 
1135 Audencia Provincial de Barcelona, section 12, 30 October 2014. 
1136 ECJ, Case C-565/16, Alessandro Saponaro, Opinion of Advocat General Tanchev delivered on 6 December 
2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:942, par. 46. 
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IIa Regulation which provides for “best interest of the child”.1137 Although the wordings are 
different, no distinction was intended by the drafters of the legislation.1138  
This condition leaves room for judicial discretion. The superior interest of the child is also a 
basis of the other jurisdictional rules, or their exceptions, but is not defined in the Brussels IIa 
Regulation. At least, Recital 12 provides that the grounds of jurisdiction established by the 
Brussels IIa Regulation are shaped in the light of the best interests of the child, in particular of 
the criterion of proximity. The same recital in the Proposal for a Recast of the Brussels IIa 
Regulation specifies in more details the best interest of the child, providing that the best 
interest of the child should be interpreted in light of Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union1139 and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child of 20 November 1989.1140 
In the context of Article 12 par. 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation, the ECJ stated that the best 
interest of the child should be examined in each individual case.1141 Moreover, the ECJ has 
already provided examples which should be taken into account when considering the best 
interest of the child, such as nationality of the child, which is the Member State of the chosen 
courts; the residence of the deceased at the date of his death; or the assets that are the subject 
matter of the inheritance, which are situated in that Member State.1142 The ECJ concluded that 
                                                          
1137 According to Practice Guide for the application of the new Brussels II Regulation, European Commission, p. 
32, in other languages the wording does not differ. 
1138 Practice Guide for the application of the new Brussels II Regulation, European Commission, p. 32. 
1139 Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 326, 26 October 2012, 
provides: «1. Children shall have the right to such protection and care as is necessary for their well-being. They 
may express their views freely. Such views shall be taken into consideration on matters which concern them in 
accordance with their age and maturity. 2. In all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities 
or private institutions, the child's best interests must be a primary consideration. 3. Every child shall have the 
right to maintain on a regular basis a personal relationship and direct contact with both his or her parents, 
unless that is contrary to his or her interests.».  
1140 According to Article 3 the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. See also UN 
Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), General comment No. 14 (2013) on the right of the child to have 
his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration (art. 3, para. 1), 29 May 2013, CRC /C/GC/14, available 
at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/51a84b5e4.html, par. 32-35. See for example par. 32 which provides: «The 
concept of the child’s best interests is complex and its content must be determined on a case-by-case basis. It is 
through the interpretation and implementation of Article 3, paragraph 1, in line with the other provisions of the 
Convention, that the legislator, judge, administrative, social or educational authority will be able to clarify the 
concept and make concrete use thereof. Accordingly, the concept of the child’s best interests is flexible and 
adaptable. It should be adjusted and defined on an individual basis, according to the specific situation of the 
child or children concerned, taking into consideration their personal context, situation and needs. For individual 
decisions, the child's best interests must be assessed and determined in light of the specific circumstances of the 
particular child.». 
1141 ECJ, Case C-656/13, L v. M, par. 58; ECJ, Case C-436/13, E. v. B, par. 49. 
1142 ECJ, Case C-565/16, Alessandro Saponaro, par. 36. 
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“the connection between the child and the Member State of those courts, lead to the 
conclusion that the condition of taking the best interests of the child into account is 
satisfied.”.1143 In consequence, one may remark that the evaluation of “best interest of the 
child” which requires only “connection between the child and the Member State” is fulfilled 
due to the connection laid down in Article 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation, i.e., habitual 
residence of one or both spouses in the seized Member State or common nationality of the 
spouses of the seized Member State. However, some jurisdictional grounds of Article 3 of the 
Brussels IIa Regulation are perceived as they do not represent a real connection with 
matrimonial life,1144 thus, the evaluation on the best interest of the child is still a significant 
criterion.  
The discretional power attributed to the prorogued seized Member State court has a 
consequence that such a Member State court is not obliged to establish its jurisdiction if all 
other conditions are met. 1145 It may be demonstrated in the following example: 
Lucia (Italian-Czech national) was born in 2011 to spouses Michele and Beatrice (Italian 
nationals), who had been living in Prague for 10 years. Michele seizes a court in Italy for divorce 
according to Article 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation. Beatrice agrees with the custody proceedings 
in Italy through the application of Article 12 par. 1 of the Brussels IIa Regulation. However, the 
Italian court disregards the parties’ agreement, since it considers that the commencement of the 
custody proceedings in Italy would not be in the best interest of the child. 
 
2.3. Article 12 par. 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation 
Article 12 of the Brussels IIa Regulation is structured in a slightly different way. The 
equivalent cannot be found in the 1996 Hague Convention on parental responsibility and 
protection of children. Party autonomy is recognized in a much broader extent than Article 12 
par. 1 of the Brussels IIa Regulation and should promote a peaceful agreement between the 
                                                          
1143 ECJ, Case C-565/16, Alessandro Saponaro, par. 39. 
1144 On the criticism of two last indents of Article 3 lett. a) of the Brussels IIa Regulation see R. BARATTA, Lo 
scioglimento del vincolo coniugale nel diritto comunitario, in S. M. CARBONE, I. QUEIROLO, Diritto di famiglia e 
Unione europea, Giappichelli, 2008, p. 182, according to the author it would not be unreasonable to eliminate 
these two connecting factors since they do not represent a real connection with matrimonial life. 
1145 See for example, B v B [2012] EWHC 1924 (fam), [23]; where the court decided that it is not in the best 
interest of the children to allow proceedings to be brought in England under Article 12 par. 3 since neither the 
children nor their parents were habitually resident in the jurisdiction. 
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parties. However, sufficient breaks have been introduced since as remembered several times 
in this thesis, the family law is characterized by the mandatory rules.1146 Indeed, the party 
autonomy is accepted only under the strict conditions. 
The conditions for application of Article 12 par. 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation, which must 
be fulfilled cumulatively, are the following: (i) the child has a substantial connection with that 
Member State (in particular by virtue of the fact that one of the holders of parental 
responsibility is habitually resident in that Member State or that the child is a national of that 
Member State); (ii) the jurisdiction of the courts has been accepted expressly or otherwise in 
an unequivocal manner by all the parties to the proceedings, at the time the court is seized; 
and (iii) the prorogation of jurisdiction is in the best interests of the child. Since the formal 
requirements (point iii) are examined together with Article 12 par. 1 of the Brussels IIa 
Regulation in the context of formal and substantive validity of the agreement, the focus will 
be paid to point (i) concerning the substantial connection; point (ii) concerning all the parties 
to the agreement and the point (iii) concerning the notion of best interest of the child.  
In the first place, the contextual wording of Article 12 par. 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation 
provides that the courts of a Member State shall also have jurisdiction in relation to parental 
responsibility in proceedings other than those referred to in paragraph 1.1147 It was discussed 
for a long time whether this provision should enable concentration of the proceedings other 
than the proceedings concerning divorce, legal separation, or marriage annulment,1148 or, if 
this provision permits seizing a Member State court in the autonomous proceedings.1149 This 
question was referred to the ECJ by Czech Supreme Court in case C-656/13, L v. M. In 
particular, the Czech court asked whether Article 12 par. 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation 
must be interpreted as establishing jurisdiction over proceedings concerning parental 
responsibility even where no other related proceedings are pending.1150 The ECJ answered 
affirmatively to this question and justified its decision by two facts. First, Article 12 par. 3 of 
                                                          
1146 See E. PATAUT, E. GALLANT, Article 12, in Brussels IIbis Regulation: 2017, op. cit., p. 162. 
1147 Emphasis added. 
1148 On this strict interpretation see B. ANCEL, H. MUIR WATT, L’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant dans le concert des 
jurisdictions: Le Règlement de Bruxelles II Bis, Revue critique de droit international privé, (2005), p. 588, where 
this provision should serve as an extension of other proceedings which based jurisdiction on Article 7 of the 
Brussels IIa Regulation (residual basis). Other interpretations would lead to the threat of operation of Article 15 
of the Brussels IIa Regulation. 
1149 On the interpretation supporting extensive interpretation see E. GALLANT, Responsabilité parentale et 
protection des enfants en droit international, Defrenois, 2004, p. 132. 
1150 ECJ, Case C-656/13, L v. M, par. 31. 
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the Brussels IIa Regulation does not specify among the conditions, which must be met, 
whether it is necessary that the seized prorogued Member State court is already seized in other 
proceedings.1151 Second, Article 12 par. 2 of the Brussels IIa Regulation, which determines 
the time when the agreement ceases, refers only to Article 12 par. 1 of the Brussels IIa 
Regulation. Article 12 par. 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation does not contain any equivalent 
provision. Furthermore, in the case C-436/13, E v. B, the ECJ upheld that an agreement under 
Article 12 par. 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation ceases following a final judgment in those 
proceedings.1152 In consequence, only the interpretation, allowing the application of Article 12 
par. 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation even where no other proceedings are pending before the 
court chosen, guarantees that the objectives pursued by the Brussels IIa Regulation are 
respected and secure the non-discriminatory treatment of the marital children and children 
born out of the marriage.1153 Article 10 par. 3 of the Proposal for a Recast of the Brussels IIa 
Regulation has reacted to this ECJ judgment and eliminates any doubts in this regards by 
removing the wording in the text “proceedings other than those referred to in paragraph 1”. 
As stated in Section 2.2. above, the Presidency of the Council proposed in the General 
Approach to the Proposal for a Recast of the Brussels IIa Regulation from 30 November 2018 
to modify Article 12 of the Brussels IIa Regulation in order to unify prorogation of 
jurisdiction in the single paragraph and it practically deletes paragraph 1 of Article 12 of the 
Brussels IIa Regulation.1154 In consequence, no specification regarding the doubts on the 
autonomous proceedings of Article 12 par. 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation was not necessary 
to add. 
 
2.3.1. Substantial Connection 
As clarified by the ECJ, Article 12 par. 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation finds application also 
in autonomous proceedings. In consequence, the “substantial connection” between the child 
and the prorogued seized Member State court based on the jurisdictional ground in divorce, 
legal separation, or marriage as provided by Article 12 par. 1 of the Brussels IIa Regulation, is 
                                                          
1151 ECJ, Case C-656/13, L v. M, par. 40. 
1152 ECJ, Case C-436/13, E. v. B., par. 48, 50. 
1153 ECJ, Case C-656/13, L v. M, par. 45, 47, 50. 
1154 The Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 14784/18, 2016/0190(CNS), 30 November 2018, p. 
26. 
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substituted by the necessity to ascertain the substantial connection. In particular, “…by virtue 
of the fact that one of the holders of parental responsibility is habitually resident in that 
Member State or that the child is a national of that Member State.”1155 However, this list is 
not exhaustive, and the Member State courts may take into consideration other factors, for 
example, factors listed in Article 15 of the Brussels IIa Regulation (such as the Member State 
where the prorogued court is situated; has become the habitual residence of the child after the 
Member State court was seized; is the former habitual residence of the child; or is the place 
where property of the child is located, and the case concerns measures for the protection of 
the child relating to the administration, conservation, or disposal of this property). Obviously, 
other factors may be considered by the Member State court as “substantially connected”. The 
Proposal for a Recast of the Brussels IIa Regulation adds another substantial factor – the 
habitual residence of close relatives of the child, with whom the child is in continuous 
contact1156 and the Council’s General Approach to the Proposal for a Recast of the Brussels 
IIa Regulation from 30 November 2018 also adds different substantial factor - the former 
habitual residence of the child.1157 
 
2.3.2. Parties to the Agreement 
In contrast to Article 12 par. 1 of the Brussels IIa Regulation which determines who are the 
parties to the agreement, Article 12 par. 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation provides that the 
jurisdiction of the Member State courts must be accepted expressly or otherwise by all the 
                                                          
1155 On the critique see T. M. DE BOER, What we should not expect from a recast of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, 
op. cit., p. 13, footnote No 34: «The phrase ‘substantial connection’ is rather (too) flexible. The connections to 
which Art. 12(3) expressly refers may not be ‘substantial’ at all, for instance if the child of an American father 
and a Dutch mother lives with his parents in the United States: the child is a Dutch/American national, but not 
in any other way connected with the Netherlands. Similarly: is there a substantial connection with the 
Netherlands if an American child is living with her American mother in the United States, while her American 
father is habitually resident in the Netherlands? Conversely, there may be a strong connection with the 
Netherlands even if the child is not a Dutch national and neither parent is a resident of the Netherlands. What if 
refugee parents have returned from the Netherlands to their home country and decide to send their child back to 
the Netherlands to be raised by a Dutch foster family?». 
1156 See Amendment No 119 proposed by E. Radev without any further explanation, Committee on Legal 
Affairs, Amendments 25-190, on the proposal for a Council regulation on jurisdiction, the recognition and 
enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, and on international 
child abduction (recast), PE 606.308v01, 26 June 2017. 
1157 The Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 14784/18, 2016/0190(CNS), 30 November 2018, p. 
26. 
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parties to the proceedings.1158 Who is party to the proceedings should be determined by the 
national law.1159 In ECJ case C-565/16, Saponaro regards the case of the parents acting on 
behalf of their child (all habitually resident in Italy) which have made an application to the 
Greek court for authorisation to renounce the inheritance from the deceased grandfather. The 
child, as the heir, would be liable in a civil action for damages brought by the victim due to 
the attempted fraud by the deceased. According to the Greek law, the prosecutor as one of the 
parties is legally a party to the relevant proceedings. In the first place, the ECJ had to examine 
whether the prosecutor being a party under the national law “is also a “party” within the 
meaning of Article 12 par. 3 lett. b) of the Brussels IIa Regulation.1160 The Advocate General 
Tanchev stated that the answer to the question, who is a party to the proceedings is, must be 
found in the particular procedure organised according to the national law of the court seized 
since Brussels IIa Regulation does not regulate preliminary issues and “refrains from 
interfering with the Member State’s procedural law in general”.1161 The ECJ, referring to the 
Opinion of Advocate General Tanchev, decided that a prosecutor who, according to the 
national law, has the capacity of a party to the proceedings commenced by the parents, is a 
party to the proceedings within the meaning of Article 12 par. 3 lett. b) of the Brussels IIa 
Regulation,1162 since the “EU legislature thus took care to use a term that encompassed all 
the parties to the proceedings, within the meaning of national law”.1163 According to the 
Council’s General Approach to the Proposal for a Recast of the Brussels IIa Regulation from 
30 November 2018, the parties, as well as any other holder of parental responsibility should 
accept jurisdiction.1164 
 
2.3.3. Best Interest of the Child 
As stated in Section 2.2.3. of this Subchapter, although Article 12 par. 1 of the Brussels IIa 
Regulation lays down the condition of “superior interest of the child”, no distinction between 
                                                          
1158 Emphasis added. 
1159 C. GONZÁLES BEILFUSS, Prorogation of Jurisdiction, in Jurisdiction in Matrimonial Matters, Parental 
Responsibility and International Abduction, op. cit., p. 191. 
1160 ECJ, Case C-565/16, Alessandro Saponaro, par 26. 
1161 ECJ, Case C-565/16, Alessandro Saponaro, Opinion of Advocat General Tanchev, par. 45-47. 
1162 ECJ, Case C-565/16, Alessandro Saponaro, par. 40. 
1163 ECJ, Case C-565/16, Alessandro Saponaro, par. 28. 
1164 The Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 14784/18, 2016/0190(CNS), 30 November 2018, p. 
26. 
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these two terms was intended by the drafters of the legislation.1165 Indeed, it can be partially 
referred to the text in Section 2.2.3. of this Subchapter concerning the superior interest of the 
child. However, the test concerning the best of interest of the child plays a more important 
role than in paragraph 1 and allows the Member State court discretion such as forum non 
conveniens.1166 However, as stated by the ECJ when the matter contains the connection 
between the child and the Member State, this should lead to the conclusion that the condition 
of taking the best interests of the child into account is satisfied. Indeed, the boundaries 
between the condition on “substantial connection” and “best interest of the child” may 
sometimes be hard to determine. 
Thus, a sizeable discretional power attributed to the prorogued seized Member State court has 
a consequence that such a Member State court is not obliged to establish its jurisdiction if all 
other conditions are met, otherwise the principle of best interest of the child would be 
jeopardized.1167 It may be demonstrated in the following example: 
Lucia (Italian-German national) was born in 2011 to Michele (German national) and Beatrice 
(Italian national), who has been living in Prague for 10 years. Michele and Beatrice wish to know 
which courts might be seized of action of parental responsibility if they reach an agreement on the 
competent court. 
Michele and Beatrice might agree according to Article 12 par. 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation on 
an Italian court (e.g. the substantial connection – Lucia is Italian national); or a German court (e.g. 
the substantial connection - Lucia is German national); or a Czech court (e.g. the substantial 
connection – Lucia and her parents are habitually resident in the Czech Republic, probably a Czech 
court could also establish jurisdiction according to Article 8 of the Brussels IIa Regulation, if Lucia 
is habitually resident in the Czech Republic at the time the court is seized and no other court has 
jurisdiction according to Articles 9, 10, 12, or 15 of the Brussels IIa Regulation). However, as stated 
above, if Michele and Beatrice agree that one of the aforementioned courts has jurisdiction, such a 
court can disregard the parties’ agreement, e.g. the German court can decide that the 
commencement of the custody proceedings in Germany would not be in the best interest of the child 
                                                          
1165 Practice Guide for the application of the new Brussels II Regulation, European Commission, p. 32. 
1166 E. PATAUT, E. GALLANT, Article 12, in Brussels IIbis Regulation: 2017, op. cit., p.164. 
1167 See for example, B v B [2012] EWHC 1924 (fam), [23]; where the court decided that it is not in the best 
interest of the children to allow proceedings to be brought in England under Article 12 par. 3 since neither the 
children nor their parents were habitually resident in the jurisdiction. 
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2.4.  Formal Validity 
Article 12 par. 1 and par. 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation provides that the jurisdiction of the 
Member State courts must be accepted expressly or otherwise in an unequivocal manner. The 
Brussels IIa Regulation does not define the notion of the acceptance made “expressly or 
otherwise in an unequivocal manner”. The wording on the formal validity of the agreement on 
jurisdiction differs significantly from Article 25 of the Brussels IIa Regulation. In 
consequence, any guidance by the Brussels IIa Regulation is not possible in this sense.  
 
2.4.1. Time of Acceptance of Jurisdiction 
The most significant doubts concern the question of time of seising a Member State court, i.e., 
whether the parties are able to agree on a Member State court prior the institution of 
proceedings or after the commencement of the proceedings. Article 12 of the Brussels IIa 
Regulation provides that the parties need to agree on a Member State court at the time the 
court is seized.1168 According to Article 16 of the Brussels IIa Regulation, a Member State 
court shall be deemed to be seized at the time when the document instituting the proceedings 
is lodged with the court. The English case I (A Child) has demonstrated the difficulties with 
the interpretation of the English version (as well as with the Italian, Spanish and French 
versions) of the wording “at the time is seized”, in particular if it can be interpreted as that the 
jurisdiction of the courts has been accepted at any time after the proceedings had begun. It 
was concluded that:  
…the diversity of views expressed by this court indicates that the interpretation is not 
acte clair and may have to be the subject of a reference to the European Court of 
Justice in another case. But I would favour an interpretation which catered both for a 
binding acceptance before the proceedings began and for an unequivocal acceptance 
once they had begun.1169  
                                                          
1168 See Article 10 of the Proposal for a Recast of the Brussels IIa Regulation which substitute the wording “at 
the time the court is seized” with the wording “at the latest the court is seized, or, where the law of that Member 
State so provides, during those proceedings”.  
1169 I (A Child), [2009] UKSC 10, [35]. 
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Article 10 of the Proposal for a Recast of the Brussels IIa Regulation clarifies this doubt by 
providing that the jurisdiction of Member State court must be accepted “at the latest the court 
is seized, or, where the law of that Member State so provides, during those proceedings”. 
According to the Council’s General Approach to the Proposal for a Recast of the Brussels IIa 
Regulation from 30 November 2018, the parties, as well as any other holder of parental 
responsibility should accept jurisdiction at the latest at the time the court is seised; or in the 
course of the proceedings and the court has ensured that all the parties are informed of their 
right not to accept the jurisdiction.1170 
It is generally accepted that any prior agreement is permitted,1171 and that the agreement may 
be ineffective if it has been withdrawn at the time the court is seized.1172 The parties are 
entitled to make different arrangements.1173 Moreover, although Article 12 par. 1 of the 
Brussels IIa Regulation enables ex ante agreement, i.e., before the court is seized with the 
divorce, separation, or marriage annulment proceedings, the parties do not have a possibility 
to foresee which Member State court will actually exercise jurisdiction on divorce, separation, 
or marriage annulment proceedings. Thus, due to the absence of a rule on choice-of-court 
relative to divorce, separation, or marriage annulment under the Brussels IIa Regulation, this 
agreement may benefit the parties who wish to concentrate the proceedings relating to 
divorce, separation, or annulment with the proceedings relating parental responsibility, 
notwithstanding the impossibility of predicting which court will assume jurisdiction. 
However, it may even encourage a “rush to court”, as either spouse may rush to file the claim 
before the Member State court that will apply the most beneficial substantive rules concerning 
divorce and parental responsibility.1174 It may be demonstrated in the following example: 
Lucia was born in 2011 to the spouses Michele and Beatrice (Italian nationals), who had been 
living in Prague for 10 years. Michele and Beatrice wish that a Member State court, which would 
                                                          
1170 The Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 14784/18, 2016/0190(CNS), 30 November 2018, p. 
26. 
1171 On the opposite opinion see M. HELIN, The Impact and application of the Brussels IIbis Regulation in 
Finland in K. BOELE-WOELKI (ed), Brussels II Bis: Its Impact and Application in the Member States. European 
Family Law Series 14, Intersentia, 2007, p. 97. 
1172 C. GONZÁLES BEILFUSS, Prorogation of Jurisdiction, in Jurisdiction in Matrimonial Matters, Parental 
Responsibility and International Abduction, op. cit., p. 191. 
1173 I (A Child), [2009] UKSC 10, [25], [26]. 
1174 On the same considerations see F. C. Villata, L. Válková, EUFam’s Model Choice-of-Court and Choice-of-
Law Clauses, available at: http://www.eufams.unimi.it/2017/12/27/model-clauses/, p. 42-45. 
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have jurisdiction for their potential future divorce according to Article 3 of the Brussels IIa 
Regulation, will have jurisdiction to rule on a potential dispute for parental responsibility for Lucia 
according to Article 12 par. 1 of the Brussels IIa Regulation. 
Although Michele and Beatrice may informally agree which a Member State court will have 
jurisdiction for their potential future divorce (for example, an Italian court), and extend jurisdiction 
on parental responsibility according to Article 12 par. 1 of the Brussels IIa Regulation, there is a 
risk that: 
(i) An agreement by virtue of Article 12 par. 1 of the Brussels IIa Regulation will not be effective 
if the parties nominate a specific Member State court, for example, an Italian court, when the 
“informal agreement on divorce” will be disregarded by one of the parties and other Member 
State court will be seized for divorce according to Article 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation;  
(ii) An agreement by virtue of Article 12 par. 1 of the Brussels IIa Regulation will be effective if the 
parties accept the jurisdiction of any Member State court exercising jurisdiction by virtue of 
Article 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation on an application for divorce, legal separation, or 
marriage annulment, in relation to parental responsibility over Lucia. But in this case, Beatrice 
or Michele can disregard their “informal agreement on divorce” and may institute the 
proceedings in front of any Member State court having jurisdiction according to Article 3 of the 
Brussels IIa Regulation. This agreement may encourage a “rush to court”. 
 
2.4.2. Acceptance made “Otherwise in an Unequivocal manner” 
 Express acceptance may be in a written or oral agreement.1175 However, the question arises 
whether the conduct of the defendant, which enters into proceedings and does not object to 
the jurisdiction of the seized Member State court may be subsumed under the term of 
acceptance made “otherwise in an unequivocal manner” within the meaning of Article 12 of 
the Brussels IIa Regulation. The ECJ has tackled the issue in several judgments. 
In case C-656/13, L v. M, the ECJ stated that where the defendant brings a second proceedings 
before the same court, as the plaintiff did, and pleads the lack of jurisdiction of that court, it 
cannot be considered that the jurisdiction of the Member State court seized by one party of 
proceedings in matters of parental responsibility has been “accepted expressly or otherwise in 
                                                          
1175 C. GONZÁLES BEILFUSS, Prorogation of Jurisdiction, in Jurisdiction in Matrimonial Matters, Parental 
Responsibility and International Abduction, op. cit., p. 192. 
  
296 
 
an unequivocal manner by all the parties to the proceedings” according to Article 12 par. 3 
lett. b) of the Brussels IIa Regulation.1176 The ECJ stated this provision must be read with 
Article 16 of the Brussels IIa Regulation, which requires the existence of the agreement to be 
shown at the latest at the time when the document instituting the proceedings or an equivalent 
document is lodged with the court chosen.1177 On the other hand, by argument a contrario, the 
ECJ held that Article 12 par. 3 lett. b) of Brussels IIa Regulation must be interpreted as 
meaning that jurisdiction has not been accepted where the defendant, on taking the first step 
required of him in the proceedings concerned, pleads the lack of jurisdiction of the court 
prorogation of whose jurisdiction is at issue.1178 In other words, the ECJ did not limit its 
assessment to the “time when the document instituting the proceedings … [was] lodged with 
the court” by virtue of Article 16 of Brussels IIa, but it refers to the other party’s conduct that 
took place later (in that case three and five days later).1179 
The second ECJ case C-215/15, Vasilka Ivanova Gogova, concerned the action for obtaining 
the authorisation for the child, habitually resident in Italy, to travel abroad and for obtaining a 
new child’s passport, which was pending in front of the Bulgarian court. As it was not 
possible to serve the document instituting the proceedings on the child’s father, the Bulgarian 
court appointed a legal representative to represent him on the basis of the Bulgarian Code of 
Civil Procedure. The legal representative did not contest the jurisdiction of the Bulgarian 
courts. The ECJ decided that the will of the defendant cannot be deduced from the conduct of 
a legal representative appointed by the Member State courts when the document instituting 
proceedings could not be served on the defendant. Thus, it cannot be regarded as having been 
“accepted expressly or otherwise in an unequivocal manner by all the parties to the 
proceedings” within the meaning of Article 12 par. 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation. 1180 It 
was justified by the fact that the legal representative has no contact with the defendant and 
thus, he cannot obtain the information necessary to accept or contest the jurisdiction of those 
                                                          
1176 ECJ, Case C-656/13, L v. M, par. 57 and 59. 
1177 ECJ, Case C-656/13, L v. M, par. 56. 
1178 ECJ, Case C-656/13, L v. M, par. 57. 
1179 The application was filed by the father of the children on 26 October 2012, the mother filed an application 
with the same court on 29 October 2012, and on 31 October 2012, the mother stated that she did not accept the 
international jurisdiction in the proceedings instituted by the father, ECJ, Case C-656/13, L v. M, par. 19, 21, 28. 
On the support of this view see ECJ, Case C-565/16, Alessandro Saponaro, Opinion of Advocate General 
Tanchev, 6 December 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:942, par. 60. 
1180 ECJ, Case C-215/15, Vasilka Ivanova Gogova v Ilia Dimitrov Iliev, par. 42. 
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courts.1181 It should be pointed out that the ECJ referred to the case A, C‑112/13, which 
concerned the conditions for application of the rule on submission of appearance laid down by 
Article 24 of the Brussels I Regulation.1182 
In the most recent case C-565/16, Alessandro Saponaro, the ECJ stated two important things. 
First, where both parents make a joint application to the same court, such agreement must be 
regarded as “unequivocal” within the meaning of Article 12 par. 3 lett. b) of the Brussels IIa 
Regulation.1183 The second statement concerned mainly the question of the prosecutor being a 
party the proceedings. The ECJ stated:  
Opposition by that party to the choice of jurisdiction made by the parents of the child 
in question, after the date on which the court was seized, precludes the acceptance of 
prorogation of jurisdiction by all the parties to the proceedings at that date from 
being established. In the absence of such opposition, the agreement of that party may 
be regarded as implicit and the condition of the unequivocal acceptance of 
prorogation of jurisdiction by all the parties to the proceedings at the date on which 
that court was seized may be held to be satisfied.1184 
According to the Advocate General Tanchev, Article 12 par. 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation, 
which requires the acceptance of all parties to the proceedings (e.g., legal representatives) is 
not compatible with the wording of Article 16 of the Brussels IIa Regulation, which would 
practically exclude the prorogation, which would be dependent only on the applicants, not to 
all parties to the proceedings.1185 In consequence, the acceptance must be attributed “as soon 
as the parties on whom a copy of the document instituting the proceedings is served have 
                                                          
1181 ECJ, Case C-215/15, Vasilka Ivanova Gogova v Ilia Dimitrov Iliev, par. 42. 
1182 ECJ, Case C--112/13, A v B and Others, 11 September 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2195, par. 54 and 55. 
1183 ECJ, Case C-565/16, Alessandro Saponaro, par. 25. See also Krajský soud v Hradci Králové, 21 Co 
611/2013, 19 December 2013, where the Court of Appeal (Krajský soud v Hradci Králové) annulled the 
judgment and remitted the case to the First Instance Court for further consideration. According to the Court of 
Appeal, the First Instance Court had to re-evaluate conditions for application of Article 12 par. 1 of the Brussels 
II-a Regulation since the action was filed by both parents, and therefore the parents probably expressed the 
acceptation of seized court. In Italy see Tribunale di Padova, Giudice tutelare, decree, 14 September 2017, 
according the court, all the conditions required by Article 12 par. 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation were met in 
the case since the jurisdiction of the court was expressly accepted by all the parties to the proceedings since the 
parents had lodged a joint application. 
1184 ECJ, Case C-565/16, Alessandro Saponaro, par. 32. 
1185 ECJ, Case C-565/16, Alessandro Saponaro, Opinion of Advocat General Tanchev, par. 57 and 58. 
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either taken the first steps open to them or can be considered to have failed to do so on the 
expiry of the period within which they are required to take such steps.” 1186  
It can be deduced from the above-mentioned interpretations of ECJ that: 
- The acceptance cannot be limited to the “time when the document instituting the 
proceedings is lodged with the court” by virtue of Article 16 of Brussels IIa Regulation, 
but it covers party’s conduct that took place later;1187 
- By analogy it is possible to make a reference to Article 24 of the Brussels I Regulation 
(Article 26 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) determining the tacit prorogation;1188 
- The agreement of the party may be regarded as implicit in the absence of opposition after 
the date on which the court was seized, whereby opposition precludes the acceptance of the 
prorogation of jurisdiction.1189 
However, it is still questionable whether the acceptance within the meaning of Article 12 of 
the Brussels IIa Regulation also covers the typical rule on submission by appearance. The 
certain national case law has already permitted submission by an appearance in their case 
law.1190 However, the clear conclusion on the rule on submission by appearance would be 
                                                          
1186 ECJ, Case C-565/16, Alessandro Saponaro, Opinion of Advocat General Tanchev, par. 59. 
1187 ECJ, Case C-656/13, L v. M, par. 19, 21, 28; Case C-565/16, Alessandro Saponaro, Opinion of Advocat 
General Tanchev, par. 60. 
1188 ECJ, Case C-215/15, Vasilka Ivanova Gogova v Ilia Dimitrov Iliev, par. 42. 
1189 ECJ, Case C-565/16, Alessandro Saponaro, par. 32. 
1190 National case law of the certain States admitted the submission by appearance as an unequivocal acceptance. 
For example, in Spain see Audencia Provincial de Barcelona, section 12, 30 October 2014, where the Spanish 
Court allowed to concentrate family proceedings in the court having jurisdiction for divorce according to Article 
12 par. 1 of the Brussels IIa Regulation since the defendant appeared and did not contest the jurisdiction. In 
France see Cour d’Appel Bordeaux, 28 May 2013, where French court established its jurisdiction where the 
mother assisted by a lawyer appeared in proceedings and did not contest the jurisdiction. In Italy see Tribunale di 
Arrezzo, decreto 15 March 2011, in Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale, (2012), p. 161, where 
the Italian court established its jurisdiction according to Article 12 of the Brussels IIa Regulation since defendant 
submitted legal conclusion of the claim as to the substance. In UK see Re Family Division, G (Children), [2017] 
EWHC 2111 (Fam), where the court affirmed that although the father raised the issue of jurisdiction in his first 
Statement and at the hearing, it does not change the fact that he had already unequivocally accepted jurisdiction 
through his previous letter as to the substance. On the opposite approach where the submission by appearance is 
rejected see S. MARINO, La portata della proroga del foro nele controversie sulla responsabilità genitoriale, op. 
cit., p. 355. See also M. C. Baruffi, C. Fratea, C. Peraro, Report on the Italian Good Practices, p. 6, available at: 
http://www.eufams.unimi.it/2017/01/10/italian-report-on-good-practices/: «The academics generally agreed that 
in such cases Art. 12 cannot be applied and that the acceptance of the jurisdiction must be, if not necessarily 
written, at least explicit, which implies the appearance of the parties before the court. The provision itself does 
not require a written agreement, but the jurisdiction must be accepted expressly or otherwise in an unequivocal 
manner by the spouses and by the holders of parental responsibility, even because matrimonial and parental 
responsibility matters, even when dealt with jointly, must be treated separately.». 
The national courts seem to accept a unified approach as to the question concerning non-admissibility of the 
extension of the acceptance of the jurisdiction in divorce proceedings to the parental responsibility matter. See 
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helpful also to the Member States where the national rule on submission by appearance is 
lacking.1191 The absence of the rule on submission by appearance on a national level and in 
the Brussels IIa Regulation then creates an additional problem, for example, problems 
connected with non-specification of the level of instance in Article 12 of the Brussels IIa 
Regulation.1192 The model could be taken from Article 26 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation,1193 which protects the policyholder, the insured, a beneficiary of the insurance 
contract, the injured party, the consumer, or the employee by ensuring that these weaker 
parties which are in the position of the defendants are informed of their right to contest the 
jurisdiction of the court and of the consequences of entering or not entering an appearance. 
However, it seems that the Proposal for a Recast of the Brussels IIa Regulation took an 
opposite approach since new paragraph 5 provides that:  
Where all the parties to the proceedings in relation to parental responsibility accept the 
jurisdiction referred to in paragraph 1 or 3 during those proceedings, the agreement of 
the parties shall be recorded in court in accordance with the law of the Member State of 
the court.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Corte di Cassazione, S.U., 30 December 2011, n. 30646, where the court specified that the acceptance of the 
jurisdiction of the Italian court as to parental responsibility could not be inferred from the failure of the party to 
contest its jurisdiction on the personal separation petition, since the two applications have different objects. In 
France see Cour de Cassation, 13 May 2015, No 13-21.827 and in Spain Tribunal Supremo - Sala Primera, de 
lo Civil, 16 December 2015, 710/2015; in UK see Mark Ian Bush v Neena Bush, [2008] EWCA Civ 865.  
1191 For examples in the Czech Republic. See Krajský soud v Brně, 20 Co 464/2014, 17 September 2014, where 
the father requested for approval of the agreement on custody and visitation right on 31 December 2013. The 
mother supported the father’s motion on approval of the agreement on custody and visitation right and filed an 
action on divorce. The first instance court (Okresní soud Brno – venkov) declared lack of jurisdiction since it 
could not establish jurisdiction according to Article 8 of the Brussels IIa Regulation. The father appealed against 
the judgment and he pointed out to the fact that all conditions for application of Article 12 of the Brussels IIa 
Regulation are fulfilled. The Court of Appeal annulled the judgment and returned the case to the First Instance 
Court for further considerations. According to the Court of Appeal, the first instance court must examine all 
conditions laid down in Article 12 par. 1 of the Brussels IIa Regulation, whereby the conditions of the 
acceptance must be examined from the first defence (e.g. response to the petition). 
1192 See Krajský soud v Českých Budějovicích, 5 Co 526/2007, 12 March 2007. The Czech judgment of Krajský 
soud v Českých Budějovicích regards the father’s claim on modification of custody and visitation order in respect 
of the child habitually resident in Austria. The first instance court established its jurisdiction, despite the child's 
habitual residence in Austria. The mother of the child appealed against this judgment as to the substance where, 
for the first time, contested the jurisdiction of Czech courts (both parties were silent in this respect in front of 
first instance court). According to Krajský soud v Českých Budějovicích, the jurisdiction of the Member State 
court according to Article 12 par. 3 of the Brussels II-a Regulation, which must be accepted expressly or 
otherwise in an unequivocal manner “at the time the court is seized”, includes acceptance in front of court of 
appeal within the meaning of Considerations No 7, referring to civil matters “whatever the nature of the court or 
tribunal”. Krajský soud v Českých Budějovicích did not taken into consideration Article 16 of the Brussels IIa 
Regulation and the acceptance made in an unequivocal manner by the mother (i.e.,. submission of appearance 
which is not known to the Czech procedural law) in front of the first instance court and declined its jurisdiction.  
1193 On the suggestion to cover explicitly the submission by appearance see also: T. M. de Boer, What we should 
not expect from a recast of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, op. cit., p. 18. 
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The question is whether the wording “to be recorded” implies tacit prorogation where entering 
into proceedings without contesting jurisdiction may be registered merely as protocol, or a 
legal filling in accordance with the law of the seized Member State court, or if a specific 
agreement by the parties registered in front of the Member State court will be necessary.1194 
However, the Council’s General Approach from 30 November 2018 provides:  
…The parties, as well as any other holder of parental responsibility … have accepted the 
jurisdiction expressly in the course of those proceedings and the court has ensured that 
all the parties are informed of their right not to accept the jurisdiction.…A choice-of-
court agreement … shall be expressed in writing, dated and signed by the parties 
concerned or included in the court record in accordance with national law and 
procedure. Any communication by electronic means which provides a durable record of 
the agreement shall be deemed equivalent to writing. Persons who become parties to the 
proceedings after the court was seised may express their agreement after the court was 
seised. In the absence of their opposition, their agreement shall be regarded as 
implicit.1195 
It means that according to the Council’s General Approach, that the tacit prorogation is not 
possible, since the parties and holders of parental responsibility must accept jurisdiction 
expressly in the course of the proceedings and the court must also firstly ensure that all the 
parties are informed of their right not to accept the jurisdiction.  
 
2.5.  Substantive Validity 
The Brussels IIa Regulation does not provide for a rule on the substantive validity of the 
prorogation of jurisdiction, which concerns the consent of the parties and may include also 
mistake, fraud, duress, or even capacity. As stated in Chapter One, Subchapter II, Section 2.3., 
one of the parties may be considered as vulnerable person due to: (i) information asymmetry 
caused by limited financial resources to be informed about the legal consequences; (ii) 
economic or the social dependence on another party; or (iii) intellectual disadvantage 
(individuals that did not reach the sufficient mental ability to consider the legal consequences 
of their conduct, for example persons under age of 18 years). Such asymmetries between the 
holders of parental responsibility may result in mistake, fraud, or duress more easily. This 
problem may become significant in case of the prior written agreements on jurisdiction where 
no control operates. Although the written agreement on the jurisdiction filed with the 
document instituting proceedings is not binding on the court, other proofs submitted by the 
                                                          
1194 See C. HONORATI, La proposta di revisione del regolamento Bruxelles II Bis: Più tutela per i minori e più 
efficacia nell’esecuzione delle decisioni, Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale, (2017), p. 8, 
where according to the author the procedural conduct of the party, which neither explicitly accepts the 
jurisdiction or contests the jurisdiction, but requests parental responsibility, will not be longer understood as 
implicit acceptation. 
1195 The Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 14784/18, 2016/0190(CNS), 30 November 2018, p. 
26. 
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applicant may persuade the court on its jurisdiction according to Article 12 of the Brussels IIa 
Regulation. At least, the discretional power of the court represents a significant break to 
reveal any mistake, fraud, or duress. At least, new Recital proposed by the Council on 30 
November 2018 should provide: 
…Before exercising its jurisdiction based on a choice of court agreement or 
acceptance the court should examine whether this agreement or acceptance was 
based on an informed and free choice of the parties concerned and not a result of 
one party taking advantage of the predicament or weak position of the other 
party...1196 
Moreover, it must be borne in mind that Article 12 of the Brussels IIa Regulation does not 
represent an exclusive ground of jurisdiction, it is an alternative forum which does not 
produce the negative effect of depriving the jurisdiction of other Member States courts.1197 
This has two consequences. First, the previous agreement which would be concluded in 
mistake, fraud, or duress does not preclude the “damaged” weaker party from seizing a 
Member State of the place of habitual residence of the child. Second, such a seized Member 
State court does not examine the (substantive) validity of the jurisdiction, since the agreement 
is not effective for any other Member State court other than the designated one. Indeed, the 
seized non-designated Member State court may establish its jurisdiction according to Article 8 
of the Brussels IIa Regulation. It means that only the seized designated Member State must 
exercise the substantive validity of the agreement. Thus, it may use three methods for the 
evaluation of the substantive validity of the agreement: 
a) The validity should be assessed only in the light of the considerations connected with the 
requirements laid down in Article 12 of the Brussels IIa Regulation. In consequence, there 
is no space for the national law regarding substantive validity.1198 However, such a 
conclusion would lead to the impossibility of examining substantive validity which seems 
even more essential element in family matters with a weaker party. 
b) Substantive validity should be governed by the lex fori. The lex fori in this case always 
means the law of the designated Member State court – there is no other Member State 
                                                          
1196 The Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 14784/18, 2016/0190(CNS), 30 November 2018, p. 
26. 
1197 C. GONZÁLES BEILFUSS, Prorogation of Jurisdiction, in Jurisdiction in Matrimonial Matters, Parental 
Responsibility and International Abduction, op. cit., p. 187, 194, 195. 
1198 As stated by the ECJ in the context of the Brussels Convention. See ECJ, Case C-159/97, Trasporti 
Castelletti par. 49. 
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court which should examine the substantive validity of the jurisdiction agreement 
according to Article 12 of the Brussels IIa Regulation. This approach corresponds to the 
reasonable expectation of the parties which designate such a Member State court. 
c) The answer concerning substantive validity could be searched for in Article 25 of the 
Brussels I-bis Regulation which determines the rule on substantive validity and refers to 
the conflict-of-laws rules of the designated Member State court. It is questionable whether, 
in cases of parental responsibility, the 1996 Hague Convention is applicable. In such a 
case, Article 15 par. 1 of the 1996 Hague Convention on parental responsibility and 
protection of the children would refer back to the lex fori.1199 The application of the 1996 
Hague Convention on parental responsibility and protection of children may be supported 
by Article 10, which covers agreements on the prorogation of jurisdiction in a similar way 
as Article 12 par. 1 of the Brussels IIa Regulation, and by Article 4 which does not exclude 
the question on validity a priori from its scope of application. However, according to 
Article 4 lett. a) of the 1996 Hague Convention on parental responsibility and protection of 
children, the establishment or contesting of a parent-child relationship is excluded from its 
scope. Thus, it is for the private international law to decide whether the underage mother of 
a child must be represented in connection with any declarations of recognition or consent 
or any lawsuits concerning her child’s status.1200 Moreover, the question of the legal 
capacity of the parties should be left to private international law.1201  
                                                          
1199 Conflictoflaw rules are excluded according to Article 21 of the 1996 Hague Convention on parental 
responsibility and protection of children. By virtue of paragraph 2 of Article 15, if the protection of the person or 
the property of the child requires, the law of another State with which the situation has a substantial connection 
may be exceptionally applied or taken into consideration. Such law might be the law of the State of habitual 
residence of the child. 
1200 P. Lagarde, Explanatory Report on the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention, HCCH Publications, 1998, 
par. 27. 
1201 P. Lagarde, Explanatory Report on the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention, HCCH Publications, 1998, 
par. 30, refers only to the question of the capacity of the children, in consequence it may be presumed that the 
capacity of the parents is excluded from the scope of application as well: «The Commission declined on the other 
hand a proposal which would have excluded capacity expressly from the scope of the Convention. It did not wish 
in that way to submit to the Convention’s rules the determination of the capacity of a person under the age of 18 
years. If, for example, the court of a Contracting State is called upon to decide, in ruling on the validity of a 
contract entered into without authorisation by a person under 18 years of age, on the capacity of this minor, it 
will decide this question of capacity without reference to the Convention. But capacity may enter indirectly into 
the scope of the Convention in that it may be posed as a question preliminary to a principal question which 
enters within the scope of the Convention as a question of legal representation or of the taking of a measure of 
protection. This preliminary question of capacity will be decided upon under the rules of private international 
law of the State of the authority which has taken jurisdiction, but the decision taken by this authority on the 
principal question, which enters by hypothesis into the scope of the Convention, will benefit from the 
Convention’s rules, in particular from the set of rules which it provides on recognition and enforcement.». 
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2.6.  Choice-of-court Agreements in Divorce, Legal Separation, and Marriage 
Annulment under the Brussels IIa Regulation 
There is no rule on the choice-of-court agreements in divorce, legal separation, or marriage 
annulment under the Brussels IIa Regulation. There was a large number of discussions 
concerning the introduction of the rule on the choice-of-court agreement in divorce, legal 
separation, and marriage annulment into the Brussels IIa Regulation; a number of studies, 
reports, impact assessments and projects concerned this issue.1202 The introduction of the new 
rule was suggested in order to limit a “rush to court” caused by alternative grounds of 
jurisdiction provided in Article 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation in conjunction with lis 
pendens rule and the absence of harmonised conflict-of-law rules in the entire European 
Union.1203Jurisdiction agreements in divorce, legal separation, or marriage would reduce 
uncertainty and could protect the economically weaker spouse from such a “rush to court”.1204 
It would also ensure access to a Member State court for the spouses of different nationalities 
                                                          
1202 See for example: Study to inform a subsequent Impact Assessment on the Commission proposal on 
jurisdiction and applicable law in divorce matters, Draft Final Report to the European Commission DG Justice, 
Freedom and Security, European Policy Evaluation Consortium, 2006; Commission Staff Working Document. 
Annex to the proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 as regards jurisdiction 
and introducing rules concerning applicable law in matrimonial matters. Impact Assessment, SEC(2006) 949, 17 
July 2006; EU Commission, Study on the assessment of Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 and the policy options 
for its amendment, Final report: evaluation – Study. Study conducted by Deloitte, 2015, available at: 
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/463a5c10-9149-11e8-8bc1-
01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-73782761 (“Deloitte, Study on the assessment of Regulation 
(EC) No 2201/2003 and the policy options for its amendment”); Commission Staff Working Document. Impact 
Assessment. Accompanying the document Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, the recognition and 
enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, and on international 
child abduction (recast), SWD/2016/0207 final, 30 June 2016; Project ‘Planning the future of cross-border 
families: a path through coordination’ (EUFam’s), co-funded by the Directorate-General for Justice and 
Consumers of the European Commission (JUST/2014/JCOO/AG/CIVI/7729) available at: 
http://www.eufams.unimi.it/project/; Project ‘Cross-Border Proceedings in Family Law Matters before National 
Courts and CJEU’, funded by the European Commission’s Justice Programme (GA - 
JUST/2014/JCOO/AG/CIVI/7722) available at: http://www.asser.nl/projects-legal-advice/cross-border-
proceedings-in-family-law-matters-before-national-courts-and-cjeu/. 
1203 Commission Staff Working Document. Impact Assessment. Accompanying the document Proposal for a 
Council Regulation on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the 
matters of parental responsibility, and on international child abduction (recast), SWD/2016/0207 final, 30 June 
2016, p. 16 and 17. 
1204 Deloitte, Study on the assessment of Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 and the policy options for its 
amendment, p. 38, p. 63. 
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who live in a Third State.1205 Moreover, the new rule would also take into account the trend of 
encouraging the parties to reach a mutual agreement and party autonomy1206 - and it would 
provide consistency with other EU instruments.1207 Finally, from a practical view, it would 
also allow the concentration of the proceedings.1208 From the different questionnaire results, 
the most part of the respondents would welcome including the possibility for spouses to 
choose a Member State court.1209 However, if we look into the national laws of the Member 
States, most of them do not allow choice-of-court agreements in divorce.1210 There are also 
negative aspects and legitimate concerns regarding the use of choice-of-court agreements in 
family matters since the contractual method does not operate fairly, especially in respect to 
                                                          
1205 Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 as regards jurisdiction and 
introducing rules concerning applicable law in matrimonial matters, COM(2006)0399 final, 17 July 2006. p. 4 
and 8. 
1206 Deloitte, Study on the assessment of Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 and the policy options for its 
amendment, p. 5, 29; Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European 
Economic and Social Committee on the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 concerning 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in matrimonial matters and the matters of 
parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, COM(2014)0225 final, 15 April 2014, p. 5.  
1207 Deloitte, Study on the assessment of Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 and the policy options for its 
amendment, p. 12. 
1208 Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe, CCBE Position on the proposal for a recast of the Brussels II-
a Regulation on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the 
matters of parental responsibility, and on international child abduction, 2 December 2016, p. 3; Commission 
Staff Working Document. Impact Assessment. Accompanying the document Proposal for a Council Regulation 
on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental 
responsibility, and on international child abduction (recast), SWD/2016/0207 final, 30 June 2016, p. 14. 
1209 85% (139 of 163) of the respondents in the questionnaire prepared by Deloitte, Study on the assessment of 
Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 and the policy options for its amendment, p. 12. See also responses to question 
no 13, The Project ‘Cross-Border Proceedings in Family Law Matters before National Courts and CJEU’, funded 
by the European Commission’s Justice Programme (GA - JUST/2014/JCOO/AG/CIVI/7722) available at: 
http://www.asser.nl/projects-legal-advice/cross-border-proceedings-in-family-law-matters-before-national-
courts-and-cjeu/ , where only Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, and Poland stated that a recast should not include a 
choice of forum. 
1210 See question No 8 of The Project ‘Cross-Border Proceedings in Family Law Matters before National Courts 
and CJEU’, funded by the European Commission’s Justice Programme (GA - JUST/2014/JCOO/AG/CIVI/7722) 
available at: http://www.asser.nl/projects-legal-advice/cross-border-proceedings-in-family-law-matters-before-
national-courts-and-cjeu/. Only Slovenia and Spain admitted that possibility. See Slovenian answer: «In 
Slovenian jurisdiction is a possibility for a choice of forum for spouses. Despite the general territorial 
jurisdiction (actor sequitur forum rei – art. 46(1) Civil Procedure Act187 (hereinafter: CPA), the jurisdiction in 
matrimonial disputes may also be at the court on the territory of which the spouses had their last common 
permanent residence (art. 54(1) CPA). The possibility of choice is therefore limited and the plaintiff may choose 
just between general jurisdiction and last common permanent residence.»; see Spanish answer: «According to 
Article 22bis Organic Law on Judiciary Power, Spanish Courts will have jurisdiction as long as the parties, 
regardless of its domicile, would have agreed in that sense. However, it is important to note that implicit and 
explicit submission would only take place in those instances where “A rule specifically allows it”. This 
expression can be controversial and would lead to problems of interpretation in order to accept that a choice of 
forum in regards to matrimonial matters would be possible in Spain.». 
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the vulnerable parties.1211 The Proposal for a Recast of the Brussels IIa Regulation from 
20061212 proposed a new rule on the choice-of-court agreement in divorce or legal 
separation.1213 The party autonomy was limited to the extent that a “criterion proximity” 
between the spouses and agreed Member State was required. In particular, the spouses could 
choose: a Member State court having jurisdiction for divorce, legal separation, or marriage 
annulment according to Article 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation;1214 a Member State court of 
the place of the spouses’ last common habitual residence for a minimum period of three 
years;1215 or a Member State court of one of the spouses’ nationality.1216 However, the first 
draft did not specify the moment when the criteria had to be met, which was subject to further 
                                                          
1211 P. MCELEAVY, The communitarization of divorce rules: what impact for English and Scottish law?, 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly 53:3 (2004), p. 621; M. NÍ SHÚILLEABHÁIN, Cross-Border Divorce 
Law: Brussels II Bis, op. cit., p. 78; Deloitte, Study on the assessment of Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 and the 
policy options for its amendment, p. 38. 
1212 Article 3a of the Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 as regards 
jurisdiction and introducing rules concerning applicable law in matrimonial matters, COM(2006)0399 final, 17 
July 2006, provided: «1. The spouses may agree that a court or the courts of a Member State are to have 
jurisdiction in a proceeding between them relating to divorce or legal separation provided they have a 
substantial connection with that Member State by virtue of the fact that: any of the grounds of jurisdiction listed 
in Article 3 applies, or it is the place of the spouses’ last common habitual residence for a minimum period of 
three years, or one of the spouses is a national of that Member State or, in the case of the United Kingdom and 
Ireland, has his or her “domicile” in the territory of one of the latter Member States. 2. An agreement conferring 
jurisdiction shall be expressed in writing and signed by both spouses at the latest at the time the court is 
seized.». 
1213 See Recital No 6 of Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 as regards 
jurisdiction and introducing rules concerning applicable law in matrimonial matters, COM(2006)0399 final, 17 
July 2006. The possibility to conclude a choice-of-court agreement for a marriage annulment was excluded 
because «Such possibility should not extend to marriage annulment, which is closely linked to the conditions for 
the validity of the marriage, and for which parties’ autonomy is inappropriate.». 
1214 On the critique of this jurisdictional ground see T. M. DE BOER, The second revision of the Brussels II 
Regulation: Jurisdiction and applicable law, op. cit., p. 6; A. BORRÁS, Lights and Shadows of 
Communitarisation of Private International Law: Jurisdiction and Enforcement in Family Matters with regard 
to Relations with Third States, in The External Dimension of EC Private International Law in Family and 
Succession Matters, op. cit., p. 120, which retains the possibility of the persistency of forum shopping, where the 
grounds of jurisdiction set out in Article 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation were not reduced. 
1215 On the critique concerning the doubts on substantial connection in the context of the last habitual residence. 
See A. BORRÁS, Lights and Shadows of Communitarisation of Private International Law: Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement in Family Matters with regard to Relations with Third States, in The External Dimension of EC 
Private International Law in Family and Succession Matters, op. cit., p. 120. This criterion was for the first time 
amended in European Parliament, Report on the proposal for a Council regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 
2201/2003 as regards jurisdiction and introducing rules concerning applicable law in matrimonial matters, A6-
0361/2008, 2006/0135(CNS), 19 September 2008, as follows: «it is the Member State in which the spouses have 
had their habitual residence for a minimum period of three years, provided that this situation did not come to an 
end more than three years before the jurisdiction was seized.». 
1216 In the European Parliament, Report on the proposal for a Council regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 
2201/2003 as regards jurisdiction and introducing rules concerning applicable law in matrimonial matters, A6-
0361/2008, 2006/0135(CNS), 19 September 2008, was proposed another jurisdictional ground – place of the 
marriage, since «The choice by the parties of a country to celebrate their marriage should be reasonably 
presumed as implying possible acceptance of the jurisdiction of that country as well.». 
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discussions.1217 The never-accepted, proposed rule on the choice-of-court agreements in 
divorce or legal separation did not meet with unconditional approval.1218  
In 2016, the Commission processed the various options in order to improve the current rules 
laid down in the Brussels IIa Regulation. The Commission took into account the introduction 
of the rule on the choice-of-court agreements in divorce, legal separation, or marriage 
annulment. The Commission proposed four options: 
a) Baseline scenario. This option proposed to leave the status quo. The consolidation of the 
proceedings is possible under the existing rules by bringing parental responsibility and 
maintenance issues before one of the Member State courts having jurisdiction for the 
divorce under the Brussels IIa Regulation. A problem of the “rush to court” would 
continue to persist in the Member States which have not joined the Rome III Regulation.  
b) Introduction of a choice-of-court in a Member State. This option would add the possibility 
for the spouses to determine in advance and upon agreement which court shall deal with 
the consolidated proceedings. However “the assessment of the effectiveness to achieve this 
objective is however hampered by the lack of data and the fact that the actual scale of the 
problem is currently unknown.”1219 85% of the stakeholders (including the Member States) 
were in favour of this option. It was proposed that the choice should be limited to the 
Member State courts to which the spouses had a substantial connection and that the formal 
requirements should be in line with other EU instruments.1220 
c) Introduction of a choice-of-court in a Member State combined with a possibility of the 
transfer of jurisdiction. In addition to a new rule on the choice-of-court, the Member State 
court seized with the divorce could consider whether a court of another Member State is 
                                                          
1217 European Parliament, Committee Draft Report on the proposal for a Council regulation amending regulation 
(EC) No 2201/2003 as regards jurisdiction and introducing rules concerning applicable law in matrimonial 
matters, PE 400.282v01 2006/0135(CNS), 9 January 2008, proposed “the time the agreement was concluded” 
since “The precise moment at which the criteria apply must be specified”. 
1218 T. M. DE BOER, What we should not expect from a recast of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, op. cit., p. 11. See 
also C. HONORATI, La proposta di revisione del regolamento Bruxelles II bis: Più tutela per i minori e più 
efficacia nell’esecuzione delle decisioni, op. cit., p. 4, where, according to the author, the formulation was 
difficult and full of complications which would not facilitate application of the Brussels IIa Regulation, even it 
could open the Pandora’s box. 
1219 Commission Staff Working Document. Impact Assessment. Accompanying the document Proposal for a 
Council Regulation on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the 
matters of parental responsibility, and on international child abduction (recast), SWD/2016/0207 final, 30 June 
2016, p. 18. 
1220 Ibidem, p. 20. 
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better placed to hear the case.1221 The UK argued in favour of introducing the possibility to 
transfer jurisdiction for matrimonial matters. 
d) Introduction of a choice-of-court in a Member State combined with a hierarchy of grounds 
of jurisdiction. In addition to a new rule on the choice-of-court, this option would 
completely eliminate the “rush to court” by providing the hierarchical list of fora.1222 
The Commission compared the options and found out that option 1 is the preferred policy 
since “the existing rules have proven to work to a large extent satisfactorily, and the 
drawbacks of the other options make them currently not feasible or desirable.”1223 In 
consequence, the Proposal for a Recast of the Brussels IIa Regulation does not contain a rule 
on the choice-of-court agreements in divorce, legal separation, and marriage annulment. 
However, the doctrine still highlights the necessity to introduce a new rule on the choice-of-
court agreements in divorce, legal separation, and marriage annulment. In a number of 
publications, a specific rule on the choice-of-court agreement has been proposed. 1224 There 
are some points which reveal the common approaches as to the choice-of-forum for divorce, 
legal separation, and marriage annulment. The choice of available fora should be limited since 
the authors or respondents deem that a weaker party is protected by limiting the number of 
choices available,1225 and the limitation would be based on “proximity” between the spouses 
                                                          
1221 Ibidem, p. 19. 
1222 Ibidem, p. 20, 21. 
1223 Ibidem, p. 23. 
1224 On the proposed wording of the new choice-of-court agreements see: P. TORREMANS, J. J. FAWCETT, U. 
GRUŠIĆ, (eds), Cheshire, North & Fawcett: Private International Law, Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 964: 
«Spouses should have been allowed to enter into a choice-of-court agreement opting for either the courts of the 
Member State of their habitual residence, at the time the agreement is concluded; the court of the member State 
of their last habitual residence, provided that one of them still resides there at the time the agreement is 
concluded; the courts of the Member State of the nationality of either spouse at the time of the agreement.»; T. 
KRUGER, L. SAMYN, Brussels II bis: successes and suggested improvements, in Journal of Private International 
Law 12:1 (2016), p. 144: «…the spouses should be able to at least opt for: the courts of the Member State of 
their habitual residence, at the time the agreement Is concluded; the courts of the Member State of their last 
habitual residence, provided that one of them still resides there at the time of the agreement; the courts of the 
Member State of the nationality of either spouse at the time of the agreement.».  
1225 During the public consultation, 97% (i.e. 140 out of 145 responses to this question) stated that the choice 
should be limited through a “substantial connection”, see Commission Staff Working Document. Impact 
Assessment. Accompanying the document Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, the recognition and 
enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, and on international 
child abduction (recast), SWD/2016/0207 final, 30 June 2016, p. 18, footnote no 51; contra T. KRUGER, L. 
SAMYN, Brussels II bis: successes and suggested improvements, op. cit., p. 145, where the authors deem a 
weaker party is not protected by limiting the number of choices available. See also T .M. DE BOER, The second 
revision of the Brussels II Regulation: Jurisdiction and applicable law, op. cit., p. 5 : «Now that we have actually 
reached the stage of choice-of-law harmonization – or rather unification – I still cannot think of any reason why 
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and the chosen forum.1226 If the choice would refer to Article 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation, 
this could create additional problems when the court is seized. For example, at the time of the 
conclusion of the jurisdiction agreement it would not be clear who will be the respondent and 
the applicant. In consequence, it seems to be more practical to list the specific jurisdictional 
grounds.1227 The possibilities given to the spouses should mirror possibilities given in the 
Rome III Regulation in order to reach the coincidence between ius and forum in the Member 
States where the Rome III Regulation is applicable. Moreover, although Article 4 of the 
Maintenance Regulation allows the parties to agree on a court which has jurisdiction to settle 
their matrimonial dispute and the maintenance between the spouses, the reversed scenario 
would enable concentration of the proceedings also for maintenance obligations towards a 
child under the age of 18. In consequence, it may be proposed that the parties could opt for 
the Member State court of the habitual residence of either spouse,1228 the former habitual 
residence of both spouses,1229 or nationality of either spouse.1230 Following the solutions 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the spouses should not be allowed to choose any forum within the European Union, and why their freedom of 
choice should be limited to a number of options under the general motto that they have ‘a substantial 
connection’ with the forum State. If the harmonization of conflict-of-law rules is thought to be an effective means 
to prevent forum-shopping, there cannot possibly be any objection to allowing the spouses to choose any court 
within EU territory as long as either of them has some connection with one of the member States, not necessarily 
the forum State.». 
1226 65% (85 out of 140 responses) think that the spouses’ habitual residence provides a valid connecting factor, 
33% (47 out of 140 responses) think that the nationality of at least one of the spouses provides a valid connecting 
factor and 36% (48 out of 140 responses) consider any court having jurisdiction to hear the case under the main 
jurisdiction provisions of the Regulation as being sufficiently closely connected with the case and therefore 
eligible to be chosen by the parties, see Commission Staff Working Document. Impact Assessment. 
Accompanying the document Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement 
of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, and on international child 
abduction (recast), SWD/2016/0207 final , 30 June 2016, p. 18, footnote no 51. 
1227 On the critique concerning the reference to Article 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation see: T. M. DE BOER, The 
second revision of the Brussels II Regulation: Jurisdiction and applicable law, op. cit., p. 6: «If the spouses 
choose a forum before they actually contemplate a divorce, they have no way of knowing who is going to be the 
petitioner and who is going to be the respondent, both crucial data for the application of Article 3. If the 
conditions of Article 3 should be measured against the time of the agreement, the only fool proof criterion listed 
in that provision is the common residence of the spouses at that time. All other factors that determine 
jurisdiction under Article 3 are unknown at the time the agreement is made. If, on the other hand, those factors 
should be measured against the time the court is actually seized, chances are that, since the date of the 
agreement, the circumstances have changed in such a way that the conditions of Article 3 are no longer 
satisfied.». 
1228 Although Article 5 per. 1 lett. a) of the Rome III Regulation provides for the possibility to designate the law 
common to the spouses’ habitual residence, the jurisdictional ground referring to habitual residence of only one 
of the spouses is aligned with Article 4 par. 1 lett. a) of the Maintenance Regulation and indirectly also with 
Article 3 par. 1 lett. a) of the Brussels IIa Regulation which is in fact based on the habitual residence of one of 
the spouses. 
1229 The spouses’ last common habitual residence is in line with Article 4 par. 1 lett. c) ii) indent of the 
Maintenance Regulation (the Maintenance Regulation requires two years duration of the spouses’ habitual 
residence). However, the duration may be irrelevant if part of the spouses’ life was spent in that Member State 
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provided in the Property Regimes Regulations and Succession Regulation, the parties may 
also be allowed to agree on the courts of the Member State, whose law is applicable, or the 
law applied to their divorce or legal separation, or marriage annulment.1231 Lastly, the parties 
should also be entitled to designate a Member State court which has jurisdiction to entertain 
proceedings concerning parental responsibility for spouses’ or future spouses’ children, 
ensuring that such jurisdiction gives primary consideration to the child’s best interests.1232 
As to the relevant point of time when the agreement should be concluded, two things must be 
mentioned. The choice-of-court agreement ex post is practically already permitted through the 
application of Article 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation when the spouses may file a joint 
application in Member State court of the habitual residence of one the spouses or of the 
nationality of both spouses. On the other hand, the spouses cannot agree on jurisdiction based 
on the nationality of only one of the spouses and thus, the spouses habitually resident in a 
Third State or with different nationalities within Member States are excluded.1233 The choice-
of-court agreement ex ante would be beneficial not only in the presence of prenuptial 
agreements. However, it must be borne in mind that the marriage lasts approximately 10-20 
years after the marriage.1234 In consequence, it may be recommended that: (i) an agreement 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
and it represents a close connection. On this opinion see T. KRUGER, L. SAMYN, Brussels II bis: successes and 
suggested improvements, op. cit., p. 145. 
1230 Such a connecting factor is in line with Article 5 par. 1 lett. c) of the Rome III Regulation and Article 4 par. 
1 lett. b) of the Maintenance Regulation. 
1231 I. Viarengo, L. Válková, Party Autonomy, in I. Viarengo, F. Marchetti (eds), EUFam’s Policy Guidelines, 
available at: http://www.eufams.unimi.it/2017/12/27/policy-guidelines/, p. 30. 
1232 L. CARPANETO, On the Recast of the Brussels II-bis Regulation’s Regime on Parental Responsibility: few 
proposals de jure condendo, in I. QUEIROLO, B. HEIDERHOFF (eds), Party Autonomy in European Private (and) 
International Law, Aracne, p. 265. See also T. M. DE BOER, Jurisdiction and Enforcement in International 
Family Law: A Labyrinth of European and International Legislation, Netherlands International Law Review 
(2002,), p. 342, 343: «If Article 12(1) Brussels II-bis allows the spouses to ask the forum divortii for a decision 
on parental responsibility for a child habitually resident in another member State, why could it not be the other 
way round? Why are they not allowed, then, to choose a forum divortii in the member State where their child is 
habitually resident?». 
1233 On this problem see for example, A. Gandia Sellens, C. Camara, A. Facucon Alonso P. Siaplaouras, Report 
on Internationally Shared Good Practices, available at: http://www.eufams.unimi.it/2017/06/16/report-on-
internationally-shared-good-practices/; T. M. DE BOER, What we should not expect from a recast of the Brussels 
IIbis Regulation, op. cit., p. 13; T. KRUGER, L. SAMYN, Brussels II bis: successes and suggested improvements, 
op. cit., p. 140. 
1234 C. E. Copen, K. Daniels, J. Vespa. W. D. Mosher, Division of Vital Statistics First Marriages in the United 
States: Data From the 2006–2010 National Survey of Family Growth, National health statistics reports, 2012; K. 
K. Payne, Median Duration of First Marriage at Divorce and the Great Recession, National Centre for Family & 
Marriage Research, 2014, available at: http://www.bgsu.edu/content/dam/BGSU/college-ofarts-and-
sciences/NCFMR/documents/FP/FP-14-20-median-durationfirst-marriage.pdf. 
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may be modified at any time;1235 (ii) the rule should enable the consideration of unforeseen 
circumstances which may fundamentally alter the equilibrium of the spouses resulting in an 
excessive burden being placed on one of the spouses or would be manifestly unfair1236 (e.g., 
“family hardship clause”). This may be reached through the certain discretion posted to the 
designated Member State court,1237 which, on the other hand, would limit the predictability 
and certainty to the parties. Or, it may be suggested to adopt the similar rule as Article 8 par. 5 
of the 2007 Hague Maintenance Protocol as to the choice-of law:  
Unless at the time of the designation the parties were fully informed and aware of the 
consequences of their designation, the law designated by the parties shall not apply 
where the application of that law would lead to manifestly unfair or unreasonable 
consequences for any of the parties. 
The formal requirements should be in line with other Regulations, mainly with the Rome III 
Regulation, the Maintenance Regulation, and the Regulations on Property Consequences,1238 
i.e., the agreement shall be expressed in writing, dated, and signed by both spouses.1239  
It is difficult to identify ex ante the “weaker party” and to provide to that party protection, 
when the position of the weaker spouse may be converted. In consequence, the weakness 
must be examined on a case-by-case basis, rather than qualify the party as a “weak party”, as 
provided for example in the Brussels Ibis Regulation for consumers etc.1240 In consequence, 
two provisions may be recommended. First, the parties would be obliged to be informed of 
                                                          
1235 Although it may be presumed that the parties may modify the agreement, it may be suggested to provide it 
expressly as Article 5 par. 2 of the Rome III Regulation: «Without prejudice to paragraph 3, an agreement 
designating the applicable law may be concluded and modified at any time, but at the latest at the time the court 
is seized.». 
1236 On the similar approach see M. NÍ SHÚILLEABHÁIN, Cross-border divorce law. Brussels II bis, op. cit., p. 79. 
1237 Ibidem. 
1238 Commission Staff Working Document. Impact Assessment. Accompanying the document, Proposal for a 
Council Regulation on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the 
matters of parental responsibility and on international child abduction (recast), SWD/2016/0207 final, 30 June 
2016, p. 18. See also the answer to question no 10 and 11, Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe, CCBE 
Position on the proposal for a recast of the Brussels II-a Regulation on jurisdiction, the recognition and 
enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, and on international 
child abduction, 2 December 2016, p. 4, the CCBE considers that formal requirements should be based on 
Article 4 par. 2 of the Maintenance Regulation. Moreover, it should be in conformity with the Rome III 
Regulation. 
1239 Article 7 par. 1 of the Rome III Regulation; Article 7 par. 1 of the Regulation on Matrimonial Property 
Regime and on Regulation of Property Consequences of Registered partnerships. However, Article 4 par. 2 of 
the Maintenance Regulation requires the agreement to be only in writing. 
1240 J. CARRUTHERS, Party autonomy in the legal regulation of adult relationships: what place for party choice in 
Private International Law?, op. cit., p. 909. 
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the consequences of the choice of Member State court by an independent legal authority,1241 
for example by the notary. Moreover, the spouses should be informed not only about the 
consequences of the selection, but also about the consequences of deselection of the otherwise 
competent court. This seems to be particularly important also due to the fact that jurisdiction 
for property consequences follows the forum of divorce, legal separation, or marriage (with 
certain exceptions) according to Article 5 of the new Regulations. Second, the express 
harmonized rule on substantive validity would guarantee that the Member State court 
examines an existence of consent and if the agreement was not concluded under duress, 
mistake, misrepresentation, etc.1242 Such a law may be the lex fori or the law of the designated 
Member State court, as provided in the Brussels Ibis Regulation.1243 
 
3. Choice of Court agreements under the Maintenance Regulation 
The Maintenance Regulation contains a “proper” rule on the choice-of-court agreements in 
maintenance matters in Article 4; there is no place for discretion as according to Article 12 of 
the Brussels IIa Regulation. 
 
3.1.  Scope of Application 
First, the territorial, material, temporal, and personal scope of the scope of application of the 
Maintenance Regulation must be analysed. This analysis must take into consideration Article 
4 of the Maintenance Regulation, since the rule on the choice-of-court agreements is 
applicable only when the legal relationship falls under its scope. 
                                                          
1241 See for example Proposal in the context of legislative procedure of Article 4 of the Maintenance Regulation, 
Opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs for the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs on 
the proposal for a Council regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions 
and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, PE386.692, 2005/0259(CNS), 5 October 2007, p. 
13: «2a. The court seized must be satisfied that any prorogation of jurisdiction has been freely agreed after 
obtaining independent legal advice and that it takes account of the situation of the parties at the time of the 
proceedings.». However, this proposal was subsequently rejected. 
1242 On the similar approach see: J. CARRUTHERS, Party autonomy in the legal regulation of adult relationships: 
what place for party choice in Private International Law?, op. cit., p. 909. 
1243 The model may be taken from Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, as suggested by U. MAGNUS, 
Choice of Court Agreements in the Review Proposal for the Brussels I Regulation, in The Brussels I Review 
Proposal Uncovered, op. cit., p. 93: «The material validity (concerning capacity, mistake, fraud, duress) of the 
choice-of-court agreement is governed by the law of the Member State where the chosen court or courts are 
located». 
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3.1.1. Territorial and Personal Scope of Application 
The rules on the jurisdiction of the Maintenance Regulation are applicable in all Member 
States, including Denmark,1244 the United Kingdom,1245 and Ireland.1246  
The Maintenance Regulation is based on its universal application; it is not relevant whether 
the defendant is domiciled in the Member State. It means that where the parties choose one of 
the Member States according to Article 4 of the Maintenance Regulation under the conditions 
laid down therein, it is not relevant whether the creditor or debtor is not habitually resident in 
the Member State. There is no room for national law. Moreover, in accordance with Article 6 
of the Maintenance Regulation, where no Member State courts have jurisdiction according to 
Article 3, 4, and 5 of the Maintenance Regulation, the courts of the Member State of the 
common nationality of the parties shall have jurisdiction. 1247  
 
3.1.2. Temporal Scope of Application 
The Maintenance Regulation applies to proceedings instituted, to court settlements approved 
or concluded, and to authentic instruments established after 18 June 2011,1248 except for 
                                                          
1244 Denmark has by letter of 14 January 2009 confirmed its intention to implement the content of the 
Maintenance Regulation to the extent that the Maintenance Regulation amends the Brussels I Regulation with 
the exception of the provisions in Chapters III and VII. Article 2 and Chapter IX of Maintenance Regulation are 
applicable only to the extent that they relate to jurisdiction, recognition, enforceability and enforcement of 
judgments, and access to justice. Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark 
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 149, 12 
June 2009, p. 80. 
1245 The United Kingdom notified by letter of 15 January 2009 its intention to accept the Maintenance 
Regulation. Commission Decision of 8 June 2009 on the intention of the United Kingdom to accept Council 
Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and 
cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, 2009/451/EC of 8 June 2009, OJ L 149, 12. June 
2009, p. 73. 
1246 See Recital no 46. 
1247 B. HESS, S. SPANCKEN, Setting the Scene – The EU Maintenance Regulation, in P. BEAUMONT, B. HESS, L. 
WALKER, S. SPANCKEN (eds), The Recovery of Maintenance in the EU and Worldwide. Studies in Private 
International Law, Hart Publishing, 2014, p. 333. See Recital No 15 of the Maintenance Regulation: «In order to 
preserve the interests of maintenance creditors and to promote the proper administration of justice within the 
European Union, the rules on jurisdiction as they result from Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 should be adapted. 
The circumstance that the defendant is habitually resident in a third State should no longer entail the non-
application of Community rules on jurisdiction, and there should no longer be any referral to national law. This 
Regulation should therefore determine the cases in which a court in a Member State may exercise subsidiary 
jurisdiction.». 
1248 See Article 76 of the Maintenance Regulation. 
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Croatia where it applies on or after 1 July 2013. Contrary to the Brussels IIa Regulation, 
which specifies that it applies to agreements concluded between the parties after 1 March 
2005, the Maintenance Regulation fixes the moment of application to the time when the 
proceedings are instituted. It means that it is not required that the choice-of-court agreement 
was concluded on or after that 18 June 2011, it is sufficient that the Member State court is 
seized with the dispute concerning Article 4 of the Maintenance Regulation at the time the 
Maintenance Regulation has become applicable at that Member State. This construction 
mirrors the Brussels Ibis Regulation solution. In consequence, the interpretation provided by 
the ECJ in case 25/79, Sanicentral GmbH in the context of intertemporal question related to 
the application of Article 17 of the Brussels Convention may also be extended into the 
Maintenance Regulation. Thus, jurisdiction clauses concluded prior to that date must be 
considered valid even in cases in which they would have been regarded as void under the 
national law (or Brussels I Regulation) in force at the time when the agreement was entered 
into.1249 The problematic point which must be highlighted in the context of this interpretation 
is: prior to the date the Maintenance Regulation entered into force, the Brussels I Regulation 
applied, which has a less strict formal requirements. The inside-out interpretation of 
Sanicentral GmbH case would lead to false retroactivity causing undesirable results. The 
transnational provisions do not address a situation when the choice-of-court agreement was 
concluded under the Brussels I Regulation, but the proceedings are instituted after 18 June 
2011. Indeed, the “stricter” conditions of Article 4 of the Maintenance Regulation do not have 
to be newly met, and such a jurisdiction agreement would not be valid.  
 
3.1.3. Material Scope of Application 
Article 1 of the Maintenance Regulation provides that it shall apply to maintenance 
obligations arising from a family relationship, parentage, marriage, or affinity. The term 
“maintenance” must be interpreted autonomously.1250 However, there are some problems 
regarding characterization and delimitation of the maintenance and the matrimonial property, 
mainly due to the fact that the certain Member States, such as England or Ireland, do not 
distinguish both concepts which are used to satisfy the goals of fairness and proper 
                                                          
1249 Brack v Brack [2018] EWCA Civ 2862, [47], [48]. 
1250 Recital No 11. 
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provision.1251 The ECJ has rendered several judgments, which provided guidance on this 
issue. It is worth mentioning that the first two judgments have dealt with the national rules in 
Germany and in France, where the characterization of the two concepts is much clearer than 
in England and Wales.1252 In the first case 143/78, Cavel v de Cavel (No 1),1253 the ECJ did 
not develop any precise criteria for distinguishing between maintenance and matrimonial 
property, but gave an autonomous meaning to the term “rights in property arising out of a 
matrimonial relationship”.1254 In the second case 120/79, Cavel v de Cavel (No 2), the ECJ 
held that the ancillary claim of maintenance falls under the scope of the Brussels Convention 
even if the primary dispute concerns the status of persons, which is excluded under Article 1 
par. 1 of the Brussels Convention. 1255 The more important thing is that the ECJ provided the 
definition of maintenance, such as payments “…concerned with any financial obligations 
between former spouses after divorce which are fixed on the basis of their respective needs 
and resources and are equally in the nature of maintenance.”1256 In the third case, C-220/95, 
Van den Boogaard, the ECJ finally dealt with English law and held that the case falls: (i) 
under the term of “maintenance” if the needs and resources of each of the spouses are taken 
into consideration in the determination of its amount; and (ii) under the term of “rights in 
property arising out of a matrimonial relationship” if the award is concerned with division of 
the property between the spouses. 1257 The ECJ decided that a decision rendered in divorce, 
                                                          
1251 M. HARDING, The Harmonisation of Private International Law in Europe: Taking the Character Out of 
Family Law?, Journal of Private International Law, 1 (2011), p. 203, 208 
1252 M. TORGA, Drawing a Demarcating Line between Spousal Maintenance Obligations and Matrimonial 
Property in the Context of the New Instruments of European Union Private International Law, in P. BEAUMONT, 
B. HESS, L. WALKER, S. SPANCKEN (eds), The Recovery of Maintenance in the EU and Worldwide. Studies in 
Private International Law, Hart Publishing, 2014, p. 428; C. ISTVÁN NAGY, Love and Money: Problems of 
Characterisation in Matrimonial Property and Maintenance Matters in the European Union, in P. BEAUMONT, 
B. HESS, L. WALKER, S. SPANCKEN (ed), The Recovery of Maintenance in the EU and Worldwide. Studies in 
Private International Law, Hart Publishing, 2014, p.411; L. WALKER, Maintenance and Child Support in Private 
International Law, Hart Publishing, 2015, p. 37 – 46; M. NÍ SHÚILLEABHÁIN, Cross-border divorce law. 
Brussels II bis, op. cit., p. 173; T. SVERDRUP, Maintenance as a Separate Issue - The Relationship between 
Maintenance and Matrimonial Property, in K. BOELE-WOELKI (ed), Common Core and Better Law in European 
Family Law, Intersentia. 2005, p. 119 – 134. 
1253 ECJ, Case 143/78, Jacques de Cavel v Louise de Cavel, 27 March 1979, ECLI:EU:C:1979:83. 
1254 ECJ, Case 143/78, Cavel de Cavel, 27 March 1979, par. 7, the term “rights in property arising out of a 
matrimonial relationship” «…includes not only property arrangements specifically and exclusively envisaged by 
certain national legal systems in the case of marriage but also any proprietary relationships resulting directly 
from the matrimonial relationship or the dissolution thereof.». 
1255 ECJ, Case 120/79, Louise de Cavel v Jacques de Cavel, 6 March 1980, ECLI:EU:C:1980:70, par. 9 and 12. 
1256 ECJ, Case 120/79, Cavel de Cavel, 6 March 1980, par. 5. 
1257 ECJ, Case C-220/95, Antonius van den Boogaard v Paula Laumen, 27 February 1997, ECLI:EU:C:1997:91, 
par. 22. 
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which orders payment of a lump sum and transfer of ownership in property by one spouse to 
another spouse, must be regarded as relating to maintenance.1258 
 
3.2.  Limitation on Free Choice of Jurisdiction according to Article 4 of the 
Maintenance Regulation 
Contrary to its predecessor (Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation), Article 4 of the 
Maintenance Regulation limits party autonomy. In particular, the Maintenance Regulation 
provides a list of the Member State courts which may be designated in a choice-of-court 
agreement. The following Member State courts may be chosen: (i) a court or the courts of a 
Member State in which one of the parties is habitually resident; (ii) a court or the courts of a 
Member State of which one of the parties has the nationality, without taking into 
consideration who is a creditor and who is debtor. Furthermore, the spouses or the former 
spouses may choose in the case of maintenance obligations: (i) the court which has 
jurisdiction to settle their dispute in matrimonial matters; and (ii) a court or the courts of the 
Member State which was the Member State of the spouses’ last common habitual residence 
for a period of at least one year. 
The European legislator has not explained the justification for the restriction of the 
jurisdictional grounds offered to the parties. In consequence, several theories have been 
developed. The application of the proximity principle between the designated Member State 
and the dispute is often discussed.1259 The principle of the Borrás Report concerning 
jurisdictional grounds according to Article 3 of the Brussels II Convention, which “are based 
on the principle of genuine connection between the person and a Member State”,1260 is also 
extended to other regulations. It is affirmed that the proximity principle should help to avoid 
any abuse to the detriment of the vulnerable person.1261 This theory may be supported by the 
                                                          
1258 ECJ, Case C-220/95, van den Boogaard, par. 27. See also other Scottish and English judgments, B v D (also 
known as AB v CD) [2006] CSOH 200; C v C, [2007] ScotCS CSOH 191; Kremen v Agrest, [2012] EWHC 45 
(Fam). 
1259 M. ABENDROTH, Choice of Court in Matters Relating to Maintenance Obligations, in The Recovery of 
Maintenance in the EU and Worldwide, in P. BEAUMONT, B. HESS, L. WALKER, S. SPANCKEN (eds), The 
Recovery of Maintenance in the EU and Worldwide. Studies in Private International Law, Hart Publishing, 2014, 
p. 465. 
1260 Borrás Report, par. 30. 
1261 M. ABENDROTH, Choice of Court in Matters Relating to Maintenance Obligations, in The Recovery of 
Maintenance in the EU and Worldwide, op. cit., p. 466. 
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legislative choice of the connecting factor “habitual residence” which considers the factual 
circumstances. On the other hand, the connecting factor “nationality” does not guarantee a 
current factual connectedness1262 and proximity. Moreover, the time factor allowing the 
choice-of-court agreement ex ante may result very often in the absence of any connection 
between the designated Member State and the parties. 
The other theory concerns the fact that when the Maintenance Regulation became an 
autonomous legal instrument governing one part of family law, the legislator chose to make a 
compromise between the unlimited approach concerning the choice-of-court clauses in 
commercial matters under the Brussels I Regulation and the non-existence of choice-of-court 
agreements in national family law.1263 It must be borne in mind that parties entering into 
choice-of-court agreements deselect the public policy of the derogated court, which could be 
otherwise taken into consideration.1264 In consequence, the limited choice given to the parties 
limits the number of the potentially derogated courts – connecting factors laid down in Article 
4 often overlap with connecting factors laid down in Article 3 of the Maintenance Regulation. 
 
3.2.1. Connecting Factors 
A connecting factor based on the habitual residence is a restriction on party autonomy laid 
down in Article 4 of the Maintenance Regulation. The term “habitual residence” is the most 
important connecting factor for establishing the jurisdiction in international family matters 
within the various EU regulations and international conventions, such as the Brussels IIa 
Regulation, 1996 Hague Convention on parental responsibility and protection of children, 
2007 Hague Maintenance Protocol, Matrimonial Property and Registered Partnerships 
Regulations, etc. However, the term is not defined in any of these legal instruments. Recital 
32 of the Maintenance Regulation provides that the “habitual residence” should be stricter 
                                                          
1262 M. NÍ SHÚILLEABHÁIN, Cross-border divorce law. Brussels II bis, op. cit., p. 73. 
1263 F. PESCE, Le obbligazioni alimentari tra diritto internazionale e diritto dell’Unione europea, Aracne, 2013, 
p. 133. 
1264 The 2007 Hague Maintenance Protocol does not provide for the protection of the overriding mandatory rules 
of the forum, but Article 13 of the 2007 Hague Maintenance Protocol provides that «The application of the law 
determined under the Protocol may be refused only to the extent that its effects would be manifestly contrary to 
the public policy of the forum.». 
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than the “residence”, which excludes mere presence.1265 The ECJ has provided interpretation 
concerning “habitual residence” of the child under the Brussels IIa Regulation in the several 
judgments, which takes into account the factual circumstances such as “the duration, 
regularity, conditions and reasons for the stay on the territory of a Member State and the 
family’s move to that State, the child’s nationality, the place and conditions of attendance at 
school, linguistic knowledge and the family and social relationships of the child in that 
State.”.1266 The ECJ has not provided an autonomous interpretation of “habitual residence” of 
adults in the international family law, but it may draw inspiration from the case law on the 
habitual residence of children. 
Another restriction of party autonomy under Article 4 of the Maintenance Regulation is based 
on the connecting factor of “nationality”.1267 The practicality of this connecting factor lies in 
the easy determination without judicial deliberation,1268 and is tied up in the primary law 
surrounding Article 18 TFEU.  
Lastly, in case of the spouses’ maintenance, the spouses may choose a Member State court 
which has jurisdiction to settle their dispute in matrimonial matters or which was the Member 
State of the spouses’ last common habitual residence for a period of at least one year. There 
are some uncertainties whether these two connecting factors for the spouses’ maintenance 
represents the only choice for the spouses or if they extend the scope of choice of Article 4 of 
                                                          
1265 M. ABENDROTH, Choice of Court in Matters Relating to Maintenance Obligations, in The Recovery of 
Maintenance in the EU and Worldwide, op. cit., p. 466. On the “presence” of the child see ECJ, Case C-393/18 
PPU, UD v XB, Opinion of Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe delivered on 20 September 2018, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:749, where the Advocate General proposed that the ECJ reply to the questions for a 
preliminary ruling that the habitual residence of a child, within the meaning of Article 8 par. 1 of the Brussels IIa 
Regulation corresponds to the place where that child has its de facto centre of interests, which in certain 
exceptional situations, de facto the centre of its interests may be in a place in which a child has never been 
physically present. Therefore, «the physical presence of the child is therefore not a prerequisite for the purpose 
of establishing the child’s habitual residence there.». 
1266 Regarding the habitual residence of child see ECJ, Case C-523/07, A; Case C-497/10, Barbara Mercredi v 
Richard Chaffe, 22 December 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:829; Case C-376/14, C v M, 9 October 2014, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2268; Case C-111/17, OL v PQ, 8 June 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:436; Case C-512/17, HR, 28 
June 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:513. On the habitual residence see also: T. Kruger, Chapter 2: Finding Habitual 
Residence, in I. Viarengo, F. C. Villata (eds), EUFam’s Final Study, p. 77 and 78, available at: 
http://www.eufams.unimi.it/2017/12/30/final-study/; T. KRUGER, Habitual Residence: The Factors that Courts 
Consider, in P. BEAUMONT, PAUL, M. DANOV, K. TRIMMINGS, B. YÜKSEL (eds), Cross-Border Litigation in 
Europe, Studies in Private International Law, Hart Publishing, 2017, p. 741-754; M. NÍ SHÚILLEABHÁIN, Cross-
border divorce law. Brussels II bis, op. cit., p. 36-73. 
1267 The problem of multiple nationalities in this field was solved by the ECJ, Case C-168/08, Hadadi. 
1268 M. NÍ SHÚILLEABHÁIN, Cross-border divorce law. Brussels II bis, op. cit., p. 73. 
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the Maintenance Regulation. However, a restrictive interpretation should be rejected.1269 It 
must be remembered that due to the absence of a rule on choice-of-court agreements for 
divorce, legal separation, or marriage, the parties may designate a Member State court which 
will have jurisdiction to settle their dispute in matrimonial matters without having knowledge 
in advance and that Member State court will exercise its jurisdiction for divorce, legal 
separation, or marriage.1270 Although such an agreement may benefit the parties from the 
concentration of the proceedings in both subject matters, the parties should be aware that it 
may encourage a “double rush to court”.1271 
a) Relevant Point of Time 
In contrast with Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the Maintenance Regulation 
specifies the moment relevant for the determination of the conditions laid down in Article 4 of 
the Maintenance Regulation. Article 4 par. 1 provides that the conditions have to be met at the 
time the choice-of-court agreement is concluded, or at the time the court is seized. It means 
that although certain aspects are meanwhile changed (for example habitual residence of the 
parties), it does not have an impact on the validity of the choice-of-court agreement. In other 
words, this legislative choice offers favor validitatis for the parties – when the parties 
designate a Member State court not listed in Article 4 of the Maintenance Regulation, the 
validity of the jurisdiction clause may be “cured”, if such Member State court would be listed 
in Article 4 during the time.1272 On the other hand, when the parties conclude a choice-of-
court agreement in an early moment in the relationship(for example at the time of the 
marriage), the connecting factor listed in Article 4 of the Maintenance Regulation may lose 
any link with a Member State court at the time the court is seized. Such a jurisdiction clause 
will be valid, but it does not have to necessarily correspond anymore to the needs of (one of) 
the parties. 
                                                          
1269 M. ABENDROTH, Choice of Court in Matters Relating to Maintenance Obligations, in The Recovery of 
Maintenance in the EU and Worldwide, op. cit., p. 466-467; F. POCAR, I. VIARENGO, Il Regolamento (CE) n. 
4/2009 in materia di obbligazioni alimentari, in Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale, (2009), p. 
814 
1270 On the opposite approach see M. ABENDROTH, Choice of Court in Matters Relating to Maintenance 
Obligations, in The Recovery of Maintenance in the EU and Worldwide, op. cit., p. 466-467. 
1271 F. C. Villata, L. Válková, EUFam’s Model Choice-of-Court and Choice-of-Law Clauses, op. cit., p. 47. 
1272 On the similar conclusion see F. PESCE, Le obbligazioni alimentari tra diritto internazionale e diritto 
dell’Unione europea, op. cit., p. 135. 
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Nothing in Article 4 of the Maintenance Regulation impedes the parties from designating a 
Member State of “habitual residence” or “nationality” of “creditor” or “debtor”, without 
specifying the Member State or specific Member State court.1273 For this reason, it seems 
necessary to specify the moment to which the jurisdiction clause makes reference, i.e., the 
moment of the conclusion of the jurisdiction agreement or the moment of the institution of the 
proceedings. It is questionable whether the agreement conferring jurisdiction to a court, for 
example, of the habitual residence of the debtor without determination of the relevant point of 
time, would be considered valid taking into consideration the fact that the debtor meanwhile 
changed its habitual residence. Fixing the moment to the institution of the proceedings brings 
the flexibility and meets the need of the maintaining the “criterion of proximity” between the 
dispute and the designated Member State court. However, it also reduces legal certainty and 
predictability when habitual residence or nationality of one of the parties has meanwhile 
changed and may even result in abuse by manoeuvring these variable jurisdictional grounds.  
The same also applies to the condition according to Article 4 par. 1 lett. c) of the Maintenance 
Regulation concerning the maintenance obligations of the spouses, which may choose a 
Member State court which has jurisdiction to settle their dispute in matrimonial matters or 
which was the Member State of the spouses’ last common habitual residence for a period of at 
least one year. These two connecting factors refer to future circumstances which are not 
known to the spouses at the time of the conclusion of the jurisdiction agreement. However, 
according to Professor Abendroth, when the parties choose a Member State court which has 
jurisdiction to settle their dispute in matrimonial matters “...the parties must clearly express 
the link between the chosen court and the court in matrimonial matters”. 1274 This would mean 
that this connecting factor can be used only in pending or concluded disputes relating to the 
matrimonial matters.1275  
In my opinion, nothing in Article 4 of the Maintenance Regulation prevents the parties from 
agreeing that any Member State court, which will be seized for divorce, legal separation, or 
marriage, will have jurisdiction also for the maintenance between the spouses. This may be 
                                                          
1273 On the similar conclusion see F. PESCE, Le obbligazioni alimentari tra diritto internazionale e diritto 
dell’Unione europea, op. cit., p. 135; M. ABENDROTH, Choice of Court in Matters Relating to Maintenance 
Obligations, in The Recovery of Maintenance in the EU and Worldwide, op. cit., p. 467. 
1274 On the opposite approach see M. ABENDROTH, Choice of Court in Matters Relating to Maintenance 
Obligations, in The Recovery of Maintenance in the EU and Worldwide, op. cit., p. 467. 
1275 Ibidem, p. 476. 
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supported by the wording of Article 4 of the Maintenance Regulation providing that “The 
conditions referred to in points (a), (b) or (c) have to be met at the time the choice-of-court 
agreement is concluded or at the time the court is seized.” Point (c) refers to the dispute in 
matrimonial matters. It is true that the choice-of-court agreement is not available for divorce, 
legal separation, or marriage and any of the Member State courts listed in Article 3 of the 
Brussels IIa Regulation may exercise jurisdiction for divorce, legal separation, or marriage in 
the future, but the parties may be merely interested in the concentration of the jurisdiction in 
both subject matters, which is to the detriment of legal certainty and predictability.  
 
3.3.  Maintenance Obligations towards Minors 
Article 4 par. 3of the Maintenance Regulation does not give effect to choice-of-court 
agreements in relation to maintenance obligations towards a minor under the age of 18. It 
seems surprising that there is no general requirement in Article 4 of the Maintenance 
Regulation protecting all weaker parties by providing that the parties should obtain 
independent legal advice before making their choice.1276 However, the rule on choice-of-court 
agreement does not apply to any dispute relating to a maintenance obligation towards a child 
under the age of 18, since this rule aims at protecting the weaker party.1277 It results that a 
maintenance creditor may choose only between the Member State courts listed in Article 3 of 
the Maintenance Regulation. The choice of applicable law is also excluded for maintenance 
obligations towards minors under Article 8 of the 2007 Hague Maintenance Protocol since: 
…minor is usually represented by either of his or her parents, who are also bound to 
provide for him or her;…admitting the choice of applicable law involves an excessive risk 
of conflicts of interest in such cases.1278  
However, this protection of the child under the age of 18 may be doubtful since the parents 
usually seek to provide the best solution for their child and the child is usually represented by 
the impartial legal prosecutor. It is worth mentioning that adults who are not in the position to 
protect their interest by reason of an impairment or insufficiency of personal faculties, are also 
                                                          
1276 J. CARRUTHERS, Party autonomy in the legal regulation of adult relationships: what place for party choice in 
Private International Law?, op. cit., p. 909, footnote no 164. 
1277 Recital No 19 of the Maintenance Regulation. 
1278 A. Bonomi, Explanatory Report on the Hague Protocol of 23 November 2007 on the Law Applicable to 
Maintenance Obligations, HCCH Publications, 2013, par. 128. 
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excluded from the choice of applicable law according to Article 8 of the 2007 Hague 
Protocol. However, they are not “protected” from the choice-of-court according to Article 4 of 
the Maintenance Regulation.1279  
This rule is criticised due to two reasons. First, the minors are not protected from the tacit 
prorogation according to Article 5 of the Maintenance Regulation.1280 Second, the prorogation 
of jurisdiction may be in favour of the child.1281 The protection of the child would be better 
guaranteed if the designated Member State court would be non-exclusively and unilaterally 
allowed to the child.1282 Another possibility could be assumed by virtue of the solution laid 
down in Article 12 of the Brussels IIa Regulation, giving to the prorogued Member State 
court the discretionary power on the determination of its jurisdiction based on the best interest 
of the child.1283 Or, the designated Member State court could dispose with the “escape 
clause”, and thus, it could transfer the proceedings to the Member State of the habitual 
residence of the child if it is in the best interest of the child.1284 
 
3.4.  Formal Validity 
Paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the Maintenance Regulation provides that a choice-of-court 
agreement shall be in writing. It means that the formal requirements regarding the Brussels I 
Regulation are limited at first sight. However, it is hard to imagine the parties concluding the 
choice-of-court agreements for their maintenance obligations in a form which accords with 
                                                          
1279 See Opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs for the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home 
Affairs on the proposal for a Council regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of 
decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, PE386.692, 2005/0259(CNS), 5 
October 2007, p. 13 and 14: «This Article shall not apply if the debtor is a child below the age of 18 or an adult 
lacking legal capacity.». However, this proposal was subsequently rejected. 
1280 M. ABENDROTH, Choice of Court in Matters Relating to Maintenance Obligations, in The Recovery of 
Maintenance in the EU and Worldwide, op. cit., p. 469. 
1281 M. HELLNER, The Maintenance Regulation: A Critical Assesment of the Commission’s Proposal, in K. 
BOELE-WOELKI, T. SVERDRUP (eds), European Challenges in Contemporary Family Law European Family Law 
Series No 19, Intersentia, 2008, p. 349. 
1282 F. POCAR, I. VIARENGO, Il Regolamento (CE) n. 4/2009 in materia di obbligazioni alimentari, op. cit., p. 814. 
1283 On this proposal see I. Viarengo, L. Válková, Party Autonomy, in I. Viarengo, F. Marchetti (eds), EUFam’s 
Policy Guidelines, available at: http://www.eufams.unimi.it/2017/12/27/policy-guidelines/, p. 55.  
1284 L. WALKER, New (and Old) Problems for Maintenance Creditors Under the EU Maintenance Regulation, in 
P. BEAUMONT, PAUL, M. DANOV, K. TRIMMINGS, B. YÜKSEL (eds), Cross-Border Litigation in Europe, Studies in 
Private International Law, Hart Publishing, 2017, p. 775. 
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practices which the parties have established between themselves.1285 Although Article 4 of the 
Maintenance Regulation specifies that any communication by electronic means which 
provides a durable record of the agreement shall be equivalent to “writing”, the practical 
consequences of this provision in maintenance matters leaves certain doubts.1286 
In the light of the Recital No 15 and No 44 of the Maintenance Regulation, the rules on 
jurisdiction as they result from the Brussels I(bis) Regulation have been incorporated into the 
Maintenance Regulation. Since the Maintenance Regulation does not require the agreement to 
be “in writing”, an autonomous interpretation can be is in the Brussels Ibis Regulation.1287 
There are no doubts that the written jurisdiction clause signed by both parties satisfies the 
formal requirements within the meaning of Article 4 of the Maintenance Regulation. 
However, the real consensus of the parties must be ascertained, and the jurisdiction agreement 
cannot be incorporated unilaterally by one party and unnoticed by the other party. This may 
be the case with the prenuptial agreements covering maintenance obligations between the 
spouses. The question also arises whether the choice-of-court agreement may be inferred. 1288 
Moreover, Recital No 8 of the Maintenance Regulation provides that the 2007 Hague 
Convention and the 2007 Hague Protocol should be taken into account. Article 3 of the 2007 
Hague Convention defines an agreement in writing as an agreement recorded in any medium. 
Articles 7 and 8 of the 2007 Hague Protocol concerning the choice-of-law agreement provide 
that the designation of the applicable law in an agreement shall be in writing or recorded in 
any medium. Bonomi Report as regards to Article 7 of the 2007 Hague Protocol States that 
the:  
                                                          
1285 The formal requirement laid down in Article 25 par. 1 lett. c) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation refers to 
international trade or commerce, in consequence for the Maintenance Regulation not applicable. 
1286 However, see Baldwin v Baldwin [2014] EWHC 4857 (Fam), par. 45: «The clear inference from the petition 
is that the husband accepts and proposes that the English court should have maintenance jurisdiction… There 
was no dissent from the wife's Statement that if the maintenance was not paid she would apply for an order. The 
husband says that silence is not to be treated as acceptance. However, in this case there was not silence, but an 
engagement, from which the only inference which can be drawn is that the husband was agreeing to the English 
court's jurisdiction. The correspondence, in my view, shows a clear joint, several, and mutual decision that these 
parties both agreed that the English court should determine their maintenance claims. I do not think it is 
necessary for me to use the word "unequivocal" but if “unequivocal” is part of the test, I record also my view 
that this was an unequivocal agreement. There is no explanation, other than that the husband agreed to the 
English court's jurisdiction, for the failure to record the husband's present case, looking at this correspondence 
as a whole. The fact that the choice-of-court agreement may not have been explicitly Stated in those terms does 
not inhibit my power to draw an explicit inference.». 
1287 M. ABENDROTH, Choice of Court in Matters Relating to Maintenance Obligations, in The Recovery of 
Maintenance in the EU and Worldwide, op. cit., p. 462. 
1288 ECJ, Case 24/76, Estasis Salotti, par. 9 ad 10. 
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…the parties’ attention should be drawn to the important consequences that the choice of 
applicable law can have in relation to the existence and extent of the maintenance 
obligation…. this provision contains only minimal formal requirements with respect to 
the agreement; States may provide other requirements, for instance to ensure that the 
parties’ consent is freely given and sufficiently informed (e.g., recourse to legal advice 
before signature of the agreement).1289  
It is questionable, whether the Member State courts should draw the attention to the fact that 
the parties have not been informed of the consequences on the choice-of-court agreement and 
whether the further formal requirements may be required by the national law. For example, 
the German Bundesrat criticised the formal requirements due to the lack of legal assistance 
and recommended notarial certifications.1290 However, by virtue of the ECJ interpretation as 
to the choice-of-court agreements under the Brussels Ibis Regulation, where the ECJ upheld 
that the formal requirements exclude any reference to the national law (i.e., no conditions on 
the form can be added or subtracted),1291 the formal requirements of Article 4 Maintenance 
Regulation suggest autonomous interpretation without considering the approach taken under 
the 2007 Hague Convention and the 2007 Hague Protocol. 
It should be briefly remembered that the submission by appearance is permitted according to 
Article 5 of the Maintenance Regulation. Therefore, no uncertainties arise as in the case of 
Article 12 of the Brussels IIa Regulation. However, it seems regrettable that the Member 
State courts are not obligated to inform (vulnerable) persons about the consequences of tacit 
prorogation without contesting the jurisdiction as provided in Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation.1292 However, the Member State courts are not prohibited from doing so.1293 
                                                          
1289 A. Bonomi, Explanatory Report on the Hague Protocol of 23 November 2007 on the Law Applicable to 
Maintenance Obligations, HCCH Publications, 2013, par. 119. 
1290 M. ABENDROTH, Choice of Court in Matters Relating to Maintenance Obligations, op. cit., p. 468 referring 
to Bundesrat, 19 May 2006, BR-Drucks 30/06, p.7. 
1291 ECJ, Case C-150/80, Elefanten Schuh, par. 25; Case C-159/97, Trasporti Castelletti, par. 37. 
1292 On the same proposal see L. WALKER, New (and Old) Problems for Maintenance Creditors Under the EU 
Maintenance Regulation, in Cross-Border Litigation in Europe, op. cit., p. 776; L. Walker, Maintenance and 
Child Support in Private International Law, op. cit., p. 67. 
1293 See F. C. VILLATA, Obblighi alimentari e rapporti di famiglia secondo il regolamento n. 4/2009, Rivista di 
diritto internazionale (2011), p. 751, which recalls the case law of ECJ regarding submission by appearance 
concerning the disputes with the consumers, employees, and the insured. In particular see ECJ, Case C-111/09, 
Česká podnikatelská pojišťovna as, Vienna Insurance Group v Michal Bilas, 20 May 2010, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:290, par. 32: «However, it is always open to the court seized to ensure, having regard to the 
objective of the rules on jurisdiction resulting from Sections 3 to 5 of Chapter II of that regulation, which is to 
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3.5.  Substantive Validity 
Article 4 of the Maintenance Regulation is silent in respect of substantive validity of choice-
of-court agreements as is Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation. As in the case of formal 
validity, the interpretation provided in respect of substantive validity under the Brussels I 
Regulation may be recalled.1294 It must be remembered that two interpretations were 
developed in the context of Article 17 of the Brussels Convention and Article 23 of the 
Brussels Regulation. The first doctrine is based on the interpretation of the ECJ, where Article 
23 of the Brussels Regulation provides a self-sufficient test for the validity of the jurisdiction 
clauses. The inquiry on existence of consent involves only the application of the rule of 
formal requirements1295 and little space is left (if any) for the use of national law.1296 In the 
case of C-159/97, Trasporti Castelletti, the ECJ stated that “the choice-of-court in a 
jurisdiction clause may be assessed only in the light of considerations connected with the 
requirements laid down by Article 17”.1297 The second interpretation was developed in the 
light of other case law of theECJ, where the ECJ referred in a number of cases to the national 
law.1298 It may be deduced that material rules of jurisdiction clauses exist.1299 In consequence, 
it was not clear whether Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation represented the independent 
regulation of the formation of the choice-of-court agreement, and thus the reference to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
offer stronger protection of the party considered to be the weaker party, that the defendant being sued before it 
in those circumstances is fully aware of the consequences of his agreement to enter an appearance.». 
1294 M. ABENDROTH, Choice of Court in Matters Relating to Maintenance Obligations, in The Recovery of 
Maintenance in the EU and Worldwide, op. cit., p. 463; F. PESCE, Le obbligazioni alimentari tra diritto 
internazionale e diritto dell’Unione europea, op. cit., p. 141. 
1295 Heidelberg Report, par. 376; L. MERRETT, Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation: A Comprehensive Code 
for Jurisdiction Agreements?, op. cit., p. 545-564. 
1296 A. DICKINSON, The Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast), op. 
cit., p. 21. 
1297 ECJ, Case C-159/97, Trasporti Castelletti, par. 49. This interpreattation was strenghtened in the ECJ, Case 
C-116/02, Gasser, par. 51, where the ECJ stated that jurisdiction clause is an independent concept to be 
appraised solely in relation to the requirements of Article 17 of the Brussels Convention. See also ECJ, Case C-
116/02, Gasser, Opinion of Advocate General Leger, par. 78., where the Advocate General Leger held that 
«…the formal and substantive conditions governing validity to which agreements conferring jurisdiction are 
subject must be assessed in the light of the requirements of Article 17 alone.». 
1298 ECJ, Case C-214/89, Powell Duffryn, par. 13, 21; Case C-150/80, Elefanten Schuh, The Opinion of 
Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn, p. 1699; Case 313/85, Iveco Fiat, par. 7-8; Case, C-269/95, Benincasa, par. 
31. 
1299 U. MAGNUS, Choice of Court Agreements in the Review Proposal for the Brussels I Regulation, in The 
Brussels I Review Proposal Uncovered, op. cit., p. 86; R. FENTIMAN, International Commercial Litigation, 2015, 
op. cit., par. 2.32. 
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national law is excluded; or if the referral to the domestic is admitted, or, even more, if it is 
necessary.1300 In the Member States where the latter approach prevailed, the Heidelberg 
Report pointed out 1301 that the law of some Member States refers to the lex fori,1302 whereas 
others refer to the lex causae,1303 and in some Member States there is no clear answer.1304 
However, Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation introduced the new rule on substantive 
validity providing that the Member State court shall have jurisdiction “…unless the 
agreement is null and void as to its substantive validity under the law of that Member 
State…”. 
Thus, it is questionable whether substantive validity on the choice-of-court agreement under 
Article 4 of the Maintenance Regulation should adopt the solution laid down in the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation, where “the rules on jurisdiction as they result from Regulation (EC) No 
44/2001 should be adapted.”1305 In consequence, it seems more probable that two approaches 
assumed by Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation in respect of choice-of-court agreements 
according to Article 4 of the Maintenance Regulation will continue, as long as the 
Maintenance Regulation is not reformed.1306 It may be recommended to adopt a new rule on 
substantive validity1307 since such a rule may reinforce the position of the “weaker party”, 
                                                          
1300 See A. MALATESTA, Gli accordi di scelta del foro, in A. MALATESTA (ed), La riforma del regolamento di 
Bruxelles I: il regolamento (UE) n. 1215/2012 sulla giurisdizione e l’efficacia delle decisioni in materia civile e 
commerciale, op. cit., p. 69, where the author uses a word “necessity”. 
1301 Heidelberg Report, par. 377. 
1302 Cyprus, Greece, and Ireland apply lex fori. See Study JLS/C4/2005/03 “Compilation of All National Reports, 
Questionnaire No 3: Legal Problem Analysis”, 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_bxl1_compilation_quest_3_en.pdf, p. 388–95. 
1303 Austria, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Luxemburg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, 
and Spain, see Study JLS/C4/2005/03 “Compilation of All National Reports, Questionnaire No 3: Legal Problem 
Analysis”, http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_bxl1_compilation_quest_3_en.pdf, p. 388–95. 
1304 Italy and Slovenia see Study JLS/C4/2005/03 “Compilation of All National Reports, Questionnaire No 3: 
Legal Problem Analysis”, http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_bxl1_compilation_quest_3_en.pdf, p. 
388–95. 
1305 Recital No 15 of the Maintenance Regulation 
1306 On the similar conclusion see M. ABENDROTH, Choice of Court in Matters Relating to Maintenance 
Obligations, in The Recovery of Maintenance in the EU and Worldwide, op. cit., p. 464. 
1307 The model may be taken from Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, as suggested by U. MAGNUS, 
Choice of Court Agreements in the Review Proposal for the Brussels I Regulation, in The Brussels I Review 
Proposal Uncovered, op. cit., p. 93: «The material validity (concerning capacity, mistake, fraud, duress) of the 
choice-of-court agreement is governed by the law of the Member State where the chosen court or courts are 
located». 
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which is hard to identify ex ante,1308 and protect such a party against fraud, the duress, or the 
mistake.  
 
3.6.  Severability 
Moreover, it must be noted that jurisdiction clauses may form part of prenuptial agreements. 
The uniform approach on the severability of the jurisdiction clause is recommended. In this 
case, it may be referred to the case Benincasa, C-269/95, stating that a jurisdiction clause and 
the substantive provisions of the contract in which a jurisdiction clause is incorporated must 
be distinguished.1309 Moreover, a problem concerning severability of the validity of the 
jurisdiction agreement concerning matrimonial property regime and the jurisdiction 
agreement concerning maintenance in the prenuptial agreement may arise. In the recent 
English case of the Court of Appeal, Brack v Brack, issued on 20 December 2012, three 
prenuptial agreements were concluded between the spouses (“Niagara agreement”, the 
“Gothenburg agreement”, and “Ohio agreement”, being the locations where each were 
signed), which contained prorogation clauses granting exclusive jurisdiction to the court in 
Stockholm. The Niagara and Gothenburg agreement contained a Prenuptial and Prorogation 
agreements relating to the property regime between the spouses as follows:  
The undersigned… who intend to contract a marriage with one another, by this conclude 
the following prenuptial agreement. Furthermore we enter into a prorogation agreement 
in which we determine what law and court shall apply and as to the distribution of 
property with ourselves… All property acquired by each of us independently before 
entering into marriage or which will be acquired during the marriage as well as any 
property which will replace that property together with all revenue generated by all 
property shall make up the private property of each of us independently, in which the 
other spouse shall have no right by marriage to community property or other joint 
property rights… Moreover, we agree that in the case of separation between the two of us 
Swedish law shall apply at the distribution of our property and that any dispute as to that 
                                                          
1308 J. CARRUTHERS, Party autonomy in the legal regulation of adult relationships: what place for party choice in 
Private International Law?, op. cit., p. 909. 
1309 ECJ, Case, C-269/95, Benincasa, par. 25. 
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property shall be settled in accordance with Swedish law before the City Court of 
Stockholm, Sweden.” 1310  
The Ohio Agreement was a more length and detailed document than either the Niagara or 
Gothenburg agreements, covering maintenance (at Clause 12 whereby the wife waived any 
rights to maintenance for herself) as well as the prorogation clause (Clause 19, identifying 
Sweden as having jurisdiction). 
The High Court of Justice distinguished between spousal maintenance on the one hand, and 
the matrimonial property on the other hand because of the ECJ case, Van den Boogaard (C-
220/95). Although, the court found the agreements to be unfair as to the rights in property 
arising out of a matrimonial relationship, the court and declared its stay of jurisdiction as to 
the spouses’ maintenance in favour of the Swedish court since the prorogation agreement was 
valid according to Article 4 of the Maintenance Regulation. The court stated:  
…the prorogation clause, albeit properly entered into, and not negated by one of the 
traditional vitiating factors, is not caught by the Maintenance Regulation insofar as it 
deals with any sharing or real property claims, unless those claims are negated by the 
terms of the prenuptial agreement itself.1311  
Although the Court of Appeal confirmed approach of the High Court of Justice as to the 
severability of the validity of the prorogation clause as to the matrimonial property and 
maintenance, since “under EU law only maintenance can be prorogated, all other aspects of 
matrimonial finance being excluded from the regulation and subject therefore to domestic 
law, pursuant to Article 1”.1312 Thus, if there is a valid maintenance prorogation agreement, it 
can be found only in the Ohio agreement.1313 According to the Court of Appeal, in Clause 12 
the spouses “irrevocably waived” their rights to maintenance in whatever form and Clause 19 
relates solely to jurisdiction in order to make good the deficit, there is no specific choice of 
jurisdiction clause in respect of maintenance.1314 The Court of Appeal concluded that 
maintenance prorogation clause is invalid, referring to ECJ case Estasis. 
                                                          
1310 DB v PB, 22 December 2016, [2016] EWHC 3431 (Fam), [40]; Brack v Brack [2018] EWCA Civ 2862, [15]. 
1311 DB v PB, 22 December 2016, [2016] EWHC 3431 (Fam), [52]. 
1312 Brack v Brack [2018] EWCA Civ 2862, [66]. 
1313 Brack v Brack [2018] EWCA Civ 2862, [44]. 
1314 Ibidem, [62], [64]. 
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…In Estasis, a prorogation clause found within the Terms and Conditions on the back of 
the agreement was not adequate to satisfy the requirements of Article 4 without specific 
reference to the clause within the agreement itself. Having considered the submissions of 
both parties, I have concluded that the same must be equally true where the meaning of 
the clause relied upon is itself unclear, particularly where, as here, the critical wording 
must be read across from a part of the document, dealing specifically with rights and not 
jurisdiction. In my judgment, the requirements in Article 4 are not satisfied, 
notwithstanding that the agreement is in writing.1315 
 
3.7.  Exclusive, Non-Exclusive and Asymmetric Jurisdiction Agreements 
Contrary to Article 12 of the Brussels IIa Regulation, the choice-of-court agreement has a 
binding effect on the selected Member States court, as well as the derogated Member State 
court. Article 4 of the Maintenance Regulation provides for the same assumption as Article 25 
of the Brussels IIa Regulation - the jurisdiction agreement shall be deemed exclusive unless 
the parties have agreed otherwise. In consequence, it may be generally referred to as to 
Chapter Two, Subchapter I, Section 11 concerning the jurisdiction clauses under the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation.1316 However, significant doubts under the Brussels Ibis Regulation may arise 
regarding the use of optional asymmetrical jurisdiction clauses in maintenance matters. It may 
be suggested that optional asymmetric jurisdiction clauses could have a binding effect when 
the party forced into a particular jurisdiction is a debtor and the counterpart is creditor, which 
has an option to commence proceedings either before the designated jurisdiction or before any 
other competent court.1317 The opposite approach could lead to the contravention of the 
rationae of the Maintenance Regulation by giving an advantage to the maintenance debtor.1318 
This may be demonstrated in the following example: 
Michele (German national) and Beatrice (Italian national), got married in 2008 and they have been 
                                                          
1315 Ibidem, [67]. 
1316 J. CARRUTHERS, Party autonomy in the legal regulation of adult relationships: what place for party choice in 
Private International Law?, op. cit., p. 909. 
1317 On the same approach see F. C. Villata, L. Válková, EUFam’s Model Choice-of-Court and Choice-of-Law 
Clauses, op. cit., p. 20. 
1318 According to a German decision BGH, NJW 2014,1101 an asymmetrical agreement on the substantive 
regime of the matrimonial relationship (including maintenance) is null and void, if it creates an excessive 
imbalance between the spouses harming the weaker party. Such findings may also have an impact on the 
substantive validity of an asymmetrical choice-of-court agreement concerning maintenance obligations. 
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living in Prague for 10 years. When they married, Michele used to live in Prague, whereas Beatrice 
moved to Prague in order to stay with Michele. As a consequence of the change of her residence, 
Beatrice lost her job in Italy and she became unable to support her own living costs. Michele 
wished for her to feel comfortable, i.e. that she can rely on a jurisdiction with which she is familiar. 
They concluded an asymmetrical exclusive choice-of-court agreement providing for the 
exclusiveness of Italian courts’ jurisdiction in case that Michele claims maintenance against 
Beatrice (through a negative declaratory action) according to Article 4 par. 1 lett. b) of the 
Maintenance Regulation, whilst Beatrice has the right to bring proceedings in Italian courts 
according to Article 4 par. 1 lett. b) or in any other court according to Article 3 of 
Maintenance Regulation. 
 
 
3.8.  Relationship between the Maintenance Regulation and the 2007 Lugano 
Convention 
There is no explicit rule dealing with the relationship between the Maintenance Regulation 
and the 2007 Lugano Convention. In consequence, several theories have been developed. 
Article 69 par. 1 of the Maintenance Regulation, which provides that the Maintenance 
Regulation shall not affect the application of multilateral conventions, refers to the 
relationship with already existing international conventions. Although the 2007 Lugano 
Convention entered into force on 1 December 2010, the 2007 Lugano Convention may be 
perceived as a pre-existing instrument which replaced the 1988 Lugano Convention.1319 
Article 69 of the Maintenance Regulation specifies that it covers only conventions concluded 
by the Member States, but the contracting party of the 2007 Lugano Convention is the EU. 
For these two reasons, it is doubtful whether the 2007 Lugano Convention should prevail. In 
support of this theory is the fact that the Maintenance Regulation should take into account the 
                                                          
1319Cross-border divorce and maintenance, Thematic Unit 3, Cross-border recovery of maintenance in Europe, 
Workshop for judges implementing the training module on European Family Law, 2012, available at: 
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwix7
crA_ezcAhVHbFAKHdeOCSIQFjAAegQIAxAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.era-
comm.eu%2FEU_Civil_Justice_Training_Modules%2Fkiosk%2Fcourses%2FFamily_Law_Module_1_EN%2F
Module%25203%2Fkiosk%2Fdokuments%2FThematical_unit_3.pdf&usg=AOvVaw0TkPXhib4QvU8hXwB55
iG9 . 
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EU’s jurisdictional obligations under the 2007 Lugano Conventions to which the EU is a 
party.1320 
On the other hand, Article 64 par. 1 of the 2007 Lugano Convention provides that the 2007 
Lugano Convention shall not prejudice the application of the Brussels I Regulation, as well as 
any amendments thereof. However, is the Maintenance Regulation a successor to the Brussels 
I Regulation? Moreover, Article 67 par. 2 of the 2007 Lugano Convention states that the 2007 
Lugano Convention shall not prevent a court from assuming jurisdiction in accordance with 
the convention on a particular matter. Indeed, it is doubtful whether the Maintenance 
Regulation is lex specialis and should prevail.1321  
The most problematic point is Article 4 par. 4 of the Maintenance Regulation, which 
determines the relationship between the Maintenance Regulation and the 2007 Lugano 
Convention as to jurisdiction clauses. If the parties agree to attribute jurisdiction to a non-
Member State, which is party to the 2007 Lugano Convention, the 2007 Lugano Convention 
applies except in the case of disputes relating to a maintenance obligation towards a child 
under the age of 18. However, it must be borne in mind that Article 23 of the 2007 Lugano 
Convention applies only when one of the parties is domiciled in the Contracting State. In my 
opinion, it leaves room for doubts. The 2007 Lugano Convention does not restrict the scope 
of application to minors under the age of 18. The non-Member State, which is party to the 
2007 Lugano Convention, is not bound by the Maintenance Regulation, i.e., by Article 4 par. 
4 of the Maintenance Regulation. Indeed, in what way may Article 4 par. 4 of the 
Maintenance Regulation impose an obligation on the non-Member State, which is party to the 
2007 Lugano Convention? This provision deals only with the derogation effect1322 and 
                                                          
1320 P. BEAUMONT, Interaction of the Brussels II-a and Maintenance Regulations with [possible] litigation in 
non-EU States: Including Brexit Implications, Working Paper No. 2018/1, available at: 
https://www.abdn.ac.uk/law/research/working-papers-455.php, p. 3. 
1321 For this approach see: K. KOSTKIEWICZ, M. EICHENBERGER, International Maintenance Law in Legal 
Relations between Switzerland and the EU, Comparative Law Review, 20 (2015), available at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/CLR.2015.009, p. 21. 
1322 P. BEAUMONT , Interaction of the Brussels IIa and Maintenance Regulations with [possible] litigation in 
non-EU States: Including Brexit Implications, op. cit., p. 3: «It is very unfortunate that the EU unilaterally 
derogated from this provision of the Lugano Convention rather than abiding by the Lugano Convention in full 
until an opportunity arose for the Lugano Convention to be revised based on the consensus of all the 
Contracting Parties to the Convention. It does not augur well for the EU’s willingness to abide by its treaty 
obligations with its near neighbours. A future revision of the Lugano Convention should discuss the pros and 
cons of jurisdiction agreements in relation to maintenance obligations towards a child under the age of 18.». 
See also F. Pesce, Le obbligazioni alimentari tra diritto internazionale e diritto dell’Unione europea, op. cit., p. 
140. 
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imposes the obligation not to recognize any effect of such jurisdiction agreements in the 
Member State courts. However, in the case of parallel proceedings, the clash between these 
two legal instruments is evident and may result in positive and negative conflicts of 
jurisdiction. 
We can imagine two scenarios with opposite results.1323 
1) The defendant is domiciled in Switzerland, the plaintiff is domiciled in the USA. A non-
designated Swiss court is first seized to decide on child maintenance (under the age of 18) 
according to Article 2 of the 2007 Lugano Convention. However, there is an agreement 
conferring jurisdiction to the Italian court which is valid by virtue of Article 23 of the 2007 
Lugano Convention. 
The Swiss court declares a lack of jurisdiction due to the valid jurisdiction agreement. The second 
seized Italian court declares lack of its jurisdiction since the jurisdiction agreement is invalid by 
virtue of Article 4 par. 4 of the Maintenance Regulation and since it cannot assume its jurisdiction 
according to Article 3 of the Maintenance Regulation. A negative conflict of jurisdiction occurs.  
 
2) A Swiss court is seized to decide on child maintenance (under the age of 18) on the basis of the 
jurisdiction agreement according to Article 23 of the 2007 Lugano Convention. The Italian 
court is seized according to Article 3 of the Maintenance Regulation. 
The Swiss court examines the validity of the jurisdiction clauses and assumes its jurisdiction. 
However, the Italian court is seized as well and might establish jurisdiction according to Article 3 
of the Maintenance Regulation, since by virtue of Article 4 par. 4 of the Maintenance Regulation, 
the jurisdiction agreement is invalid. A positive conflict of jurisdiction occurs. However, the second 
seized court must suspend its jurisdiction according to Article 27 of the 2007 Lugano Convention 
(also if we presume that the Maintenance Regulation prevails, Article 12 of the Maintenance 
Regulation is applicable only between the Member States). On the other hand, according to 
Professor Beaumont “… a possible construction of Article 4 par. 4 of the Maintenance Regulation 
is that for courts in EU Member States it overrides Article 27 of the 2007 Lugano Convention in a 
                                                          
1323 On similar examples and problems connected with positive and negative conflicts of jurisdiction see K. 
KOSTKIEWICZ, M. EICHENBERGER, International Maintenance Law in Legal Relations between Switzerland and 
the EU, op. cit., p. 25, 26. 
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case where the non-EU Lugano court is first seized on the basis of a non-exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement”. 1324 Such a situation could lead to two conflicting judgments.  
 
 
4. Choice-of-Court Agreements under the Regulations on Property Consequences of 
Marriage and Registered Partnership 
As described in the introduction of Section 1 of this Subchapter, a group of 17 Member States 
declared their interest in enhanced cooperation in the area of the property regimes of 
international couples including matrimonial property regimes and the property consequences 
of registered partnerships. Beginning1 January 2019 the both Property Regimes Regulations 
will become applicable in their jurisdictions. The common goal of the Regulations is to 
establish a European legal framework for determining jurisdiction and the law applicable to 
matrimonial property and registered partnership regimes and to facilitate the movement of 
decisions and among the Member States. 
Both regulations contain the rule on choice-of-court agreements, which is dealt in the slightly 
different manner. In consequence, the rules on choice-of-court agreements will be analysed 
separately. On the other hand, the examined aspects which are common for the rules on 
choice-of-court agreements in the regulations, the formal and substantive validity of 
jurisdiction agreements, the lis pendens rule, and the scope of application will be dealt 
simultaneously. 
 
4.1.  Scope of Application 
4.1.1. Territorial and Personal Scope of Application 
The Regulation on Matrimonial Property Regime and the Regulation on the Property 
Consequences of Registered Partnership will be applicable only in the Member States that 
have established enhanced cooperation among themselves.1325 Until now, the Member States 
                                                          
1324 P. BEAUMONT, Interaction of the Brussels IIa and Maintenance Regulations with [possible] litigation in non-
EU States: Including Brexit Implications, op. cit., p. 4. 
1325 Article 20 of the Treaty on European Union; and Article 326 and ff. TFEU. 
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taking part in the enhanced cooperation are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Finland, Germany, Greece, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. Cyprus reiterated this wish during the work of the 
Council.1326 Estonia announced its intention to take part in the cooperation after its 
adoption.1327 
The UK and Ireland decided not to opt-in into the Property Regime Regulations, since the 
common law system is not familiar with the concept of matrimonial property regimes. Also:  
…the Government considers that these proposals would create problems for all UK 
jurisdictions given that the proposals do not cover all aspects of financial provision on 
divorce or dissolution. When considering ancillary relief or equivalent financial 
provision courts in the UK only consider domestic law and take account of a wider range 
of issues than matrimonial property regimes in other Member States usually cover – e.g. 
maintenance (needs and resources), the division of capital, including gifts and jointly 
owned companies (both of which are excluded from the scope of the Commission’s 
proposals), and matters such as pension sharing and discretionary trusts (where the 
scope of these proposals is unclear).1328  
In accordance with Protocol No 22 on the Position of Denmark (ex Protocol No 5), the 
measures adopted under Title V of Part III of the TFEU (ex Title IV of Part III of the EC 
Treaty) would not apply to Denmark,1329 thus Denmark is not bound by both regulations.  
                                                          
1326 Recital No 11 of the Property Regime Regulations 
1327 See www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/06/09/property-regimes-for-international-
couples.  
1328 Joint consultation by the Ministry of Justice, Scottish Government, and the Northern Ireland Department of 
Finance and Personnel, “Matrimonial Property Regimes and the property consequences of registered 
partnerships -How should the UK approach the Commission’s proposals in these areas?”, (Consultation Paper 
CP 8/2011,2011), par. 28. See also Impact Assessment on proposed European Community Regulations on 
Matrimonial Property Regimes and the property consequences of registered partnerships, Ministry of Justice, 15 
April 2011, par. 2.7. and 2.8.; S. CRETNEY, Community of property imposed by judicial decision, Law Quarterly 
review, 119 (2003), p. 349; E. COOKE, T. AKOTO, A. BALLOW, T. CALLUS, A community of property-a regime for 
England and Wales: interim report, International family law, (2005), p. 133-137; B. BRAAT, Matrimonial 
property law: diversity of forms, equivalence in substance?, in M. ANTOKOLSKAIA (ed), Convergence and 
divergence of family law in Europe Intersentia, 2008, p. 243; J. SCHERPE, Towards a matrimonial property 
regime for England and Wales, in R. PROBERT, C. BARTON (eds), Fifty years in family law. Essays for Stephen 
Cretney, Intersencia, 2012, p. 133-146; M. THORPE, Financial consequences of divorce: England versus the rest 
of Europe, in K. BOELE-WOELKI (ed), The Future of family property in Europe, Intersentia, 2011, p. 4 et seq. 
1329 See Article 2 of the protocols: Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties 
establishing the European Communities and certain related acts - Protocol annexed to the Treaty on European 
Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Community - Protocol on the position of Denmark, OJ C 340, 
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The six Member States where the Regulations will not be applicable are Poland, Hungary, 
Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania. It seems that the reasons are more socio-political 
such as the non-recognition of same-sex marriages and registered partnerships.1330 Although 
Article 9 of both Regulations allow the Member State courts to decline its jurisdiction for 
property disputes where such marriages or registered partnerships are not recognised, it seems 
that this provision did not offer enough of a guarantee.1331 
Both Property Regime Regulations do not contain any specific provisions concerning its 
personal scope. The rules are based on universal application, as well as the Maintenance 
Regulation and do not foresee any reference to the national law of the Member States.1332  
 
4.1.2. Temporal Scope of Application  
Both Property Regime Regulations shall apply to: legal proceedings instituted, authentic 
instruments formally drawn up or registered, and court settlements approved or concluded on 
or after 29 January 2019 in the Member States participating in enhanced cooperation. 1333 
Contrary to the Brussels IIa Regulation, which specifies that it applies to agreements 
concluded between the parties after 1 March 2005, the two Property Regime Regulations fix 
the moment of application to the time when the proceedings are instituted (as well as the 
Maintenance Regulation and the Brussels Ibis Regulation). It will not be required that the 
choice-of-court agreement be concluded on or after 29 January 2019. It will be sufficient that 
the Member State court will be seized with the dispute concerning the choice-of-court 
agreement at the time the two Property Regime Regulations will be applicable in that Member 
State.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
10 November 1997 and Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Protocol 
(No 22) on the position of Denmark, OJ C 326, 26 October 2012 
1330 However, in Hungary registered partnerships are permitted from 2010. In Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and 
United Kingdom (excluding Northern Ireland) same-sex marriages are permitted. 
1331 However, see the recent case of the ECJ, Case C-673/16, Relu Adrian Coman and Others v Inspectoratul 
General Pentru Imigrări and Ministerul Afacerilor Interne, 5 June 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:385, par. 34 and 46, 
where the ECJ defined the term “spouse” as gender-neutral, which may cover the same-sex spouse of the Union 
citizen concerned and an obligation to recognise such marriages for the sole purpose of granting a derived right 
of residence to a third-country national does not undermine the national identity or pose a threat to the public 
policy of the Member State concerned. 
1332 The Regulations make an express reference to the national law for the determination of the certain questions, 
see for example Recital No 17 of the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation regarding the term “marriage”. 
1333 See Article 69 of the Matrimonial Regime Regulation. 
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4.1.3. Material Scope of Application 
Article 1 of both Property Regime Regulations establishes the material scope of application in 
a positive and a negative way.  
The Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation defines the concept of matrimonial property 
regimes autonomously1334 in Article 3 par. 1 lett. a) as “a set of rules concerning the property 
relationships between the spouses and in their relations with third parties, as a result of 
marriage or its dissolution”. The Regulation on Property Consequences of Registered 
Partnership defines the concept of registered partnership as well in Article 3 par. 1 lett. a) as 
“the regime governing the shared life of two people which is provided for in law, the 
registration of which is mandatory under that law and which fulfils the legal formalities 
required by that law for its creation.”. 
Recital No 18 of both Regulations state clearly that the scope of the Regulations should 
include all civil-law aspects of the matrimonial property regimes and property consequences 
of registered partnerships which cover the daily management of matrimonial property, a 
partner's property, and the liquidation of the regime, in particular as a result of the couple's 
separation or the death of one of the spouses or partners. In contrast with the Regulation on 
Property Consequences of Registered Partnership, Recital No 18 of the Matrimonial Regime 
Regulation then specifies that it also encompasses: (i) the rules from which the spouses may 
not derogate; (ii) any optional rules to which the spouses may agree in accordance with the 
applicable law; and(iii) any default rules of the applicable law. 1335  
                                                          
1334 Recital No 18 of the Matrimonial Regime Regulation. 
1335 “…the rules from which the spouses may not derogate” may be understood as the general law on marriage 
(régime primarie), for example rules governing family home and household goods, which are applied 
irrespective of the matrimonial property regime and must be distinguished from the secondary regime which 
focuses on the property rights of the spouses and exercise of party autonomy. The secondary regime then 
concerns the default regime (“…any default rules of the applicable law”, e.g. community or separation of assets) 
and optional regime (“…any optional rules to which the spouses may agree in accordance with the applicable 
law”, e.g. marital agreements). See W. PINTENS, Matrimonial property law in Europe, in K. BOELE-WOELKI, K. 
MILES, J. SCHERPE (eds), The future of family property in Europe, Intersentia, 2011, p. 20 (régime primarie), p. 
21-37 (default regime), p. 37-39 (optional regime); K. BOELE-WOELKI, F. FERRAND, C. GONZÁLEZ BEILFUSS, M. 
JÄNTERA-JAREBORG, N. LOWE, D. MARTINY, W. PINTENS, Principles of European family law regarding property 
relations between spouses, Intersentia, 2013, p. 35-97 (régime primarie), p. 99-135 (optional regime), p. 139—-
340 (default regime); K. BOELE-WOELKI, European Family Law in Action. Vol. 4: Property Relations between 
Spouses, European Family Law Series 24, Intersentia, 2009, p. 175-207 (régime primarie), p. 237-245 (optional 
regime), p. 245-249 (default regime). 
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The negative scope of application is provided in Article 1 par. 1 and par. 2 of both 
Regulations. In particular, they do not cover the following subject matters: revenue, customs 
or administrative matters, the legal capacity of spouses or partners;1336 the existence, the 
validity, or the recognition of a marriage or registered partnership;1337 maintenance 
obligations;1338 the succession to the estate of a deceased spouse or partner;1339 social security; 
the entitlement to transfer or adjustment between spouses or partners, in the case of divorce, 
legal separation, or marriage annulment or dissolution or annulment of the registered 
partnership; the rights to retirement or disability pension accrued during marriage and which 
have not generated pension income during the marriage or registered partnership;1340 the 
nature of rights in rem relating to a property;1341 and any recording in a register of rights in 
immovable or movable property, including the legal requirements for such recording, and the 
effects of recording or failing to record such rights in a register.1342 
  
4.2. Types of the Choice-of-Court Agreements under the Matrimonial Property 
Regime Regulation and under the Regulation on Property Consequences of 
Registered Partnerships 
Articles 4 and 5 of the Matrimonial Regime Regulation establish an innovative rule providing 
for typical connections.1343 In other words, the rules automatically allocate the jurisdiction of 
the property regime disputes to the Member State courts having jurisdiction over succession 
                                                          
1336 However, according to Recital 20 of the Property Regime Regulations, this exclusion should not cover the 
specific powers and rights of either or both spouses with regard to property, either as between themselves or as 
regards third parties, as these powers and rights should fall under the scope of the Regulations. 
1337 The Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation clearly states that the concept of marriage should be 
determined according to the national law of each Member State, see Recital No 17. Concerning registered 
partnership – the term should be defined here solely for the purpose of this Matrimonial Property Regime 
Regulation, where the substance of the concept should remain defined in the national laws of the Member States. 
1338 Issue covered by the Maintenance Regulation. 
1339 Issue covered by the Succession Regulation. 
1340 However, according to Recital No 23, the Property Regime Regulations should govern in particular the issue 
of classification of pensions assets, the amounts that have already been paid to one spouse during the 
marriage/registered partnership, and the possible compensation that would be granted in case of a pension 
subscribed to with common assets. 
1341 See Recitals No 24 to 26 of the Property Regime Regulations. 
1342 See Recitals No 27 and 28 of the Property Regime Regulations. 
1343 S. MARINO, Strengthening the European Civil Judicial Cooperation: the patrimonial effects of family 
relationships, Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional, (2017), p. 270. 
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(Article 4) and divorce, legal separation, or marriage annulment (Article 5).1344 The 
connection is exclusive; the choice-of-court agreement providing for the concentration of the 
proceedings is admissible only under the specific circumstances laid down in paragraph 2 of 
Article 5 of the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation. Although Article 4 of the 
Regulation on Property Consequences of Registered Partnership automatically allocates the 
jurisdiction of the property regime disputes to the Member State courts having jurisdiction 
over succession, in case of the dissolution or annulment of a registered partnership the 
agreement of the spouses is necessary. 
Moreover, both Regulations allow two types of choice-of-court agreements. One type of 
choice-of-court agreements is covered by the already mentioned Article 5 par. 2 and 3 of the 
Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation and by Article 5 of the Regulation on Property 
Consequences of Registered Partnership. These Articles allow the concentration of the 
proceedings concerning divorce, legal separation, or marriage annulment or dissolution or 
annulment of a registered partnership with the proceedings concerning the property regime 
(under the specific circumstances in the matrimonial property regime). The second type of 
choice-of-court agreements is determined by Article 7 of the Matrimonial Property Regime 
Regulation and Regulation on Property Consequences of Registered Partnership and provides 
for the limited choice, which is activated only in two cases:  
(i) When the Member State court is seized to rule on an application for divorce, legal 
separation, or marriage annulment in accordance with the fifth or the sixth indent of 
Article 3 par. 1 lett. a), Article 5 or Article 7 of the Brussels IIa Regulation and the 
parties fail to agree to such a Member State court; or when the Member State court is 
                                                          
1344 The connecting rules can be found already in Article 3 par. 1 lett. c) and d) of the Maintenance Regulation. 
However, the connection rules are not automatic. See in this context ECJ, Case C-184/14, A v B, 16 July 2015, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:479, where the ECJ upheld that Article 3 lett. referred by the Italian Corte di Cassazione, n. 
8049, order 7 April 2014, in this regard see E. D’ALESSANDRO, Giudizio di separazione e domanda concernente 
la responsabilità genitoriale ed il mantenimento dei figli stabilmente residenti in altro Stato membro, nota a 
Cass. ord. 7 aprile 2014, n. 8049, La nuova giurisprudenza civile commentate (2014), pp. 957-960. The ECJ 
upheld that Article 3 lett. c) and lett. d) of the Maintenance Regulation must be interpreted that, in the event that 
a court of a Member State is seized of proceedings involving the separation or dissolution of a marital link 
between the parents of a minor child and a court of another Member State is seized of proceedings in matters of 
parental responsibility involving that same child, an application relating to maintenance concerning that child is 
ancillary only to the proceedings concerning parental responsibility, within the meaning of Article 3 lett. d). 
However, it must be borne in mind that the connection is not automatic as in the case of the Matrimonial 
Property Regime Regulation.  
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seized to rule on an application for the dissolution or annulment of a registered 
partnership and the parties fail to agree to such a Member State court; or 
(ii) When matters of the property regime are not linked to proceedings on succession or 
divorce, legal separation, or marriage annulment or dissolution, or annulment of the 
registered partnership (for example, when the spouses or partners want to change the 
property regime of their marriage or registered partnership)”.1345  
In the first place, in order to understand this division, it is necessary to make a brief 
introduction of the legislative history of these rules. The 2011 Matrimonial Property Regime 
Proposal proposed the first type of choice-of-court agreement in a manner that the agreement 
was required every time the spouses intended to connect the proceedings in divorce and 
matrimonial property regime; the allocation of jurisdiction was not automatic.1346 The same 
                                                          
1345 Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of 
decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes, COM(2016)0106 final, 2 March 2016, p. 8; Proposal for a 
Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters 
of the property consequences of registered partnerships, COM(2016)0107 final, 2 March 2016, p. 8; The scope 
and the use of this “second” jurisdictional clause is not explained sufficiently in the Recitals. See for example 
Recital No 35 and 36 of the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation, where it seems that the rule on the choice 
of court under Article 7 and the rule on alternative grounds of jurisdiction under Article 6 are not connected. 
Recital No 35 provides «Where matters of matrimonial property regime are not linked to proceedings pending 
before the court of a Member State on the succession of a spouse or on divorce, legal separation or marriage 
annulment, this Regulation should provide for a scale of connecting factors for the purposes of determining 
jurisdiction, starting with the habitual residence of the spouses at the time the court is seized. These connecting 
factors are set in view of the increasing mobility of citizens and in order to ensure that a genuine connecting 
factor exists between the spouses and the Member State in which jurisdiction is exercised.» Recital No 36 
provides: «In order to increase legal certainty, predictability and the autonomy of the parties, this Regulation 
should, under certain circumstances, enable the parties to conclude a choice-of-court agreement in favour of the 
courts of the Member State of the applicable law or of the courts of the Member State of the conclusion of the 
marriage.” However, the “certain circumstances» provided in Recital No 36 should be understood as the “cases 
which are covered by Article 6” as specified in Article 7. In consequence, Recital No 36 should be read in 
conjunction with Recital No 35, i.e. «Where matters of matrimonial property regime are not linked to 
proceedings pending before the court of a Member State on the succession of a spouse or on divorce, legal 
separation or marriage annulment… this Regulation should …, enable the parties to conclude a choice-of-court 
agreement in favour of the courts of the Member State of the applicable law or of the courts of the Member State 
of the conclusion of the marriage.». This may be supported by the wording of Proposal for a Council Regulation 
on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial 
property regimes, COM(2011)0126 final, 16 March 2011, Recital No 16: «Where matters of matrimonial 
property regimes are not linked to a divorce, separation or marriage annulment or to the death of a spouse, the 
spouses may decide to submit questions related to their matrimonial regime to the courts of the Member State of 
the law they chose as the law applicable to their matrimonial property regime. Such a decision is expressed by 
an agreement between the spouses which may be concluded at any moment, even during the proceedings.». The 
same considerations apply to the Regulation on Property Consequences of Registered Partnership, where the 
connection between Articles 6 and 7 are not clarified, which is neither evident from Recitals No 34 and 36. 
1346 Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of 
decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes, COM(2011)0126 final, 16 March 2011, Article 4: «The 
courts of a Member State called upon to rule on an application for divorce, judicial separation or marriage 
annulment under Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003, shall also have jurisdiction, where the spouses so agree, to 
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rule was also proposed in the 2011 Proposal on the Property Consequences of the Registered 
Partnership,1347 which has maintained this structure until now. Although in 2011, the 
delegations of the certain Member States proposed the automatic concentration of the 
proceedings,1348 other Member States did not support such an idea of the automatic extension 
of the jurisdiction.1349 In July 2012, the Committee on Legal Affairs rejected the first idea of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
rule on matters of the matrimonial property regime arising in connection with the application.». See B. 
CAMPUZANO DÍAZ, The Coordination of the EU Regulations on Divorce and Matrimonial Property, Yearbook of 
Private International Law, 13 (2011), p. 238: «..we consider that by requiring an agreement between the spouses, 
the Proposal seeks to avoid an automatic extension to the matrimonial property regime issues of the large 
number of alternative grounds of jurisdiction offered in Regulation 2201 /2003. The list of seven alternative fora, 
which is criticized even with respect to divorce," seems inadequate in a Proposal aimed at fixing the specific 
competent court.». 
1347 Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of 
decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes, COM(2011)0127 final, 16 March 2011. 
1348 Comments by the German delegation on Chapters I, II, III, IV, V, and VI, 17792/11 ADD 9, 2011/0059 
(CNS) 2011/0060 (CNS), 16 January 2011, p. 7, 8: «That the court competent in divorce matters should also 
have jurisdiction to rule on the division of property should not be made dependent on an agreement between the 
spouses. Where spouses are in conflict, divided, such an agreement can be difficult to reach and provides one or 
other of the spouses with an opportunity to delay the process of dividing the property. It would be preferable to 
ensure that an application from only one spouse is sufficient.»… «Germany takes the view that, because divorce 
and division of property are closely connected, the court with (international) jurisdiction over the divorce should 
also attend to the division of property. To deal with cases in which, contrary to Article 4, the spouses cannot 
agree that jurisdiction should lie with the court conducting the divorce proceedings, there should be maximum 
concordance between international jurisdiction over the divorce under the Brussels II-a Regulation and 
jurisdiction over the division of property under this Regulation. This can be achieved by further aligning Article 
5(1) of the Regulation with Article 3(1) of the Brussels II-a Regulation, i.e. by supplementing the former with the 
last two indents of the latter.». For the automatic concentration see also Comments from the United Kingdom 
delegation on Chapters I-II, 13698/11 ADD 1, 2011/0059 (CNS) 2011/0060 (CNS), 6 September 2011; 
Comments from the Spanish delegation on Chapters I-II, 13698/11 ADD 7 REV 1, 2011/0059 (CNS) 2011/0060 
(CNS), 13 September 2011, p. 8, 9; Comments from the Swedish delegation on Chapters I-II, 13698/11 ADD 10, 
2011/0059 (CNS) 2011/0060 (CNS), 15 September 2011, p. 3; Comments from the Portuguese delegation on 
Chapters I-II, 13698/11 ADD 11, 2011/0059 (CNS) 2011/0060 (CNS), 19 September 2011, p. 4; Comments 
from the Danish delegation on Chapters I-II, 13698/11 ADD 1, 2011/0059 (CNS) 2011/0060 (CNS), 20 
September 2011, p. 2; Comments from the Czech delegation on Chapters I-II, 13698/11 ADD 13, 2011/0059 
(CNS) 2011/0060 (CNS), 20 September 2011, p. 6; Comments from the Belgian delegation on Chapters I-II, 
13698/11 ADD 16, 2011/0059 (CNS) 2011/0060 (CNS), 30 September 2011, p. 4; Comments from the 
Slovenian delegation on Chapters I and II, 13698/11 ADD 18, 2011/0059 (CNS) 2011/0060 (CNS), 3 October 
2011, p. 3. 
1349 Comments from the Hungarian delegation on Chapters I-II 13698/11 INIT, 2011/0059 (CNS) 2011/0060 
(CNS), 6 September 2011: «We support Article 4 of the MPR draft regulation whereby the courts of a MS called 
upon to rule on divorce, judicial separation or marriage annulment, may have jurisdiction by this fact only if the 
spouses so agree. Article 3 of EC Regulation 2201/2003 provides for several possible fora for divorce, judicial 
separation and marriage annulment from which the spouses may choose including – under certain 
circumstances -the plaintiff’s habitual residence. Though such fora may be suitable for divorce proceedings, 
would not have sufficient connection to an MPR matter unless the defendant agrees. Providing jurisdiction in 
MPR matters to the courts of a MS where the plaintiff has his/her habitual residence (in most common cases to a 
MS where the plaintiff leaves after the marriage broke down) without the defendant’s consent would be unfair to 
the defendant.». Against the automatic concentration see also Austrian delegation, Comments from the Austrian 
delegation on Chapters I-II, 13698/11 ADD 4, 2011/0059 (CNS) 2011/0060 (CNS), 09 September 2011, p. 5; 
Comments from the Slovak delegation on Chapters I-II, 13698/11 ADD 6, 2011/0059 (CNS) 2011/0060 (CNS), 
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automatic concentration and amended the rule to be inspired more by Article 12 par. 1 lett. b) 
of the Brussels IIa Regulation for the spouses, as well as for the registered partners.1350 In the 
Council’s seventh revised text of the Proposal in 2013, it was the first time the rule was 
proposed with the current wording where the concentration of the proceedings is 
automatic.1351 As stated in the Section 1 of this Subchapter, these proposals were not 
successful since it was not possible to gain the unanimity. 
The second type of the choice-of-court agreement was situated in 2011 Matrimonial Property 
Regime Proposal in the second paragraph under Article called “Jurisdiction in other cases” 
concerning the cases when the parties failed to agree on the extension of the proceedings in 
divorce, legal separation, or marriage into the matrimonial property regime1352 or “where 
matters of matrimonial property regimes are not linked to a divorce, separation or marriage 
annulment or to the death of a spouse”1353. In such cases, the 2011 Matrimonial Property 
Regime Proposal provided for the objective rule on jurisdiction based on the alternative 
grounds or the parties could also agree that the Member State courts whose law they have 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
12 September 2011, p. 2; Comments from the Finnish delegation on Chapters I-II, 13698/11 ADD 13, 2011/0059 
(CNS) 2011/0060 (CNS), 19 September 2011.  
1350 Committee on Legal Affairs, Draft Report on the proposal for a Council regulation on jurisdiction, applicable 
law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes, PE494.578, 
2011/0059(CNS), 25 July 2012, p. 27 and Committee on Legal Affairs, Draft Report on the proposal for a 
Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions on the 
property consequences of registered partnerships, PE494.575, 2011/0060(CNS), 25 July 2012, p. 27. See for 
example this amendment in matters of matrimonial property regimes: «The courts of a Member State called upon 
to rule on an application for divorce, judicial separation or marriage annulment under Regulation (EC) No 
2201/2003 shall also have jurisdiction to rule on matters of the matrimonial property regime arising in 
connection with the application, if the jurisdiction of the courts concerned has been recognised, expressly or 
otherwise in an unequivocal manner by the spouses. Failing recognition of the jurisdiction of the court referred 
to in paragraph 1, jurisdiction shall be governed by Article 5 et seq.». The justification for this amendment was: 
«In divorce cases, it seems sensible not to provide for an automatic concentration of jurisdiction, including for 
associated issues of property rights, in order to preserve the interests of the parties concerned more effectively 
and to ensure that they accept the jurisdiction of the divorce court. The proposed provision corresponds to 
Article12(1)(b) of the Brussels IIa Regulation.». However, the justification for registered partners the 
justification is different: «It would be advisable to avoid automatically imposing a concentration of jurisdictions, 
even in connected property regime cases, to better safeguard the interests of the parties concerned and ensure 
that they accept the jurisdiction of the court dealing with the separation. The proposed provision corresponds to 
Article 12(1)(b) of the ‘Brussels IIa’ Regulation.». 
1351 The Irish Presidency and the incoming Lithuanian Presidency, 11699/13 INIT, 2011/0059 (CNS), 28 June 
2013. 
1352 See Article 4 of the Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and 
enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes, COM(2011)0126 final, 16 March 2011: 
«Failing agreement between the spouses, jurisdiction is governed by Articles 5 et seq.». 
1353 See Recital No 16 of the Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the 
recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes, COM(2011)0126 final, 16 
March 2011. 
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chosen as the law applicable to their matrimonial property regime would have jurisdiction to 
rule on matters of their matrimonial property regime.1354 However, in the case of the 
annulment of a registered partnership, the second type of the choice-of-court agreement was 
not taken into consideration, since the 2011 Proposal on the Property Consequences of the 
Registered Partnership did not allow the partners to choose the applicable law.1355 
Subsequently, it was proposed to determine this rule in a more detailed way, which was 
approved by the European Parliament.1356 However, according to the Commission “The 
Article as proposed by the European Parliament in the opinion of the Commission is 
conceived in too large terms and would undermine the overall objective of consolidation of 
jurisdiction. Therefore the Commission cannot accept it.”1357 
                                                          
1354 Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of 
decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes, COM(2011)0126 final, 16 March 2011, Article 5 par 2: 
«Both parties may also agree that the courts of the Member State whose law they have chosen as the law 
applicable to their matrimonial property regime in accordance with Articles 16 and 18 shall also have 
jurisdiction to rule on matters of their matrimonial property regime. Such an agreement may be concluded at 
any time, even during the proceedings. If it is concluded before the proceedings, it must be drawn up in writing 
and dated and signed by both parties.». 
1355 On the critique see C. GONZÁLEZ BEILFUSS, The Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Property 
consequences of registered partnerships, Yearbook of Private International Law, 13 (2011), p. 193: «Apparently 
there is no need for such a rule in the context of the Registered Partnership Proposal since this Proposal does 
not allow the partners to choose the applicable law, as will be analysed below. It would however, in my opinion, 
make sense to allow the partners to agree that the courts at the place of registration should have jurisdiction in 
view of two factors. From a strictly jurisdictional perspective such an agreement would counteract the fact that 
courts other than those of the place of registration have the possibility of declining to hear the case if the 
situation is unknown under their law. Whether such a rule will be interpreted narrowly or broadly, allowing 
courts to decline to hear the case also if the particular type of registered partnership is not known under their 
law is unclear. Such a rule, therefore, creates a certain amount of uncertainty, which the partners would be able 
to remove if they were allowed to agree that the courts of the place of registration should be the ones with 
jurisdiction.». 
1356 See Amendment 45 of the European Parliament legislative resolution of 10 September 2013 on the proposal 
for a Council regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in 
matters of matrimonial property regimes, P7_TA(2013)0338, 2011/0059(CNS), 10 September 2013: «1. The 
spouses may agree that the courts of the Member State whose law they have chosen as the law applicable to 
their matrimonial property regime in accordance with Article 16 are to have jurisdiction to rule on matters of 
their matrimonial property regime. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive. … 2. The spouses may also agree that, if 
no court has been chosen, the courts of the Member State whose law is applicable pursuant to Article 17 are to 
have jurisdiction.». See also the same rule for the registered partners, Amendment 42 of the European Parliament 
legislative resolution of 10 September 2013 on the proposal for a Council regulation on jurisdiction, applicable 
law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions regarding the property consequences of registered 
partnerships, P7_TA(2013)0337, 2011/0060(CNS), 10 September 2013. 
1357 For the matrimonial property regimes see Commission response to text adopted in plenary, SP(2013)774, 6 
December 2013. See different reasoning for the property consequences of registered partnership, Commission 
response to text adopted in plenary, SP(2013)774, 6 December 2013: «If a choice of law is introduced as set out 
below (see Amendment 63), Amendments 12 and 50 can be accepted by the Commission in principle. However, 
technical changes should be made to both of them. In particular, the Article proposed is conceived in too large 
terms and would undermine the overall objective of consolidation of jurisdiction.». 
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In consequence, it does not seem surprising that the automatic connection was introduced in 
the 2016 Proposal Matrimonial Property Regime Proposal only under the certain conditions, 
as well an autonomous rule on choice-of-court agreement was proposed in Article 7 of the 
2016 Matrimonial Property Regime Proposal /2016 Proposal on the Property Consequences 
of the Registered Partnership in the wording more similar to the 2011 Matrimonial Property 
Regime Proposal. 
 
4.2.1. Choice-of-Court Agreements Providing for the Concentration of the 
Proceedings 
As stated before, the rules automatically allocate the jurisdiction of the matrimonial property 
regime disputes to the Member State courts having jurisdiction over succession, divorce, legal 
separation, or marriage annulment. A choice-of-court agreement sui generis is possible to 
conclude according to Article 5 of the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation when the 
Member State is seized to rule on an application for divorce, legal separation, or marriage 
annulment: 
a) In accordance with the fifth indent of Article 3 par. 1 lett. a) of the Brussels IIa Regulation 
(i.e., the court of a Member State in which the applicant is habitually resident, and the 
applicant had resided there for at least a year immediately before the application was 
made);  
b) In accordance with the sixth indent of Article 3 par. 1 lett. a) of the Brussels IIa Regulation 
(i.e., the court of a Member State of which the applicant is a national and the applicant is 
habitually resident there and had resided there for at least six months immediately before 
the application was made); 
c) In accordance with Article 5 of the Brussels IIa Regulation (in cases of conversion of legal 
separation into divorce); 
d) In accordance with Article 7 of the Brussels IIa Regulation and the parties fail to agree 
upon such a Member State court (in cases of residual jurisdiction).  
The justification of the legislative decision regarding the automatic concentration of the 
proceedings in certain cases and the exclusion of the automatic concentration of the 
proceedings in other cases, which are then subject to the party autonomy, has not been 
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clarified. However, it may be presumed that due to the criticism of the potential abuse of the 
two last indents of Article 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation based on the simulation of the 
habitual residence of the applicant in the Member States where “advantageous” substantial 
rules are applicable, the Commission intended to avoid such abuse by requiring agreement of 
the parties. Such a step does not seem to be very reasonable taking into consideration the fact 
that Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation unifies the law applicable to the matrimonial 
property regime. It means that the Member State court A having jurisdiction according to 
Article 5 of the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation, as well as the Member State court 
B having jurisdiction according to Article 6 of the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation, 
would apply the same law. On the other hand, the place of the venue remains a significant 
factor for the application of the overriding mandatory rules and public policy of forum 
according to Articles 30 and 31 of the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation. 
The connection is not automatic under the Regulation on Property Consequences of 
Registered Partnerships. Thus, the agreement of the partners is required every time the 
partners intend to concentrate the proceedings in accordance with Article 5. The justification 
for the requirement of the agreement of the partners is cannot foresee the outcome of the 
application of the national law for the dissolution or annulment of registered partnerships.1358 
a)  Moment of the Agreement 
As to the relevant point of time when the parties are entitled to conclude such a choice-of-
court agreement, nothing impedes the parties from concluding the choice-of-court agreement 
ex ante. Or they can extend the jurisdiction for the property regime when the Member State 
court is already seized with divorce, legal separation, or marriage annulment/dissolution or 
annulment of the registered partnership. This extension does not seem to create any problems 
because it is already known from Article 12 par. 1 of the Brussels IIa Regulation. The choice-
of-court agreement ex ante makes different complications. 
The possibility to conclude an ex ante choice-of-court agreement is supported by the wording 
of Article 5 par. 3 of the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation and of Article 5 par. 2 of 
the Regulation on the Property Consequences of the Registered Partnership. These provisions 
provide that if the agreement is concluded before the court is seized to rule on the matters of 
                                                          
1358 For this interpretation see S. MARINO, Strengthening the European Civil Judicial Cooperation: the 
patrimonial effects of family relationships, op. cit., p. 271. 
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matrimonial property regimes/property consequences of the registered partnership, the 
agreement shall comply with the formal requirements laid down in Article 7 of both 
regulations. The same assumption can be deduced from the point of view of the historical 
developments of this rule.1359  
What are the consequences of such an agreement ex ante? Due to the absence of a rule on 
choice-of-court agreements relating to divorce, legal separation, or marriage annulment in the 
Brussels IIa Regulation and due to the absence of EU rules on choice-of-court agreements 
relating to the dissolution or annulment of registered partnerships, the parties at the pre-
dispute stage cannot foresee which Member State court will actually exercise jurisdiction.1360 
Thus, ex ante choice-of-court agreements according to Article 5 of both regulations may 
benefit the parties who wish to concentrate the proceedings relating to divorce, legal 
separation, or marriage annulment or dissolution or annulment of a registered partnership with 
the proceedings relating to property regime (according to Article 5 of the Regulation on 
Property Consequences of Registered Partnerships or in the listed cases covered in paragraph 
2 of Article 5 of the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation). They will not have the 
possibility to foresee which court will actually exercise jurisdiction. The jurisdiction 
agreement in a matrimonial property regime should be drafted in a way that if the Member 
State court will be seized with divorce, legal separation, or marriage annulment according to 
fifth or sixth indent of Article 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation, it will have jurisdiction to 
decide over the property regime according to Article 5 par. 2 of the Matrimonial Property 
Regime Regulation. Such an agreement, however, may even encourage abusive litigation 
tactics such as a “rush to court”, as either spouse may rush to file the claim before the court 
that will apply the most beneficial substantive rules concerning divorce, legal separation, or 
                                                          
1359 See Article 4 of the Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and 
enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes, COM(2011)0126 final, 16 March 2011 
and Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of 
decisions regarding the property consequences of registered partnerships, COM(2011)0127 final, 16 March 
2011: “Such an agreement may be concluded at any time, even during the proceedings. If it is concluded before 
the proceedings, it must be drawn up in writing and dated and signed by both parties.”. 
1360 On this problem see also: J. GRAY, P. QUINZÁ REDONDO, Stress-Testing the EU Proposal on Matrimonial 
Property Regimes: Co-operation between EU private international law instruments on family matters and 
succession, 2013, p. 17, available at: http://www.familyandlaw.eu/tijdschrift/fenr/2013/11/FENR-D-13-00008: 
«Should the EU legislator wish to enhance the autonomy of couples by allowing them to choose the particular 
Member State court which will decide on matters relating to their matrimonial property regime in cases of 
divorce, they would first have to revise Brussels II bis in order to allow for choice-of-court agreements in 
divorce proceedings instituted under this Regulation.». 
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marriage annulment and the property regime in accordance with Article 3 of the Brussels IIa 
Regulation. The parties should be aware of the consequences of such an agreement, but 
unfortunately, there is no provision requiring legal advice.1361 However, the scenario might be 
very different in case of property consequences of the registered partnership if the relevant 
national law grants the possibility to choose the competent forum in relation to the dissolution 
or annulment of registered partnerships.1362 
Moreover, due to the wording of Article 5 par. 2 of the Matrimonial Property Regime 
Regulation, which refers to the parties’ agreement where the court is seized, it can be deduced 
that choice-of-court agreements become effective when the court is seized to rule on the 
application for divorce, legal separation, or marriage annulment.1363 It means, that if the 
Member State court is seized according to the first indents of par. 1 lett. a) of Article 3 or 
Article 3 par. 1 lett. b) of the Brussels IIa Regulation, the choice-of-court agreement would be 
redundant. However, when the Member State court is seized according to the fifth or the sixth 
indent of par. 1 lett. a) of Article 3, or according to Articles 5 or 7 of the Brussels IIa 
Regulation, the choice-of-court agreement will become effective. 
 
4.2.2. Choice-of-Court Agreements in Other Cases 
In case that the parties fail to conclude the jurisdiction agreement according to Article 5 of the 
Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation/Regulation on Property Consequences of 
Registered Partnerships in order to concentrate these two proceedings, two various scenarios 
are possible: (i) the Member State courts listed in Article 6 of the Matrimonial Property 
Regime Regulation/Regulation on Property Consequences of Registered Partnerships will 
                                                          
1361 See Amendment 12 of the Opinion of the Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality for the 
Committee on Legal Affairs on the proposal for a Council regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the 
recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes, PE478.403, 
2011/0059(CNS), 7 May 2012, where the rule providing for the necessity to inform of the spouses was drafted: 
«Such an agreement may be concluded at any time, even during the proceedings. If it is concluded before the 
proceedings, it must be drawn up in writing, dated and signed by both parties and authenticated. Before the 
agreement is concluded each spouse should be individually informed by a legal practitioner of the legal 
consequences of this choice.». It was justified by the fact that the spouses should get access to independent legal 
advice from a legal practitioner should allow an autonomous and informed choice to be made that protects a 
spouse who may be in a situation of vulnerability. 
1362 On this conclusion see F. C. Villata, L. Válková, EUFam’s Model Choice-of-Court and Choice-of-Law 
Clauses, op. cit., p. 49 and 50. 
1363 On this conclusion see F. C. Villata, L. Válková, EUFam’s Model Choice-of-Court and Choice-of-Law 
Clauses, op. cit., p. 49 and 50. 
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have jurisdiction; or, (ii) the parties may conclude a choice-of-court agreement according to 
Article 7 of the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation/Regulation on Property 
Consequences of Registered Partnerships. Article 7 of the Matrimonial Property Regime 
Regulation/Regulation on Property Consequences of Registered Partnerships may operate 
also “where no court of a Member State has jurisdiction pursuant to Article 4 or 5 or in cases 
other than those provided for in those Articles”. In other words, the choice-of-court agreement 
according to Article 7 of the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation/ Regulation on 
Property Consequences of Registered Partnerships operates in two cases: (i) where the parties 
fail to conclude the jurisdiction agreement according to Article 5 of the Matrimonial Property 
Regime Regulation/ Regulation on Property Consequences of Registered Partnerships; or (ii) 
the dispute on the property regime is not linked to proceedings on succession or divorce, legal 
separation, or marriage annulment or dissolution or annulment of a registered partnership (for 
example, when the spouses/partners want to change their property regime).  
In other words, this “second type” of the choice-of-court agreement will be directly effective 
when the property regime represents the principal issue of the proceedings (e.g., when the 
parties would like to modify their property regime, etc.). However, in case that the property 
regime deals simultaneously with divorce, legal separation, or marriage annulment, it is 
doubtful whether the parties may derogate from a Member State court seized with the divorce, 
legal separation, or marriage annulment proceedings and designate a different competent 
court according to Article 7 of the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation if application for 
divorce, legal separation, or marriage is filed according to first four indents of Article 3 par. 1 
lett. a) or according to Article 3 par. 1 lett. b) of the Brussels IIa Regulation.1364 It seems from 
the wording of Article 7 of the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation (“in cases which fall 
under Article 6”) that choice-of-court agreements according to Article 7 of the Matrimonial 
Property Regime Regulation should be considered invalid by the court seized with the 
divorce, legal separation, or marriage annulment proceedings according to first four indents of 
Article 3 par. 1 lett. a) or according to Article 3 par. 1 lett. b) of the Brussels IIa 
                                                          
1364 On the doubts see also Swedish delegation, Comments from the Swedish delegation on Chapters I-II, 
13698/11 ADD 10, 2011/0059 (CNS) 2011/0060 (CNS), 15 September 2011, p. 4: «An agreement on 
jurisdiction according to paragraph 2 would of course be valid also in the case of a divorce between the spouses 
or in case of the death of one of them. However, recital 16 gives the impression that such agreements would not 
be valid in such cases. Neither does this correspond with the text nor does it make sense as it would render such 
agreements meaningless in most cases. Recital 16 should, therefore, be deleted or amended.». 
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Regulation.1365 In the case of registered partnerships, the situation is different, and nothing 
impedes the parties from concluding choice-of-court agreements according to Article 7 of the 
Regulation on Property Consequences of Registered Partnerships, which would be binding on 
the Member State court without taking into the consideration which Member State court will 
be seized to rule on the dissolution or annulment of a registered partnership. 
Moreover, the derogation of jurisdiction of the Member State court is possible on the basis of 
the rule on the submission by appearance (Article 8). This Article provides that a court of a 
Member State whose law is applicable pursuant to Article 22 or Article 26 and before which a 
defendant enters an appearance in cases covered by Article 5 par. 2 of the Matrimonial 
Property Regime Regulation, shall have jurisdiction. This double solution for the matrimonial 
property regime does not provide for legal certainty.  
Article 7 of the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation and the Regulation on Property 
Consequences of Registered Partnerships additionally restrict party autonomy by offering 
three options to the parties: 
- The parties may choose the law applicable to their property regime pursuant to Article 22 
of the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation/Regulation on Property Consequences of 
Registered Partnerships and may designate such a Member State court, whose law was 
chosen. The parties may agree on the law and the Member State court of the place where 
the spouses or partners or future spouses or partners, or one of them, is habitually resident 
at the time the agreement is concluded; or the law and the court of a Member State of the 
nationality of either spouse/partner or future spouse/partner at the time the agreement is 
concluded.  
- The parties designate the Member State court, whose law is applicable pursuant to Article 
26 par. 1 lett. a) or b) of the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation (the law of the State 
of the spouses’ first common habitual residence after the conclusion of the marriage; or, 
failing that of the spouses’ common nationality at the time of the conclusion of the 
marriage); or according to Article 26 of the Regulation on Property Consequences of 
Registered Partnerships (the law of the State under whose law the registered partnership 
was created. By way of exception and upon application by either partner, the law of the 
                                                          
1365 On the similar conclusion see S. MARINO, La portata della proroga del foro nele controversie sulla 
responsabilità genitoriale, op. cit., p. 272. 
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State where the partners had their last common habitual residence for a significantly long 
period of time and where both partners had relied on the law of that other State in 
arranging or planning their property relations);  
- The parties may designate the court of a Member State where the marriage was concluded 
or the courts of the Member State under whose law the registered partnership was created; 
this jurisdictional ground is not dependent on the law applicable to the matrimonial 
property regime. 
Thus, Article 7 offers the parties only one choice without considering the applicable law. 
Such a choice represents a Member State court of the celebration of marriage or of the 
registered partnership. Although this jurisdictional ground may be criticised due to the non-
sufficient connection with such a Member State,1366 such designation may be advantageous 
for same-sex couples. The designation of the Member State under which law the marriage or 
the registered partnership of same-sex couples was celebrated or registered, may “safeguard” 
a situation where another Member State having jurisdiction pursuant to the Matrimonial 
Property Regime Regulation/Regulation on Property Consequences of Registered 
Partnerships, does not recognize the marriage or institution of registered partnerships under its 
private international law.1367  
Otherwise, the legislative effort to guarantee the coincidence between ius and forum in all 
other cases seems evident. Although the idea behind this rule has not been explained in the 
proposals, it may be presumed that it aims at facilitating the proof of foreign law.1368 This 
                                                          
1366 For this interpretation see S. MARINO, La portata della proroga del foro nele controversie sulla 
responsabilità genitoriale, op. cit., p. 272. 
1367 See Article 9 par. 2 of Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation: «Where a court having jurisdiction 
pursuant to Article 4 or 6 declines jurisdiction and where the parties agree to confer jurisdiction to the courts of 
any other Member State in accordance with Article 7, jurisdiction to rule on the matrimonial property regime 
shall lie with the courts of that Member State. In other cases, jurisdiction to rule on the matrimonial property 
regime shall lie with the courts of any other Member State pursuant to Article 6 or 8, or the courts of the 
Member State of the conclusion of the marriage.” And Article 9 par. 2 of the Regulation on Property 
Consequences of Registered Partnerships: “«Where a court referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article declines 
jurisdiction and where the parties agree to confer jurisdiction to the courts of any other Member State in 
accordance with Article 7, jurisdiction to rule on the property consequences of the registered partnership shall 
lie with the courts of that Member State. In other cases, jurisdiction to rule on the property consequences of a 
registered partnership shall lie with the courts of any other Member State pursuant to Article 6 or 8.». 
1368 On the proof of foreign law and taking evidence abroad see L. FUMAGALLI, Conflitti tra giurisdizioni 
nell'assunzione di prove civili all'estero, CEDAM, 1990; L. FUMAGALLI, Assunzione di prove all’estero, in R. 
BARATTA (ed), Diritto internazionale privato, Giuffrè, 2010, pp. 18-22; L. FUMAGALLI, La nuova disciplina 
comunitaria dell'assunzione delle prove all'estero in materia civile, Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e 
processuale (2002), pp. 327-348; E. D’ALESSANDRO, Onere della prova e legge applicabile, in M. BOVE (ed), 
 
  
349 
 
problem was highlighted mainly by the UK at the time of the ongoing legislative process. The 
UK law does not normally apply foreign law in family cases, whereby “the need to use 
experts to prove foreign law will drive up the costs to parties and complicate the resolution of 
such disputes.”1369. In consequence, the effort to provide for the coincidence between ius and 
forum could be developed in order to facilitate the acceptance of the proposals from the 
Member States which normally apply lex fori to the property regime.1370 The solution that the 
forum follows the applicable law and not the opposite classical method of private international 
of the application of lex fori,1371 mirrors the solution provided in the Succession Regulation 
even to a greater extent.1372 
a) Moment of the Agreement 
Both Regulations are silent about when the agreement designating the Member State court can 
be concluded. In consequence, it can be presumed that the parties may conclude the choice-
of-court agreement ex ante or they may designate the Member State court when it is seized. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Scritti offerti dagli allievi a Francesco Paolo Luiso per il suo settantesimo compleanno, 2017, pp. 181-203; P. 
IVALDI, In tema di applicazione giudiziale del diritto straniero, Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e 
processuale (2010), p. 585-602; I. QUEIROLO, Conoscenza del diritto straniero e contraddizioni della 
giurisprudenza italiana, Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (2010), p. 603-634. See for 
example Moore v Moore [2007] EWCA Civ 361, where the court spent five days hearing expert evidence on 
Spanish law. 
1369 Joint consultation by the Ministry of Justice, Scottish Government, and the Northern Ireland Department of 
Finance and Personnel, ‘Matrimonial Property Regimes and the property consequences of registered partnerships 
-How should the UK approach the Commission’s proposals in these areas?’ (Consultation Paper CP 
8/2011,2011), para 37. The UK Goverment also pointed to two problems. First, where the parties change the 
applicable law without retrospective effect, this would lead to the possible application of more than one 
applicable law to a number of different assets. Second, such designation of the applicable law may lead to the 
application of the law of the Third State (Article 20 provides for the universal application), which may be often 
in sensitive family matters.  
1370 See Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, Accompanying document to the 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Bringing legal clarity to property rights for international 
couples, Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement 
of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes and the Proposal for a Council Regulation on 
jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions regarding the property 
consequences of registered partnerships, SEC(2011) 327 final, 16 March 2011, p. 51, which seems that only 
Latvia applies lex fori. 
1371 As provided for in the example in the Rome III Regulation or in the 1996 Hague Convention on parental 
responsibility and protection of children. 
1372 Article 5 of the Succession Regulation allows to the “concerned parties” to agree a Member State law, which 
law was chosen by the deceased to govern his succession pursuant to Article 22. On the details see infra Section 
2.2.4., Subchapter II of this Chapter. 
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The possibility to conclude ex ante, as well as ex post choice-of-court agreements, may be 
supported by the historical developments of this rule.1373  
The ex ante choice-of-court agreement may operate also when the parties designate: (i) the 
courts of the Member State whose law is applicable pursuant to Article 22; (ii) the courts of 
the Member State whose law is applicable pursuant to Article 26; or (iii) the courts of the 
Member State of the conclusion of the marriage or the courts of the Member State under 
whose law the registered partnership was created.  
The first option concerning the choice-of-law agreement coupled with the choice-of-court 
agreement enables planning the venue and the law applicable to the property regime at the 
pre-dispute stage, which guarantees the coincidence between the ius and forum. The second 
option for choice-of-court agreements concerning the coincidence between the ius and forum 
in the absence of the choice of law agreement does not seem to be a simple planning tool. The 
utility of this choice-of-court agreement concluded ex ante might find the parties who wish 
that any Member State court with jurisdiction over the property regime will apply its own 
substantive law to the merits of the case, notwithstanding the impossibility of foreseeing such 
a competent court and applicable law. In such a case, the parties may agree that the Member 
State court, whose law is applicable pursuant to Article 26 of Matrimonial Property Regime 
Regulation/Regulation on the Property Consequences, is to have jurisdiction to rule on their 
matrimonial property regime in accordance with Article 7 of Matrimonial Property Regime 
Regulation/Regulation on the Property Consequences. However, the examination of the law 
applicable to the property regime could be difficult for private parties not experts in private 
international law. The last option enables straightforward ex ante planning by designating the 
                                                          
1373 Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of 
decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes, COM(2011)0126 final, 16 March 2011, Article 5 par 2: 
«... Such an agreement may be concluded at any time, even during the proceedings. If it is concluded before the 
proceedings, it must be drawn up in writing and dated and signed by both parties.». See also Amendment 45 of 
the European Parliament legislative resolution of 10 September 2013 on the proposal for a Council regulation on 
jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property 
regimes, P7_TA(2013)0338, 2011/0059(CNS), 10 September 2013: «… Without prejudice to the third 
subparagraph, a choice-of-court agreement may be concluded or amended at any time, but no later than when 
the case is brought before the court. If the law of the forum so provides, the spouses may also choose the court 
after the case has been brought before the court. In that event, such choice shall be recorded in court in 
accordance with the law of the forum. If the agreement is concluded before the proceedings, it must be drawn up 
in writing and dated and signed by the spouses. Any communication by electronic means which provides a 
durable record of the agreement shall be equivalent to ‘writing’.». 
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court of the Member State of the conclusion of the marriage or the law that created the 
registered partnership without the necessity to consider the applicable law. 
One may also wonder whether the spouses can choose the court during the course of the 
proceedings. The wording of Article 7 does not limit the moment of the agreement to the time 
the Member State court is seized. On the other hand, it does not provide for the rule similar to 
the Rome III Regulation which allows parties to reach a choice-of-law agreement during the 
proceedings if the law of the forum so provides.1374 It may be deduced that although the law 
of the forum does not permit reaching the choice-of-court agreement during the course of the 
proceedings, the parties should not be prevented from doing so.  
 
4.3.  Formal Validity  
Article 7 par. 2 of the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation/Regulation on the Property 
Consequences determines the formal requirements of the “first type” of the ex ante choice-of-
court agreements according to Article 5 of the Matrimonial Property Regime 
Regulation/Regulation on the Property Consequences, This Article also determines the 
requirements for the “second type” of the ex ante as well as ex post choice-of-court 
agreements according to Article 7 par. 1 of the Matrimonial Property Regime 
Regulation/Regulation on the Property Consequences. The choice-of-court agreement shall be 
expressed in writing and dated and signed by the parties.1375 Since there is no interpretation 
provided by the ECJ as to Article 5 par. 2 of the Succession Regulation1376 and the 
Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation/Regulation on the Property Consequences do not 
define an agreement that is considered to be “in writing”, autonomous interpretation could be 
searched for in the Brussels I(bis) Regulation. The real consensus of the parties must be 
ascertained, as well as the fact that the jurisdiction agreement has not been incorporated 
unilaterally by one party and has been noticed by the other party. 1377 This may be the case 
with the matrimonial property agreement, or partnership property agreement concluded 
                                                          
1374 Article 5 par. 3 of the Rome III Regulation. 
1375 Any communication by electronic means which provides a durable record of the agreement shall be deemed 
equivalent to a writing. 
1376 The wording of Article 7 par. 2 of both Regulations corresponds to Article 5 par. 2 of the Succession 
Regulation. 
1377 ECJ, Case 24/76, Estasis Salotti, par. 9 ad 10. 
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according to Article 25 of the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation/Regulation on the 
Property Consequences. 
It does not seem opportune to provide for a different treatment of the choice-of-court 
agreement when it is concluded during the proceedings.1378 When the choice-of-court 
agreement is concluded during the proceedings according to Article 5 par. 2 of the 
Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation or according to Article 5 par. 1 of Regulation on the 
Property Consequences, the regulations do not prescribe any formal requirements.1379 
However, when the choice-of-court agreement confers jurisdiction to the Member State court 
according to Article 7 of the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation/Regulation on the 
Property Consequences during the proceedings, the written, dated, and signed choice-of-court 
agreement is required. Thus, it may be presumed that such a jurisdiction agreement according 
to Article 5 par. 2 of the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation or Article 5 par. 1 of 
Regulation on the Property Consequences does not have to be in writing, dated, and signed, it 
can be simply recorded or concluded in any other form in court and in accordance with the 
law of the forum. 
Moreover, it must be remembered that when the parties choose the applicable law according 
to Article 22 of the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation/Regulation on the Property 
Consequences and choose the courts of the Member State, whose law is applicable pursuant to 
Article 22, the validity of the choice-of-court agreement will be dependent on the validity of 
the choice of law agreement. Article 23 determines the additional formal requirements of the 
law of the habitual residence of the one or both spouses or partners.1380 In such a case, the 
                                                          
1378 Emphasis added. 
1379 This was pointed during the legislative process by the Spanish delegation. See, see Comments from the 
Spanish delegation on Chapters I-II, 13698/11 ADD 7 REV 1, 2011/0059 (CNS) 2011/0060 (CNS), 13 
September 2011, p. 8: «Moreover, we fail to understand why the requirements apply only if an agreement is 
concluded before the proceedings but do not apply if it is concluded during the proceedings. Where an 
agreement is concluded during proceedings, there is no indication of the formal requirements which must be met 
in order for that agreement to be valid.». 
1380 See Article 23 par. 2, 3, 4 of both Regulations: «If the law of the Member State in which both 
spouses/partners have their habitual residence at the time the agreement is concluded lays down additional 
formal requirements for partnership property agreements/ matrimonial property agreements, those requirements 
shall apply. 3. If the spouses/partners are habitually resident in different Member States at the time the 
agreement is concluded and the laws of those States provide for different formal requirements for matrimonial 
property agreements/partnership property agreements, the agreement shall be formally valid if it satisfies the 
requirements of either of those laws. 4. If only one of the spouses/partners is habitually resident in a Member 
State at the time the agreement is concluded and that State lays down additional formal requirements for 
matrimonial property agreements/partnership property agreements, those requirements shall apply.». 
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parties should be aware that the choice-of-law agreement must be accompanied by guarantees 
of authenticity, such as a notarial act if this is required by the legal system of the habitual 
residence of the one or both of the spouses or partners.1381  
Article 8 of the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation/Regulation on the Property 
Consequences determines the rule on tacit prorogation. A court of a Member State whose law 
is applicable pursuant to Article 22 or Article 26, and before which a defendant enters an 
appearance, shall have jurisdiction.1382 However, this rule does not apply in cases covered by 
Article 4 of the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation/Regulation on the Property 
Consequences or 5 par. 1 of the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation. This rule 
practically removes any formal requirements laid down in Article 7 of the Matrimonial 
Property Regime Regulation/Regulation on the Property Consequences when the parties want 
the court of a Member State, whose law is applicable pursuant to Article 22 or Article 26, to 
have jurisdiction. On the other hand, the tacit prorogation in front of the courts of the Member 
State of the conclusion of the marriage or the courts of the Member State under whose law the 
registered partnership was created is not allowed. However, the parties should not be impeded 
from concluding a choice-of-court agreement in front of the seized Member State court under 
the formal requirements laid down in Article 7 of the Matrimonial Property Regime 
Regulation/Regulation on the Property Consequences. 
 
4.4.  Substantive Validity 
Article 7 of the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation/Regulation on the Property 
Consequences is silent in respect of the substantive validity of the choice-of-court agreement 
as in with Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation or Article 4 of the Maintenance Regulation. 
Since this significant “gap” was analyzed several times and the specific solutions were 
                                                          
1381 See for example German EGBGB, where Articles 46b-46d provide for special rules in order to implement 
the Rome III Regulation. Article 46d specifies that an agreement on choice of law according to Article 5 of the 
Rome III must be notarized. It is not excluded that such a rule will be extended in the future also to the choice of 
law agreement according to the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation/Regulation on the Property 
Consequences. On the English translation see: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgbeg. On the 
additional formal requirements in the Rome III Regulation see I. VIARENGO, The Rome III Regulation in legal 
practice: case law and comments, op. cit., p. 554. 
1382 The positive must be evaluated; par. 2 of Article 8 which provides «Before assuming jurisdiction pursuant to 
paragraph 1, the court shall ensure that the defendant is informed of his right to contest the jurisdiction and of 
the consequences of entering or not entering an appearance.». 
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proposed; thus, it may be referred to as Chapter Two, Subchapter I, Section 8.1. and Section 
3.5. of this Subchapter. Although it was questionable whether Article 4 of the Maintenance 
Regulation should adopt the solution laid down in the Brussels Ibis Regulation, where “the 
rules on jurisdiction as they result from Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 should be adapted”1383 
such an assumption cannot be supported in the area of the property regime due to the lack of 
any historical and language such as “direct connection”. It seems regrettable that a rule on 
substantive validity has not been adopted1384 since such a rule may protect the “weaker party” 
(e.g., from the fraud, duress, or mistake), which is hard to identify ex ante.1385  
 
4.5.  Severability 
As stated in Chapter Two, Subchapter I, Section 10, severability is a technique which protects 
the validity of the jurisdiction agreement from attacks on the invalidity of the contract to 
which it belongs.1386 The paragraph 5 of Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation expressly 
provides for the rule on severability. However, neither Article 5 nor Article 7 of the 
Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation/Regulation on the Property Consequences 
determines the severability of the choice-of-court agreement inserted into the matrimonial 
property agreement or partnership property agreement within the meaning of Article 25 of the 
Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation/Regulation on the Property Consequences. Article 
25 determines the additional formal requirements of the law of the habitual residence of one 
or both spouses or partners.1387 In consequence, it may happen that a matrimonial property 
                                                          
1383 Recital No 15 of the Maintenance Regulation. 
1384 The model may be taken from Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, as suggested by U. MAGNUS, 
Choice of Court Agreements in the Review Proposal for the Brussels I Regulation, in The Brussels I Review 
Proposal Uncovered, op. cit., p. 93: «The material validity (concerning capacity, mistake, fraud, duress) of the 
choice-of-court agreement is governed by the law of the Member State where the chosen court or courts are 
located». 
1385 J. CARRUTHERS, Party autonomy in the legal regulation of adult relationships: what place for party choice in 
Private International Law, p. 909. 
1386 A. BRIGGS, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, op. cit., par. 1.21. 
1387 See Article 25 par. 2, 3, 4 of both Regulations: «If the law of the Member State in which both 
spouses/partners have their habitual residence at the time the agreement is concluded lays down additional 
formal requirements for partnership property agreements/ matrimonial property agreements, those requirements 
shall apply. 3. If the spouses/partners are habitually resident in different Member States at the time the 
agreement is concluded and the laws of those States provide for different formal requirements for matrimonial 
property agreements/partnership property agreements, the agreement shall be formally valid if it satisfies the 
requirements of either of those laws. 4. If only one of the spouses/partners is habitually resident in a Member 
State at the time the agreement is concluded and that State lays down additional formal requirements for 
matrimonial property agreements/partnership property agreements, those requirements shall apply.». 
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agreement or partnership property agreement must be accompanied by guarantees of 
authenticity, such as a notarial act. The substantive validity of the matrimonial property 
agreement or partnership property agreement is then governed by the law applicable to the 
property regime pursuant to Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation/Regulation on the 
Property Consequences.1388 
It is questionable whether the choice-of-court agreement included in the invalid matrimonial 
property agreement or partnership property agreement (for example, since it does not meet the 
additional formal requirements such as notarization), should be considered as valid. In this 
case, the case Benincasa, C-269/95 held that a jurisdiction clause and the substantive 
provisions of the contract in which a jurisdiction clause was incorporated were to be 
distinguished. The ECJ decided that the jurisdictional clause served a procedural purpose and 
was governed by Brussels Convention,1389 but the substantive provisions and validity of the 
main contract were governed by the lex causae determined by the private international law 
rules.  
This case means that these two distinct terms legal terms operate autonomously. If this 
interpretation is extended to the property regime, it would lead to the conclusion that if the 
choice-of-court agreement is valid, even when the matrimonial property agreement or 
partnership property agreement is invalid, the designated Member State court will have 
jurisdiction to decide on the invalidity of the matrimonial property agreement or partnership 
property agreement. 
 
5. Lis Pendens between the Member States 
5.1.  Lis Pendens under the Brussels IIa Regulation 
Article 19 of the Brussels IIa Regulation determines the rule on lis pendens in a very similar 
way as Article 29 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, where the first seized Member State court 
                                                          
1388 See Article 27 of the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation/Regulation on the Property Consequences 
which determines the scope of the applicable law. Under the letter g), the material validity of a matrimonial 
property agreement or partnership property agreement falls under the scope of the applicable law. 
1389 ECJ, Case, C-269/95, Benincasa, par. 25. 
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has precedence to decide its own jurisdiction.1390 On first sight, it may seem that the abusive 
procedural tactics highlighted in the Gasser judgment may take place also in the context of 
the agreements on parental responsibility matters according to Article 12 of the Brussels IIa 
Regulation. However, the abuse of “first seized lis pendens” is not probable, where Article 12 
of the Brussels IIa Regulation is “an independent alternative forum,”1391 and does not 
represent exclusive grounds of jurisdiction producing the negative effect of depriving 
jurisdiction of other Member States courts.1392 In cases of the parallel proceedings in different 
Member State courts, two different scenarios are possible: 
i) Where the prorogued Member State court is first seized, it will assets all conditions of 
Article 12 of the Brussels IIa Regulation, and it will decide over its own jurisdiction as 
first seized within the meaning of Article 19 par. 2 of the Brussels IIa Regulation. The 
second seized Member State court shall decline jurisdiction in favour of that court where 
the jurisdiction of the prorogued Member State first seized is established. However, it is 
probable, that where one of the parties seizes another Member State court, the acceptance 
of both parties will not be given. 
                                                          
1390 However, Article 19 par. 2 of the Brussels IIa Regulation strictly requires the same cause of action and the 
proceedings involving the same child, where the rule lays down a number of substantive conditions for the 
determination of an autonomous definition. ECJ, Case C-256/09, Bianca Purrucker v Guillermo Vallés Pérez, 15 
July 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:437 and mainly Case C-296/10, Bianca Purrucker v Guillermo Vallés Pérez, 9 
November 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:665, where the ECJ stated there is no requirement that the parties to the 
proceedings are the same and that a determination whether a situation of lis pendens arises must be regarded as 
autonomous as decided in ECJ Case 144/86, Gubisch Maschinenfabrik KG. Moreover, the ECJ confirmed its 
approach concerning lis pendens as in the context of the Brussels Convention, in specific the “object of the 
action”, where account must be taken of the applicants’ claims in each of the sets of proceedings and “cause of 
the action”, where account must be taken of the facts and the rule of law relied on as the basis of the action. The 
ECJ referred to Case C-406/92, Tatry, par. 39, 41; Case C-111/01, Gantner Electronic GmbH v Basch 
Exploitatie Maatschappij BV., 8 May 2003, ECLI:EU:C:2003:257, par. 26. See also ECJ, Case C-376/14 PPU, C 
v M , par. 40, concerning lis pendens and child abduction proceedings «Such an action, whose object is the 
return, to the Member State of origin, of a child who has been wrongfully removed or retained in another 
Member State, does not concern the substance of parental responsibility and therefore has neither the same 
object nor the same cause of action as an action seeking a ruling on parental responsibility.». On the lis pendens 
in family matters see M. ŽUPAN, M. DRVENTIĆ, Chapter 5. Parallel Proceedings, in I. VIARENGO, F. C. VILLATA 
(eds), EUFam’s Final Study, available at: http://www.eufams.unimi.it/2017/12/30/final-study/, p. 152-169; F. C. 
VILLATA, Lis pendens, in I. VIARENGO, F. C. VILLATA (eds), First Assessment Report on the case-law collected 
by the Research Consortium, available at: http://www.eufams.unimi.it/2017/01/09/firstassessmentreport/, p. 55-
58; I. KUNDA, D. VRBLJANAC, Lis Pendens, in C. HONORATI (ed), Jurisdiction in Matrimonial Matters, Parental 
Responsibility and International Abduction: A Handbook on the Application of Brussels II-a Regulation in 
National Courts, Giappichelli, 2017, p. 221-245. 
1391 E. PATAUT, E. GALLANT, Article 12, in Brussels IIbis Regulation: 2017, op. cit., p. 151. 
1392 C. GONZALES BEILFUSS, Prorogation of Jurisdiction, in Jurisdiction in Matrimonial Matters, Parental 
Responsibility and International Abduction op. cit., p. 187, 195. On the opposite approach which defines the 
prorogation of jurisdiction as “a derogation of the general rule on jurisdiction” see S. MARINO, La portata della 
proroga del foro nele controversie sulla responsabilità genitoriale, op. cit., p. 349. 
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ii) Where the prorogued Member State court is second seized, the first seized Member State 
court would not take into consideration any written proof of the previous agreement on 
jurisdiction, since it suggests there is no longer any valid jurisdiction agreement according 
to Article 12 of the Brussels IIa Regulation. Article 12 of the Brussels IIa Regulation 
would represent only an alternative forum. The prorogued Member State court is regularly 
the second seized Member State court and Article 19 par. 2 and 3 of the Brussels IIa 
Regulation operates correctly. In consequence, a situation where a party seizes a Member 
State court in breach of the agreement would not occur, as in the Gasser case.  
 
5.2.  Lis Pendens under the Maintenance Regulation 
Contrary to Article 12 of the Brussels IIa Regulation, the choice-of-court agreement in 
maintenance matters concluded according to Article 4 of the Maintenance Regulation has a 
binding effect on all Member State courts. The rule on lis pendens between the Member 
States is determined in Article 12 of the Maintenance Regulation and is also based on the 
prior temporis principle.1393 It is interesting to note that the model for the lis pendens rule 
under the Maintenance Regulation was Article 27 of the Brussels I Regulation, instead of 
Article 19 of the Brussels IIa Regulation. In Chapter Two, Subchapter I, Section 14, the new 
rule on lis pendens of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, which was designed as a reaction to the 
Gasser case and gave precedence to the jurisdiction of the Member State court in the 
exclusive jurisdiction agreement, was described in the details. It is doubtful whether the 
Gasser case may be considered as outdated under the Maintenance Regulation by virtue of the 
new Article 31 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.1394 
                                                          
1393 See also ECJ Case C-467/16, Brigitte Schlömp, concerning the lis pendens rule and the 2007 Lugano 
Convention which covers also the maintenance matters, where the ECJ stated that the term court includes any 
authorities designated by a State bound by that convention as having jurisdiction in the matters falling within its 
scope, such includes a conciliation proceedings. As to the subject matter of the lis pendens see also ECJ, Case, 
C-467/16, Brigitte Schlömp v Landratsamt Schwäbisch Hall, Opinion of Advocat General Szpunar delivered on 
18 October 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:768, par. 31: « it is sufficient that the actions have, in essence, the same 
subject matter: the claims are not required to be entirely identical. The converse situation of an action for a 
declaration of non-liability being followed by an action for damages has also been the subject of a ruling. In that 
respect, the latter action has the same object as the former, since the question of the existence or nonexistence of 
liability is the focus of the proceedings. The different heads of claim do not mean that the two legal actions have 
different objects.». 
1394 M. ABENDROTH, Choice of Court in Matters Relating to Maintenance Obligations, in The Recovery of 
Maintenance in the EU and Worldwide, op. cit., p. 470. 
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It was also questioned whether the same lis pendens rule as adopted in Article 31 par. 2 of the 
Brussels IIa Regulation is the right solution for family matters. Hence, it was suggested to 
adopt a transfer mechanism akin to Article 15 of Brussels IIa Regulation, where a non-
designated Member State court seized in breach of a choice-of-court agreement would be 
empowered to exercise discretion to decline jurisdiction in favour of the Member State court 
designated. Or, a designated seized Member State court would be permitted to exercise its 
discretion to decline jurisdiction, to take into account the changed circumstances (e.g., unfair 
bargaining powers of the parties), and to transfer the case to a court of another Member State 
if it is better placed to hear the case.1395 This type of discretionary power as a legitimate check 
on unequal bargaining power could also be employed in the case where there is no other 
pending procedure.1396  
 
5.3. Lis Pendens under the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation and under the 
Regulation on Property Consequences of Registered Partnerships 
The rule on lis pendens between the Member States is determined in Article 17 of both 
Regulations and is based on the prior temporis principle. The model was the lis pendens rule 
under the Brussels I Regulation with one exception - upon request by a seized Member State 
court, any other Member State court seized shall without delay inform the former Member 
State court of the date when it was seized. However, the new rule on lis pendens of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation giving precedence to the Member State court having jurisdiction on 
the basis of the jurisdiction agreement was not inserted into the Matrimonial Property Regime 
Regulation/the Regulation on Property Consequences of Registered Partnership. Is it possible 
that the Gasser case could have an impact on Article 5 or 7 of the Matrimonial Property 
Regime Regulation/ Regulation on Property Consequences of Registered Partnership? Two 
situations must be distinguished under the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation and 
under the Regulation on Property Consequences of Registered Partnership depending on: (a) 
whether the dispute on the property regime is not linked to proceedings on succession or 
divorce, legal separation, or marriage annulment or dissolution or annulment of a registered 
                                                          
1395 J. CARRUTHERS, Party autonomy in the legal regulation of adult relationships: what place for party choice in 
Private International Law?, op. cit., p. 911. 
1396 For this solution concerning choice-of-court agreements in divorce see M. NÍ SHÚILLEABHÁIN, Cross-border 
divorce law. Brussels II bis, op. cit., p. 78, 140-141. 
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partnership (for example, when the spouses or partners want to change their property regime); 
or (b) whether the dispute on the property regime is not linked to proceedings on succession 
or divorce, legal separation, or marriage annulment or dissolution or annulment of a registered 
partnership.  
In the first case, when the property regime represents the principal issue of the proceedings, 
the choice-of-court agreement according to Article 7 of the Matrimonial Property Regime 
Regulation/the Regulation on Property Consequences of Registered Partnership is directly 
effective on all other Member State courts. In such a case, the Gasser problem may arise. 
In the second case, the situation is more complicated, and another five situations may arise: 
i) The first seized court is Member State A court having jurisdiction for divorce, legal 
separation, and marriage annulment according to one of the first four indents of Article 3 
par. 1 lett. a) or lett. b) of the Brussels IIa Regulation. The second seized court is Member 
State B court having jurisdiction for divorce, legal separation, and marriage annulment 
according to one of the last two indents of Article 3 par. 1 lett. of the Brussels IIa 
Regulation. The parties concluded an ex ante jurisdiction agreement according to Article 5 
par. 2 of the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation conferring jurisdiction to the 
whatever Member State court which will rule on divorce, legal separation, or marriage 
annulment according to one of the last two indents of Article 3 par. 1 lett. a) of the Brussels 
IIa Regulation in order to enable the concentration of the proceedings. There is practically 
no contradiction concerning the jurisdiction agreement. As stated in Section 4.2.1. of this 
Subchapter, there is no certainty which Member State will exercise the jurisdiction; both 
Member State courts would be competent to decide the case, and there is no precedence 
that should be given to the jurisdiction agreement. The Gasser problem does not arise. 
ii) Member State A is first seized according to Article 6 of the Matrimonial Property Regime 
Regulation (which cannot establish jurisdiction for divorce, legal separation, or marriage 
annulment according to the Brussels IIa Regulation). The second seized court is Member 
State court B having jurisdiction for divorce, legal separation, and marriage annulment 
according to one of the last two indents of Article 3 par. 1 lett. a) of the Brussels IIa 
Regulation. The parties concluded an ex ante jurisdiction agreement according to Article 5 
par. 2 of the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation conferring the jurisdiction to the 
whatever Member State court which will rule on divorce, legal separation, or marriage 
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annulment according to the last two indents of Article 3 par. 1 lett. a) of the Brussels IIa 
Regulation in order to enable the concentration of the proceedings. The Gasser problem 
arises only partially. In the case of divorce, legal separation, or marriage annulment, no 
jurisdiction agreement is possible, and the binding effect of the jurisdiction agreement 
concluded according to Article 5 par. 2 of the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation is 
dependent on the institution of the proceedings in divorce, legal separation, or marriage 
annulment according to the last two indents of Article 3 par. 1 lett. a) of the Brussels IIa 
Regulation. Once Member State court B is seized, Article 6 is inapplicable, 1397 there is no 
jurisdiction of the Member State court A. Article 17 gives precedence to the first seized 
Member State court A. However, Member State court A, which is seized to rule on 
application of the property regime according to Article 6 of the Matrimonial Property 
Regime (which is linked to the divorce, legal separation, or marriage annulment), will not 
be able to establish its jurisdiction under its national rules where there is no already 
pending application on divorce. Indeed, there will be time for the institution of the divorce 
proceedings and activating the jurisdiction agreement according to Article 5 par. 2 of the 
Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation. Member State B will be entitled to conduct the 
proceedings concerning the application on divorce, legal separation, or marriage annulment 
under the Brussels IIa Regulation (if there are no other pending proceedings concerning 
divorce). However, the Member State B shall of its own motion stay its proceedings until 
such time as the jurisdiction of the Member State court A is established under Article 17 of 
the Matrimonial Property Regime. The same applies to the jurisdiction agreements 
according to Article 5 of the Regulation on Property Consequences of Registered 
Partnership. 
iii) The first seized court is Member State A court having jurisdiction for divorce, legal 
separation, and marriage annulment according to one of the first four indents of Article 3 
par. 1 lett. a) or lett. b) of the Brussels IIa Regulation. The second seized court is Member 
State B and does not have jurisdiction for divorce, legal separation, and marriage 
annulment according to the Brussels IIa Regulation. The parties concluded an ex ante 
jurisdiction agreement according to Article 7 par of the Matrimonial Property Regime 
                                                          
1397 Article 6 of the Matrimonial Property regime is applicable “where no court of a Member State has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Article 4 or 5”, 
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Regulation conferring jurisdiction to the Member State B. The concentration of the 
proceedings for divorce, legal separation, and marriage annulment with the proceedings for 
property regime is automatic, and the jurisdiction agreement is disregarded. The Gasser 
problem cannot arise. 
iv) The first seized court is Member State A court having jurisdiction for the dissolution or 
annulment of a registered partnership. The second seized is a Member State B does not 
have jurisdiction for the dissolution or annulment of a registered partnership. The parties 
concluded an ex ante jurisdiction agreement according to Article 7 par of the Matrimonial 
Property Regime Regulation conferring jurisdiction to the Member State B. The 
concentration of the proceedings for the dissolution or annulment of a registered 
partnership with the proceedings for property regime is not automatic, and the jurisdiction 
agreement is valid. The Gasser problem can arise. 
v) Member State court A is first seized according to Article 6 of the Matrimonial Property 
Regime Regulation, and the Member State court B is second seized on the basis of an ex 
ante jurisdiction agreement according to Article 7 of the Matrimonial Property Regime 
Regulation/ Regulation on Property Consequences of Registered Partnership conferring the 
jurisdiction Member State court B. Both Member State courts cannot establish jurisdiction 
for divorce, legal separation, or marriage annulment according to the Brussels IIa 
Regulation on the dissolution or annulment of a registered partnership according to the 
national law. The Member State court C exercises jurisdiction for divorce, legal separation, 
or marriage annulment pursuant to one of the first four indents of Article 3 par. 1 lett. a) or 
lett. b) of the Brussels IIa Regulation for the dissolution or annulment of a registered 
partnership according to the national law. The Gasser problem may arise. 
 
6. Derogation from Jurisdiction in favour of Third States 
6.1.  Derogation from Jurisdiction under the Brussels IIa Regulation 
It would be inconsistent to separate cases concerning divorce, legal separation, or marriage 
annulment and parental responsibility. The rules on divorce, legal separation, or marriage 
annulment and parental responsibility must be distinguished so far that Articles 3, 4, and 5 of 
the Brussels IIa Regulation provide for objective, alternative, and mandatory rules in matters 
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concerning divorce, legal separation, or marriage annulment.1398 When Articles 3, 4, and 5 do 
not give jurisdiction to a Member State court, the national laws are applicable, but only if no 
other Member State can be seized in accordance with the Brussels IIa Regulation, as stated by 
the ECJ in case C-68/07, Sundelind Lopez.1399 However, in parental responsibility matters, the 
Brussels IIa Regulation does not make reference to the “exclusive” or “non-exclusive” nature 
the provisions.1400 Article 14 of the Brussels IIa Regulation (i.e., the “residual” jurisdiction) 
merely provides that where no Member State court has jurisdiction pursuant to Articles 8 to 
13 of the Brussels IIa Regulation, jurisdiction shall be determined, in each Member State, by 
the laws of that Member State. As to the lis pendens rule, Article 19 of the Brussels IIa 
Regulation is applicable only between the Member States; the Brussels IIa Regulation does 
not contain any rule concerning lis pendens in relation to Third States.1401 
Two situations must be distinguished. The first concerns a case, which does not fall under the 
scope of the Brussels IIa Regulation, or the national law is residually applicable under the 
Brussels IIa Regulation. In such a case, where a choice-of-court agreement confers 
jurisdiction in favour of the Third State courts, and it is not possible to establish jurisdiction in 
divorce, legal separation, or marriage annulment according to Article 3 to 5 and in parental 
responsibility according to Article 8 to 13 of the Brussels IIa Regulation. The jurisdiction of 
the seized Member State court will be established by its own law by virtue of Article 6, 7, and 
14 of the Brussels IIa Regulation. It is apparently a question of the national law whether the 
choice-of-court agreement in favour of the Third State court will produce a legal effect, the 
                                                          
1398 Borrás Report, par. 13B and 28 
1399 ECJ, Case C-68/07, Sundelind Lopez. However, there are some practical uncertainties, such as a position of a 
defendant who is EU national not resident in a Member State, for whom no Member State court has jurisdiction 
according to the Articles 3, 4, and 5 and one of the spouses has the nationality of a Member State and both 
spouses have the habitual residence in a third country. See for example A. GANDIA SELLENS, C. CAMARA, A. 
FACUCON ALONSO P. SIAPLAOURAS, Report on Internationally Shared Good Practices, available at: 
http://www.eufams.unimi.it/2017/06/16/report-on-internationally-shared-good-practices/. On this problem see 
also T. M. DE BOER, What we should not expect from a recast of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, op. cit., p. 13; T. 
KRUGER, L. SAMYN, Brussels II bis: successes and suggested improvements, op. cit., p. 140. 
1400 A. BORRÁS, Lights and Shadows of Communitarisation of Private International Law: Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement in Family Matters with regard to Relations with Third States, in The External Dimension of EC 
Private International Law in Family and Succession Matters, op. cit., p. 117. 
1401 On the critique of this provision, which does not take account of situations where there may be competing 
matrimonial proceedings in a Third State see P. MCELEAVY, The communitarization of divorce rules: what 
impact for English and Scottish law?, op. cit., p. 624. 
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jurisdiction is extra-EU, and it is untouched by Owusu principles.1402 The national rules 
giving space to the parallel proceedings in the Third States are applicable to the extent that 
they do not impede the effectiveness of the EU law.1403 This applies either when the Third 
State court is seized, or where there are no pending proceedings in the Third States. However, 
if the parents conclude a choice-of-court agreement in favour of a Third State court 
concerning divorce, legal separation, marriage or parental responsibility where the Member 
State court may establish jurisdiction according to the Brussels IIa Regulation (e.g., a 
respondent is habitually resident in the seized Member State according to Article 3 of the 
Brussels IIa Regulation; a child is habitually resident in the seized Member State according to 
Article 8 of the Brussels IIa Regulation), the situation is different. 
For the purpose of the latter case Owusu must be remembered. ECJ held that Article 2 is 
mandatory in nature and therefore cannot be derogated from unless expressly provided for by 
the Convention. Article 2 cannot be derogated from the basis of forum non conveniens, which 
“is liable to undermine the predictability of the rules of jurisdiction laid down by the Brussels 
Convention”.1404 The refusal of the extension of the Owusu case into the Brussels IIa 
Regulation must be supported mainly by the ECJ case, where the ECJ stated that  
…it should be pointed out that, according to settled case law, a national court which is 
called upon, within the exercise of its jurisdiction, to apply provisions of Community law 
is under a duty to give full effect to those provisions, if necessary refusing of its own 
motion to apply any conflicting provision of national legislation.1405  
The Advocate General Kokott also stressed that the principle of supremacy of Community 
law obliges the Member State courts to disapply domestic law which conflicts with 
Community law unless the relevant provisions of Community law expressly permit 
derogations by the Member States.1406 The national case law of the Member States has tackled 
                                                          
1402 On this opinion see High Court of Justice Family Division, JKN v JCN, [2010] EWHC 843 (Fam). In 
matrimonial proceedings in England see Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 c. 45, Schedule 1 
Staying of Matrimonial proceedings (England And Wales)  
1403 G. VITELLINO, European Private International Law and Parallel Proceedings in Third States in Family 
Matters, in A. MALATESTA, S. BARIATTI, F. POCAR (eds), The External Dimension of EC Private International 
Law in Family and Succession Matters, CEDAM, 2008, p. 222. 
1404 ECJ, Case C-281/02, Owusu, par. 41. On the details of the case and impact of this judments on the the 
Brussels Regime, see supra Chapter Two, Subchapter I, Section 15. 
1405 ECJ, Case C-435/06, C., par. 57. 
1406 ECJ, Case C-435/06, C., Opinion of Advocate Kokott, 20 September 2007, ECLI:EU:C:2007:543, par. 56, 
57. 
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this problem, but not concerning the choice-of-court agreement in respect of the Third State 
court.1407 Although the following three English cases did not concern the problem of choice-
of-court agreements in family matters in favour of Third State courts, the interpretation 
provided by the English courts is an important guide to comprehend the interference of the 
Owusu effect with the Brussels IIa Regulation.  
In the first case, Ella v Ella1408 the Court of Appeal granted a stay in English divorce 
proceedings in favour of proceedings in Israel. However, the Owusu case was not cited.1409 
The second case JKN v JCN1410 concerned the question, whether the English court is 
prevented from exercising discretionary jurisdiction to stay English divorce proceedings 
where Article 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation is applicable. The husband and wife had dual 
US and English citizenship. They were born, brought up and married in New York, but they 
lived in London for most of their marriage. They returned to New York by the date of their 
separation, but the residency requirements were not met in order to seize a court for divorce 
proceeding in New York. The wife initiated divorce proceedings in the UK and the husband 
in New York a month later. According to the husband, New York was the appropriate forum, 
and Owusu doctrine could be applicable under the Brussels I Regulation but not under the 
Brussels IIa Regulation. The wife argued that Owusu case confirmed the mandatory exercise 
of jurisdiction and must also be applied where the jurisdiction of a Member State was founded 
                                                          
1407 See for example, in the Czech Republic, Krajský soud v Českých Budějovicích, 5 Co 1611/2008, 14 August 
2008. The Court of Appeal decided that Article 19 of the Brussels IIa Regulation only addresses lis pendens 
between Member States. Thus, the first instance court must take into account a specific judgement of the 
Supreme Court (Nejvyšší soud České republiky, R 26/1987) dealing with the possibility to suspend divorce 
proceeding in casescase of parallel proceedings with other foreign States according to Article 109 par. 2 lett. c) 
of Act 99/1963 Coll. on Civil Procedure (Občanský soudní řád č. 99/1963 Sb.) and Article 68 par. 1 of 1963 PIL 
Act. the Act No 97/1963 Coll., on Private International Law (Zákon č. 97/1963 Sb. o mezinárodním právu 
soukromém a procesním). 
1408 Ella v Ella, [2007] EWCA Civ 99. 
1409 See also case of the Italian Corte di Cassazione, S.U., n. 30877, 22 December 2017, where problem 
regarding Owusu case was not tackled. Corte di Cassazione was called upon to rule on whether jurisdiction 
grounded on Article 3 of Brussels IIa Regulation should be understood as exclusive, and thus prevailing over the 
domestic rule on lis pendens, or whether Article 7 of the Italian Act on Private International Law should be 
deemed applicable in cases of parallel proceedings between Italian and third States’ courts (Switzerland). Corte 
di Cassazione hold that the order to stay the proceedings issued by the second seized court does not entail any 
decision on its jurisdiction, which depends on the first seized court. Thus, the second seized court is limited to 
determine whether the lis pendens situation actually exists on the basis of the first seized lis pendens rule and not 
to a ruling on jurisdiction. On the analysis of this judgment see E. D’ALESSANDRO, Le Sezioni Unite ribadiscono 
che è il regolamento necessario di competenza lo strumento utilizzabile avverso il provvedimento di sospensione 
del processo per litispendenza internazionale (nota a Cass., 22 dicembre 2017, n. 30877), Il Foro italiano, pp. 
521-526. 
1410 JKN v JCN, [2010] EWHC 843 (Fam). 
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according to Article 3 to the Brussels IIa Regulation; there is no power to grant a stay of 
proceedings under the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973.1411 The court 
decided that it is “neither necessary nor desirable” to extend Owusu principle to the parallel 
proceedings in a non-Member State,1412 and it stayed the proceedings due to the fact that New 
York was clearly the more appropriate forum. The court stated that:  
The risk of irreconcilable judgments which undermine two important objectives of the 
Brussels scheme namely: avoiding irreconcilable judgments between Member States and 
ensuring recognition of judgments between Member States. It would lead to an 
undesirable lacuna, as there will be no mechanism in place for resolving this situation 
with the consequence of both proceedings continuing with the consequent increased 
uncertainty and cost.  
The court’ decision is grounded on the further arguments: (i) there is no “direct connection” 
between the Brussels I Regulation and Brussels IIa Regulation; (ii) the interpretation of the 
Brussels I Regulation may be used for the Brussels IIa Regulation where the language is 
identical, but the respective provisions are different; Article 2 of Brussels I Regulation is 
mandatory and requires the exercise of that jurisdiction once the court is seized; Article 3 of 
Brussels IIa Regulation facilitates jurisdiction with no obligation on a Member State court to 
exercise that jurisdiction or on the applicant as to where he or she must bring proceedings; 
(iii) the court’s discretion to stay under the national law remains in place where the competing 
proceedings are in a non-Member State (it would be ousted in cases where the mandatory 
provisions of Article 19 of the Brussels IIa Regulation were engaged), (iv) Brussels IIa 
Regulation provides a mechanism in place to deal with competing non-Member State 
proceedings and reduces the risk of irreconcilable judgments; and (v) Owusu is not applicable 
in the case of parallel proceedings.1413 
Another decision was approved by the Court of Appeal in Mittal v Mittal.1414 The spouses, 
Indian nationals and married in India, moved to the UK in 2006 because of the husband’s 
                                                          
1411 Section 5 par. 2 of schedule 1 of the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 provides that the high 
court or divorce county court shall have jurisdiction to entertain proceedings if and only if the court has 
jurisdiction under the Brussels IIa Regulation; or if no Member State court has jurisdiction under the Brussels IIa 
Regulation and either of the parties to the marriage is domiciled in England and Wales on the date when the 
proceedings are begun. 
1412 JKN v JCN, [2010] EWHC 843 (Fam), [149]. 
1413 JKN v JCN, [2010] EWHC 843 (Fam), [149]. 
1414 AB v CB (Divorce: Jurisdiction), [2013] EWCA Civ 1255. 
  
366 
 
employment. They separated and returned to India in 2010. The husband initiated divorce 
proceedings in India in 2009, and the wife filed in England one year later. The court in India 
had jurisdiction to determine the proceedings. The court confirmed the first instance decision 
on the English stay of divorce proceedings on the basis of forum non conveniens in favour of 
the first seized Indian court. The court held that Owusu “has little to do with our case”. 
According to the court the reasons why the Owusu effect cannot be extended to the Brussels 
IIa Regulation are the following: (i) it was concerned with a different convention regulating 
jurisdiction in a very different field of activity; (ii) Article 2 of the Brussels Regulation is 
mandatory, transitive, and prescriptive, but Article 3 par. 1 of Brussels IIa Regulation is 
intransitive and facilitative; (iii) Owusu did not deal with stay of proceedings in favour of 
competing for prior proceedings in a non-Member State, but the policy of the Brussels I 
Regulation, as well as the Brussels IIa Regulation, is to avoid conflicting judgments in 
different jurisdictions; (iv) the policy of both Regulations are similar; (v) Brussels IIa 
Regulation recognises diversity in different legal systems; and(vi) the policy under the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation recognises a discretionary power to stay proceedings (Article 33 and 
34 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation). 1415 
There are significant doctrinal discussions regarding the extension of Owusu case into the 
Brussels IIa Regulation. The argument supporting such an extension, at least concerning 
divorce, is that the ECJ held that Article 2 of the Brussels Convention based on the 
defendant’s domicile in mandatory. It must be stressed that although the jurisdictional 
grounds in divorce laid down in Article 3, 4, and 5 of the Brussels IIa Convention are simply 
alternative (as stated in JKN v JCN), they are also objective and mandatory as stressed in 
Borrás Report.1416 Moreover, the Borrás Report provides that “..it is compulsory to apply all 
                                                          
1415 AB v CB, [2013] EWCA Civ 1255 [37]. 
1416 Borrás report, par. 28. See also P. TORREMANS, J. J. FAWCETT, U. GRUŠIĆ (eds), Cheshire, North & Fawcett: 
Private International Law, op. cit., p. 975. Although the authors have doubts regarding Article 3 of the Brussels 
IIa Regulation, whether it is mandatory in nature, the authors support the view that Owusu affects the Brussels 
IIa Regulation: «The likelihood is that the ECJ, if asked by means of a preliminary reference to give an 
interpretative ruling on the point, would deny the possibility of any derogation from the principle enshrined in 
Article 3, except such as is expressly provided for by Article 7 (residual jurisdiction). The Regulation provides 
no exception in relation to forum non conveniens, at least in relation to matrimonial proceedings. It is highly 
probable that application, in a case such as has been conjectured, of the doctrine of forum non conveniens by 
means of the operation of a discretionary stay, would be deemed to undermine the desired objectives of certainty 
and predictability, which are inherent in the Regulation, as well as to jeopardise the legal protection of persons 
established in the European Community»; contra P. MANKOWSKI, Article 19, in U. MAGNUS, P. 
MANKOWSKI,(eds), Brussels IIbis Regulation: 2017, European Commentaries on Private International Law, Otto 
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the rules in Convention… and replace all other national or contractual provisions, subject to 
the limitations resulting from the Convention itself…”.1417 As to parental responsibility, 
nothing in the Brussels IIa Regulation suggests that the rules on parental responsibility are 
mandatory in nature; they are only shaped in the light of the best interests of the child, in 
particular on the criterion of proximity.1418 Moreover, Article 15 of the Brussels IIa 
Regulation provides for intra-EU forum non conveniens where another Member State court is 
“better placed to hear the case, or a specific part thereof, and where this is in the best interest 
of the child”. Although Article 15 of the Brussels IIa Regulation deals only with intra-EU 
proceedings, some doubts may arise in the context of Owusu interpretation neglecting forum 
non conveniens, which is liable “to undermine the predictability” of the rules of jurisdiction of 
the Brussels Convention.1419 However, discretionary power is not unlimited, rather the 
mechanism of transfer of jurisdiction provides strict and specific conditions laid down in 
Article 15 of the Brussels IIa Regulation aiming to guarantee the best interest of the child.1420 
At first, Article 15 of the Brussels IIa Regulation may be perceived as an option to give effect 
to the Third State proceedings, where a Third State is better placed, thus, opening the door to 
the jurisdiction clauses in parental responsibility matters in favour of the Third State court. 
The English Supreme Court, although it has dealt with the case concerning child abduction 
and determination of the habitual residence of the child, held:  
We have not heard detailed argument on whether the courts of a Member State which 
has jurisdiction in respect of parental responsibility for a child under the Brussels II 
revised Regulation is obliged to exercise that jurisdiction even though there is a third 
country which would be better placed to hear the case. The wording of Articles 3 and 8 
of the Regulation is not the same as that in Article 2 of the Brussels Convention. 
Furthermore, Article 19 of the Regulation deals with the position where there are 
pending proceedings in two Member States and Article 15 allows the courts of the 
Member State having jurisdiction to transfer the case to another Member State in 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Schmidt, Sellier European Law Publishers, 2017, p. 244: «There is nothing in Owusu that would directly demand 
to press jurisdiction forward and through even against the exceptional settings of third State proceedings which 
would take precedence under the national law of the forum.». 
1417 Borrás Report, par. 13B and 28. This was confirmed by the ECJ, Case C-68/07, Sundelind Lopez.  
1418 Recital No 12 of the Brussels IIa Regulation. 
1419 See A. BORRÁS, Lights and Shadows of Communitarisation of Private International Law: Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement in Family Matters with regard to Relations with Third States, in The External Dimension of EC 
Private International Law in Family and Succession Matters, op. cit., p. 107. 
1420 Recital No 13 of the Brussels IIa Regulation. 
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appropriate circumstances (see para 24 above). It might therefore be thought 
anomalous for this to be precluded in a case where the courts of a non-Member State 
were better placed to hear the case.1421  
The Supreme Court made a reference to the cases JKN v JCN and Mittal v Mittal and 
concluded, “The relevance of Owusu v Jackson is merely to reinforce the conclusion that the 
jurisdiction provisions of the Regulation do indeed apply regardless of whether there is an 
alternative jurisdiction in a non-Member State.”1422 On the other hand, one of the arguments 
of the ECJ in Owusu when rejecting forum non conveniens was that this doctrine is 
recognised only in a limited number of Contracting States.1423 It means that the use of judicial 
discretion would be available only to the seized English courts, but not to German or French 
courts.1424 The use of effet reflexe concerns only the material scope of the rule, but not the rule 
to be applied under the Brussels IIa Regulation by virtue of the ECJ case law.1425 The proper 
mirrored application of the forum non conveniens rule according to Article 15 of the Brussels 
IIa Regulation in non-EU court is a matter of domestic law.1426 Thus, the use of the forum non 
conveniens would be not available to most of the Member States. 
The doctrine of effect reflexe allowing the mirror application of the rule on the choice-of-court 
agreements vis-à-vis the Third States cannot get by the fact that a choice-of-court agreement 
in divorce and a “true” choice-of-court agreement in parental responsibility matters according 
to the Brussels IIa Regulation does not exist. 1427 In parental responsibility matters, the rule on 
the prorogation of jurisdiction is a non-exclusive alternative ground permitted only under 
several conditions, which are subject to the discretionary power of the seized prorogued 
Member State court. In consequence, it is hard to imagine using the theory of reflexive effect 
in these cases. However, the theory of effet reflexe under the Brussels IIa Regulation in the 
                                                          
1421 A (Children), [2013] UKSC 60, par. [32]. 
1422 A (Children), [2013] UKSC 60, [33]. 
1423 A (Children), [2013] UKSC 60, [43]. 
1424 E. PATAUT, E. GALLANT, Article 15, in Brussels IIbis Regulation: 2017, op. cit., p. 175. 
1425 G. VITELLINO, European Private International Law and Parallel Proceedings in Third States in Family 
Matters, in The External Dimension of EC Private International Law in Family and Succession Matters, op. cit., 
p. 233. 
1426 G. A. L. DROZ, Compétence judiciaire et effets des jugements dans le Marché commun, Daloz, 1972, par. 
199. 
1427 On this conclusion regarding choice-of-court agreements in divorce in favour of Third State court see M. NÍ 
SHÚILLEABHÁIN, Cross-border divorce law. Brussels II bis, op. cit., p. 206. 
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context of lis pendens laid down in Article 19 of the Brussels IIa Regulation may be 
invoked.1428  
According to some authors, which welcome the stay of proceedings in favour of Third States, 
the lack of clarification leads to parallel proceedings, whereby the decision does not produce 
an effect.1429 In consequence, it was suggested that the similar mechanism as provided in 
Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation allowing a stay of proceedings in case of 
pending proceedings in a Third State should be introduced into the Brussels IIa 
Regulation.1430 However, the Impact Assessment to the Proposal for a Recast of the Brussels 
IIa Regulation takes an opposite approach. The Impact Assessment clarifies that although 
Article 19 of the Brussels IIa Regulation will not follow the changes made in the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation, the interpretation of Owusu should be extended to the Brussels IIa Regulation:  
This judgment concerned the Brussels I Convention, but the overwhelming majority of 
courts and academics applies this Statement also to other EU instruments such as the 
Brussels I Regulation and the Brussels IIa Regulation, at far as matrimonial matters are 
concerned.1431  
                                                          
1428 See G. VITELLINO, European Private International Law and Parallel Proceedings in Third States in Family 
Matters, in The External Dimension of EC Private International Law in Family and Succession Matters, op. cit., 
p. 237, 239; P. MANKOWSKI, Article 19, in Brussels IIbis Regulation: 2017, op. cit., p. 243. On the certain doubts 
regarding application of theory of reflexive effect of Article 19 of the Brussels IIa Regulation see: J. HILL, M. NÍ 
SHÚILLEABHÁIN, Clarkson & Hill’s Conflict of Laws, Oxford University Press, 4ed, p. 420, «With regard to 
divorce etc cases, when there are proceedings pending in a non-Member State, a case can be made for the 
English court having discretion under paragraph 9 to decline jurisdiction on the basis that paragraph 9 is the 
domestic analogue of Article 19 (1) of Brussels II Revised. Without mentioning the reflexive theory as such, this 
was the approach adopted in the above cases. It remains to be seen whether or not the “reflexive effect” theory 
(in any of its possible permutations) will be endorsed by the Court of Justice.». 
1429 M. ŽUPAN, M. DRVENTIĆ, Chapter 5: Parallel Proceedings, in EUFam’s Final Study, available at: 
http://www.eufams.unimi.it/2017/12/30/final-study/,op. cit., p. 168; G. VITELLINO, European Private 
International Law and Parallel Proceedings in Third States in Family Matters, in The External Dimension of 
EC Private International Law in Family and Succession Matters, op. cit., p. 235. See also P. TORREMANS, J. J. 
FAWCETT, U. GRUŠIĆ (eds), Cheshire, North & Fawcett: Private International Law, op. cit., p. 977; K. 
TRIMMINGS, Brussels IIa: Matrimonial Matters, in P. BEAUMONT, M. DANOV, K. TRIMMINGS, B. YÜKSEL 
(eds.),), Cross-Border Litigation in Europe, Studies in Private International Law, Hart Publishing, 2017, p. 815, 
where according to the authors, the English case law “seems to be at odds with the latest European 
developments”. On the critique of English case law see J. MILES, England and Wales, in M. J. SCHERPE (ed), 
Marital Agreements and Private Autonomy in Comparative Perspective, op. cit., p. 115, 116.  
1430 NÍ SHÚILLEABHÁIN, Cross-border divorce law. Brussels II bis, op. cit., p. 207; U. MAGNUS, P. MANKOWSKI, 
Introduction, in Brussels IIbis Regulation: 2017, op. cit., p. 8. See also the answer to question no 5, Council of 
Bars and Law Societies of Europe, CCBE Position on the proposal for a recast of the Brussels IIa Regulation on 
jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental 
responsibility, and on international child abduction, 2 December 2016, p. 2. 
1431 Commission Staff Working Document,. Impact Assessment,. Accompanying the document, Proposal for a 
Council Regulation on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the 
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Moreover, the Impact Assessment adds that the discretion under national law to transfer 
jurisdiction is not allowed:  
As the Court of Justice has ruled that Member States are not allowed to use any 
discretion which may exist under their national law to transfer jurisdiction established by 
EU Regulations, the transfer mechanism could only be created by including it into the 
Regulation.1432 
 
6.2.  Derogation from Jurisdiction under the Maintenance Regulation 
Recital No 15 specifies that:  
The circumstance that the defendant is habitually resident in a third State should no 
longer entail the nonapplication of Community rules on jurisdiction, and there should no 
longer be any referral to national law. 
 The Maintenance Regulation is based on universal jurisdiction; the habitual residence of the 
defendant is no longer required.1433 It means that there is no room for the residual jurisdiction 
as in the Brussels Ibis Regulation. Thus, the problem of giving effect to the proceedings in the 
Third States in the presence of Owusu case seems to be even more significant. The erga 
omnes approach of the system of allocation of jurisdiction is reinforced by autonomous 
subsidiary jurisdiction and the rule on forum necessitatis.1434 Otherwise, there is no 
jurisdictional rule which directly deals with the jurisdiction of the Third State court, which 
might be better situated, for example, if there is a choice-of-court agreement in favour of the 
Third State court. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
matters of parental responsibility, and on international child abduction (recast), SWD(2016) 207/0207 final, 30 
June 2016, p. 16. 
1432 Commission Staff Working Document,. Impact Assessment,. Accompanying the document, Proposal for a 
Council Regulation on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the 
matters of parental responsibility, and on international child abduction (recast), SWD(2016) 207/0207 final, 30 
June 2016, p. 16 footnote no 49.  
1433 See T. M. DE BOER, What we should not expect from a recast of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, op. cit., p. 13, 
footnote 28 providing an example: «Thus, a French citizen living in New York could not start proceedings in 
France against her Swiss husband living in Switzerland, even if French national law would allow her to do so. 
Except for prorogation (Art. 4) or tacit submission (Art. 5), the Maintenance regulation does not offer her an 
opportunity to bring suit in France.». 
1434 P. FRANZINA, Sul forum necessitatis nello spazio giudiziario europeo, Rivista di diritto internazionale (2009), 
p. 1121; G. ROSSOLILLO, Forum necessitatis e flessibilità dei criteri di giurisdizione nel diritto internazionale 
privato nazionale e dell’Unione europea, Cuadernos de derecho transnacional, (2010), p. 413–15. 
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Could the rejection of Owusu in Mittal v Mittal case and JKN v JCN case under the Brussels 
IIa Regulation be extended into the Maintenance Regulation? These English cases were built 
on different arguments, some of them might also survive in the context of the Maintenance 
Regulation. The most significant general argument against the threat of the extension of 
Owusu into the Maintenance Regulation is the risk of irreconcilable judgments, which may 
undermine the objectives of the Maintenance Regulation.1435 
On the other hand, the extension of Owusu case into the Maintenance Regulation could be 
argued because of several reasons. There is a historic “direct connection” between the 
Maintenance Regulation and Brussels I Regulation - before the enactment of the Maintenance 
Regulation, the questions of maintenance were dealt with under the Brussels I Regulation, and 
therefore, Owusu would be applicable. The interpretation of the Brussels I Regulation may be 
used for the Brussels IIa Regulation where the language is identical. Although it is 
questionable whether the language of the Maintenance Regulation is more akin to the Brussels 
I Regulation or the Brussels IIa Regulation, the wording of the rules on choice-of-court 
agreements and lis pendens under the Maintenance Regulation mirrors the solutions adopted 
in the Brussels I Regulation. Thus, it may be argued, that there is a transfer of questions of 
maintenance from the Brussels I Regulation to the Maintenance Regulation, with the 
consequence that Owusu case continues to apply. Moreover, the Maintenance Regulation does 
not contain any forum non conveniens mechanism as does Article 15 of the Brussels IIa 
Regulation. 
However, according to the English court in the case Mittal v Mittal, there “…is a division 
between commercial cases on the one hand and family cases on the other, putting 
maintenance into the latter category.” 1436 The nature of the maintenance claim as a family 
claim may also be supported by the fact that the maintenance claim is considered under the 
Brussels IIa Regulation as ancillary to the proceedings concerning the status of a person or 
concerning parental responsibility.1437 
                                                          
1435JKN v JCN, [2010] EWHC 843 (Fam), [149]. 
1436 See AB v CB, [2013] EWCA Civ 1255, [29], [30]. The argument of the extension of the Brussels I 
Regulation (and Owusu case) into the Maintenance Regulation was rejected due to the Recital No 15 of the 
Maintenance Regulation and similar language with the Brussels IIa Regulation.  
1437 In the case JKN v JCN, [2010] EWHC 843 (Fam), [149]: «The wife’s claims for maintenance are not free- 
standing. If her petition is stayed, the maintenance claim automatically falls away. (c) Following the rationale in 
Lucasfilm, personal jurisdiction over the husband and subject-matter jurisdiction in respect of the divorce suit 
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As to choice-of-court agreements in favour of Third State courts, it is doubtful whether all the 
theories developed in the commercial matters under the Brussels Ibis Regulation may be 
transferred to the Maintenance Regulation. First, as stated above, the Maintenance Regulation 
refuses any reference to the residual application of the national law. In consequence, to give 
effect to choice-of-court agreements in favour of the Third State court under the national law 
would have difficulty succeeding.1438 Moreover, although Article 23 of the Brussels I 
Regulation was a model for Article 4 of the Maintenance Regulation, the limitation of party 
autonomy was justified by the necessity to protect weaker parties and mirrors to a great extent 
the connecting factors of Article 3 of the Maintenance Regulation. However, it does not mean 
that the Member State court, which assumed jurisdiction according to Article 3 of the 
Maintenance Regulation always represents a more favourable forum for the maintenance 
creditor compared to a Third State court, which may have jurisdiction in accordance with the 
choice-of-court agreement. We may demonstrate it in the following scenario: 
The child over the age 18 is a child of divorced parents, nationals of the US and Finland. The child 
lives in Finland with parent A. The child concluded a choice-of-court agreement with parent B 
according to Article 4 of the Maintenance Regulation designating a court of the place of the 
habitual residence of the child without any other specification. Parent A went back to the US with 
the child and acquired habitual residence. There is a choice-of-court agreement in favour of a US 
court, but the Swedish court has jurisdiction according to Article 3 lett. a) of the Maintenance 
Regulation.  
From this example, it is evident that the maintenance debtor habitually resident in Finland could sue 
the maintenance creditor (habitually resident in the US) for negative declaratory relief in Finland for 
breach of a choice-of-court agreement providing protection for the weaker party. It may be 
presumed that the jurisdiction of the US court on the basis of the jurisdiction agreement represents a 
more favourable forum for the maintenance creditor. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
are conferred on this court by virtue of Article 3 of BIIR. Jurisdiction for ancillary relief is not conferred by 
Brussels I since personal jurisdiction is conferred over the husband by Article 3 of BIIR and not by Brussels I 
and it is expressly excluded from the ambit of BIIR (recital 8). Jurisdiction over ancillary relief is therefore 
conferred not by either of the Regulations but by national legislation (Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (as 
amended)).». 
1438 In support of this conclusion see D. RANTON, A sad death in the family: Owusu, the Maintenance Regulation 
and the demise of forum conveniens, International Family Law (2012), p. 437. 
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6.3. Derogation from Jurisdiction under the Matrimonial Property Regime 
Regulation and the Regulation on Property Consequences of Registered 
Partnership 
In the first place, it must be noted that there is no space for national law in the Matrimonial 
Property Regime Regulation and Regulation on Property Consequences of Registered 
Partnership. These Regulations follow the model provided in the Maintenance Regulation 
rather than the one provided in the Brussels Ibis Regulation, where the grounds of jurisdiction 
apply even where none of the parties presents a personal connection to one or more Member 
States.1439 This excludes a rule on the residual application of national law of the Member 
States in respect of the disputes falling into the scope of these two Regulations. The 
exhaustive allocation of jurisdiction which does not leave any space for national law does not 
contribute to the justification of giving effect to the proceedings in the Third States in the 
presence of the Owusu case.1440 Except for the rule on forum necessitatis,1441 and rule on the 
limitation of proceedings,1442 there is no jurisdictional rule which directly deals with the 
jurisdiction of the Third State court. 
The Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation and the Regulation on Property Consequences 
of Registered Partnership distinguish two types of jurisdiction clauses. These clauses depend 
on: (a) whether the dispute on the property regime is not linked to proceedings on succession 
or divorce, legal separation, or marriage annulment or dissolution or annulment of a registered 
partnership (for example, when the spouses or partners want to change their property regime); 
or (b) whether the dispute on the property regime is linked to proceedings on succession or 
                                                          
1439 On the similar considerations in respect of the Succession Regulation see F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI, The EU 
Succession Regulation and third country courts, Journal of Private International Law, 12:3 (2016), p. 547; L. 
FUMAGALLI, Il sistema italiano di diritto internazionale privato e processuale e il regolamento (UE) n. 650/2012 
sulle successioni:spazi residui per la legge interna?, Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale 
(2015), pp. 779-792.  
1440 In respect of the Succession Regulation see F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI, The EU Succession Regulation 
and third country courts, op. cit., p. 552; In respect of the Maintenance Regulation see D. RANTON, A sad death 
in the family: Owusu the Maintenance Regulation and the demise of forum conveniens, op. cit., p. 437. 
1441 Article 11 of the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation and Regulation on Property Consequences of 
Registered Partnership. 
1442 Article 13 of the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation and Regulation on Property Consequences of 
Registered Partnership. 
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divorce, legal separation, or marriage annulment or dissolution or annulment of a registered 
partnership, this section must also take into the account this division. 
In the first case, when the property regime is not linked to proceedings on divorce, legal 
separation, or marriage annulment or dissolution or annulment of a registered partnership 
since the spouses or partners intend to change their property regime, the seized Member State 
court does not consider the question regarding derogation from jurisdiction of another court 
which might have jurisdiction for divorce, legal separation, or marriage annulment or 
dissolution or annulment of a registered partner according to the Brussels IIa Regulation or 
national law. In case that the parties conferred jurisdiction to a Third State court on the basis 
of the jurisdiction agreement, in what way should the Member State court, having jurisdiction 
according to Article 6 of the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation/the Regulation on 
Property Consequences of Registered Partnership, proceed? Article 7 of the Matrimonial 
Property Regime Regulation/Regulation on Property Consequences of Registered Partnership 
provides that: “the parties may agree that the courts of the Member State…shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction” This Article appears manifestly to exclude an option of jurisdiction 
agreement in favour of Third State court. The only argument for upholding such a jurisdiction 
agreement might be a theory of effect reflexe. This theory may come into play when: (i) the 
parties designate, as the law applicable to the property regime, the law of a Third State 
according to Article 22 of the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation/the Regulation on 
Property Consequences of Registered Partnership; (ii) when the law applicable to the property 
regime according to Article 26 of the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation/the 
Regulation on Property Consequences of Registered Partnership leads to the law of a Third 
State; 1443 or (iii) when the marriage was concluded or the registered partnership was created 
in the Third State. Unfortunately, the lis pendens rule laid down in Article 17 is applicable 
only between the Member States and there is no rule similar to Articles 33 and 34 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation which would allow the proceedings in the Third States. 
In the second case, where the dispute on the property regime is linked to proceedings on 
succession or divorce, legal separation, or marriage annulment or dissolution or annulment of 
a registered partnership, the situation is even more complicated. When there is an automatic 
                                                          
1443 The rules on the applicable law have universal application within the meaning of Article 20 of the 
Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation and Regulation on Property Consequences of Registered Partnership. 
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concentration of the proceedings in divorce, legal separation, or marriage annulment with the 
proceedings in matrimonial property regime, it may be referred to in Section 6.1. of this 
Subchapter concerning derogation from the jurisdiction for divorce, legal separation, or 
marriage annulment under the Brussels IIa Regulation, since the property regime in practice 
represents ancillary proceedings as to status.  
However, what happens where the concentration of the proceedings is not automatic, and 
there is no agreement which would permit the concentration, and on the contrary, the parties 
designated the Third State court? In case that Member State A is seized for divorce, legal 
separation, or marriage annulment according to one of the last two indents of Article 3 lett. a) 
of the Brussels IIa Regulation, basically, there is no Member State court that may establish 
jurisdiction to rule on the matrimonial property regime, since Article 6 of the Matrimonial 
Property Regime Regulation mirrors only first three indents of Article 3 lett. a) and Article 3 
lett. b) of the Brussels IIa Regulation.1444  
In the case of the registered partnership, the situation differs. In case that Member State A is 
seized to rule on the dissolution or annulment of a registered partnership according to the 
national law, there might be another Member State court, which may establish jurisdiction to 
rule on the property consequences of their registered partnership according to Article 6 
Property Consequences of Registered Partnership. First, it may be actually Member State A, 
since, for example, the partners are habitually resident there at the time the court is seized; or 
it may be any other Member State competent according to Article 6 of the Property 
Consequences of Registered Partnership. This case practically brings back the considerations 
made in respect of the application of Article 7 of the Matrimonial Property Regime 
Regulation/Regulation on Property Consequences of Registered Partnership. 
  
                                                          
1444 If the Member State court would not have jurisdiction according to Article 10 (subsidiary jurisdiction), or 
Article 11 (forum necessitatis). 
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II. Choice-of-Court Agreements in Succession Matters 
The Proposal on a Succession Regulation was presented by the Commission in 2009,1445 and 
was already one of the priorities of the Vienna Action Plan in 1998.1446 The Hague 
Programme called on the Commission to present a Green Paper on succession covering 
applicable law, jurisdiction, and recognition and administrative measures.1447 As to 
jurisdiction, significant problems caused by a positive and negative conflicts of jurisdiction 
and difficulties with the identification of the competent authorities were revealed, and the 
Impact Assessment proposed and evaluated Policy Options which reacted to such 
difficulties.1448 Although it was admitted that the Member States should allow a choice of 
jurisdiction by the parties in case of a dispute between heirs, the Impact Assessment and the 
Proposal on a Succession Regulation did not take into the consideration a rule on choice-of-
court agreements. However, the choice-of-law rule represented a cornerstone of the Proposal 
                                                          
1445 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction, applicable law, 
recognition and enforcement of decisions and authentic instruments in matters of succession and the creation of a 
European Certificate of Succession, COM(2009)0154 final, 14 October 2009. On the Proposal see A. BONOMI, 
Prime considerazioni sulla proposta di regolamento sulle successioni, Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e 
processuale (2010), p. 877; A. BONOMI, Il regolamento europeo sulle successioni, Rivista di diritto 
internazionale privato e processuale (2013), p. 293; A. DAVÌ, Riflessioni sul futuro diritto internazionale privato 
europeo delle successioni, Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale, (2005), p. 297; P. KINDLER, La 
legge regolatrice delle successioni nella proposta di regolamento dell’Unione europea: qualche riflessione in 
tema di carattere universale, rinvio e professio iuris, Rivista di diritto internazionale, (2011), p. 422; E. LEIN, A 
Further Step Towards a European Code of Private International Law: The Commission Proposal for a 
Regulation on Succession, Yearbook of Private International Law (2009), pp. 107-142; J. HARRIS, The Proposed 
EU Regulation on Succession and Wills: Prospects and Challenges, Trust Law International (2008), pp. 181-
235. See also the study of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law, Comments 
on the European Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and authentic instruments in matters of 
succession and the creation of a European Certificate of Succession, Rabels Zeitschrift 74:3 (2010). 
1446 Action Plan of the Council and the Commission on how best to implement the provisions of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam on an area of freedom, security and justice - Text adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs Council 
of 3 December 1998, OJ C 19, 23 January 1999. 
1447 The Hague Programme: strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union, OJ C 53, 3 
March 2005. 
1448 Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and 
authentic instruments in matters of successions and on the introduction of a European Certificate of Inheritance, 
Impact Assessment, SEC(2009) 410 final, 14 October 2009, p. 10. It was pointed out that many Member States 
take the last habitual residence of the deceased as connecting factor, such as Austria, Germany, Spain, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania (for movable property), Slovenia, Sweden, and the Czech Republic; 
other Member States take the nationality of the testator as connecting factor, such as Belgium (movables), 
Bulgaria (movables), Cyprus (movables), Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France (movables), Luxembourg 
(movables), Ireland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, and the UK (England and Wales; Scotland: for movables only).  
  
377 
 
on a Succession Regulation. The rule on choice-of-court agreements was for the first time 
proposed by the Committee on Legal Affairs in 2011,1449 and in 2012 was drafted using 
almost the current wording.1450 The Succession Regulation was adopted on 4 July 2012, and 
has become applicable since 17 August 2015. The rule on choice-of-court agreements is 
provided in Article 5 of the Succession Regulation and must be read in conjunction with 
Articles 6, 7, and 9 of the Succession Regulation. 
 
1. Scope of Application  
First, territorial, material, temporal, and personal scopes of application of the Succession 
Regulation must be briefly analysed. These scopes must be considered in the context of 
Article 5 of the Succession Regulation, since the rule on choice-of-court agreements is 
applicable only when the legal relationship falls under its scope.  
 
1.1.  Territorial Scope of Application 
The Succession Regulation is applicable in 24 Member States as from 17 August 2015 except 
for UK, Ireland,1451 and Denmark.1452 According to the opinion of the majority of the authors, 
the reasons behind the United Kingdom’s decision to not opt into the Succession Regulation 
is because of the use of a “weak” connecting factor, habitual residence, in the Succession 
Regulation, and the characteristic of civil law successions, where a clawback is used to make 
a claim against inter vivos gifts and which does not fall within the UK’s succession law.1453 It 
                                                          
1449 See Amendments No 173 and 174 of the Draft Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and 
authentic instruments in matters of succession and the creation of a European Certificate of Succession, 
Committee on Legal Affairs, PE464.765, 23 February 2011. 
1450 Amendments 246, Committee on Legal Affairs, Draft report - on the proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of 
decisions and authentic instruments in matters of succession and the creation of a European Certificate of 
Succession, Committee on Legal Affairs, PE483.680, 2009/0157(COD), 27 February 2012, p. 23. 
1451 See Recital No 82 of the Succession Regulation. 
1452 See Recital No 83 of the Succession Regulation. 
1453 P. BEAUMONT, J. HOLLIDAY, Some Aspects of Scots Private International Law of Succession Taking Account 
of the Impact of the EU Succession Regulation, Working Paper No. 2015/6, available at: 
https://www.abdn.ac.uk/law/research/working-papers-455.php, p. 2, 3: «The use of habitual residence at the time 
of death to determine the applicable law was considered to be a weak connecting factor, in that it lacked the 
certainty required to determine the applicable law to a succession and to aspects of the succession…Clawback, 
a device used to make a claim against inter vivos gifts when the estate does not make sufficient provision for 
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is a subject of the doctrinal discussions whether these three Member States should be 
considered as the “Third States” for the purpose of the Succession Regulation.1454 
 
1.2.  Temporal Scope of Application 
According to Article 83 of the Succession Regulation, the decisive moment is the death of the 
person whose succession is at issue. The de cujus must have died on or after 17 August 2015, 
since the Succession Regulation is not meant to have retroactive effect.1455 The successions of 
persons who died prior to 17 August 2015 continue to be governed by the domestic rules of 
private international law of the forum. Thus, the choice-of-court agreements concluded before 
17 August 2015 are governed by the Succession Regulation if the de cujus dies or died on or 
after 17 August 2015. Moreover, as it will be analysed further in Section 2.2.1. of this 
Subchapter, the choice-of-court agreement is considered valid only if there is a valid choice-
of-law agreement. Indeed, it must be stressed that the deceased may have chosen the law 
applicable to his/her succession prior to 17 August 2015, and the choice may not conform to 
the provisions in the Succession Regulation. Nevertheless, the choice will be upheld if it is 
valid under the rules of private international law which were in force at the time the choice 
was made, in the Member State in which the deceased had his habitual residence, or in any of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
forced heirship beneficiaries does not fall within the UK’s succession law… The third issue concerned the 
administration of estates. The UK separates the settling of the debts and tax and ingathering of the estate from 
the distribution of the estate». See also P. BEAUMONT, P. MCELEAVY, Anton’s Private International Law, W 
Green, 2011, 3edn, p. 1000, 1063; A. DAVÌ, A. ZANOBETTI, Il nuovo diritto internazionale privato europeo delle 
successioni, Giappichelli, 2014, p. 18-22; Parliament of the UK, available at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldselect/ldeucom/75/7504.htm: «The red lines were: the EU 
measure should not in any way call into question the validity of otherwise valid inter vivos gifts, and it should 
not deal with the administration of estates, the validity and operation of testamentary trusts, matrimonial 
property law and interests terminating on death such as joint tenancies.». 
1454 See for example Article 1 par. 2 of the German International Succession Law Procedure Act (Internationales 
Erbrechtsverfahrensgesetz – IntErbRVG vom 29. Juni 2015 ([2015] BGBl I 1042), which states that UK, 
Denmark, and Ireland must be considered as Third States. On the assumption that “non-compliant Member 
States” cannot be categorised as Member States see: E. B. CRAWFORD, J. M. CARRUTHERS, Speculation on the 
Operation of Succession Regulation 650/2012: Tales of Unexpected, European Review of Private Law 22 
(2014), p. 847; A. Davì, Introduction, in A. L. CALVO CARAVACA, A. DAVÌ (eds), The EU Succession 
Regulation: A Commentary, Cambridge University Press, 2016, p. 17; P. Lagarde, Introduction, in U. 
BERGQUIST, D. DAMASCELLI, R. FRIMSTON, P. LAGARDE, F. ODERSKY, B. REINHARTZ, (eds), EU Regulation on 
Succession and Wills: Commentary, Otto Schmidt, 2015, p. 37; I. QUEIROLO, General Rules on Jurisdiction, in 
S. BARIATTI, I. VIARENGO, F. C. VILLATA (eds), Final Study: Towards the entry into force of the succession 
regulation: building future uniformity upon past divergences, 2016, available at: 
https://eventi.nservizi.it/evento.asp?evID=85&IDm=1688, p. 341  
1455 P. FRANZINA, Article 83. Transnational Provisions, in A. L. CALVO CARAVACA, A. DAVÌ (eds), The EU 
Succession Regulation: A Commentary, Cambridge University Press, 2016, p. 853. 
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the States whose nationality he possessed. However, this grandfather clause1456 does not apply 
to the choice-of-court agreements. Thus, it can be deduced that if the concerned persons have 
chosen the Member State court prior to 17 August 2015, which does not conform to the 
provisions in the Succession Regulation, the choice shall be valid only if it meets the 
conditions laid down in the Succession Regulation. It means that the validity of a jurisdiction 
agreement made before 17 August 2015 must be assessed according to the conditions set out 
in Article 5 of the Succession Regulation, which does not seem to be at odds with the 
principle of non-retroactivity.1457 
 
1.3.  Personal Scope of Application 
The scope of the Succession Regulation ratione personae is unlimited since it also covers the 
successions of persons who are not related to any Member State at the time of death. 
However, for the application of the rule on choice-of-court agreements it is necessary that the 
deceased is a national of the Member State. On the other hand, the parties to the choice-of-
court agreement, i.e., the parties concerned, do not have to be related to any Member State. 
 
1.4.  Material Scope of Application 
Article l of the Succession Regulation provides for both a positive list of the matters, which 
fall within the scope of application of the Succession Regulation and a negative list of the 
matters that are excluded from its scope. Hence, the Succession Regulation covers the 
succession of the estates of deceased persons. The term “succession” must be interpreted in an 
autonomous manner, and it includes all civil law aspects of a succession.1458 Succession is 
defined in Article 3 of the Succession Regulation as  
…succession to the estate of a deceased person and covers all forms of transfer of assets, 
rights and obligations by reason of death, whether by way of a voluntary transfer under a 
disposition of property upon death or a transfer through intestate succession.  
                                                          
1456 A. DAVÌ, A. ZANOBETTI, Il nuovo diritto internazionale privato europeo delle successioni, op. cit., p. 39. 
1457 On the similar conclusion concerning the agreements as to succession see P. FRANZINA, Article 83. 
Transnational Provisions, in The EU Succession Regulation: A Commentary, op. cit., p. 853, 854. 
1458 See Recital No 9 of the Succession Regulation. 
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Conversely, the Succession Regulation does not apply to: revenue, customs, or administrative 
matters; the status of natural persons, as well as family relationships and relationships; the 
legal capacity of natural persons; questions relating to the disappearance, absence, or 
presumed death of a natural person; questions relating to matrimonial property regimes1459 
and property regimes of relationships; maintenance obligations other than those arising by 
reason of death; the formal validity of dispositions of property upon death made orally; 
property rights, interests, and assets created or transferred otherwise than by succession; 
questions governed by the law of companies and other bodies, corporate or unincorporated; 
the nature of rights in rem; and any recording in a register of rights in immovable or movable 
property.1460 
                                                          
1459 ECJ, Case C-558/16, Doris Margret Lisette Mahnkopf, 1 March 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:138: «Article 1(1) 
… must be interpreted as meaning that a national provision, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which 
prescribes, on the death of one of the spouses, a fixed allocation of the accrued gains by increasing the surviving 
spouse’s share of the estate falls within the scope of that regulation.». 
1460 On the interpretation of Article 1 par. 2 lett. k) and l) of the Succession Regulation see ECJ, Case C-218/16, 
Aleksandra Kubicka, 12 October 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:755: «Article 1(2)(k) and (l) and Article 31… must be 
interpreted as precluding refusal, by an authority of a Member State, to recognise the material effects of a 
legacy ‘by vindication’, provided for by the law governing succession chosen by the testator in accordance with 
Article 22(1) of that regulation, where that refusal is based on the ground that the legacy concerns the right of 
ownership of immovable property located in that Member State, whose law does not provide for legacies with 
direct material effect when succession takes place.» On the material scope of application see: A. BONOMI, P. 
WAUTELET, Ambito di Applicazione, in A. BONOMI, P. WAUTELET (eds), Il Regolamento europeo sulle 
successioni: Commentario al Reg. UE 650/2012 in vigore dal 17 agosto 2015, Giuffrè, 2015, p. 23-79; A. DAVÌ, 
A. ZANOBETTI, Il nuovo diritto internazionale privato europeo delle successioni, op. cit., p. 23-32; D. 
DAMASCELLI, Diritto internazionale privato delle successioni a causa di morte: dalla l. n. 218/1995 al reg. UE 
n. 650/2012, Giuffrè, 2013, p. 39-44; M. WELLER, Article 1, Scope and Definitions, in A. L. CALVO CARAVACA, 
A. DAVÌ (eds), The EU Succession Regulation: A Commentary, Cambridge University Press, 2016, p. 73-111; R. 
FRIMSTON, Chapter I: Scope and Definitions, in U. BERGQUIST, D. DAMASCELLI, R. FRIMSTON, P. LAGARDE, F. 
ODERSKY, B. REINHARTZ, (eds), EU Regulation on Succession and Wills: Commentary, Otto Schmidt, 2015, p. 
38-50; P. KINDLER, Definition of succession, in S. BARIATTI, I. VIARENGO, F. C. VILLATA (eds), Final Study: 
Towards the entry into force of the succession regulation: building future uniformity upon past divergences, 
2016, available at: eventi.nservizi.it/evento.asp?evID=85&IDm=1688, p. 9 et seq.; A. REIS, Succession and 
family law, in S. BARIATTI, I. VIARENGO, F. C. VILLATA (eds), Final Study: Towards the entry into force of the 
succession regulation: building future uniformity upon past divergences, 2016, available at: 
eventi.nservizi.it/evento.asp?evID=85&IDm=1688, p. 13 et seq.; D. MURITANO, Succession and trust, in S. 
BARIATTI, I. VIARENGO, F. C. VILLATA (eds), Final Study: Towards the entry into force of the succession 
regulation: building future uniformity upon past divergences, 2016, available at: 
eventi.nservizi.it/evento.asp?evID=85&IDm=1688, p. 59 et seq.; Z. CRESPI REGHIZZI, Succession and property 
rights, in S. BARIATTI, I. VIARENGO, F. C. VILLATA (eds), Final Study: Towards the entry into force of the 
succession regulation: building future uniformity upon past divergences, 2016, available at: 
eventi.nservizi.it/evento.asp?evID=85&IDm=1688, p. 87 et seq.; D. PAULUS, Succession and company law, in S. 
BARIATTI, I. VIARENGO, F. C. VILLATA (eds), Final Study: Towards the entry into force of the succession 
regulation: building future uniformity upon past divergences, 2016, available at: 
eventi.nservizi.it/evento.asp?evID=85&IDm=1688, p. 126 et seq.; D. MURITANO, Tax aspects of international 
successions: notarial problems, in S. BARIATTI, I. VIARENGO, F. C. VILLATA (eds), Final Study: Towards the 
entry into force of the succession regulation: building future uniformity upon past divergences, 2016, available 
at: https://eventi.nservizi.it/evento.asp?evID=85&IDm=1688, p. 152 et seq. 
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2. Choice-of-Court Agreements under the Succession Regulation 
Under the Succession Regulation the choice-of-court agreement is conceived as strictly 
complementary in respect of the choice of law.1461 In fact, the admissibility of the choice-of-
court agreement is subject to the condition that the deceased has previously made a choice of 
law in accordance with Article 22 of the Succession Regulation and the parties concerned 
made a choice in respect of the courts of the Member State of the law chosen by the deceased. 
The function of the jurisdiction agreement is the establishment of the so-called Gleichlauf, in 
other words parallelism between the jurisdiction and applicable law, which would be gained 
also in absence of choice-of-law and choice-of-court agreements, through the habitual 
residence, which represents a general rule for jurisdiction (Article 4 of the Succession 
Regulation) and a general rule for applicable law (Article 21 of the Succession 
Regulation).1462 As it is analysed further, the deceased is entitled to choose the law of his/her 
nationality, and the rule on a choice of court serves as a tool to reach the coincidence between 
ius and forum. The advantage of this approach is realized by the courts on the application of 
their own domestic law: the proceedings are easier to manage, less expensive, and less time-
consuming.1463 This emerges from Recitals No 27 and 28, which refer to the choice-of-court 
agreements’ “mechanism” designed to ensure that the Member State court applies their own 
law.1464 Thus, it is evident that party autonomy in the Succession Regulation is somewhat 
limited and aims mainly at establishing the coincidence between ius and forum. 
Article 5 of the Succession Regulation determines a proper rule on choice-of-court 
agreements, although the choice of the potential fora is limited only to the Member State of 
                                                          
1461 F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI, Article 5. Choice-of-Court Agreement, in A. L. CALVO CARAVACA, A. DAVÌ (eds), 
The EU Succession Regulation: A Commentary, Cambridge University Press, 2016, p. 149. 
1462 F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI, Article 5. Choice-of-Court Agreement, in The EU Succession Regulation: A 
Commentary, op. cit., p. 150. 
1463 I. QUEIROLO, General Rules on Jurisdiction, in Final Study: Towards the entry into force of the succession 
regulation: building future uniformity upon past divergences, op. cit., p. 342. 
1464 See Recital No 27 and 28 of the Succession Regulation which provides: «The rules of this Regulation are 
devised so as to ensure that the authority dealing with the succession will, in most situations, be applying its own 
law. This Regulation therefore provides for a series of mechanisms which would come into play where the 
deceased had chosen as the law to govern his succession the law of a Member State of which he was a 
national…One such mechanism should be to allow the parties concerned to conclude a choice-of-court 
agreement in favour of the courts of the Member State of the chosen law. It would have to be determined on a 
case-by-case basis, depending in particular on the issue covered by the choice-of-court agreement, whether the 
agreement would have to be concluded between all parties concerned by the succession or whether some of them 
could agree to bring a specific issue before the chosen court in a situation where the decision by that court on 
that issue would not affect the rights of the other parties to the succession.». 
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the nationality of the deceased. There are several conditions that must be satisfied, which are 
analysed further. Moreover, the jurisdiction may also be conferred to the Member State court 
after the institution of the proceedings according to Article 7 lett. c) of the Succession 
Regulation. This rule is not based on the choice-of-court agreement within the meaning of 
Article 5 of the Succession Regulation, but on the fact that a Member State court, whose law 
was chosen by the deceased according to Article 22 of the Succession Regulation shall have 
jurisdiction if the parties to the proceedings have expressly accepted the jurisdiction of the 
court seized. This acceptance must be also distinguished from the jurisdictional rule under 
Article 9 of the Succession Regulation, where acceptance is implied. Article 9 of the 
Succession Regulation aims mainly at complementing Article 5 of the Succession Regulation 
by providing that where in the course of proceedings it appears that not all the parties to those 
proceedings were party to the choice-of-court agreement, the court shall continue to exercise 
jurisdiction if the parties to the proceedings which were not party to the agreement enter an 
appearance without contesting the jurisdiction of the court.  
Thus, the “mechanism” allowing the parties concerned to conclude a choice-of-court 
agreement in favour of the courts of the Member State of the chosen law according to Article 
5 of the Succession Regulation must be read in conjunction with Article 6, 7, and 9 of the 
Succession Regulation. Therefore, the choice of law, as well as the formal and substantive 
validity of Article 5 of the Succession Regulation, are analysed together with Article 6, 7, and 
9 of the Succession Regulation.  
 
2.1.  Effects of the Choice-of-Court Agreement 
By virtue of Article 5 of the Succession Regulation, only exclusive jurisdiction agreements 
are admitted in the Succession Regulation. It means, that non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses 
are not valid for the purposes of the Succession Regulation. For example, the Succession 
Regulation does not permit the parties to widen the choice of jurisdictional grounds by adding 
jurisdictions (of the Member State court of the nationality of de cujus) to the general 
jurisdiction laid down in Article 4 of the Succession Regulation. This option is explained by 
the aim of the Succession Regulation to make the ius and forum coincide and by the effort to 
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prevent the multiplicity of competent Member States.1465 The question arises how should 
choice-of-court agreements be treated where the parties did not specify the exclusivity of the 
jurisdiction. The Brussels Ibis Regulation and the Maintenance Regulation provide for an 
assumption, under which agreements are considered to be exclusive if the parties do not 
express otherwise. Thus, from the lack of this assumption in the Succession Regulation it may 
be deduced that the Succession Regulation requires ascertaining the mutual will of the parties 
by the seized Member State court, which, should favour the validity of the agreement over 
material errors of the parties.1466 
Article 6 lett. b) of the Succession Regulation provides that if the deceased chose the law to 
govern his/her succession pursuant to Article 22 of the Succession Regulation, the court 
seized pursuant to Article 4 or Article 10 of the Succession Regulation shall decline 
jurisdiction if the parties to the proceedings have a choice-of-court agreement in favour of the 
Member State court whose law was chosen in accordance with Article 5 of the Succession 
Regulation.1467 In other words, the negative effect of the jurisdiction agreement according to 
Article 5 of the Succession Regulation is confirmed by the mandatory declining of the 
jurisdiction of the non-designated seized Member State court.1468 Also, in this case, the 
prerequisite is a valid professio juris and the valid choice-of-court agreement.  
A problem arises with identifying which Member State court should ascertain the existence 
and validity of the jurisdiction agreement. In case that only the non-designated Member State 
court is seized (i.e., there is no lis pendens) or is seized first, such a Member State court must 
provide a “full review” on the existence and the validity of the jurisdiction agreement and 
must decline (not only suspend) its jurisdiction in case of a valid jurisdiction agreement.1469 
After this moment, it is not possible to question the existence and validity of the jurisdiction 
                                                          
1465 A. BONOMI, R. DI IORIO, Accordi di scelta del foro, in A. BONOMI, P. WAUTELET (eds), Il Regolamento 
europeo sulle successioni: Commentario al Reg. UE 650/2012 in vigore dal 17 agosto 2015, Giuffrè, 2015, p. 
139. 
1466 I. QUEIROLO, General Rules on Jurisdiction, in Final Study: Towards the entry into force of the succession 
regulation: building future uniformity upon past divergences, op. cit., p. 359. 
1467 Article 6 lett. a) of the Succession Regulation is not subject of the current analysis since it deals with the 
declination of jurisdiction at the request of one of the parties when the court of a Member State of the chosen law 
is better placed to rule on the succession. 
1468 A. BONOMI, R. DI IORIO, Dichiarazione di incompetenza in caso di scelta di legge, in A. BONOMI, P. 
WAUTELET (eds.), Il Regolamento europeo sulle successioni: Commentario al Reg. UE 650/2012 in vigore dal 
17 agosto 2015, Giuffrè Editore, 2015, p. 146; H. PAMBOUKIS, EU Succession Regulation No 650/2012: A 
Commentary, Hart Publishing, 2017, p. 129. 
1469 A. BONOMI, R. DI IORIO, Dichiarazione di incompetenza in caso di scelta di legge, in Il Regolamento 
europeo sulle successioni: Commentario al Reg. UE 650/2012 in vigore dal 17 agosto 2015, op. cit., p. 147. 
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agreement by the designated Member State court.1470 This negative effect is connected with 
the positive effect laid down in Article 7 lett. a) of the Succession Regulation, which leads to 
the establishment of jurisdiction of the designated Member State court where a Member State 
court previously seized has declined jurisdiction in the same case pursuant to Article 6 lett. b) 
of the Succession Regulation. The establishment of jurisdiction is automatic and the 
designated Member State court is not entitled to re-examine the existence or validity of the 
professio juris and the jurisdiction agreement,1471 although the examination of the non-
designated court was not correct.1472 This solution aims at preventing the negative conflict of 
the jurisdiction and denegatio iustitiae.1473 Although this rule seems to be a new solution in 
the EU regulations, it practically adopts same approached endorsed by the ECJ in the Gothaer 
case where other Member State courts are bound by the final judgment regarding the validity 
of the jurisdiction clause.  
On the contrary, where the designated Member State court is the only court seized or is first 
seized in accordance with Article 5 of the Succession Regulation, Article 7 lett. b) of the 
Succession Regulation provides that such Member State courts shall have jurisdiction to rule 
on the succession. It practically confirms the jurisdiction of the Member State court 
designated according to Article 5 of the Succession Regulation. In such a case, it is a 
designated Member State court which must examine the existence and the validity of the 
professio juris and the choice-of-court agreement pursuant to the conditions laid down in 
Article 5 of the Succession Regulation.  
  
                                                          
1470 A. BONOMI, R. DI IORIO, Dichiarazione di incompetenza in caso di scelta di legge, in Il Regolamento 
europeo sulle successioni: Commentario al Reg. UE 650/2012 in vigore dal 17 agosto 2015, op. cit., p. 147. 
1471 A. BONOMI, R. DI IORIO, Competenza in Caso di Scelta di Legge, in A. BONOMI, P. WAUTELET (eds), Il 
Regolamento europeo sulle successioni: Commentario al Reg. UE 650/2012 in vigore dal 17 agosto 2015, 
Giuffrè, 2015, p. 151 
1472 F. ODERSKY, Article 6: Declining of jurisdiction in the event of a choice of law, in U. BERGQUIST, D. 
DAMASCELLI, R. FRIMSTON, P. LAGARDE, F. ODERSKY, B. REINHARTZ (eds), EU Regulation on Succession and 
Wills: Commentary, Otto Schmidt, 2015, p. 80. 
1473 A. BONOMI, R. DI IORIO, Dichiarazione di incompetenza in caso di scelta di legge, in Il Regolamento 
europeo sulle successioni: Commentario al Reg. UE 650/2012 in vigore dal 17 agosto 2015, op. cit., p. 147; A. 
BONOMI, R. DI IORIO, Competenza in Caso di Scelta di Legge, in Il Regolamento europeo sulle successioni: 
Commentario al Reg. UE 650/2012 in vigore dal 17 agosto 2015, op. cit., p. 152. 
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2.2.  Conditions for Application of the Rule on Choice-of-Court Agreement 
Several conditions must be satisfied in order to give effect to the valid jurisdiction agreement 
according to Article 5 of the Succession Regulation: (i) there must a previous professio juris 
made by the deceased according to Article 22 of the Succession Regulation; (ii) the choice-of-
court agreement must fulfil certain formal requirements; (iii) it must be substantively valid; 
and (iv) the choice-of-court agreement must be concluded by the concerned parties. 
 
2.2.1. Choice-of-Law under Article 22 of the Succession Regulation 
The first mandatory prerequisite of the choice of forum is a previous professio juris. The 
choice of law must be effectuated by the de cujus, whereas the choice-of-court agreement 
must be concluded by the “parties concerned”. Moreover, while the choice of law in 
accordance with Article 22 of the Succession Regulation may result in the designation of the 
law of a Third State, the choice-of-court provision finds no application if the de cuius chose 
the law of a Third State. It means that where the deceased is a national of the Third State, the 
choice-of-court agreement is not governed by the Succession Regulation.1474 This clearly 
follows from the wording of Article 22 par. 1 in conjunction with Article 20 of the Succession 
Regulation, which supports the universalistic approach of the conflict-of-laws rules already 
admitted in other regulations. Converse to this approach, Article 5 of the Succession 
Regulation provides that the parties concerned may agree on a court, whose law was chosen 
by the deceased pursuant to Article 22, only if such law is the law of a Member State. It must 
be borne in mind that the renvoi in case of choice of law is excluded. Therefore, it is not 
possible to conclude the choice-of-court agreement in favour of the Member State court, 
where renvoi refers to such a Member State through the law of a Third State, which was 
chosen.1475 
The choice-of-court agreement may not precede the professio juris1476 and other forms of the 
intention of the deceased to designate a law (such as dispositions of property upon death or 
agreements as to succession) may not be admitted as an effective condition for applying the 
                                                          
1474 On the derogation from jurisdiction under the Succession Regulation, see infra Section 4 of this Subchapter. 
1475 See Article 34 par. 2 of the Succession Regulation. 
1476 F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI, Article 5. Choice-of-Court Agreement, in The EU Succession Regulation: A 
Commentary, op. cit., p. 154. 
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rule on choice-of-court agreements according to Article 5 of the Succession Regulation.1477 
Articles 24 and 25 of the Succession Regulation, which govern dispositions of property upon 
death and agreements as to succession, refers to profession juris under Article 22 of the 
Succession Regulation as to admissibility, substantial validity, and effects. However, Article 5 
of the Succession Regulation clearly provides that the choice-of-court agreement is permitted 
only “where the law chosen by the deceased to govern his succession pursuant to Article 22 is 
the law of a Member State”. This establishes the coincidence between ius and forum for the 
succession as a whole. A different approach would lead to the introduction of the co-existence 
among concurrent jurisdictions.1478 
The choice of law must satisfy the requirements of Article 22 of the Succession Regulation. It 
is likely that the consequence of an invalid professio iuris is the invalidation of the choice-of-
court agreement. The valid professio iuris seems to be a precondition for a valid choice of 
court. Otherwise, the choice-of-court agreement itself would not meet the conditions 
prescribed in Article 5 of the Succession Regulation.1479 However, if the concerned parties 
conclude a valid choice-of-court agreement, who could challenge the validity of the choice of 
law made by deceased? In this regard, the question arises whether the designated Member 
State court is obliged to assess the validity ex officio. The assessment of the jurisdiction ex 
officio according to Article 15 of the Succession Regulation in conjunction with the 
contextual wording of Articles 5, 6 lett. b) and 7 of the Succession Regulation suggest that the 
Member State court must review whether the deceased chose the law to govern his succession 
pursuant to Article 22 of the Succession Regulation. Due to the fact that Article 22 of the 
Succession Regulation determines the formal and substantive validity of the professio iuris, it 
may be deduced that the Member State court is obliged to assess the validity of the choice of 
                                                          
1477 On the same conclusion see A. BONOMI, R. DI IORIO, Accordi di scelta del foro, in Il Regolamento europeo 
sulle successioni: Commentario al Reg. UE 650/2012 in vigore dal 17 agosto 2015, op. cit., p. 136; F. 
MARONGIU BUONAIUTI, Article 5. Choice-of-Court Agreement, in The EU Succession Regulation: A 
Commentary, op. cit., p. 154; A. DAVÌ, A. ZANOBETTI, Il nuovo diritto internazionale privato europeo delle 
successioni, op. cit., p. 206. 
1478 F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI, Article 5. Choice-of-Court Agreement, in The EU Succession Regulation: A 
Commentary, op. cit., p. 155. 
1479 I. QUEIROLO, General Rules on Jurisdiction, in Final Study: Towards the entry into force of the succession 
regulation: building future uniformity upon past divergences, op. cit., p. 361.  
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law ex officio. Such examination of validity should be fully reviewed also by the seized non-
designated Member State court,and the prima facie approach does not suffice.1480  
 
2.2.2. Formal Validity 
The formal requirements are laid down in Article 5 par. 2 of the Succession Regulation and 
provide that a choice-of-court agreement shall be expressed in writing, dated, and signed by 
the parties concerned. The formal requirements seem to be inspired by paragraph 2 of Article 
4 of the Maintenance Regulation, which provides only that a choice-of-court agreement shall 
be in writing. In addition, the Succession Regulation requires the jurisdiction agreement to be 
in writing and dated. Moreover, Article 5 par 2, as well as Article 4 of the Maintenance 
Regulation specifies that any communication by electronic means which provides a durable 
record of the agreement shall be equivalent to a “writing”. Thus, the formal requirements in 
respect of the Brussels Ibis Regulation are limited, since jurisdiction agreements in succession 
matters in a form which accords with practices or usage would be meaningless. Also, the 
Succession Regulation does not define the agreement to be “in writing”, and thus, an 
autonomous interpretation can be searched for in the Brussels Ibis Regulation, when the real 
consensus of the parties must be ascertained.1481 
It is questionable whether the manifestation of the agreement in writing requires the mutual 
agreement of the parties concerned, or whether the declaration of the intent of each party on a 
separate document, which is dated and signed, satisfies the formal requirements prescribed in 
Article 5 par. 2 of the Succession Regulation.1482 The signature of the parties is typically 
considered as being part of a written agreement, at least for evidential purposes. The same 
also applies to the communication by electronic means which provides a durable record, that 
is, for the purpose of Article 5 of the Succession Regulation, assimilated into an agreement in 
                                                          
1480 A. BONOMI, R. DI IORIO, Dichiarazione di incompetenza in caso di scelta di legge, in Il Regolamento 
europeo sulle successioni: Commentario al Reg. UE 650/2012 in vigore dal 17 agosto 2015, op. cit., p. 148; H. 
PAMBOUKIS, EU Succession Regulation No 650/2012: A Commentary, op. cit., p. 130. 
1481 ECJ, Case C-150/80, Elefanten Schuh, par. 26; Case C-159/97, Trasporti Castelletti, par. 34, 48. 
1482 On the approach excluding unilateral declaration see A. BONOMI, R. DI IORIO, Accordi di scelta del foro, in Il 
Regolamento europeo sulle successioni: Commentario al Reg. UE 650/2012 in vigore dal 17 agosto 2015, op. 
cit., p. 137; on the opposite approach affirming that the unilateral declaration meets the requirements as to form 
see F. ODERSKY, Article 5: Choice-of-Court agreement, in U. BERGQUIST, D. DAMASCELLI, R. FRIMSTON, P. 
LAGARDE, F. ODERSKY, B. REINHARTZ (eds), EU Regulation on Succession and Wills: Commentary, Otto 
Schmidt, 2015, p. 75. 
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writing. Thus, a digital signature should be part of the jurisdiction agreement concluded 
through means of electronic communication.1483 The requirement of the date is then a 
significant factor for the determination of the moment of the conclusion of the choice-of-court 
agreement.1484 
The Succession Regulation does not specify the moment when the choice-of-court agreement 
should be concluded. There are no doubts that the choice-of-court agreement is admitted after 
the opening of the succession and before the institution of the proceedings in the designated 
Member State court.1485 On the other hand, it would be a too restrictive approach to prevent 
the concerned parties from designating the Member State court before the opening of the 
succession under the condition that the deceased had already chosen the law applicable to 
his/her succession as a whole.1486 In case that the professio juris is withdrawn by the 
deceased, the choice-of-court agreement would not produce any effect.1487 If the interpretation 
admits the possibility of designating a Member State court before the death of the deceased, it 
should be admitted as well the possibility to include the choice-of-court agreement in the 
agreement as to succession concluded between the de cujus and his/her heirs. In such a case, 
the principle of severability prescribed by the Brussels Ibis Regulation should be upheld. The 
validity of the agreement as to succession should not have an impact on the validity of the 
choice-of-court agreement.1488 However, it must be borne in mind, that that the validity of the 
choice-of-court agreement is dependent on the valid professio juris.  
                                                          
1483 Insupport of this conclusion see: A. BONOMI, R. DI IORIO, Accordi di scelta del foro, in Il Regolamento 
europeo sulle successioni: Commentario al Reg. UE 650/2012 in vigore dal 17 agosto 2015, op. cit, p. 137; H. 
PAMBOUKIS, EU Succession Regulation No 650/2012: A Commentary, op. cit., p. 123. On the doubts whether it 
is not sufficient the document signed, scanned and transmitted see F. ODERSKY, Article 5: Choice-of-Court 
agreements, op. cit., p. 75. 
1484 F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI, Article 5. Choice-of-Court Agreement, in The EU Succession Regulation: A 
Commentary, op. cit., p. 157. 
1485 A. BONOMI, R. DI IORIO, Accordi di scelta del foro, in Il Regolamento europeo sulle successioni: 
Commentario al Reg. UE 650/2012 in vigore dal 17 agosto 2015, op. cit., p. 138. 
1486 A. BONOMI, R. DI IORIO, Accordi di scelta del foro, in Il Regolamento europeo sulle successioni: 
Commentario al Reg. UE 650/2012 in vigore dal 17 agosto 2015, op. cit., p. 138; F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI, 
Article 5. Choice-of-Court Agreement, in The EU Succession Regulation: A Commentary, op. cit., p. 152; contro 
O. FERACI, La nuova disciplina europea della competenza giurisdizionale in materia di successioni mortis 
causa, in Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional, 5:2 (2013), p. 306. 
1487 A. BONOMI, R. DI IORIO, Accordi di scelta del foro, in Il Regolamento europeo sulle successioni: 
Commentario al Reg. UE 650/2012 in vigore dal 17 agosto 2015, op. cit., p. 138; F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI, 
Article 5. Choice-of-Court Agreement, in The EU Succession Regulation: A Commentary, op. cit., p. 152. 
1488 ECJ, Case, C-269/95, Benincasa, par. 25. On support of this conclusion see: A. BONOMI, R. DI IORIO, 
Accordi di scelta del foro, in Il Regolamento europeo sulle successioni: Commentario al Reg. UE 650/2012 in 
vigore dal 17 agosto 2015, op. cit., p. 138. 
  
389 
 
Jurisdiction may also be attributed to the court also after the institution of the proceedings 
according to Article 7 lett. c) of the Succession Regulation. This rule is not based on the 
choice-of-court agreement within the meaning of Article 5 of the Succession Regulation, but 
on the fact that a Member State court, whose law was chosen by the deceased according to 
Article 22 of the Succession Regulation shall have jurisdiction if the parties to the 
proceedings have expressly accepted the jurisdiction of the court seized. Therefore, the last 
moment when it is possible to accept jurisdiction during the proceedings depends on the 
procedural law of the seized Member State court.1489 On the other hand, this rule may be 
considered as obsolete since Article 5 of the Succession Regulation does not pose a limit 
regarding the moment of conclusion of the agreement. It is questionable whether such an 
agreement should respect the formal requirements in Article 5 par. 2 of the Succession 
Regulation, or, whether may also be concluded orally at a hearing of the proceedings, or in 
other manners according to the procedural requirements of the seized Member State court, 
such as recorded in the minutes of the proceedings. 1490 This acceptance must be distinguished 
from jurisdiction under Article 9 of the Succession Regulation, where the acceptance is 
implied. Where, in the course of proceedings it appears that not all the parties to those 
proceedings were party to the choice-of-court agreement, the court shall continue to exercise 
jurisdiction if the parties to the proceedings, which were not party to the agreement, enter an 
appearance without contesting the jurisdiction of the court. 
 
2.2.3. Substantive Validity 
Article 5 of the Succession Regulation does not determine the rule on substantive validity like 
the Brussels I Regulation and all the Regulations in the family matters. Also, in this case, it 
seems regrettable that the rule was not inspired by the new rule on substantive validity 
                                                          
1489 A. BONOMI, R. DI IORIO, Accordi di scelta del foro, in Il Regolamento europeo sulle successioni: 
Commentario al Reg. UE 650/2012 in vigore dal 17 agosto 2015, op. cit., p. 139; A. BONOMI, R. DI IORIO, 
Competenza in caso di scelta di legge, in Il Regolamento europeo sulle successioni: Commentario al Reg. UE 
650/2012 in vigore dal 17 agosto 2015, op. cit., p. 152. 
1490 On the approach that the formal validity of acceptance should be based on the same conditions set out by 
Article 5 of the Succession Regulation see I. QUEIROLO, General Rules on Jurisdiction, in Final Study: Towards 
the entry into force of the succession regulation: building future uniformity upon past divergences, op. cit., p. 
369; contra F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI, Article 7. Jurisdiction in the Event of a Choice of Law, in A. L. CALVO 
CARAVACA, A. DAVÌ (eds), The EU Succession Regulation: A Commentary, Cambridge University Press, 2016, 
p. 176. 
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included in Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. Should substantive validity of the 
choice-of-court agreement under Article 5 of the Succession Regulation adopt the solution 
laid down in the Brussels Ibis Regulation? According to some authors, the gap in the 
Succession Regulation should be filled by the solution adopted in the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation. Thus, the answers concerning the substantive validity of the jurisdiction 
agreement are to be searched for in the conflict-of-laws rules of the designated Member State 
court.1491 The application of the law of the chosen Member State court may be supported by 
the reasonable expectations of the parties and by the strict interrelationship between ius and 
forum. The parties expressed their intention to consider the legal order of the nationality of the 
deceased, whose law was chosen and such a legal order would be competent to regulate the 
succession in terms of the applicable law and jurisdiction.1492 Moreover, this solution 
circumvents the non-uniformity between the designated court and seized non-designated 
court,1493 which seems to be relevant mainly in the context of Article 6 lett. b) and Article 7 
lett. a) of the Succession Regulation. As analyzed above, according to Article 6 lett. b) of the 
Succession Regulation the non-designated Member State court has a duty to decline its 
jurisdiction whenever the parties opted for the jurisdiction agreement according to Article 5 of 
the Succession Regulation. The examination of the jurisdiction agreement by the seized non-
designated Member State court must precede the declaration of its lack of jurisdiction. It 
should be admitted that the examination of the jurisdiction agreement must be based on the 
full review approach since the existence and validity of the jurisdiction agreement are not 
subject to the further examination by the designated Member State court within the meaning 
of Article 7 lett. a) of the Succession Regulation, which is bound by the examination of the 
                                                          
1491 In this regard see A. Bonomi, R. Di Iorio, Accordi di scelta del foro, in Il Regolamento europeo sulle 
successioni: Commentario al Reg. UE 650/2012 in vigore dal 17 agosto 2015, op. cit., p. 136. See also H. 
PAMBOUKIS, EU Succession Regulation No 650/2012: A Commentary, op. cit., p. 123, where the author retains 
that «the Succession regulation does not contain any provisions with respect to the applicable law, however 
Regulation 1215/2012 may very well be applied without any difficulty», but on the other hand the author 
continues «Consequently, the applicable law shall be determined by the conflict-of-laws rule of the court 
seized». On the doubts regarding the future interpretation of the ECJ affirming the extension of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation’sapproach into the Succession Regulation due to the differences between the Regulations see I. 
QUEIROLO, General Rules on Jurisdiction, in Final Study: Towards the entry into force of the succession 
regulation: building future uniformity upon past divergences, op. cit., p. 363.  
1492 On similar conclusions see F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI, Article 5. Choice-of-Court Agreement, in The EU 
Succession Regulation: A Commentary, op. cit., p. 159. 
1493 R. A. BRAND, P. HERRUP, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Commentary and 
Documents, op. cit., p. 90. 
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non-chosen Member State court.1494 Therefore, the application of the law of the chosen 
Member State court by the non-chosen Member State court would ensure the same result on 
the substantive validity of the jurisdiction agreement, which would be gained by the chosen 
Member State court. 
Or, as the other solution to the demonstrated lacuna concerning the substantive validity of the 
choice-of-court agreement, the case of C-159/97, Trasporti Castelletti may be useful. 
According to this interpretation, an inquiry on the existence of consent involves only the 
application of the rule of formal requirements and provides a self-sufficient test for the 
validity of jurisdiction clauses.1495 The last possibility encompasses the application of lex 
fori.1496 
 
                                                          
1494 A. BONOMI, R. DI IORIO, Dichiarazione di incompetenza in caso di scelta di legge, in Il Regolamento 
europeo sulle successioni: Commentario al Reg. UE 650/2012 in vigore dal 17 agosto 2015, op. cit., p. 147. 
1495 ECJ, Case C-159/97, Trasporti Castelletti, par. 49. See also ECJ, Case C-116/02, Gasser, par. 51 and ECJ, 
Case C-116/02, Gasser, Opinion of Advocate General Leger, par. 78. In support of the approach concerning the 
interference of the ECJ interpretation on consensus between the parties, which must be clearly and precisely 
demonstrated see I. QUEIROLO, General Rules on Jurisdiction, in Final Study: Towards the entry into force of the 
succession regulation: building future uniformity upon past divergences, op. cit., p. 362. 
1496 A. DAVÌ, A. ZANOBETTI, Il nuovo diritto internazionale privato europeo delle successioni, op. cit., p. 205, 
where according to the author, the choice-of-court agreement is a procedural agreement which should be 
governed by lex fori, which is the law of the last habitual residence, since the courts of the habitual residence 
with jurisdiction according to Article 4. Or, the designated law should be examined by virtue of Article 7 lett. b). 
Thus, the agreement should respect both laws. On the other hand, it was suggested to apply the law which 
governs the successions. See original text: «il regolamento non precisa in base a quale legge debba essere 
valutata la validità sostanziale dell'accordo. Trattandosi di accordo processuale, si dovrebbe, a rigore, ritenere 
applicabile la lex fori, vale a dire la legge del paese di ultima residenza abituale, i cui tribunali sono competenti 
ai sensi dell'art. 4, oppure la legge designata, in applicazione dell'art. 7, lett. b), a seconda del giudice dal quale 
la validità dell' accordo debba venire valutata. L'accordo dovrebbe quindi in pratica rispettare i requisiti 
stabiliti da entrambe le leggi. È stato però suggerito che la validità sostanziale dell' accordo di scelta del foro 
sia invece da considerare sottoposta alla stessa legge che regola la successione.». See also A. LEANDRO, La 
giurisdizione nel regolamento dell’Unione europea sulle successioni mortis causa, in P. FRANZINA, A. LEANDRO 
(eds), Il diritto internazionale privato europeo delle successioni mortis causa, Giuffrè, 2013, p. 69, where 
according to the author, substantive validity depends on the legal system of the private international law of the 
forum seized (that do not have to be necessarily the prorogued one) and is governed by the lex fori which 
governs the procedural effects of the prorogation agreement. See original text: «mentre quella sostanziale, nel 
silenzio del regolamento, va risolta alla luce del sistema di diritto internazionale privato del foro adito 
(prorogato o no che sia) ed è immaginabile che essa sia regolata dalla lex fori in qualità di legge notoriamente 
richiamata per disciplinare gli effetti processuali della proroga». 
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2.2.4. Parties to the Agreement 
Article 5 of the Succession Regulation provides that the parties concerned may agree on a 
jurisdiction agreement.1497 The concept of “the parties concerned” is not defined. The heirs 
and the legatees can be included under the term, which is evident from the numerous 
references in the Succession Regulation.1498 However, the main problem lies in the difficulty 
of identifying all parties concerned. In case the agreement is concluded before opening the 
succession, all parties concerned do not have to be known at this stage. The difficulties with 
the identification of the parties may be evident mainly in the non-contentious proceedings, 
such a proceeding directed to determine the heirs.1499 Moreover, the positions of the specific 
group of subjects in the succession proceedings, such as the creditors, remains controversial. 
Thus, the notion of the parties concerned should be limited in a manner that “there must be a 
direct and objective connection between the succession and the parties.”1500 In consequence, 
the persons with a mere claim against the estate,1501 should not be considered as sufficiently 
concerned and the creditor’s claim should be governed by the jurisdictional rules applicable to 
the debt collection.1502 
                                                          
1497 See the proposal on a choice of court of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private 
Law, Comments on the European Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and authentic instruments 
in matters of succession and the creation of a European Certificate of Succession, p. 50-51, where the Institute 
suggested to grant freedom of choice of jurisdiction to the person whose succession is concerned on the basis of 
a testamentary disposition and to the parties to the dispute with regard to contentious proceedings in succession 
matters: «1. A person may by way of a testamentary disposition provide that a court or the courts of a Member 
State whose law they may choose to govern the succession pursuant to Articles 17, 18(3) or 18a(3) shall have 
jurisdiction to rule on their succession as a whole or in part… 2. The parties to a dispute may agree that a court 
or the courts of a Member State shall have jurisdiction to settle any contentious litigation proceedings which 
have arisen or which may arise among them in connection with the succession…». 
1498 See for example Recital No 32 of the Succession Regulation. On this conclusion see F. ODERSKY, Article 5: 
Choice-of-Court Agreement, in EU Regulation on Succession and Wills: Commentary, op. cit., p. 72-73; H. 
PAMBOUKIS, EU Succession Regulation No 650/2012: A Commentary, op. cit., p. 124, I. QUEIROLO, General 
Rules on Jurisdiction, in Final Study: Towards the entry into force of the succession regulation: building future 
uniformity upon past divergences, op. cit., p. 359. 
1499 These proceedings are covered by the Succession Regulation according to Article 64 of the Succession 
Regulation. see F. ODERSKY, Article 5: Choice-of-Court agreement, in EU Regulation on Succession and Wills: 
Commentary, op. cit., p. 73. 
1500 I. QUEIROLO, General Rules on Jurisdiction, in Final Study: Towards the entry into force of the succession 
regulation: building future uniformity upon past divergences, op. cit., p. 359. 
1501 On this conclusion see F. ODERSKY, Article 5: Choice-of-Court Agreement, in EU Regulation on Succession 
and Wills: Commentary, op. cit., p. 73. 
1502 A. BONOMI, R. DI IORIO, Accordi di scelta del foro, in Il Regolamento europeo sulle successioni: 
Commentario al Reg. UE 650/2012 in vigore dal 17 agosto 2015, op. cit., p. 137. On the opposite approach 
where the creditors should be covered by the term “concerned parties” see H. PAMBOUKIS, EU Succession 
Regulation No 650/2012, op. cit., p. 124, where according to the author: «there is no reason why to exclude the 
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In the proceedings where the compulsory participation of the specific parties is required (i.e., 
compulsory joinders), the choice-of-court agreement is valid only when all compulsory 
joinders are parties to the jurisdiction agreement.1503 If during the proceedings it appears that 
not all the compulsory joinders concluded the choice-of-court agreement, the designated 
Member State court cannot rule on the succession,1504 unless the parties have expressly 
accepted the jurisdiction of the court seized according to Article 7 lett. c) of the Succession 
Regulation, or compulsory joinders who were not a party to the agreement enter an 
appearance without contesting the jurisdiction of the court pursuant to Article 9 of the 
Succession Regulation. In other words, Article 7 lett. c) and Article 9 of the Succession 
Regulation gives to the court a possibility to “heal” the invalid jurisdiction agreement where 
the jurisdiction agreement was not concluded with all compulsory concerned parties. 
However, the identification of all concerned parties and the validity of the jurisdiction 
agreement may be even more complicated when the non-designated Member State court was 
seized previously according to Article 4 of the Succession Regulation. When the non-
designated Member State court declines its jurisdiction according to Article 6 lett. b) of the 
Succession Regulation after having assessed positively the validity of the jurisdiction 
agreement (which covers the question of the participation of all parties concerned), the 
designated Member State court is bound by this decision by virtue of Article 7 lett. a) of the 
Succession Regulation and cannot review the validity of the jurisdiction agreement. However, 
where the compulsory participation of the specific parties in the proceedings is required, and 
it appears that all compulsory joinders were not parties to the jurisdiction agreement and did 
not agree on the jurisdiction according to Article 7 of the Succession Regulation, or did not 
enter an appearance according to Article 9 par. 1 of the Succession Regulation, the choice-of-
court agreement should be invalid, and the designated Member State court should not rule on 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
creditors since “the prorogation of jurisdiction aims exactly to achieve legal unity with respect to all issues 
related to the inheritance». On support of this latter opinion see P. LAGARDE, Les principes de bases du nouveau 
règlement européen sur les successions, Revue critique de droit international privé 4 (2012), p. 691. 
1503 On relationship between jurisdiction based on the choice-of-court agreement and compulsory joinders under 
the Succession Regulation see A. BONOMI, R. DI IORIO, Accordi di scelta del foro, in Il Regolamento europeo 
sulle successioni: Commentario al Reg. UE 650/2012 in vigore dal 17 agosto 2015, op. cit., p. 136; H. 
PAMBOUKIS, EU Succession Regulation No 650/2012: A Commentary, op. cit., p. 124. 
1504 A. BONOMI, R. DI IORIO, Accordi di scelta del foro, in Il Regolamento europeo sulle successioni: 
Commentario al Reg. UE 650/2012 in vigore dal 17 agosto 2015, op. cit., p. 136. In such a case where the 
measures have been already taken, they will produce the effects until the time they will be changed. 
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the succession.1505 In such a case, as provided in Article 9 par. 2 and 3 of the Succession 
Regulation, if jurisdiction is contested by parties to the proceedings which were not a party to 
the agreement, the court shall decline jurisdiction and the jurisdiction over the succession 
shall lie with the courts having jurisdiction pursuant to Article 4 or Article 10. However, the 
non-designated Member State, which is competent according to Article 4 of the Succession 
Regulation, already declined its jurisdiction according to Article 6 lett. b) of the Succession 
Regulation. Therefore, there are two possible results: either the designated Member State 
court declines its jurisdiction as provided in Article 9 par. 2 and 3 of the Succession 
Regulation, which could result in the denegatio iustitiae. Or the designated Member State 
court assumes its jurisdiction, but the jurisdiction agreement should not produce any effects 
for the compulsory joinders which were not a party to the agreement.1506 
In some cases, the Succession Regulation acknowledges that a choice-of-court agreement 
might be concluded only by some of the concerned parties in relation to a specific issue.1507 
In such a case, this possibility must be determined on a case-by-case basis, depending on the 
issue covered by the choice-of-court agreement where the decision by that court on that issue 
would not affect the rights of the other parties to the succession.1508 It seems that such a 
situation is foreseen in Article 7 lett. c) of the Succession Regulation, which makes reference 
simply to the “parties to the proceedings” where only the acceptance is required only by the 
parties involved in the specific proceedings.1509 On the other hand, it can be argued that 
Article 7 lett. b) of the Succession Regulation also makes reference to the “parties to the 
                                                          
1505 A. BONOMI, R. DI IORIO, Accordi di scelta del foro, in Il Regolamento europeo sulle successioni: 
Commentario al Reg. UE 650/2012 in vigore dal 17 agosto 2015, op. cit., p. 136. In such a case where measures 
have been already taken, they will produce effects until the time they are changed. 
1506 On the conclusion that the jurisdiction agreement cannot produce any effects for the parties which were not a 
party to the agreement A. BONOMI, R. DI IORIO, Accordi di scelta del foro, in Il Regolamento europeo sulle 
successioni: Commentario al Reg. UE 650/2012 in vigore dal 17 agosto 2015, op. cit., p. 137. 
1507 Emphasis added. 
1508 See Recital No 28 of the Succession Regulation. 
1509 In this regard see I. QUEIROLO, General Rules on Jurisdiction, in Final Study: Towards the entry into force 
of the succession regulation: building future uniformity upon past divergences, op. cit., p. 369-370, where 
according to the author «on the other hand, the express acceptance of jurisdiction in the proceedings can 
constitute a way through which a subject, who is not bound by a choice of court agreement previously concluded 
by other parties, can subsequently adhere to the agreement.». See also F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI, Article 7. 
Jurisdiction in the Event of a Choice of Law, in The EU Succession Regulation: A Commentary, op. cit., p. 175, 
where according to the author, the acceptance only produces effects regarding the specific proceedings 
commenced before the court seized. 
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proceedings” in the context of Article 5 of the Succession Regulation, and thus, it must have 
the same meaning as the parties concerned.1510  
 
3. Lis Pendens under the Succession Regulation  
The “first seized lis pendens” rule was inspired by the Brussels I Regulation. Any court other 
than the court first seized shall of its own motion stay its proceedings until such time as the 
jurisdiction of the court first seized is established. However, the rule giving precedence to the 
Member State court designated in the jurisdiction agreement to decide on its jurisdiction in 
case of lis pendens (Article 31 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) was not introduced into 
the Succession Regulation. On the contrary, Article 6 lett. b) which must be read in 
conjunction with Article 7 lett. a) of the Succession Regulation indirectly confirms the 
approach of the ECJ taken in the Gasser case. These provisions impose a general duty upon 
any other Member State court seized pursuant to Articles 4 or 10 of the Succession 
Regulation to decline jurisdiction, based on a choice-of-court agreement under Article 5 of the 
Succession Regulation, irrespective of the designated Member State court having been seized 
or not.1511  
In practice, the decision on the existence and validity of the jurisdiction agreement lies with 
the seized non-designated Member State court according to Article 6 lett. a) and Article 17 of 
the Succession Regulation, once the non-designated Member State court is first seized. The 
designated Member State court shall of its own motion stay its proceedings until such time as 
the jurisdiction of the Member State court first seized is declined. Subsequently, the 
designated Member State court cannot bring into question the existence and the validity of the 
jurisdiction agreement and must establish its jurisdiction according to Article 7 lett. a) of the 
Succession Regulation.1512 Also, even if the first seized non-chosen Member State court finds 
the jurisdiction agreement non-existent or invalid, “the first seized lis pendens” rule laid down 
                                                          
1510 In this regard see F. ODERSKY, Article 7: Jurisdiction in the event of choice of law, in U. BERGQUIST, D. 
DAMASCELLI, R. FRIMSTON, P. LAGARDE, F. ODERSKY, B. REINHARTZ (eds), EU Regulation on Succession and 
Wills: Commentary, Otto Schmidt, 2015, p. 82. 
1511 A. BONOMI, R. DI IORIO, Dichiarazione di incompetenza in caso di scelta di legge, in Il Regolamento 
europeo sulle successioni: Commentario al Reg. UE 650/2012 in vigore dal 17 agosto 2015, op. cit., p. 147; F. 
MARONGIU BUONAIUTI, Article 17. Lis pendens, in A. L. CALVO CARAVACA, A. DAVÌ (eds), The EU Succession 
Regulation: A Commentary, Cambridge University Press, 2016, p. 265. 
1512 A. BONOMI, R. DI IORIO, Dichiarazione di incompetenza in caso di scelta di legge, in Il Regolamento 
europeo sulle successioni: Commentario al Reg. UE 650/2012 in vigore dal 17 agosto 2015, op. cit., p. 147. 
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in Article 17 of the Succession Regulation applies and the designated Member State court 
shall of its own motion stay its proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of the Member 
State court first seized is established and consequently, it declines jurisdiction in favour of the 
first seized Member State court.1513 In this latter case, the Gasser problem regarding the “first 
seized lis pendens” rule may be even more significant. The Succession Regulation does not 
unify the solution on the substantive validity of the jurisdiction agreement. Thus, the non-
designated Member State court may evaluate the matter of substantive validity according to 
its own lex fori, 1514 whereas the designated Member State court would apply the law of the 
chosen court, i.e., its own lex fori. 
  
4. Declination from Jurisdiction in favour of Third States 
It must be borne in mind that the jurisdictional rules in the Succession Regulation are 
unlimited and exclusive in a sense that they delineate the jurisdiction of the Member State 
courts as well as Third State courts; indeed, there is no space for the national law. 1515 It means 
that the jurisdiction rules of the Succession Regulation apply to successions with international 
elements which are situated both within the EU and outside the EU. This model follows from 
the Maintenance Regulation concerning universal jurisdiction, rather than the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation, and the habitual residence of the defendant is no longer required.1516 This 
excludes residual jurisdiction as provided in the Brussels Ibis Regulation.  
                                                          
1513 F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI, Article 7. Jurisdiction in the Event of a Choice of Law, in The EU Succession 
Regulation: A Commentary, op. cit., p. 179. 
1514 On the lex fori approach: A. DAVÌ, A. ZANOBETTI, Il nuovo diritto internazionale privato europeo delle 
successioni, op. cit., p. 205, A. LEANDRO, La giurisdizione nel regolamento dell’Unione europea sulle 
successioni mortis causa, in Il diritto internazionale privato europeo delle successioni mortis causa, op. cit., p. 
69. 
1515 L. FUMAGALLI, Il sistema italiano di diritto internazionale privato e processuale e il regolamento (UE) n. 
650/2012 sulle successioni:spazi residui per la legge interna?, op. cit., pp. 779-792; A. DAVÌ, Introduction, in 
The EU Succession Regulation: A Commentary, op. cit., p. 30; A. BONOMI, Le Introduzione, in A. BONOMI, P. 
WAUTELET (eds), Il Regolamento Europeo sulle successioni: Commentario al reg. UE 650/2012 in vigore dal 17 
agosto 2015, Giuffrè Editore, 2015, p. 11. 
1516 See T. M. DE BOER, What we should not expect from a recast of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, op. cit., p. 13, 
footnote 28 providing an example: «Thus, a French citizen living in New York could not start proceedings in 
France against her Swiss husband living in Switzerland, even if French national law would allow her to do so. 
Except for prorogation (Art. 4) or tacit submission (Art. 5), the Maintenance regulation does not offer her an 
opportunity to bring suit in France.». On the Succession Regulation see I. QUEIROLO, General Rules on 
Jurisdiction, in Final Study: Towards the entry into force of the succession regulation: building future uniformity 
upon past divergences, op. cit., p. 350: «…under the Succession Regulation the jurisdiction of Italian courts is 
now subject to relevant limitations since the succession of an Italian national habitually resident abroad will fall 
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Also, the problem of giving effect to the jurisdiction of Third States courts in the presence of 
Owusu case seems to be even more significant. The erga omnes approach of the system of 
allocation of jurisdiction is reinforced by Article 10 on subsidiary jurisdiction and by Article 
11 on forum necessitatis.1517 It means that the Succession Regulation provides only for the 
reverse scenario. The Member State courts may establish jurisdiction over the succession 
although the deceased at the time of death is not located in a Member State. Or, Member 
States have jurisdiction if proceedings cannot reasonably be brought or conducted or would be 
impossible in a Third State with which the case is closely connected. Otherwise, there is no 
jurisdictional rule which directly deals with the jurisdiction of Third State courts, which might 
be better situated (for example, where there is a choice-of-court agreement in favour of the 
Third State court).  
On the contrary, Article 5 of the Succession Regulation provides that where the law chosen by 
the deceased to govern his succession pursuant to Article 22 is the law of a Member State, the 
parties concerned may confer the jurisdiction to such a Member State court. Therefore, the de 
cujus may choose the law of his/her nationality even if it is a law of a Third State, but the 
concerned parties subsequently cannot designate such a Third State court. Since the objective 
of the Succession Regulation is the establishment of the coincidence between the ius and the 
forum, it seems regrettable that the Succession Regulation did not take the position that where 
the deceased chose a law of the Third State and the parties would be interested in seizing such 
a Third State court. Although the EU regulations cannot determine the allocation of the 
jurisdiction in respect of Third States,1518 the Succession Regulation could provide for a rule 
to stay the proceedings in favour of the Third State court on the basis of the jurisdiction 
agreement.1519 Unfortunately, due to the exhaustive system of the allocation of jurisdiction, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
outside the jurisdiction of Italian courts, unless special heads of jurisdiction provided by the Regulation are to 
be applied.». 
1517 L. FUMAGALLI, Il sistema italiano di diritto internazionale privato e processuale e il regolamento (UE) n. 
650/2012 sulle successioni:spazi residui per la legge interna?, op. cit., p. 790; P. FRANZINA, Sul forum 
necessitatis nello spazio giudiziario europeo, op. cit., p. 1121; G. ROSSOLILLO, Forum necessitatis e flessibilità 
dei criteri di giurisdizione nel diritto internazionale privato nazionale e dell’Unione europea, in op. cit., p. 413–
15. 
1518 M. FALLON, T. KRUGER, The spatial scope of the EU’s rules on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments: 
from bilateral modus to unilateral universality?, Yearbook of Private International Law (2013), p. 1-36. 
1519 See for example, the European Group for Private International Law in its meeting in Bergen on 19-21 
September 2008, available at: https://www.gedip-egpil.eu/documents/gedip-documents-18pe.htm, Article 23bis: 
«1. A court of a Member State seized of proceedings over which it has jurisdiction under this Regulation, and 
with regard to which the parties have given exclusive jurisdiction to a court or the courts of a non-Member State 
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which does not leave room for national law, it seems hardly arguable that the choice-of-court 
agreements in favour of a Third State court may be permitted under the national law.1520 The 
only argument for upholding such a jurisdiction agreement might be the theory of effet 
reflexe, which might come into play when the de cujus designate, as the law applicable to the 
succession as a whole, the law of a Third State according to Article 22 of the Succession 
Regulation. On the other hand, nothing in the regulations impede the parties from bringing the 
dispute in front of the Third State court on the basis of the jurisdiction agreement. However, if 
the relevant parties enter into an agreement and file a petition before non-Member State court 
and later on, one of them files a claim in Member State court where the deceased had habitual 
residence, the problem of parallel proceedings occurs and the Member State court should 
assume its jurisdiction in accordance with Article 4 of the Succession Regulation.  
The Succession Regulation does not address the case of lis pendens concerning the pending 
proceedings in the Third States, contrary to the Brussels Ibis Regulation, which would ensure 
desirable coordination. The lis pendens rule is designated only for the scope of determining 
the parallel proceedings between the Member State. The use of the theory of effet reflexe is 
rejected by some authors.1521 Although Professor Bonomi points out the interpretation of the 
ECJ in Owusu case, he suggests application of the national rules for lis pendens even when 
the jurisdiction of the Member State court is based on Articles 4, 7, and 10 of the Succession 
Regulation since the application of national rules “is the mean for the coordination between 
the Member State courts and the Third States”.1522 The specific consideration of the English 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
under an agreement complying with the conditions laid down by Article 23, shall not hear the proceedings 
unless and until the chosen court has declined jurisdiction. It shall stay the proceedings as long as the chosen 
court has not been seized or, if it has been seized, has not declined jurisdiction. It shall decline jurisdiction once 
the chosen court has given a judgment entitled to recognition under the law of the State of the court seized. 
Nevertheless, it may hear the proceedings if it appears that: (a) the chosen court will not give judgment within a 
reasonable time; (b) the chosen court will give a judgment which will not be entitled to recognition under the 
law of the State of the court seized.». On the similar solution in the Succession Regulation see F. MARONGIU 
BUONAIUTI, The EU Succession Regulation and third country courts, op. cit., p. 563. 
1520 On this conclusion see F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI, The EU Succession Regulation and third country courts, 
op. cit., p. 552. 
1521 A. BONOMI, R. DI IORIO, Litispendenza, in A. BONOMI, P. WAUTELET (eds), Il Regolamento europeo sulle 
successioni: Commentario al Reg. UE 650/2012 in vigore dal 17 agosto 2015, Giuffrè Editore, 2015, op. cit., p. 
201. 
1522 A. BONOMI, R. DI IORIO, Litispendenza, in Il Regolamento europeo sulle successioni: Commentario al Reg. 
UE 650/2012 in vigore dal 17 agosto 2015, op. cit., p. 201. On the ooposite approach see L. FUMAGALLI, Il 
sistema italiano di diritto internazionale privato e processuale e il regolamento (UE) n. 650/2012 sulle 
successioni:spazi residui per la legge interna?, op. cit., pp. 790-791. See also for example L. MARI, Il Diritto 
processuale civile della Convenzione di Bruxelles, CEDAM, 1999, p. 779, where the author excludes the 
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courts concerning the interference of the Owusu case with the other regulations (in this case 
with the Brussels IIa Regulation) in the case JKN v JCN1523 and in Mittal v Mittal1524 may 
confirm Bonomi’s opinion. The English court decided that the Member State court’s 
discretion to stay under the national law remains in place where the competing proceedings 
are in a non-Member State and that the Owusu case is not applicable in the case of parallel 
proceedings.1525 Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the policy of the Succession 
Regulation is also to avoid conflicting judgments in different jurisdictions.1526 Some other 
doubts on the extension of the Owusu interpretation into the Succession Regulation may arise 
in the context of forum non conveniens, which is according to the ECJ liable “to undermine 
the predictability” of the rules of jurisdiction of the Brussels Convention. Contrary to this 
rejection, Article 6 lett. a) of the Succession Regulation is inspired by the forum non 
conveniens.1527 In any case, it is regrettable that the Succession Regulation did not opt for the 
rule similar to the current Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. For example, the 
Member State court seized could take into the consideration the ability of a Third State court 
to exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to the national law of the seized Member State court, and 
where the dispute would be closely connected with the jurisdiction of a Third State court, 
such as when the coincidence of the ius and the forum occurs.1528 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
application of the national law in the case of the lis pendens in case that the Member States courts have 
jurisdiction according to the Brussels regime. 
1523 JKN v JCN, [2010] EWHC 843 (Fam). 
1524 AB v CB, [2013] EWCA Civ 1255. 
1525 JKN v JCN, [2010] EWHC 843 (Fam), [149]. 
1526 AB v CB, [2013] EWCA Civ 1255, [37]. 
1527 A. BONOMI, R. DI IORIO, Dichiarazione di incompetenza in caso di scelta di legge, in Il Regolamento 
europeo sulle successioni: Commentario al Reg. UE 650/2012 in vigore dal 17 agosto 2015, op. cit., p. 143. 
1528 F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI, The EU Succession Regulation and third country courts, op. cit., p. 551. 
However, there is a danger that the choice-of-court agreement is inadmissible admissible according to national 
law. The author points out that according to the specific domestic law, the deceased is only entitled to make a 
choice of court, instead of the concerned parties, as the Succession Regulation provides. 
  
400 
 
CONCLUSION 
At the beginning of the conclusion of this PhD thesis, it is necessary to remember some facts. 
The importance and the main task of choice-of-court agreements are legal certainty and 
predictability by enabling the parties to plan the venue of the dispute with cross-border 
elements. Although the importance of the choice-of-court agreement was recognized in civil 
and commercial matters, this tool, which gives legal certainty to cross-border couples and 
individuals, proved to be necessary for international family and succession law as well. 
It must be borne in mind that the efficacy of this tool is reliant on the statutory recognition of 
choice-of-court agreements and providing for the functional legal framework. Indeed, this 
PhD thesis examined the legal framework of choice-of-court agreements within the EU. In 
particular, this PhD thesis examined the rules on choice-of-court agreements (e.g., the scope, 
conditions for application, formal and substantive validity, exclusivity, and severability) and 
related rules, such as rules on lis pendens among both Member States courts and parallel 
proceedings in Third States, under the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the 2007 Lugano Convention, 
the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, the Brussels IIa Regulation, the 
Maintenance Regulation, Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation, Regulation on the 
Property Consequences of Registered Partnerships, and the Succession Regulation.  
The task of the first chapter was to create a foundation for comprehension of the examined 
argument. This served as a point for departure for the second chapter dealing with the “origin” 
rule on choice-of-court agreement in civil and commercial matters under the Brussels 
Convention which paved the way and influenced, to a certain extent, the “younger” rules on 
choice-of-court agreements in family and succession matters. This PhD thesis directed the 
readers to comprehend the gradual evolution of the argument, the push for the enhancement of 
the rules, the expansion of the rule to other subject-matters, and the actual trends. 
In this conclusion, the questions raised in the Introduction must be addressed even though the 
answers can be found through the reading of the whole PhD thesis. The content of these 
questions is briefly summarized. The questions concern: (i) the identification of the problems, 
loopholes, gaps, or weak points and the solutions adopted in this regard, which may 
contribute to the enhancement and strengthening of the effectiveness of the rules on choice-
of-court agreements; (ii) the approach for testing the rules and their interplay; (iii) the 
verification of the transferability of the approach assumed in one subject matter to another and 
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the possibility of assuming the conclusions transversely through all subject matters; and lastly 
(iv) the general conclusion of the functionality of the rules on choice-of-court agreements in 
the all analysed legal instruments. It is not possible to define the boundaries between 
individual questions because the approach to two or more questions often overlaps.  
The first questions concern the identification of the problems, loopholes, gaps, or weak points 
and the solutions de lege ferenda. This PhD thesis detected both significant and less essential 
loopholes and weak points resulting from the wording of the texts of the rules on choice-of-
court agreements, lis pendens laid down in the different legal instruments, as well as from the 
ECJ interpretation. Some of the loopholes, gaps, or weak points are free-standing since they 
create problems only in respect of a single legal instrument and the considerations cannot be 
extended into another legal instrument. Therefore, the solutions for the single problems must 
be assessed on the case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the specificity of the analysed 
legal problem and the nature of the subject matter. It is not surprising that the free-standing 
problems were practically detected in all target legal instruments. This conclusion only 
presents the most significant problems and the brief tailor-made recommendations for their 
solutions. 
The analysis of the Brussels Ibis Regulation revealed several free-standing substantial 
problems in this PhD thesis when most of them relate to the new rules of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation. It must be remembered that the new rules were established in the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation either due to the gaps in the wording of the rules of the Brussels I Regulation or 
due the ECJ interpretation based on the often criticized principle of the legal certainty, which 
may often contrast with limited effectivity and has turned out to be deceptive in practice.1529 
This PhD thesis recognized that the gap of substantive validity was positively refilled by the 
new rule of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, which clarified past doctrinal mismatches by 
providing the uniform solutions for the designated and non-designated Member State court. 
This thesis also affirms also that there is space for further enhancement. The effectiveness of 
choice-of-court agreements might be further strengthened by the delineation of its scope of 
application, such as answering questions of capacity, voidable circumstances, agency, and 
assignment. For this specific problem the thesis suggested using a proposal of Professor 
                                                          
1529 On the general consideration as to the principle of legal certainty see J. VAN MEERBEECK, The principle of 
legal certainty in the case-law of the European Court of justice: from certainty to trust, European Law Review 
41:2 (2016), pp. 275-288. 
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Magnus as a springboard for reasoning for the next amendments, because the proposal 
recommended subsuming capacity, mistake, fraud, duress, as well as matters such as agency 
and assignment under the new rule of substantive validity.1530  
Moreover, the ECJ interpretations, which are built on the principle of legal certainty, have led 
to the over-rigid application of the rules and even to the injustice.1531 Therefore, different and 
new rules established in the Brussels Ibis Regulation aimed at correcting the ECJ 
interpretations undermining the effectiveness of the rule on choice-of-court agreements. The 
new rule on lis pendens giving precedence to the designated Member State court to decide on 
validity was a reaction to the ECJ interpretation provided in the Gasser case. It was 
demonstrated that even though the new lis pendens rule may limit the “torpedo actions”, a 
negative side of this rule was detected: the Brussels Ibis Regulation does not tackle the 
possibility of a disagreement between two seized Member State courts (although it will be 
limited due to the new rule on substantive validity). This lacuna may lead to a special type of 
parallel proceedings often resulting in a race to judgments.1532 This result is caused by the 
combination of the imprecise wording regarding the extent of the review of the existence and 
validity of the jurisdiction agreement by the non-designated Member State (resulting in 
application of the “full review” approach), and by the Gothaer case, where the designated 
Member State courts are bound by the decision rendered by the non-designated Member State 
court regarding the validity of the jurisdiction clause. For this specific problem, it was 
suggested to perform a “prima facie” review.1533 Another ECJ interpretation, which had a 
side-effect on choice-of-court agreements in favour of the Third States was the Owusu case. 
The criticised Owusu case exerted pressure on the adoption, at least of the partial solution - of 
Articles 33 and 34 dealing with the parallel proceedings in the Third States. Although the new 
Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation enhance parallel proceedings in the Third 
States, the application only to pending proceedings in the Third States was evaluated as a 
                                                          
1530 U. MAGNUS, Choice-of-court Agreements in the Review Proposal for the Brussels I Regulation, in The 
Brussels I Review Proposal Uncovered, op. cit., p. 93-95. On the general considerations on the substantive 
validity, related problems and the solutions under ther Brussels Regime see supra Section 8.2., Subchapter I, 
Chapter Two. 
1531 A. DICKINSON, Legal Certainty and the Brussels Convention - Too Much of a Good Thing?, in P. DE 
VAREILLES-SOMMIERES (ed), Forum Shopping in the European Judicial Area, Hart Publishing, 2007, p. 136. 
1532 See Recital No 22 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation: «The designated court should be able to proceed 
irrespective of whether the non-designated court has already decided on the stay of proceedings.». 
1533 On the general considerations on the new rule on lis pendens under ther Brussels Regime, and on the 
examples and solutions see supra Section 14, Subchapter I, Chapter Two. 
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weak point. Thus, it was recommended to extend the application of Articles 33 and 34 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation to cases when the Member State court is first seized.1534  
The free-standing loopholes and weak points were identified in the wording of the rules under 
the EU Regulations in family and succession matters as well. Although several problems may 
be found under the Brussels IIa Regulation, it is presumed that the Proposal for a Recast of 
the Brussels IIa Regulation may resolve some of the problems. Such solutions include: 
determining the duration of the effect of the jurisdiction agreement under Article 12 par. 3 of 
the Brussels IIa Regulation;1535 a more precise specification of the best interest of the 
child;1536 application of Article 12 par. 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation to the autonomous 
proceedings (C-656/13, L v. M);1537 or the possibility of accepting jurisdiction during the 
proceedings, etc. However, as to the latter issue, it was noted that the new paragraph 5 of 
Article 10 of the Proposal does not shed light on the problem concerning the possibility to 
accept jurisdiction through the “submission of appearance” under Article 12 of the Brussels 
IIa Regulation.1538 In respect of the Maintenance Regulation, it was noted that the exclusion 
of party autonomy in relation to the maintenance obligations towards a minor under the age of 
18 might be seen as another weak point. In this case, various solutions were proposed which 
have taken into consideration the nature of the subject matter and the position of the minor as 
a weaker party. In consequence, it was proposed to give the option to the minor to choose a 
court through non-exclusive unilateral jurisdiction agreements; and to enable a discretionary 
power of the courts’ jurisdiction, when the best interest of the child should be considered, or 
to provide for a “escape clause” where the transfer of the proceedings to the better place court 
may be requested.1539  
                                                          
1534 On the general considerations on problem of Owusu case, the new rules on parallel proceeding with the 
Third States under the Brussels Regime, and on solutions see supra Section 15, Subchapter I, Chapter Two. 
1535 On the time limit of the effects of the agreement under the Brussels IIa Regulation see supra Section 2.1.2, 
Subchapter I, Chapter Three. 
1536 On the best interest of the child and new Proposal for a Recast of the Brussels IIa Regulation see supra 
Sections 2.2.3. and 2.3.3., Subchapter I, Chapter Three. 
1537 On the problem regarding wording of Article 12 par. 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation providing that the 
courts of a Member State shall also have jurisdiction in relation to parental responsibility “in proceedings other 
than those referred to in paragraph 1”, and for the new Proposal for a Recast of the Brussels IIa Regulation, see 
see supra Section 2.3., Subchapter I, Chapter Three. 
1538 On the problem of the submission by appearance under the Brussels IIa Regulation see supra Section 2.4., 
Subchapter I, Chapter Three. 
1539 On the general considerations on exclusion of choice-of-court agreements in relation to maintenance 
obligations towards a minor under the age of 18, and on solutions see supra Section 3.3., Subchapter I, Chapter 
Three. 
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Not only gaps and weaknesses were identified in the PhD thesis, but also uncertainties 
regarding the wording of the rules. These uncertainties were mainly due to the lack of 
doctrinal approaches and ECJ interpretation in respect of the young EU Regulations. The 
significant uncertainty, which may undermine the effectiveness of the rules on choice-of-court 
agreements, was identified under the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation. In case that 
property regime is dealt simultaneously with divorce, legal separation, or marriage annulment, 
it is doubtful whether the parties may derogate from the jurisdiction of a Member State court 
seized with the divorce, legal separation, or marriage annulment proceeding according to first 
four indents of Article 3 par. 1 lett. a) or according to Article 3 par. 1 lett. b) of the Brussels 
IIa Regulation and may designate a different competent court according to Article 7 of the 
Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation.1540  
Other loopholes can be called transversal since they affect more legal instruments 
cumulatively. The most serious loophole, which was revealed in chapter III, is the lack of a 
rule on a choice-of-court agreement for divorce. The lack of a rule on choice-of-court 
agreements for divorce, legal separation, or marriage annulment under the Brussels IIa 
Regulation prevents the spouses from planning the potential dispute in other connected family 
matters (maintenance, parental responsibility, property regime) and the effective 
concentration of the jurisdiction in the hand of a single Member State court for one package 
including all family matters. It was demonstrated that the concentration would be possible 
through: (i) Article 12 par. 1 of the Brussels IIa Regulation, which provides for the possibility 
to agree on jurisdiction of the Member State court having jurisdiction according to Article 3 
of the Brussels IIa Regulation to matters of parental responsibility upon fulfilment of strict 
conditions (which is discretionary); (ii) according to Article 4 par. 1 lett. c) of the 
Maintenance Regulation, which confers jurisdiction upon agreement to the Member State 
court which has jurisdiction to settle disputes in matrimonial matters and maintenance 
obligations between spouses or former spouses; and (iii) according to Article 5 of the 
Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation, which provides for the automatic extension of 
jurisdiction of the Member State court competent to decide on the divorce, legal separation, or 
marriage annulment under the Brussels IIa Regulation.  
                                                          
1540 On this uncertainty under the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation see supra Section 4.2.2., Subchapter 
I, Chapter Three. 
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Although it was expected that this loophole would be filled by the Proposal for a Recast of the 
Brussels IIa Regulation, no rule on choice-of-court agreements for divorce was proposed. 
Thus, it was affirmed that due to the absence of a rule on choice of court relative to divorce, 
separation, or marriage annulment, jurisdiction agreements in parental responsibility matters, 
maintenance, and property regime designating a court having jurisdiction in divorce, 
separation, or marriage annulment under the Brussels IIa Regulation, may benefit the parties 
who wish to “blindly” concentrate all proceedings, notwithstanding the impossibility to 
predict which court will assume jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction agreements may encourage 
“rush to court” tactics. The PhD thesis highlights the need to adopt a rule on choice-of-court 
relative to divorce, otherwise choice-of-court agreements would lose fundamental functions 
and would not be able to guarantee the legal certainty and predictability.1541 
The other question, which must be addressed regards the approach for testing the rules and 
their interplay. As stated in the Introduction, the testing was pursued through the analysis of: 
the target legal instruments; the ECJ interpretation; the presentation of the different doctrinal 
approaches; and through the creation of the examples, considerations, and analysis of the 
examples; and evaluation, verification, and presentation of their outcomes. It is necessary to 
pause for the latter approach. According to the author, this approach represents an efficient 
tool for revealing different legal problems and gaps following their combined application. 
This approach allows imagining a concrete situation, to ratiocinate the examples, and to offer 
solutions. Sometimes, it was necessary to turn the example inside out which revealed the 
potential weaknesses and gaps. This approach also illustrated the outcomes arising out from 
the presented problems when the presentation of a specific problem would be difficult to 
follow only through the reading of the legal instruments and doctrinal studies.  
By this means, two significant problems concerning the simultaneous application of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation and the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements were 
identified. The first problem concerns the interplay of the rules on lis pendens between the 
Member States under Articles 25 and 31 par. 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation and Articles 5 
and 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreement and in the presence of one of 
the exceptions for a stay of proceedings (substantive validity) laid down in Article 6 of the 
                                                          
1541 On considerations regarding the lack of a rule on choice-of-court for divorce, legal separation, or marriage 
annulment under the Brussels IIa Regulation and the proposals see supra Section 2.6., Subchapter I, Chapter 
Three. 
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Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreement. It was shown that the problem resulting in 
the parallel proceedings and irreconcilable judgments might arise due to the combination of: 
the applying a “full review” approach by the non-designated Member State court under the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation; the double test of capacity under both lex fori and law of the 
designated Member State court by a seized non-designated Member State court under the 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements; and by prevalence of the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements over the Brussels Ibis Regulation pursuant to 
Article 26 par. 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements.1542  
The second problem concerned the interplay of the rules on parallel proceedings between the 
Member State and Third State under Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation and 
Articles 5 and 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreement. One gap was 
detected: when all parties involved reside exclusively within the Member States, or when the 
plaintiff is domiciled in a Third State that is not a Contracting State and the defendant is 
domiciled in a Member State, and they agree on a court in the Contracting State. In such a 
case, the Brussels Ibis Regulation should prevail over the Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements. The problem of parallel proceedings and irreconcilable judgments may 
arise when the Member State court should establish jurisdiction according to Article 4 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation by virtue of the Owusu case and Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation cannot operate. In such a case, it was recommended to follow the Impact 
Assessment, the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements.1543 
Another question concerns the transferability of the approach assumed in one subject matter 
to another and the possibility of the transversal conclusions through all subject matters. It was 
demonstrated that the extension of the approach assumed under the Brussels Regime into the 
                                                          
1542 On the problem concerning the simultaneous application of the Brussels Ibis Regulation and the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements as to lis pendens between the Member States see supra Section 2.3., 
Subchapter III, Chapter Two. 
1543 A study to inform an impact assessment on the ratification of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements by the European Community, p. 105: «Finally, a situation may arise under which all parties to a 
choice-of-court agreement are resident in EU Member States but they have agreed to a court in a non-EU 
Member State which is a Contracting Party to the Hague Convention. In this case, Art. 26 para 6 of the Hague 
Convention which refers to residence of the parties only, gives priority to Brussels I. However, if in such a case 
there is no exclusive jurisdiction of any court in a EU Member State under Brussels I, the Hague Convention 
could still apply even if, this situation is not exactly covered by any provision of the Hague Convention.». On the 
problem concerning the simultaneous application of the Brussels Ibis Regulation and the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements as to parallel proceedings in the Member State and Third State see supra Section 
2.4., Subchapter III, Chapter Two. 
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family and succession matters might be possible through: (i) the ECJ interpretation as to the 
Brussels Regime; (ii) the doctrinal studies regarding the Brussels Regime; or (iii) by virtue of 
the new rules of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. This may be proved on the basis of the 
following demonstrations.  
The gap regarding substantive validity was identified pursuant to all EU Regulations in family 
and succession matters,1544 which represented a highly discussed problem under the Brussels 
Convention and Brussels I Regulation. The ECJ interpretation and the different doctrinal 
approaches were developed as to substantive validity of the jurisdiction agreement under the 
Brussels Regime,1545 which have led to the adoption of a new rule under the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation. In consequence, the solution of the gap concerning substantive validity of 
jurisdiction agreements pursuant to all EU Regulations in family and succession matters may 
be, for example, found in the following: the ECJ interpretation in Trasporti Castelletti 
regarding the formal requirements under the Brussels Convention; in lex fori which reflects 
the comprehension of jurisdiction agreements as procedural agreements (which is mainly 
based on the doctrinal studies as to the Brussels Regime); or may be inspired by the new rule 
on substantive validity laid down in the Brussels Ibis Regulation.  
The other demonstration concerns the gap on severability of the jurisdiction agreement in the 
EU Regulations in family and succession matters. This may have an impact on the validity of 
jurisdiction agreements forming part of the prenuptial agreement or the agreement as to the 
succession. In such a case, the scholars often refer to a solution in the ECJ’s interpretation in 
the Benincasa case.1546  
In this PhD thesis, it was also pointed out that some rules under the Brussels I(bis) Regulation 
were practically transposed into other EU Regulations in family and succession matters (for 
example, regarding the electronic communication, which is considered a written formal 
                                                          
1544 On the of the rule on substantive validity under the Brussels IIa Regulation see supra Section 2.5., 
Subchapter I, Chapter Three; under the Maintenance Regulation see supra Section 3.5., Subchapter I, Chapter 
Three: under the Regulations on the Property Regime see supra Section 4.4., Subchapter I, Chapter Three; under 
the Succession Regulation see supra Section 2.2.3., Subchapter II, Chapter Three. 
1545 On the gap in the rule on substantive validity under the Brussels I Regulation see see supra Section 8.1., 
Subchapter I, Chapter Two. 
1546 On the gap regarding severability of the jurisdiction agreement under the Maintenance Regulation see supra 
Section 3.6., Subchapter I, Chapter Three; under the Regulations on the Property Regime see supra Section4.5., 
Subchapter I, Chapter Three, under the Succession Regulation see supra Section 2.2.2. Subchapter II, Chapter 
Three. 
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requirement under the Maintenance Regulation or Regulations of the Property Regimes; rules 
on lis pendens etc.). This raised the question whether such transposition of the rules from the 
Brussels Regime into the EU Regulations in family and succession matters was intentional 
and all conclusions assumed under the Brussels Regime may be automatically extended into 
another EU Regulations. This is a case of lis pendens rule. If such automatic extension should 
be accepted, the ECJ interpretation in Gasser case under the Brussels Regime may represent a 
threat for choice-of-court agreements in family and succession matters as well. In 
consequence, this PhD thesis also examined in what cases the Gasser case might come into a 
play in family and succession matters.1547  
Lastly, it may be stated that one specific point is transversal for all subject matters. This 
connecting point, unfortunately, concerns the loophole on choice-of-court agreements in 
favour of the Third States and the extension of the Owusu case into the family and succession 
matters. Although the national case law of the specific Member States admitted derogation of 
jurisdiction in favour of the Third States in the context of the Brussels IIa Regulation (JKN v 
JCN case or Mittal v Mittal case),1548 it was demonstrated that the Owusu case is often 
considered in cross-border family and succession matters. The justification for the derogation 
from Owusu case may be even more difficult due to the exclusive jurisdictional rules laid 
down in certain EU Regulations in family and succession matters excluding national law. 
Despite all different weaknesses, gaps, and problems which were pointed out in this PhD 
thesis, it may be stated that the current legal framework of the rules on choice-of-court 
agreements laid down in the analysed legal instruments operate satisfactorily and contribute to 
legal certainty and predictability. However, there is wide room for the further enhancement 
and strengthening of the effectiveness of the rules on choice-of-court agreements. This PhD 
thesis analysed many aspects, included many considerations, and offered new conclusions and 
proposals. This analysis may be helpful for further improvement of the current wording of the 
target legal instruments. For example, this analysis may assist the ongoing proposals on the 
                                                          
1547 On lis pendens between the Member under the Brussels IIa Regulation, Maintenance Regulation; 
Regulations on the Property Regime see supra Section 5, Subchapter I, Chapter Three; under the Succession 
Regulation see supra Section 3, Subchapter II, Chapter Three. 
1548 On the considerations regarding the extension of the Owusu case under the Brussels IIa Regulation, 
Maintenance Regulation; Regulations on the Property Regime see supra Section 6, Subchapter I, Chapter Three; 
under the Succession Regulation see supra Section4, Subchapter II, Chapter Three. 
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recast of the Brussels IIa Regulation or, the future proposals on the recast of the Maintenance 
Regulation. 
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2:1 (2009), pp. 1-15; 
ŽUPAN M., DRVENTIC M., Chapter 5. Parallel Proceedings, in I. VIARENGO, F. C. VILLATA 
(eds), EUFam’s Final Study, available at: http://www.eufams.unimi.it/2017/12/30/final-
study/, p. 152-169. 
II. Legal Acts and Other Related Documents of EU and European Community 
1. Treaties, Protocols, Conventions of Accession and Other Fundamental Documents 
Protocol concerning the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the convention of 27 
September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters - signed in Luxembourg on 3 June 1971, OJ L 204, 2 August 1975 
Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities and certain related acts, OJ C 340, 10 November 1997; 
Convention of Accession of 9 October 1978 of the Kingdom of Denmark, of Ireland and of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on 
jurisdiction and enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters and to the 
Protocol on its interpretation by the Court of Justice, (78/884/EEC), OJ L 304, 30 
October 1978; 
Convention on the accession of the Hellenic Republic to the Convention on jurisdiction and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters and to the Protocol on its 
interpretation by the Court of Justice with the adjustments made to them by the 
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Convention on the accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, of Ireland and of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, (82/972/EEC), OJ L 388, 31 December 
1982;  
Convention on the accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic to the 
Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters and to the Protocol on its interpretation by the Court of Justice with the 
adjustments made to them by the Convention on the accession of the Kingdom of 
Denmark, of Ireland and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
and the adjustments made to them by the Convention on the accession of the Hellenic 
Republic, (89/535/EEC), OJ L 285, 3 October 1989;  
Convention on the accession of the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the 
Kingdom of Sweden to the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters and to the Protocol on its interpretation by 
the Court of Justice, with the adjustments made to them by the Convention on the 
accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, of Ireland and of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, by the Convention on the accession of the Hellenic 
Republic and by the Convention on the accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the 
Portuguese Republic, OJ C 15, 15 January 1997 
Action Plan of the Council and the Commission on how best to implement the provisions of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam on an area of freedom, security and justice - Text adopted by 
the Justice and Home Affairs Council of 3 December 1998, OJ C 19, 23 January 1999; 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 326, 26 October 2012; 
The Hague Programme: strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union, 
OJ C 53, 3 March 2005; 
Council Decision of 20 September 2005 on the signing, on behalf of the Community, of the 
Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters, (2005/790/EC), OJ L 299, 16 November 2005;  
Council Decision of 27 April 2006 concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between the 
European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark on jurisdiction and the recognition 
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and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, (2006/325/EC), OJ L 
120, 5 May 2006; 
Treaty establishing the European Community (consolidated version 2006), OJ C 321E, 29 
December 2006; 
Treaty establishing the European Community (consolidated version), Protocols annexed to the 
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community 
Protocol (No 4) on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland (1997), OJ C 321E, 
29 December 2006; 
Treaty establishing the European Community (consolidated version), Protocols annexed to the 
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community 
Protocol (No 5) on the position of Denmark (1997), OJ C 321E, 29 December 2006;  
Council Decision of 26 February 2009 on the signing on behalf of the European Community 
of the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, (2009/397/EC), OJ L 133, 29 May 
2009; 
Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Protocol (No 
22) on the position of Denmark, OJ C 326, 26 October 2012; 
Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Protocol (No 
21) on the Position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in Respect of the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice, OJ C 326, 26 October 2012; 
Council Decision of 4 December 2014, on the approval, on behalf of the European Union, of 
the Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, (2014/887/EU) 
OJ L 353, 10 December 2014; 
Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 202, 7 
June 2016; 
Council Decision (EU) of 9 June 2016 authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of 
jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions on the 
property regimes of international couples, covering both matters of matrimonial 
property regimes and the property consequences of registered partnerships, (2016/954), 
OJ L 159, 16 June 2016. 
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2. Conventions, Directives and Regulations of EU and European Community 
2.1.  Conventions 
1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters, OJ L 299, 31 December 1972; 
Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations opened for signature in Rome on 
19 June 1980, OJ L 266, 9 October 1980; 
Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters 
- Declaration, annexed to the minutes of the Council, adopted during the Justice and 
Home Affairs Council on 28 and 29 May 1998 when drawing up the Convention on 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial 
Matters, OJ C 221, 16 July 1998; 
1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters (consolidated version), OJ C 27, 26 January 1998; 
2.2.  Directives 
Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, OJ L 95, 
21 April 1993; 
Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on 
certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees, OJ L 171, 7 
July 1999; 
Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 
on a Community framework for electronic signatures, OJ L 13, 19 January 2000; 
Directive 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 
concerning the distance marketing of consumer financial services and amending 
Council Directive 90/619/EEC and Directives 97/7/EC and 98/27/EC, OJ L 271, 9 
October 2002; 
Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on 
credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC, OJ L 
133, 22 May 2008; 
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2.3.  Regulations 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 of 29 May 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and in matters of parental 
responsibility for children of both spouses, OJ L 160, 30 June 2000; 
Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 12, 16 
January 2001; 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of 
parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, OJ L 338, 23 
December 2003; 
Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2006 creating a European order for payment procedure, OJ L 399, 30 
December 2006; 
Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 
on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), OJ L 177, 4 July 2008; 
Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, 
recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to 
maintenance obligations, OJ L 7, 10 January 2009; 
Council Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010 of 20 December 2010 implementing enhanced 
cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation, OJ L 343, 
29 December 2010; 
Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 
on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and 
acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on 
the creation of a European Certificate of Succession, OJ L 201, 27 July 2012; 
Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters, OJ L 351, 20 December 2012; 
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Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on 
insolvency proceedings, OJ L 141, 5 June 2015; 
Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1103 of 24 June 2016 implementing enhanced cooperation in 
the area of jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions 
in matters of matrimonial property regimes, OJ L 183, 8 July 2016; 
Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1104 of 24 June 2016 implementing enhanced cooperation in 
the area of jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions 
in matters of the property consequences of registered partnerships, OJ L 183, 8 July 
2016; 
3. Proposals, Reports and Other Related Documents 
3.1. Green Papers, Proposals, Reports and Impact Assessments prepared by the 
Commission 
Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in matrimonial matters and in matters of parental responsibility for joint 
children, COM/99/0220 final, 31 August 1999; 
Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in matters of parental responsibility, COM(2001) 505 final, 27 November 
2001; 
Proposal for a Council Regulation concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and in matters of parental 
responsibility repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 and amending Regulation (EC) 
No 44/2001 in matters relating to maintenance, COM(2002)0222 final, 27 August 2002; 
Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and 
enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance 
obligations, COM(2005)0649 final, 15 December 2005; 
Green Paper on Conflicts of Laws in Matters Concerning Matrimonial Property Regimes, 
Including the Question of Jurisdiction and Mutual recognition of 17 July 2006, 
COM(2006) 400 final, 17 July 2006; 
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Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 as regards 
jurisdiction and introducing rules concerning applicable law in matrimonial matters, 
COM(2006)0399 final, 17 July 2006; 
Proposal for a Council Decision on the signing by the European Community of the 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, COM(2008) 538 final, 5 September 2008; 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction, 
applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and authentic instruments in 
matters of succession and the creation of a European Certificate of Succession, 
COM(2009)0154 final, 14 October 2009; 
Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 
COM/2010/0748 final, 14 December 2010; 
Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and 
enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes, COM(2011)0126 
final, 16 March 2011; 
Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and 
enforcement of decisions regarding the property consequences of registered 
partnerships, COM(2011)0127 final, 16 March 2011; 
Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and 
enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes, COM(2016)0106 
final, 2 March 2016; 
Proposal for Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and 
enforcement of decisions in matters of the property consequences of registered 
partnerships, COM(2016)0107 final, 2 March 2016; 
Commission Staff Working Document. Annex to the proposal for a Council Regulation 
amending Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 as regards jurisdiction and introducing rules 
concerning applicable law in matrimonial matters. Impact Assessment, SEC(2006) 949, 
17 July 2006; 
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Commission Staff Working Document. Accompanying the Proposal for a Council Decision 
on the signing by the European Community of the Convention on Choice-of-Court 
Agreements, SEC (2008) 2390, 5 September 2009; 
Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and 
enforcement of decisions and authentic instruments in matters of successions and on the 
introduction of a European Certificate of Inheritance, Impact Assessment, SEC(2009) 
410 final, 14 October 2009; 
Commission staff working paper. Impact assessment. Accompanying document to the 
Proposal for Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
(Recast), SEC(2010) 1547 final, 14 December 2010; 
Commission Staff Working Paper. Impact assessment. Accompanying document to the 
Proposal for Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
(Recast), SEC(2010) 1548 final, 14 December 2010; 
Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, Accompanying document to the 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Bringing 
legal clarity to property rights for international couples, Proposal for a Council 
Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of 
decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes and the Proposal for a Council 
Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of 
decisions regarding the property consequences of registered partnerships, SEC(2011) 
327 final, 16 March 2011; 
Commission Staff Working Document. Impact Assessment. Accompanying the document 
Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of 
decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, and on 
international child abduction (recast), SWD/2016/0207 final, 30 June 2016; 
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Green Paper on the review of Council Regulation (EC) no 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 
COM/2009/0175 final, 21 April 2009; 
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European 
Economic and Social Committee on the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 
2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgements 
in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation 
(EC) No 1347/2000, COM(2014)0225 final, 15 April 2014; 
3.2.  Reports, Resolutions, Opinions of the European Parliament and Committees 
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Report on the proposal for a Council 
regulation amending regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 as regards jurisdiction and 
introducing rules concerning applicable law in matrimonial matters, PE 400.282v01, 
2006/0135(CNS), 9 January 2008; 
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Report on the proposal for a Council 
regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 as regards jurisdiction and 
introducing rules concerning applicable law in matrimonial matters, A6-0361/2008, 
2006/0135(CNS), 19 September 2008; 
Committee on Legal Affairs, Report on the implementation and review of Council Regulation 
(EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters, PE 439.997, A7-0219/2010, 29 June 2010; 
Committee on Legal Affairs, Draft Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast), PE467.046, 28 June 2011; 
Committee on Legal Affairs, Draft report - on the proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and 
enforcement of decisions and authentic instruments in matters of succession and the 
creation of a European Certificate of Succession, Committee on Legal Affairs, 
PE483.680, 2009/0157(COD), 27 February 2012; 
Committee on Legal Affairs, Draft Report on the proposal for a Council regulation on 
jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters 
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of matrimonial property regimes, Committee on Legal Affairs, PE494.578, 
2011/0059(CNS), 25 July 2012; 
Committee on Legal Affairs, Draft Report on the proposal for a Council Regulation on 
jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions on the 
property consequences of registered partnerships, PE494.575, 2011/0060(CNS), 25 July 
2012; 
Committee on Legal Affairs, Amendments 121 Draft report - Jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast), PE496.504, 
2010/0383 (COD), 25 September 2012; 
Committee on Legal Affairs, Amendments 25-190, on the proposal for a Council regulation 
on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and 
the matters of parental responsibility, and on international child abduction (recast), PE 
606.308v01, 26 June 2017; 
European Parliament Resolution of 7 September 2010 on the implementation and review of 
Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, P7 TA(2010) 0304, 7 
September 2010; 
European Parliament legislative resolution of 10 September 2013 on the proposal for a 
Council regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement 
of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes, P7_TA(2013)0338, 
2011/0059(CNS), 10 September 2013; 
European Parliament legislative resolution of 10 September 2013 on the proposal for a 
Council regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement 
of decisions regarding the property consequences of registered partnerships, 
P7_TA(2013)0337, 2011/0060(CNS), 10 September 2013; 
Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Proposal for a Regulation of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on the law applicable to contractual 
obligations (Rome I), CESE/2006/1153, 13 September 2006; 
Opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs for the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs on the proposal for a Council regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, 
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recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to 
maintenance obligations, PE386.692, 2005/0259(CNS), 5 October 2007; 
Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Green Paper on the review 
of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters’ COM (2009) 175 final, OJ 
C 255, 22 September 2010; 
Opinion of the Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality for the Committee on 
Legal Affairs on the proposal for a Council regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law 
and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property 
regimes, PE478.403, 2011/0059(CNS), 7 May 2012; 
3.3.  Documents of the Council  
The Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 14066/08 ADD1, 2005/0259 (CNS), 
21 October 2008; 
The Presidency and the incoming Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 
11867/11, 2010/0383 (COD), 29 June 2011; 
The Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 6795/12, 2010/0383 (COD), 24 
February 2012; 
The Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 8855/12, 2010/0383 (COD), 17 April 
2012;  
The Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 10609/12 ADD 1, 2010/0383 (COD), 
1 June 2012; 
The Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 10711/12, 2010/0383 (COD), 6 June 
2012; 
The Irish Presidency and the incoming Lithuanian Presidency, 11699/13 INIT, 2011/0059 
(CNS), 28 June 2013; 
The Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 14655/15 INIT, 2011/0059 (CNS) 
2011/0060 (CNS), 26 November 2015; 
The Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 14784/18, 2016/0190(CNS), 30 
November 2018; 
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Comments by the German delegation on Chapters I, II, III, IV, V and VI, 17792/11 ADD 9, 
2011/0059 (CNS) 2011/0060 (CNS), 16 January 2011 
Comments from the United Kingdom delegation on Chapters I-II, 13698/11 ADD 1, 
2011/0059 (CNS) 2011/0060 (CNS), 6 September 2011; 
Comments from the Hungarian delegation on Chapters I-II 13698/11 INIT, 2011/0059 (CNS) 
2011/0060 (CNS), 6 September 2011; 
Comments from the Austrian delegation on Chapters I-II, 13698/11 ADD 4, 2011/0059 
(CNS) 2011/0060 (CNS), 9 September 2011;  
Comments from the Slovak delegation on Chapters I-II, 13698/11 ADD 6, 2011/0059 (CNS) 
2011/0060 (CNS), 12 September 2011;  
Comments from the Spanish delegation on Chapters I-II, 13698/11 ADD 7 REV 1, 2011/0059 
(CNS) 2011/0060 (CNS), 13 September 2011; 
Comments from the Swedish delegation on Chapters I-II, 13698/11 ADD 10, 2011/0059 
(CNS) 2011/0060 (CNS), 15 September 2011; 
Comments from the Finnish delegation on Chapters I-II, 13698/11 ADD 13, 2011/0059 
(CNS) 2011/0060 (CNS), 19 September 2011; 
Comments from the Portuguese delegation on Chapters I-II, 13698/11 ADD 11, 2011/0059 
(CNS) 2011/0060 (CNS), 19 September 2011;  
Comments from the Danish delegation on Chapters I-II, 13698/11 ADD 1, 2011/0059 (CNS) 
2011/0060 (CNS), 20 September 2011;  
Comments from the Czech delegation on Chapters I-II, 13698/11 ADD 13, 2011/0059 (CNS) 
2011/0060 (CNS), 20 September 2011;  
Comments from the Belgian delegation on Chapters I-II, 13698/11 ADD 16, 2011/0059 
(CNS) 2011/0060 (CNS), 30 September 2011;  
Comments from the Slovenian delegation on Chapters I and II, 13698/11 ADD 18, 2011/0059 
(CNS) 2011/0060 (CNS), 3 October 2011; 
Comments from the delegation of the United Kingdom, 8000/12, 2010/0383 (COD), 22 
March 2012 
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4. International Conventions and Preliminary Documents of the World 
Organisations 
4.1. Bilateral Conventions 
Convention concluded between France and Belgium on jurisdiction and the validity and 
enforcement of judgments, arbitration awards and authentic instruments, signed at Paris 
on 8 July 1899; 
Convention concluded between Belgium and the Netherlands jurisdiction, bankruptcy, and the 
validity and enforcement of judgments, arbitration awards and authentic instruments, 
signed at Brussels on 28 March 1925; 
Convention concluded between France and Italy on the enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters, signed at Rome on 3 June 1930; 
Convention concluded between Germany and Italy on the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters, signed at Rome on 9 March 1936; 
Convention concluded between Germany and Belgium on the mutual recognition and 
enforcement of judgments, arbitration awards and authentic instruments in civil and 
commercial matters, signed at Bonn on 30 June 1958; 
Convention concluded between Italy and the Netherlands on the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in civil and commercial matters, signed at Rome on 17 April 1959; 
Convention concluded between Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg on jurisdiction, 
bankruptcy, and the validity and enforcement of judgments, arbitration awards and 
authentic instruments, signed at Brussels on 24 November 1961; 
Convention concluded between Belgium and Italy on the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments and other enforceable instruments in civil and commercial matters, signed at 
Rome on 6 April 1962; 
Convention concluded between Germany and the Netherlands on the mutual recognition and 
enforcement of judgments and other enforceable instruments in civil and commercial 
matters, signed at The Hague on 30 August 1962; 
4.2.  Multilateral Conventions 
Convention of 15 June 1955 on the law applicable to international sales of goods; 
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Convention of 15 April 1958 on the jurisdiction of the selected forum in the case of 
international sales of goods; 
Convention of 5 October 1961 concerning the powers of authorities and the law applicable in 
respect of the protection of infants; 
Convention of 25 November 1965 on the Choice of Court; 
Convention of 1 June 1970 on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations; 
Convention of 1 February 1971 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters; 
Convention of 14 March 1978 on the Law Applicable to Matrimonial Property Regimes; 
Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
- Done at Lugano on 16 September 1988, (88/592/EEC), OJ L 319, 25 November 1988; 
Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement 
and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection 
of Children; 
Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters, OJ L 339, 21 December 2007; 
Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements; 
Hague Convention of 23 November 2007 on the International Recovery of Child Support and 
Other Forms of Family Maintenance; 
Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts adopted in 1994 
in Mexico; 
4.3.  Preliminary Documents of the Hague Conference of Private International Law 
Prel. Doc. No 17 of May 1992 in Proceedings of the Seventeenth Session (1993), Vol I, 231 – 
Some reflections of the Permanent Bureau on a general convention on enforcement of 
judgments; 
Prel. Doc. No 19 of November 1992 - Proceedings of the Seventeenth Session (1993), Vol I – 
Conclusions of the Working Group meeting on enforcement of judgments; 
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Prel. Doc. No 12 of August 1996 - Proceedings of the Nineteenths Session (1996), Vol 1 – 
Miscellaneous matters 
Prel. Doc. No. 11 of August 2000- - Report on the preliminary draft Convention on 
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, drawn up by 
Peter Nygh and Fausto Pocar; 
Interim Text - Summary of the Outcome of the Discussion in Commission II of the First Part 
of the Diplomatic Conference (6-22 June 2001), prepared by the Permanent Bureau and 
the Co-reporters; 
Prel. Doc. No 16 of February 2002 - Some reflections on the present state of negotiations on 
the judgments project in the context of the future work programme of the Conference; 
Prel. Doc. No 22 of June 2003 Report on the work of the Informal Working Group on the 
Judgments Project, in particular a text achieved at its third meeting of March 2003; 
Prel. Doc. No 25 of March 2004 - Explanatory Report on the Preliminary Draft Convention 
on Choice of Court Agreements, drawn up by Trevor C. Hartley and Masato Dogauchi; 
Minutes No. 3 of the Second Commission Meeting of Wednesday 15 June 2005, Proceedings 
of the Twentieth Session; 
Prel. Doc. No 5 of January 2017 - Suggested Further Work in Support of Forum and Law 
Selection in International Commercial Contracts; 
5. Official Reports and External Studies to the EU and International Legal Acts 
P. Bellet, B. Goldman. Explanatory Report on the 1970 Hague Divorce Convention, HCCH 
Publications, 1970; 
Report by Mr P. Jenard on the Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ C 59, 5 March 1979; 
Report by Professor Dr Peter Schlosser on the Convention of 9 October 1978 on the 
Association of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters and to the Protocol on its interpretation by 
the Court of Justice, OJ C 59, 5 March 1979; 
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Report on the Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations by Mario Giuliano, 
Professor, University of Milan, and Paul Lagarde, Professor, University of Paris I, 31 
October 1980, OJ C 282; 
Report on the accession of the Hellenic Republic to the Community Convention on 
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ C 
298, 24 November 1986; 
Report by Mr de Almeida Cruz, Mr Desantes Real and Mr Jenard on the Convention on the 
accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic to the 1968 Brussels 
Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters, OJ C 189, 28 July 1990;  
Report by Mr P. Jenard and Mr G. Möller on the Convention on jurisdiction and the 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters done at Lugano on 16 
September 1988, OJ C 189, 28 July 1990; 
Explanatory Report on the Convention, drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on 
European Union, on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in 
Matrimonial Matters (approved by the Council on 28 May 1998) prepared by Dr 
Alegría Borrás Professor of Private International Law University of Barcelona, OJ C 
221, 16 July 1998; 
P. Lagarde, Explanatory Report on the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention, HCCH 
Publications, 1998; 
Explanatory Memorandum on the Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) on jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 
COM(1999) 348 final, 14 July 1999; 
Study to inform a subsequent Impact Assessment on the Commission proposal on jurisdiction 
and applicable law in divorce matters, Draft Final Report to the European Commission 
DG Justice, Freedom and Security, European Policy Evaluation Consortium, 2006; 
A. Nuyts, Study on Residual Jurisdiction (Review of the Member States' Rules Concerning 
the ‘Residual Jurisdiction’ of Their Courts in Civil and Commercial Matters Pursuant to 
the Brussels I and II Regulations), 6 July 2007; 
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Study to Inform an Impact Assessment on the Ratification of the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements by the European Community, Directorate-General Justice, 
Freedom and Security, Final Report submitted by GHK, 7 December 2007; 
Study JLS/C4/2005/03, Report on the Application of Regulation Brussels I in the Member 
States, presented by B. Hess, T. Pfeiffer, P. Schlosser, 2007; 
Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters, signed in Lugano on 30 October 2007 - Explanatory report by 
Professor Fausto Pocar (Holder of the Chair of International Law at the University of 
Milan), OJ C 319, 23 December 2009; 
Comments on the European Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and 
enforcement of decisions and authentic instruments in matters of succession and the 
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